Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries
Articles Posted in Injury Law
Western Horizons Living Centers v. Feland
Western Horizons sued Dakota Travel Nurse, a North Dakota corporation that contracts with healthcare facilities to provide licensed nursing staff, alleging Western Horizons and Dakota Travel Nurse entered a 2008 contract for Dakota Travel Nurse to provide licensed nursing staff for Western Horizons Care Center, a nursing home in Hettinger owned and operated by Western Horizons. Western Horizons claimed the parties' contract required Dakota Travel Nurse to "indemnify, hold harmless and defend Western Horizons against any and all claims, losses, demands, actions, administrative proceedings, liabilities and judgments, including reasonable attorneys fees, court[] costs and other expenses, arising from or associated with the action or inaction of [Dakota Travel Nurse] personnel." Western Horizons alleged Dakota Travel Nurse refused to defend or indemnify Western Horizons in a nursing home resident's prior lawsuit against Western Horizons for injuries allegedly arising from the actions or inactions of Dakota Travel Nurse personnel providing care to the resident at the time of his injury. Dakota Travel Nurse was not a party to the resident's prior lawsuit, and Dakota Travel Nurse refused Western Horizons' tender of a defense in that action. Western Horizons thereafter settled the resident's lawsuit and brought this action against Dakota Travel Nurse, seeking a monetary judgment equal to the amount paid to settle the resident's lawsuit, plus costs and reasonable attorney's fees incurred by Western Horizons in defense of that action. Western Horizons Living Centers petitioned the Supreme Court for a supervisory writ directing the district court to reverse an order compelling Western Horizons to answer discovery requests by Dakota Travel Nurse, Inc., for information involving a nursing home resident's prior lawsuit against Western Horizons. Western Horizons argued that its insurer's claims file in the prior lawsuit was protected by the lawyer-client privilege and that settlement negotiations and related documents from the prior lawsuit are not subject to discovery in this action. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court concluded this was an appropriate case to exercise our supervisory jurisdiction. The Supreme Court directed the district court to vacate its order compelling discovery. The case was then remanded for further proceedings.
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Johnston-Forbes v. Matsunaga
The issue this case presented to the Supreme Court was whether, under Evidence Rules (ER) 702 through 705, the trial court properly admitted expert biomechanical testimony in an automobile collision case. In August 2006, Dawn Matsunaga rear-ended the car that Cathy Johnson-Forbes was riding in. Johnston-Forbes claimed that she suffered injuries as a result of the collision and sued Matsunaga. Before trial, Matsunaga identified Dr. Allan Tencer as an expert who would be testifying as a biomechanical engineer. In a motion in limine, Johnston-Forbes moved to exclude Tencer's testimony, arguing that he was not qualified as an engineer, that his opinion lacked sufficient foundation, and that in viewing photographs he could not account for Johnston-Forbes's precise body position at the time of impact. The trial court limited Tencer's testimony but denied Johnston-Forbes's motion, and the jury returned a verdict for Matsunaga. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Finding no reversible error in the trial court's decision, the Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals.View "Johnston-Forbes v. Matsunaga" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Civil Procedure, Injury Law
Carpenter v. Kenneth Thompson Builder, Inc.
The Supreme Court granted review of this personal-injury negligence action to clarify state law on the doctrine of claim-splitting. After new defendants were identified during discovery on her original complaint, Plaintiff Jeanette Carpenter filed a motion to amend her complaint to include the newly discovered defendants. A hearing could not be scheduled in time for the trial court to approve the amendment before the expiration of the three-year statute of limitations. In an effort to avoid losing the opportunity to bring the new defendants into the litigation, Carpenter filed a second action before the statute of limitations ran, based on the exact same set of facts, in the same court, and naming the same new defendants named in the motion to amend. The trial court dismissed both cases. The cases were consolidated for purpose of appeal. After review, the Supreme Court held that Carpenter’s procedural actions constituted impermissible claim-splitting as outlined in "Wilner v. White," (929 So. 2d 315 (Miss. 2006)). The Court reversed the Court of Appeals and affirmed the judgments of the Circuit Court.
