Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Injury Law
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Plaintiff worked as a service dog trainer but was not disabled. Plaintiff filed a lawsuit against Drake University Law School, where she was a student, alleging that Drake barred her from bringing with her a dog she was training into the classroom and to another event in violation of Iowa Code 216C.11(2). The district court granted Drake’s motion to dismiss after applying the four-factor test adopted from Cort v. Ash for determining whether an Iowa statute provides an implied private right of action, concluding that section 216C.11(2) creates no private enforcement action. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court, holding that, under an application of the Cort factors, section 216C.11(2) does not provide a service dog trainer with a private right to sue. View "Shumate v. Drake Univ." on Justia Law

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Jessica Milwicz negligently rear-ended a vehicle driven by Justin Pralle. Pralle sued. Milwicz admitted negligence but argued that she had not caused Pralle’s injuries. A jury agreed with her, and judgment was entered in Milwicz’s favor. Pralle appealed, arguing that the verdict was not supported by the evidence and that the superior court abused its discretion in its refusal to excuse several jurors for cause and its admission of expert testimony. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment. View "Pralle v. Milwicz" on Justia Law

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Tommie Patterson’s vehicle was struck from behind when he braked to avoid a car stalled in his lane of travel. He sued the owner of the stalled vehicle and subpoenaed her for trial, but she refused to appear. The Supreme Court concluded that the superior court should have issued a warrant or an order to show cause to compel the appearance of this party. In addition, the superior court instructed the jury on Patterson’s products liability claim against Ford Motor Company (manufacturer of Patterson's vehicle), but this claim was erroneously omitted from the special verdict form. Therefore, the Court reversed the superior court’s judgment and remanded this case for a new trial. View "Patterson v. Cox" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court granted the writ application in this case to answer the question of whether a one-year time period for instituting a survival action pursuant to La. Civ. Code art. 2315.1, particularly as amended by Acts 1986, No. 211, section 2, was prescriptive, within the meaning of La. Civ. Code art. 3447, or is peremptive, within the meaning of La. Civ. Code art. 3458. The trial court granted the defendants’ peremptory exceptions of peremption and no cause of action. The trial court found the plaintiff’s survival action was extinguished because it was perempted, having been filed more than one year from the date of the decedent’s death. The court of appeal reversed, finding the one-year period for bringing the survival action is a period of liberative prescription rather than a period of peremption. The court of appeal then remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeal’s decision. View "Watkins v. Exxon Mobil Corporation" on Justia Law

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Plaintiffs filed suit, individually and per proxima amici, against numerous defendants, alleging, inter alia, negligence, lack of informed consent, and vicarious liability for injuries sustained by their minor daughter, Yendee, who was born with a genetic blood disorder. Four groups of defendants filed motions to dismiss on the grounds that R.I. Gen. Laws 9-1-14.1(1), an act that tolls the three-year statute of limitations for medical malpractice claims when the person claiming injury is a minor, barred Plaintiffs’ claims. The trial justice entered judgment in favor of Defendants, concluding that all of Plaintiffs’ claims were time-barred but that Yendee retained the right to bring suit on her own behalf when she reached the age of majority, and up to three years thereafter. After issuing an order to show cause, the Supreme Court (1) vacated the judgments entered in favor of defendants Corning Incorporated and Quest Diagnostics, LLC because Plaintiffs’ allegations against these defendants were not medical malpractice claims; and (2) directed that Plaintiffs’ appeal, as well as the appeals and cross-appeals of Rhode Island Hospital, Miriam Hospital, Women & Infants Hospital and each hospital’s associated medical professionals, be assigned to the Court’s regular calendar for further briefing and argument. View "Ho-Rath v. R.I. Hosp." on Justia Law

