Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Carl McIntyre, Destiny McIntyre (through her guardian ad litem), Theresa McIntyre, and My Jeweler, Inc. appealed a judgment entered on a jury verdict in favor of The Colonies-Pacific, LLC. Colonies owns the Colonies Crossroads shopping center in Upland. The common areas of the shopping center were under Colonies's exclusive control, but maintenance expenses were chargeable to tenants on a pro rata basis. Initially, Colonies did not budget anything for security services. McIntyre owned a jewelry business called My Jeweler. In January 2006, two stores in Colonies Crossroads were robbed at gunpoint, eight days apart. In May 2006, there was a shoplifting incident at another store, which police reportedly classified as a robbery because it resulted in a physical altercation in which the perpetrator pulled out a knife. After the first two robberies, McIntyre expressed concern several times about the lack of security to Leanne Meissner, an employee of Colonies's property management company. Meissner reported the robberies to her superior, but Colonies decided not to provide security or seek anchor tenants' approval of an expense for security. Rather, Colonies asked the Upland Police Department to "step up the patrol through the center" because it believed "the police are much more capable than the . . . private security force." McIntyre took his then 14-year-old daughter, Destiny, to work with him at the Colonies Crossroads store on summer morning in 2006. Shortly after the store opened, three men entered. Despite offering his cooperation, the men severely pistol whipped McIntyre, and one of them tied up Destiny and held a gun to her head. The men shattered glass display cases and stole jewelry, cash and digital security recording equipment. After this robbery, Colonies hired a security service to provide an unarmed guard to patrol the common areas of the shopping center. The McIntyres sued Colonies for negligence and premises liability, a species of negligence. At the beginning of trial, Colonies brought a motion in limine under section 1151 to exclude evidence of subsequent remedial measures. The McIntyres argued section 1151 was inapplicable because they did not intend to use the evidence to show Colonies was negligent by breaching its duty of care, but rather to show the lack of a security patrol was the cause of the robbery. The McIntyres contended the trial court abused its discretion by excluding the evidence. Alternatively, the McIntyres contended the court abused its discretion by not admitting the evidence as rebuttal to a comment Colonies's attorney made during opening statement. The Court of Appeal found no abuse of discretion and affirmed the judgment.View "McIntyre v. The Colonies-Pacific" on Justia Law

Bristol-Myers Squibb (BMS) was sued in a coordinated proceeding before the San Francisco Superior Court for alleged defects in Plavix, a drug BMS manufactures and sells throughout the country. BMS moved below to quash service of the summons regarding the complaints concerning plaintiffs who are not California residents, for lack of personal jurisdiction. The trial court denied BMS’s motion, finding that California had general jurisdiction over BMS, and did not address the issue of specific jurisdiction. Following the U.S. Supreme Court’s ruling in Daimler AG v. Bauman (2014) which limited the application of general jurisdiction under the Fourteenth Amendment, the California Supreme Court remanded to the court of appeals, which affirmed denial of the motion to quash. California does not have general jurisdiction over BMS in this case, but, applying the International Shoe Co. v. Washington test of “fair play and substantial justice,” the court reasoned that BMS has engaged in substantial, continuous economic activity in California, including the sale of more than a billion dollars of Plavix to Californians. That activity is substantially connected to claims by non-residents, which are based on the same alleged wrongs as those alleged by California-resident plaintiffs. BMS has not established that it would be unreasonable to assert jurisdiction over it. View "Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

After Loren Collin was diagnosed with mesothelioma, he and his wife Verna Lee Collin sued 22 entities for negligence, strict liability, false representation, intentional tort/failure to warn, alter ego, and loss of consortium, alleging Loren was exposed to asbestos from the defendants' products or activities when he worked in various construction trades. Plaintiff appealed the grant of summary judgment in favor of four defendants: CalPortland Company, Kaiser Gypsum Company, Inc., J-M Manufacturing Company, Inc. (J-MM), and Formosa Plastics Corporation USA, named as an alter ego of J-MM. Plaintiff argued those defendants did not show that plaintiff did not possess and could not reasonably obtain evidence of exposure to an asbestos-containing product for which defendants were responsible; but even if the burden shifted to plaintiff, the evidence was sufficient to support an inference of exposure. Plaintiff also claimed J-MM and Formosa did not establish that Loren was a sophisticated user who knew or should have known of the potential risks and dangers of using J-MM’s asbestos cement pipe. Upon review, the Court of Appeal concluded summary judgment was proper as to CalPortland and Kaiser Gypsum, because they met their initial burdens on summary judgment and the evidence and reasonable inferences would preclude a reasonable trier of fact from finding that Loren was exposed to one of their asbestos-containing products. With respect to J-MM and Formosa, however, summary judgment was not proper: the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiff, demonstrated a triable issue of fact as to whether Loren was exposed to asbestos from a J-MM product. In addition, J-MM and Formosa did not establish they were entitled to summary adjudication as a matter of law based on the sophisticated user defense. View "Collin v. CalPortland Co." on Justia Law

