Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs filed a wrongful death suit against Illinois Central for the death of their father. The case was dismissed because the three-year statute of limitations had run. Plaintiffs appealed, claiming that the statute of limitations had not expired, because it was tolled while the first suit, filed by the plaintiffs’ mother, was pending. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of the case on the grounds that, because the doctrine of equitable tolling did not apply, the statute of limitations had expired by the time plaintiffs filed the second complaint. View "Burch v. Illinois Central Railroad Company" on Justia Law

The European Community filed suit against RJR, alleging that RJR directed, managed, and controlled a global money-laundering scheme with organized crime groups in violation of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) statute, 18 U.S.C. 1961 et seq., laundered money through New York-based financial institutions and repatriated the profits of the scheme to the United States, and committed various common law torts in violation of New York state law. The court concluded that the district court erred in dismissing the federal and state law claims; the court disagreed with the district court's conclusion that RICO cannot apply to a foreign enterprise or to extraterritorial conduct; the court concluded that, with respect to a number of offenses that constitute predicates for RICO liability and were alleged in this case, Congress had clearly manifested an intent that they apply extraterritorially; and, as to the other alleged offenses, the Complaint alleged sufficiently important domestic activity to come within RICO's coverage. The court also concluded that the district court erred in ruling that the European Community's participation as a plaintiff in this lawsuit destroyed complete diversity; the European Community is an "agency or instrumentality of a foreign state" under 28 U.S.C. 1603(b) and therefore, qualified as a "foreign state" for purposes of 28 U.S.C. 1332(a)(4); and its suit against "citizens of a State or of different States" came within the diversity jurisdiction. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded for further proceedings. View "European Community v. RJR Nabisco, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a complaint against Metropolitan Property and Casualty Insurance Company and other defendants, alleging multiple counts. A jury found Defendants liable for abuse of process and awarded compensatory and punitive damages against each defendant. On May 31, 2012, judgments were entered against Defendants. On August 31, 2012, Metropolitan filed an appeal from the May 31, 2012 judgment, and on September 18, 2012, Plaintiff filed a notice of cross-appeal from the May 31, 2012 judgment. Metropolitan moved to dismiss Plaintiff’s cross-appeal, arguing that it was untimely because it was not filed within the initial twenty-day appeal period that began to run after entry of the August 20, 2012 orders. The trial justice denied Metropolitan’s motion to dismiss, concluding that Plaintiff’s cross-appeal was timely because it was filed within twenty days of Metropolitan’s August 31, 2012 notice of appeal. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Plaintiff’s September 18, 2012 notice of cross-appeal was timely because it was filed within the twenty-day period triggered by Metropolitan’s August 31, 2012 notice of appeal. View "Miller v. Metro. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Mary Berryhill sued Frances Synatzke, alleging that Synatzke was responsible for a car accident between Berryhill and Synatzke. Berryhill also sued seventy John Does, including a John Doe that was designated to represent the estate of any defendant who predeceased the service of the complaint. At the time the complaint was filed, however, Synatzke had died. After the statute of limitations had passed, Berryhill filed an amended complaint naming Synatzke’s estate as a party. The estate filed a motion for summary judgment asserting that the original complaint was a nullity because Synatzke had died prior to the filing of the original complaint, and therefore, the complaint could not be transformed into a valid suit by amending the complaint after the statute of limitations had passed. The circuit court granted summary judgment for the estate. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) because the identity of the tortfeasor, the estate, was unknown to Berryhill at the time she filed her original complaint, Ark. Code Ann. 16-56-125 was applicable to her claim and tolled the statute of limitations; and (2) because there was a valid pleading to relate back to, the real party, the estate, could be substituted for the John Doe defendant in the original complaint. View "Berryhill v. Synatzske" on Justia Law