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Posted in:
Civil Procedure, Injury Law
Linden v. Griffin
Plaintiff filed suit against Defendants alleging fraud, defamation, abuse of process, breach of fiduciary duty, and other claims. Plaintiff also requested declaratory judgment, accounting, and injunctive relief. Pursuant to the parties’ prior agreement, which included an arbitration clause, the trial court granted Defendants’ motion to compel arbitration on all counts with the exception of claims involving defamation and abuse of process. Because Defendants appealed, the trial court refrained from ruling on Plaintiff’s request for injunctive relief. Consequently, Plaintiff petitioned the court of appeals, without success, for a writ of mandamus. The Supreme Court affirmed. Plaintiff also appealed the trial court’s order compelling arbitration. Plaintiff’s and Defendants’ appeals were consolidated. The court of appeals affirmed the entirety of the trial court’s order compelling arbitration. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the Court lacked jurisdiction to consider the merits of Plaintiff’s appeal because Plaintiff attempted to appeal from a non-final order; and (2) the court of appeals correctly determined that the abuse of process and defamation claims fell outside the agreement to arbitrate.View "Linden v. Griffin" on Justia Law
Greene v. Tinker
A patient at a health clinic learned that a clinic employee, who was not authorized to access the patient’s medical record, had discussed the patient’s pregnancy with a clerical worker at the clinic. The patient complained to a supervisor, accusing the clinic employee of breaching medical confidentiality. Shortly afterward, the clinic operator fired the employee, citing a breach of confidentiality. The employee then sued the patient for defamation. The patient counterclaimed for invasion of privacy and abuse of process, the latter claim being based on the employee’s filing and withdrawing an earlier petition for a protective order. At some point the clinic investigated the patient’s complaint and determined that it was unsubstantiated. It was later revealed that the patient herself was the source of the employee’s knowledge about the patient’s pregnancy. At trial the patient claimed that she had an absolute privilege to accuse the employee of breaching medical confidentiality. The superior court rejected that argument and determined that the patient had only a conditional privilege. The superior court also denied the patient’s motion for summary judgment and made several challenged evidentiary rulings. After a three-day jury trial, the superior court granted a directed verdict on the patient’s abuse-of-process counterclaim. The jury returned a verdict for the employee on her defamation claim, awarding one dollar in nominal damages; the jury rejected the patient’s counterclaim of invasion of privacy. Finding the employee to be the prevailing party, the superior court awarded her partial attorney’s fees. The patient appealed the superior court’s ruling on conditional privilege, its denial of her motion for summary judgment, and its evidentiary rulings. She also argued the trial court erred in giving jury instructions, in its decision to grant a directed verdict on her abuse-of-process counterclaim, and in its award of attorney’s fees to the employee. She claimed various violations of her state and federal constitutional rights. The Supreme Court concluded that the superior court did not err in any of its legal or evidentiary rulings or in its instructions to the jury, and it therefore affirmed the superior court in all respects.View "Greene v. Tinker" on Justia Law
Shapria, M.D. et al. v. Christiana Care Health Services, Inc., et al.
The patient in this case alleged that his physician negligently performed a surgical procedure and breached his duty to obtain informed consent. The patient also sued the supervising health services corporation based on vicarious liability and independent negligence. The jury found both the physician and the corporation negligent and apportioned liability between them. On appeal, the physician and corporation argued the trial court erred in several evidentiary rulings, incorrectly instructed the jury on proximate cause, and wrongly awarded pre- and post-judgment interest. In cross appeals, the physician and corporation sought review of the trial court’s decision to submit a supplemental question to the jury, as well as its failure to alter the damages award based on the jury’s response to that supplemental question. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment in favor of the patient. The trial court should not have requested supplemental information from the jury after the verdict. Although the trial court decided not to modify the verdict, the jury’s response to the supplemental question arguably could have affected other proceedings between the physician and corporation. The case was remanded with instructions to the Superior Court to vacate the supplemental verdict.
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Brouwer v. Sisters of Charity Providence
Patricia Brouwer challenged the circuit court's order dismissing her medical malpractice case for failure to file an expert witness affidavit with her Notice of Intent to File Suit ("NOI") pursuant to section 15-79-125 of the South Carolina Code. Brouwer argued she was exempt from filing an expert witness affidavit because section 15-36-100(C)(2) did not require an affidavit where the alleged negligent act "lies within the ambit of common knowledge and experience." The Supreme Court agreed because it previously held that section 15-79-125(A) incorporated section 15-36-100 in its entirety, including the common-knowledge exception codified in 15-36-100(C)(2). Furthermore, the Court concluded that Brouwer successfully invoked this exception and, thus, was not required to file an expert witness affidavit with her NOI.
