Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs filed a civil complaint against The Power Company, Inc. (“TPCI”) and TPCI’s president, Rick Rizzolo. Less than five years after Plaintiffs filed their action, they entered into a settlement agreement with TPCI and Rizzolo providing that Plaintiffs would receive $9 million upon the sale of Crazy Horse Too, which TPCI owned. More than five years after Plaintiffs filed their complaint, TPCI and Rizzolo filed two motions to dismiss Plaintiffs’ action under Nev. R. Civ. P. 41(e) for want of prosecution. The district court denied the motions. After the Crazy Horse Too sold at a foreclosure sale, Plaintiffs filed a third motion to reduce the settlement agreement to judgment. The district court granted the motion. TPCI and Rizzolo appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Rule 41(e)’s provision requiring dismissal for want of prosecution does not apply to an action in which the parties enter into a binding settlement agreement before Rule 41(e)’s five-year deadline has expires, and therefore, the district court properly denied TPCI and Rizzolo’s motions to dismiss for want of prosecution; and (2) the district court did not err in reducing the parties’ settlement agreement to judgment. View "The Power Co., Inc. v. Henry" on Justia Law

Michael Crawford sued defendants Alex Jordan, Morris Transportation, and Custom Sign Company (Custom) based on a motor vehicle accident. Initially, Crawford filed a petition to perpetuate testimony to depose Jordan and Morris Transportation in an attempt to identify any additional defendants. The case was removed to federal court. After removal, Crawford filed a complaint in federal court. Crawford subsequently was granted leave from the federal court to file a complaint in the Circuit Court of Coahoma County against Jordan, Morris, and Custom. The case was later dismissed by the federal court based on premature removal since removal occurred before Crawford had filed a complaint. Thereafter, Crawford filed an amended complaint in circuit court, styled as a separate cause of action. Defendants then moved to have both the original complaint and first amended complaint dismissed based on the argument that the federal-court action was dismissed rather than remanded, which would bar Crawford from proceeding on either complaint in circuit court. Alternatively, Defendants asserted that the suit was barred by the general three-year statute of limitations. Defendants also alleged that the one-year savings statue did not apply because the federal court granted Crawford's voluntary motion to dismiss, which was not a dismissal for a matter of form in accordance with Mississippi Code Section 15-1-69. The trial court granted Defendants' motion to dismiss with prejudice, and Crawford appealed. The Supreme Court reversed the dismissal, finding that the federal court's dismissal was for a matter of form (lack of subject-matter jurisdiction). The Mississippi Supreme Court also found that the original complaint filed during Crawford's leave from federal court was a nullity, since the case ultimately was dismissed rather than remanded by the federal court. Nevertheless, the first amended complaint was filed after the federal court's dismissal; therefore, it was deemed valid and timely filed within one year after the dismissal; thus the savings statute applied. Accordingly, the case was remanded. On remand, Crawford settled with Jordan and Morris Transportation. Custom filed its answer and motion for summary judgment, submitting that Crawford's claims were barred by the statute of repose. The trial court granted Custom's motion based on the statute of repose being applicable. Crawford unsuccessfully moved for reconsideration, and thereafter appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing: (1) the statute of repose does not apply in this case; or alternatively, (2) Custom waived the right to such defense. Finding this cause of action should be reversed and remanded for further factual determinations regarding the applicability of the statute of repose, the Supreme Court concluded the trial court erred in granting summary judgment when genuine issues of material fact existed and needed resolution before ruling out the statute of repose argument. View "Crawford v. Custom Sign Company" on Justia Law

The trial court granted plaintiff Karen Richardson’s motion to reinstate a negligence action arising out of a 2001 automobile accident involving a truck owned by defendant Entergy Mississippi, Inc. Richardson’s action had been dismissed for failure to prosecute. Upon review of the appeal, the Supreme Court found that the trial court erred in granting the motion to reinstate. While the statute of limitations did not operate to preclude an evaluation of the merits for equitable relief under Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b), no valid Rule 60(b) grounds existed for granting relief from the dismissal of the action. The case was appropriately dismissed for failure to prosecute and no extraordinary circumstances were present to justify reinstatement. The judgment of the Circuit Court granting reinstatement was therefore reversed and the case dismissed without prejudice. View "Entergy Mississippi, Inc. v. Richardson" on Justia Law