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Respondent-claimant, Ben Snell was employed by petitioner-employer Kentucky Fried Chicken of McAlester. He alleged that while at work he slipped and fell while carrying a tray of chicken weighing approximately 40 to 50 pounds. The trial court awarded claimant temporary total disability (TTD) and reasonable and necessary medical treatment for injuries to his neck, the second finger of his right hand, and aggravation of pre-existing conditions to his left knee and low back. All other issues were reserved. On appeal, the Court of Civil Appeals (COCA) sustained the award. In its opinion, COCA ruled the standard of review in this case was the "any competent evidence" standard because of a holding in a previous opinion by the same division, "Westoak Industries, Inc. v. DeLeon," which held 85 O.S. 2011 sec. 340(D)(4), setting out "against the clear weight of the evidence" as the appellate standard of review in workers' compensation cases, constituted a violation of the separation of powers provision of the Oklahoma Constitution. Westoak was completely at odds with another COCA opinion, "Harvey v. Auto Plus of Woodward." "Harvey" held section 340(D)(4) was not unconstitutional as a separation of powers violation. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider the issue as one of first impression since certiorari was not sought in either of the previous cases. The Court concluded that there was no constitutional separation of powers prohibition in in the Okla.Const., art IV, section 1 against the Legislature's adoption of the "against the clear weight of the evidence" standard of review in 85 O.S. 2011 sec. 340(D)(4). COCA's opinion was therefore vacated. Because "Westoak" and "Harvey" were totally inconsistent with the views expressed in this opinion, they were both specifically overruled. View "Kentucky Fried Chicken of McAlester v. Snell" on Justia Law

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Sixteen years ago Carolyn Bayless began to suffer from a mysterious illness. As her condition deteriorated, she sought to learn what caused (and how to treat) her illness. In 2008, convinced that she was the victim of exposure to nerve gas emitted by an Army testing facility, she filed a claim under the Federal Tort Claims Act. When this lawsuit followed in 2009, the Army responded that she knew of her claim by at least 2005 and had waited too long to assert it. The district court agreed and granted summary judgment dismissing the case. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit concluded that under the "unusual circumstances presented here," the period of limitation did not accrue until February 2007. Therefore, the Court reversed. View "Bayless v. United States, et al" on Justia Law

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Plaintiffs, machinists at Pearl Harbor, filed suit against defendants under state tort law on the theory that defendants failed to warn them of the hazards posed by asbestos used in and around equipment defendants sold to the Navy. Defendant Crane removed the actions to federal court under the federal removal statute, 28 U.S.C. 1442. The district court denied plaintiffs' motions to remand to state court and certified their orders for interlocutory appeal. The federal officer removal statute authorizes removal of a civil action brought against any person "acting under" an officer of the United States "for or relating to any act under color of such office." In this instance, Crane established that it is a "person" within the meaning of the statute, a causal nexus exists between plaintiffs' claims and the actions Crane took under the federal officer's direction, and it has a "colorable" federal defense to plaintiffs' claims. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's orders. View "Leite v. Crane Co." on Justia Law

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Plaintiff filed a health care liability action against Defendant-health care providers. Six days before filing his complaint, Defendant sent a pre-suit notice of his potential claim to each Defendant by certified mail, return receipt requested, as permitted by Tenn. Code Ann. 29-26-121(a)(1). Defendants filed a motion to dismiss on the basis that Plaintiff failed to file with his complaint an affidavit of the person who had sent the pre-suit notice by certified mail. The trial court dismissed the complaint. The court of appeals affirmed but noted the harsh results strict compliance produces in cases such as this one where no prejudice is alleged. The Supreme Court reversed and reinstated the complaint, holding (1) the statutory requirement that an affidavit of the person who sent the pre-suit notice by certified mail be filed with the complaint may be satisfied by substantial compliance; and (2) Plaintiff substantially complied with the statute in this case. View "Thurmond v. Mid-Cumberland Infectious Disease Consultants, PLC " on Justia Law

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The issue in this mandamus proceeding was whether the trial court correctly denied defendants' motion to change venue. Plaintiffs, a husband and wife, initiated a medical malpractice action against defendants in Multnomah County. Defendants argued that venue was in Clackamas County, because that was where the clinic was located, where the doctor who provided the husband's medical services resided, and where the husband received treatment. Plaintiffs argued that venue is proper in Multnomah County, because defendants solicited patients who lived in that county, referred patients to imaging facilities in that county, used medical education programs in that county, and "identified" the clinic's location in its website as the "Portland area." The trial court denied defendants' motion, explaining that defendants, by soliciting patients in Multnomah County, "purposely availed themselves of the court's jurisdiction" in that county. The Supreme Court concluded that the trial court mistakenly conflated personal jurisdiction considerations with the statutory requirements for venue and erred in denying defendants' motion. The Court therefore granted defendants relief and granted the writ. View "Kohring v. Ballard" on Justia Law