In 2008, Plaintiff and Defendant were involved in an automobile accident. In 2012, Plaintiff filed a complaint against Defendant alleging that Defendant’s negligent motor vehicle operation caused the collision, resulting in serious injury to Plaintiff. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss, alleging that Plaintiff’s action was barred by the statute of limitations. The district court agreed and granted Defendant’s motion to dismiss with prejudice. Plaintiff appealed, arguing that the district court’s consideration of evidence outside the pleadings converted Defendant’s motion to a summary judgment motion and that genuine issues of material fact precluded dismissal. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Defendant’s motion was converted to a summary judgment motion, but no issues of material fact precluded entry of the court’s order, and (2) the court properly denied Plaintiff’s assertion of equitable estoppel and correctly ruled that Plaintiff’s action was barred by the statute of limitations.View "Inman v. Boykin" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant-cross-appellee R.T. Vanderbilt Company, Inc. appealed a Superior Court judgment on a jury verdict of $2,864,583.33 plus interest to Plaintiff-appellees-cross-appellant Darcel Galliher, individually and on behalf of the Estate of Michael Galliher. The decedent, Michael Galliher, contracted and died from mesothelioma as a result of exposure to asbestos or asbestiform material while employed by Borg Warner at a bathroom fixtures facility. Vanderbilt provided industrial talc to Borg Warner, which was alleged to be the source of the substance that caused Michael's illness. At trial, Vanderbilt denied causation and claimed that Borg Warner was responsible because it did not operate the facility in a manner that was safe for employees like Michael. Vanderbilt argued: (1) the trial court erred when it failed to instruct the jury on the duty of care required of Borg Warner, as Michael's employer; and (2) the trial court erred when it failed to grant a new trial based on the admission of unreliable and inflammatory evidence that previously was ruled inadmissible. Galliher argued on cross-appeal that the trial court erred as a matter of law when it disallowed post-judgment interest for a certain period of months. The Supreme Court found that the trial court erred when it failed to provide any instruction to the jury on Borg Warner's duty of care to Michael, despite Vanderbilt's request that it do so. The trial court also abused its discretion when it denied Vanderbilt's motion for a new trial based upon the substantial prejudice resulting from the admission of evidence, not subject to cross-examination, that it had engaged in criminal conduct. Accordingly, the Court reversed the judgment and remanded for a new trial. View "R.T. Vanderbilt Company, Inc., v. Galliher, et al." on Justia Law

In this medical malpractice case, Vicki Wilkinson appealed the circuit court's dismissal of her civil action with prejudice based on the motions filed by respondents East Cooper Community Hospital, Inc., Carolina Aesthetic Plastic Surgery Institute, P.A., and Dr. Thomas Hahm. Wilkinson argued on appeal that the court erred in finding: (1) the statute of limitations was not tolled because she failed to file an expert witness affidavit contemporaneously with her Notice of Intent to File Suit ("NOI") pursuant to section 15-79-125 of the South Carolina Code; and (2) she failed to file her Complaint within the applicable statute of limitations given she did not contemporaneously file an expert witness affidavit with the Complaint or within forty-five days thereafter in accordance with section 15-36-100(C). This appeal implicated the Court of Appeals' decision in "Ranucci v. Crain," (723 S.E.2d 242 (Ct. App. 2012)) ("Ranucci I"). The Supreme Court reversed Ranucci I, holding that section 15-79-125(A) incorporatesdsection 15-36-100 in its entirety. Therefore, Wilkinson could invoke section 15-36-100(C)(1), which extended the time for filing the expert witness affidavit with her NOI and tolled the applicable statute of limitations. However, because the analysis in Ranucci II was limited to the dismissal of the pre-litigation NOI, it was not dispositive since this case involved the next procedural step in medical malpractice litigation. Accordingly, the circuit court's order was reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings. View "Wilkinson v. East Cooper Community Hospital" on Justia Law