Appellant Marvin Morgan appealed the dismissal of his wrongful death action, as well as an order imposing sanctions against him and his former attorney. Morgan asserted that he was entitled to special and general damages as a result of the wrongful death of his wife, Ella Morgan. In January of 2004, Mrs. Morgan underwent testing at the Idaho Heart Institute in Idaho Falls. After reviewing Mrs. Morgan’s test results, Dr. John Chambers recommended that she return for an angiogram. The Morgans expected that Dr. Chambers would perform the angiogram. Mr. Morgan drove Mrs. Morgan to the Idaho Heart Institute for her scheduled angiogram. Morgan asserts that it was not Dr. Chambers who performed the angiogram, but Dr. Michael Demos, a doctor who neither of the Morgans had ever met. Morgan alleged that Dr. Demos negligently performed the angiogram, "causing a dissection and damage to Mrs. Morgan’s heart and right coronary artery, creating a medical emergency which then necessitated a high-risk medical procedure in an attempt to repair the damage." Mrs. Morgan passed away on February 24, 2004, purportedly because of complications resulting from the angiogram performed by Dr. Demos. The case sat "dormant for a remarkable twenty one months." Due to the inactivity, Mr. Morgan's son filed notice of substitution of counsel, then attempted to reopen the case. Morgan's motion to reopen was ultimately denied, and the case dismissed with prejudice. The Supreme Court concluded the district court did not abuse its discretion for dismissing the case without prejudice, but vacated the sanction against Morgan's former counsel. View "Morgan v. Demos" on Justia Law

Denver police arrested Marvin Booker on a warrant for failure to appear at a hearing regarding a drug charge. During booking, Booker died while in custody after officers restrained him in response to alleged insubordination. Several officers pinned Booker face-down to the ground, one placed him in a chokehold, and another tased him. The officers sought medical help for Booker, but he could not be revived. Booker’s estate sued Deputies Faun Gomez, James Grimes, Kyle Sharp, Kenneth Robinette, and Sergeant Carrie Rodriguez, alleging they used excessive force and failed to provide Booker with immediate medical care. Defendants moved for summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds. The district court denied their motion because disputed facts precluded summary judgment. The Defendants appealed, but finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed. View "Estate of Marvin L. Booker, et al v. Gomez, et al" on Justia Law

Attorney represented Plaintiff in a negligence lawsuit against Defendant. After a jury trial, the district court entered judgment in favor of Plaintiff. Attorney subsequently made an oral motion for payment of attorney fees and costs in the underlying negligence lawsuit. The district court granted the motion. The Supreme Court vacated the district court’s order granting Attorney’s oral motion and dismissed Plaintiff’s appeal because (1) Attorney never filed a petition in intervention, and therefore, at the time of his oral motion, Attorney was not a party to the suit; (2) furthermore, Attorney stated at the time he made his motion that he no longer represented Plaintiff; and (3) therefore, the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to decide Attorney’s oral motion for payment. View "Wisniewski v. Heartland Towing, Inc." on Justia Law

This case arose from a malfunctioning HVAC system installed in a new building owned by Caduceus Properties. Caduceus sued Michael Gordon, the building architect, and Gordon initiated a third-party action against KTD Consulting Engineers and William Graney, who designed the HVAC system. The third-party claims were dismissed. After the statute of limitations governing Caduceus’ original action had expired, Caduceus successfully amended its complaint to name third-party defendants, KTD and Graney, as party defendants to the action. The trial court ruled against KTD and Graney. The court of appeal reversed, holding that the amended complaint did not relate back and was barred by the statute of limitations. The Supreme Court remanded, holding (1) an amended complaint, filed after the statute of limitations has expired, that names a party who had previously been made a third-party defendant as a party defendant, relates back under Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.190(c) to the filing of the third-party complaint; and (2) for the amended pleading to be timely in this situation, the third-party complaint must have been filed prior to the expiration of the statute of limitations, and the plaintiff’s claims in the amended complaint must arise from the same conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth in the third-party complaint. View "Caduceus Props., LLC v. William G. Graney, P.E." on Justia Law

Walden, a Georgia police officer working as a DEA agent at a Georgia airport, searched plaintiffs and seized a large amount of cash. Plaintiffs claim that after they returned to their Nevada residence, Walden helped draft a false probable cause affidavit in support of forfeiture and forwarded it to a Georgia office of the U.S. Attorney. No forfeiture complaint was filed and the funds were returned. Plaintiffs filed a tort suit in a Nevada District Court. The district court dismissed, finding that the Georgia search and seizure did not establish a basis for personal jurisdiction in Nevada. The Ninth Circuit reversed, reasoning that Walden submitted the affidavit with the knowledge that it would affect persons with significant Nevada connections. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court lacked personal jurisdiction over Walden. The Due Process Clause limits state authority to bind a nonresident defendant to a judgment of its courts, requiring that the nonresident have “certain minimum contacts” with the forum state. For a state to exercise jurisdiction consistent with due process, a relationship must arise out of contacts that the defendant himself created with the forum itself, not with persons residing there. The plaintiff cannot be the only link between the defendant and the forum. Walden lacks those “minimal contacts” with Nevada. None of his conduct occurred in Nevada, and he formed no jurisdictionally relevant contacts with that forum. Mere injury to a forum resident is not a sufficient connection to the forum. The injury occurred in Nevada simply because that is where plaintiffs chose to be when they desired to use the seized funds. The Court also rejected an argument based on the origin of the funds. View "Walden v. Fiore" on Justia Law