This case had its origins in a property damage action brought by Jason and Gina Corrick against B&B Transit, Inc. B&B Transit filed a notice and coverage claim with its insurer, Montpelier US Insurance Company. Montpelier eventually settled the case against B&B Transit. While the Corricks’ complaint was still pending, Respondents, including B&B Transit, filed a first-party bad faith claim against Petitioners, including Montpelier and its national coverage counsel, Charlston, Revich & Wollitz (“CRW”). Respondents subsequently served discovery requests on Petitioners. After CRW opposed disclosure of certain requested documents, Respondents filed a motion to compel disclosure of the documents. The circuit court entered an order requiring CRW to disclose certain documents. Petitioners sought a writ of prohibition to prevent enforcement of the circuit court’s discovery order. The Supreme Court granted the writ of prohibition as moulded, concluding that part of the circuit court’s order permitting discovery of documents sought by Respondents was prohibited from enforcement because the documents were protected under the attorney-client privilege. View "State ex rel. Montpelier US Ins. Co. v. Hon. Bloom" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was N.Y. C.P.L.R. 3101(a)(4), which allows a party to obtain discovery from a nonparty. John Kapon was the CEO of Acker, Merrall & Condit Company (AMC), a retailer and auctioneer of fine and rare wines, and the employer of Justin Christoph. In 2008, William Koch commenced an action against AMC in Supreme Court concerning alleged counterfeit wine that Rudy Kurniawan had consigned to AMC and that AMC had sold to Koch. In 2009, Koch commenced a fraud action in California against Kurniawan, alleging that Kurniawan had sold Respondent counterfeit wine through AMC’s auctions and sales. In 2012, Koch, seeking disclosure in the California action, served subpoenas on Kapon and Christoph (together, Petitioners). Petitioners filed motions to quash the subpoena, which Supreme Court denied. The Appellate Division affirmed, concluding that Petitioners failed to show that the requested deposition testimony was irrelevant to the prosecution of the California action. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the subpoenas satisfied the notice requirement of section 3101(a)(4); and (2) in moving to quash the subpoena, Petitioners failed to meet their burden of establishing that their deposition testimonies were irrelevant to the California action. View "Kapon v. Koch" on Justia Law

Appellant, on behalf of her daughter, Sarah, filed a wrongful death action under Nev. REv. Stat. 41.085(4) against Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. after Sarah’s father was fatally assaulted in a Wal-Mart parking lot. The district court dismissed Plaintiff’s action against Wal-Mart, concluding that claim preclusion barred the case because the decedent’s estate, along with three of the decedent’s heirs, had already filed a wrongful death lawsuit under 41.085(5) against Wal-Mart and lost. The Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal but on issue preclusion grounds, holding that Appellant was barred from relitigating the issue of Wal-Mart’s negligence because it had already been established, in the case brought by the estate on her behalf, that Wal-Mart was not negligent and thus, not liable. View "Alcantara v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc." on Justia Law

Saul Morales was fleeing from the police when one of the police officers left his Ford vehicle, then pursued and apprehended Morales. The officer’s vehicle began rolling backward toward the pair while the officer attempted to handcuff Morales. The vehicle ran over and came to rest on top of Morales, injuring him. Morales sued Ford Motor Company and the car’s seller (collectively, “Ford”), alleging that the vehicle had a design defect. After deposing two of Ford’s expert witnesses, Morales sought to depose a corporate representative of each expert’s employer to expose potential bias. The Supreme Court conditionally granted mandamus relief, holding that on the facts of this case, the Rules of Civil Procedure did not permit such discovery. View "In re Ford Motor Co. & Ken Stoepel Ford, Inc." on Justia Law

Crosstex Energy Services, LP hired Pro Plus, Inc. as the principal contractor to construct a natural gas compression station. Crosstex sued Pro Plus after an explosion occurred at the station, causing $10 million in property damage. The parties entered an agreement to move expert designation dates beyond the limitations period, but after limitations ran, Pro Plus filed a motion to dismiss because Crosstex had not filed a certificate of merit with its original petition as required by Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. 150.002. The trial court denied the motion and granted Crosstex an extension to file the certificate. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the court of appeals did not err in asserting jurisdiction over Pro Plus’s interlocutory appeal of the extension order; (2) section 150.002’s “good cause” extension is available only when a party filed suit within ten days of the end of the limitations period, and therefore, Crosstex could not claim protection from the good cause extension; and (3) a defendant’s conduct can waive the plaintiff’s certificate of merit requirement, but Pro Plus’s conduct did not constitute waiver. View "Crosstex Energy Servs. L.P. v. Pro Plus, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed tort claims against Mine Safety Appliances Company (“MSA”). Plaintiffs settled with MSA under settlement agreements that assigned to Plaintiffs the right to recover the remainder of the settlement amount under an insurance policy that North River Insurance Company sold to MSA. MSA then amended their complaints to add claims against North River, and MSA filed cross-claims against North River. In the meantime, earlier-filed litigation between North River and MSA was pending in Pennsylvania and Delaware. North River filed a motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, motion for a stay of the proceedings, arguing that West Virginia was an inconvenient forum and the proceedings should be dismissed pending resolution of the out-of-state litigation. The circuit court denied the motions. The Supreme Court denied the writ of prohibition subsequently sought by North River, holding that the circuit court did not err in (1) denying North River’s motion to dismiss where strong deference was according to Plaintiffs’ choice of forum and considerations relevant to a forum non conveniens analysis suggest no basis for dismissal of the action; and (2) denying the motion to stay the proceedings, as it would be unfair and prejudicial to Plaintiffs to delay the trials unnecessarily. View "State ex rel. N. River Ins. Co. v. Circuit Court" on Justia Law