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Young v. Daimler AG
In 2008, plaintiffs were driving a 2004 Jeep Cherokee in San Joaquin County, when the vehicle rolled over and the roof collapsed. Young sustained injuries, rendering her a permanent quadriplegic. Young’s daughter allegedly suffered physical and emotional harm. They filed suit, claiming that the roof and restraint systems were defectively designed. The vehicle at issue was designed, manufactured, and distributed by DaimlerChrysler Corporation (DCC), a former indirect subsidiary of Daimler. Among others, the complaint named Daimler and DCC as defendants. Daimler is a German public stock company that designs and manufactures Mercedes-Benz vehicles in Germany and has its principal place of business in Stuttgart. Before 1998, DCC was known as Chrysler Corporation. After a 1998 agreement, Chrysler Corporation became an indirect subsidiary of Daimler and changed its name to DCC. DCC was a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in Michigan. It ceased to be a subsidiary of Daimler in 2007, changing its name to Chrysler LLC. Daimler is not a successor-in-interest to DCC or Chrysler LLC. Plaintiffs served Daimler with the complaint in accordance with the Hague Convention. The trial court quashed service for lack of personal jurisdiction over Daimler AG. The court of appeal affirmed, relying on the 2014 U.S. Supreme Court decision in Daimler AG v. Bauman.View "Young v. Daimler AG" on Justia Law
Gillis v. Frazier
Frank Gillis, M.D. appealed a $5,000,000 judgment entered on a jury verdict against him in favor of Joey Frazier, as executor of the estate of his mother, Florine Bryant, in a wrongful-death/medical-malpractice case. Bryant died in 2005. The case against Dr. Gillis was first tried in October 2010. At the close of Frazier's case, Dr. Gillis moved for a judgment as a matter of law ("JML"), arguing that his alleged negligence was not the proximate cause of Bryant's death. The trial court entered a JML in Dr. Gillis's favor. The Court of Civil Appeals reversed the trial court and remanded the case for a new trial. The case was retried in June 2012. At the conclusion of the retrial of the case, the jury awarded Frazier $5,000,000 in damages for the wrongful death of his mother. Dr. Gillis filed a motion seeking, alternatively, a JML, a new trial, or a remittitur of the damages award. The parties engaged in posttrial discovery. Frazier sought the production of evidence related to a potential bad-faith claim by Dr. Gillis against his liability-insurance carrier, ProAssurance Indemnity Company, Inc. ProAssurance produced certain documents from its claim file for in camera review by the trial court. The trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing and subsequently denied Dr. Gillis's postjudgment motions. Dr. Gillis appealed. After Dr. Gillis filed his appeal from the trial court's denial of his postjudgment motions, Dr. Gillis asked the Supreme Court for permission to file a motion with the trial court for relief from the trial court's judgment under Rule 60(b), Ala. R. Civ. P. Frazier opposed Dr. Gillis's motion. The Supreme Court entered an order staying the appeal and allowing Dr. Gillis to file a Rule 60(b) motion, and remanded the case to the trial court for the limited purpose of conducting a "Hammond/Green Oil" hearing concerning the jury's punitive-damages award. The trial court denied Dr. Gillis's Rule 60(b) motion as time-barred. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's judgment denying Dr. Gillis relief under Rule 60(b). The Court also reversed the trial court insofar as it considered the potential bad-faith and/or negligent-failure-to-settle claim against Dr. Gillis's liability-insurance carrier. On remand, the trial court was ordered to conduct a Hammond/Green Oil hearing without consideration of the potential bad-faith claim and without consideration of Dr. Gillis's wife's portion of jointly owned assets.
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BB Buggies, Inc. v. Leon
In June 2011, fourteen-year-old Jean-ah Leon was seriously injured while operating a Bad Boy Buggy ( an off-road vehicle used for outdoor recreation). A year later, Jean-ah’s parents, Vincent and Mandi Leon, filed a products liability and personal injury lawsuit in Louisiana against the owner of the Bad Boy Buggy, a Louisiana resident. They also named the owner’s insurer, the Textron Parties, and several other entities and individuals. Within a few days, the Leons dismissed all parties except the vehicle owner and his insurer from the Louisiana case. The Leons filed suit in Adams County, Mississippi, against the Textron Parties and the others previously named in the Louisiana suit, seeking damages of “an amount not yet determined” but greater than $10,000,000. The Leons served that complaint and summonses on the Textron Parties through their registered agents in Mississippi. They amended their complaint, adding claims for gross negligence and punitive damages. The Leons did not issue new summonses to the Textron Parties with the amended complaint; instead, they sent copies to the Textron Parties’ headquarters by certified mail with accompanying letters addressed “To Whom it May Concern.” The Textron Parties’ attorney in the Louisiana case also requested and received a copy of the amended complaint by email. The Textron Parties’ answer was due thirty days after they were served with the original complaint. They did not file an answer to the original complaint or the amended complaint. The Leons then sought a default judgment against the Textron Parties based on the amended complaint. An entry of default and default judgment were entered the same day. The issue this case presented for the Mississippi Supreme Court's review arose from that default judgment: the Textron Parties claimed that the default judgment was void and should have been set aside because they did not receive proper service of the amended complaint, they were not given notice of the default judgment, and the plaintiffs failed to state a claim against them. Additionally, the Textron Parties asserted that a three-pronged balancing test for relief from default judgments required that it be set aside because they had a colorable defense and the plaintiffs would not be prejudiced. The Supreme Court held that the default judgment was not void, but it should have been set aside under the three-pronged test.
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