Shannon Ranucci appealed the circuit court's order dismissing her medical malpractice case for failing to contemporaneously file an expert witness affidavit with her Notice of Intent to File Suit ("NOI") pursuant to section 15-79-125 of the South Carolina Code. Ranucci argued on appeal that the circuit court erred in finding the affidavit of her medical expert was not timely filed because section 15-79-125 incorporated section 15-36-100, which included a "safe harbor" provision that extends the time for filing the affidavit. The Court of Appeals, holding the pre-litigation filing requirement for a medical malpractice case found in section 15-79-125 incorporated only the parts of section 15-36-100 that related to the preparation and content of an expert's affidavit. The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals and remanded the case to the circuit court. The Court held that section 15-79-125(A) incorporated section 15-36-100 in its entirety. Thus, Ranucci could invoke section 15-36-100(C)(1), which extended the time for filing the expert witness affidavit and tolled the applicable statute of limitations. View "Ranucci v. Crain" on Justia Law

After the jury awarded damages to plaintiffs for their injuries resulting from a tractor-trailer accident, both parties appealed the trial court's orders. The court concluded that defendants' motion for a new trial and motion notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) were premature because they were filed before the case was fully decided. Accordingly, the court reversed the trial court's order as to those rulings. Further, the trial court's order striking the awards of noneconomic damages is nonappealable and defendants' appeal from the judgment is of no effect and must be dismissed because there is no judgment. The court also concluded that unpaid medical bills are not evidence of the reasonable value of the services provided, and no expert witness declaration is required for a treating physician offering an opinion based on facts acquired in the physician-patient relationship or otherwise acquired independently of the litigation, including, to the extent it is otherwise admissible, an opinion on reasonable value. View "Ochoa v. Dorado" on Justia Law

KDC had cash flow problems and, in 2004, hired Johnson. Johnson retained the law firm (GPM) of his acquaintance, Tenenbaum. GPM sent KDC an engagement letter that included conflict‐waiver language regarding Johnson and a company affiliated with Johnson. Johnson soon resigned and joined First Products. GPM resigned as KDC’s counsel. KDC filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy. Its assets were purchased at auction by First Products. No other bids were received; the bankruptcy court approved the sale. The bankruptcy was later converted to a Chapter 7 liquidation proceeding. The bankruptcy trustee hired Sullivan as special counsel. Sullivan had filed a shareholder derivative action before KDC filed for bankruptcy, alleging that directors and officers of KDC had conspired to defraud the company of its intellectual property by driving KDC out of business and purchasing its assets at bargain prices. In 2010, a Wisconsin state judge entered judgment, finding some defendants, including Johnson, had engaged in a civil conspiracy to defraud KDC and steal its assets. In 2012, KDC, through its bankruptcy trustee, brought claims against GPM, alleging involvement in the scheme to defraud KDC orchestrated by Johnson. On summary judgment, the district court determined that the remaining claims were barred by the six‐year Wisconsin statute of limitations because KDC was on notice of GPM’s alleged fraud by 2006, when Sullivan received KDC’s client file. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "KDC Foods, Inc. v. Gray, Plant, Mooty, Mooty & Bennett, P.C." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a wrongful death action against Union Pacific in state court after his parents were killed when a Union Pacific train derailed and caused a bridge to collapse. Union Pacific removed to federal court based on diversity jurisdiction where plaintiff's parents were domiciled in Illinois and Union Pacific is a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in Nebraska. On appeal, Union Pacific challenged the district court's grant of plaintiff's request for leave to amend his complaint to add claims against two Illinois residents. The court held that, because the order granting leave to amend can be reviewed in state court, mandamus relief is neither necessary nor appropriate. In this instance, Union Pacific's appeal and request for a writ of mandamus must be dismissed. View "Lindner v. Union Pacific Railroad Co." on Justia Law