Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Freidrich and Davis, both American citizens, were passengers on a U.S. Airways flight in 2010 from Philadelphia to Munich, Germany. Davis formerly lived in Pennsylvania, but now lives in Germany. On his 2012 Registration and Ballot Request form, Davis checked a box that declared his intent to return to the U.S. Freidrich alleges that, during the flight, Davis left his seat and, while standing in the aisle waiting to use the lavatory, he fell on her, breaking her arm. In 2012, Freidrich filed suit against Davis for her injuries in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania based on diversity jurisdiction. The court dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The Third Circuit affirmed. Freidrich argued that, because Davis manifested his intent to return to the U.S., he did not produce sufficient evidence to rebut the presumption that his domicile continued to be Pennsylvania. Rejecting the argument, the court upheld a finding of a German domicile, based upon both Davis’ actions and his declarations of intent. View "Freidrich v. Davis" on Justia Law

Following an injury in October 1999, Employee filed a claim for workers’ compensation benefits. Shortly thereafter, Employer began paying the first of 32 payments of temporary total disability benefits. Twelve of the payments were untimely under the terms of the workers’ compensation statute. Employee returned to work in June 2002 and his benefits were suspended at that time. Nearly eight years later, employee demanded payment of the statutory penalties due on the 12 late payments. Employer refused the demand, asserting it was time barred. Employee sought a hearing and an order requiring employer to pay the penalties. The administrative law judge determined employee’s claim was a “change in condition” claim under OCGA 34-9-104, and, therefore, barred under the two-year limitation period set forth in OCGA 34-9-104 (b). The Appellate Division of the State Board and the superior court agreed. The Court of Appeals granted employee’s application for discretionary review and reversed the judgment of the superior court, finding employee’s claim for statutory penalties was not governed by any limitation period and, therefore, was not time barred. The question presented for the Supreme Court's review was whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the proper statute of limitations for a claim of statutory penalties for late benefits payments in workers’ compensation cases under OCGA 34-9-221 was the general statute of limitations, OCGA 34-9-82, rather than the change in condition statute of limitations, OCGA 34-9-104 (b). The Court answered that question in the affirmative. View "Marta v. Reid" on Justia Law

This case centered on a July 2008 motor vehicle accident. The vehicle occupied by plaintiffs Leo Pope and Judi Nightingale was hit by a vehicle driven by Debbie Sert (who was no longer a party). Plaintiffs proceeded to trial against Thomas Stanley, who they argued made a negligent lane change and caused Sert to hit plaintiffs’ car, and Matthew Babick, the vehicle’s owner. The jury found defendants not liable. Plaintiffs appealed, arguing: (1) there was not substantial evidence to support the verdict; and (2) misconduct of Babick’s attorney, Gregory Kane, was so egregious the court should have granted plaintiffs’ request for a mistrial or motion for a new trial. Kane directly violated a court order by eliciting causation evidence from a California Highway Patrol officer who responded to the scene. Kane was subsequently sanctioned $500 and the jury was given a curative instruction. The Court of Appeal completely rejected plaintiffs' first contention. While it found Kane’s behavior unacceptable from an officer of the court, the Court did not find the single question and answer on this subject was so prejudicial as to warrant a mistrial or new trial. The Court therefore affirmed. View "Pope v. Babick" on Justia Law

In August 2002, plaintiff William Vaughan went to the emergency room at St. Vincent Hospital complaining of symptoms that included abdominal pain. In this medical negligence case, Vaughan alleged that, as the result of a communication failure between a surgeon and a contract radiologist, St. Vincent failed to tell Vaughan about a cancer diagnosis. The district court granted summary judgment for St. Vincent because Vaughan did not specifically plead vicarious liability relating to the radiologist, St. Vincent's apparent agent, and failed to establish a genuine issue of material fact through expert testimony. After review, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding that Vaughan's complaint adequately notified St. Vincent that one or more of its employees or agents was negligent and that genuine issues of material fact required resolution at a trial on the merits.View "Vaughan v. St. Vincent Hospital" on Justia Law

Petitioner Alberta Major fell and sustained an ankle injury while walking across an unpaved area of an intersection, which was owned and maintained by respondent City of Hartsville. Petitioner asserted her injury was a result of a rut in the ground created by vehicles frequently driving over the unpaved area. Petitioner brought suit against respondent alleging negligence, gross negligence, and willful and wanton conduct. Prior to trial, respondent filed a motion for summary judgment contending it was not liable under the South Carolina Torts Claims Act (SCTCA) because it was not on notice of any rut at the location where petitioner allegedly sustained her injury. The trial judge granted summary judgment in favor of respondent, finding respondent's knowledge of vehicles cutting the unpaved corner at the intersection did not create a continual condition and did not place respondent on constructive notice of the actual rut. The Court of Appeals affirmed, referring to the SCTCA and finding although petitioner presented evidence that respondent had notice of circumstances it knew would eventually lead to a rut, there was no evidence respondent had notice of the specific rut petitioner alleged caused her injury. The Court of Appeals further found there was no continual condition sufficient to establish constructive notice and impute liability to respondent. Based on the testimony presented at the summary judgment hearing, the Supreme Court found, however, that a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether respondent should have been charged with constructive notice on the basis that the rut existed for such a period of time that respondent, in the use of reasonable care, should have discovered it. Furthermore, the Court found a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the recurring nature of the defect created a continual condition giving rise to constructive notice. Therefore, the Court of Appeals' was reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "Major v. City of Hartsville" on Justia Law

The defendants in this case were private fire sprinkler inspection companies that were hired to assess the operating condition of a hotel's sprinkler system. Following a fatal fire at the hotel, the parents of the victims, individually and on behalf of the estates of the decedents, alleged that defendants had negligently failed to inform the hotel owner about a flaw in the design of the hotel’s sprinkler system. The trial court granted defendants' motions for summary judgment, finding that defendants' inspectors had possessed no duty to report any sprinkler system design flaws to the hotel owner because applicable State regulations did not necessitate any such reporting. The Appellate Division reversed, agreeing with plaintiffs' contention that defendants' compliance with regulatory requirements was not dispositive of the issue of negligence. The appellate panel explained that defendants owed plaintiffs a duty of reasonable care and that a jury should decide whether defendants had been obliged to exceed the dictates of the regulations in their exercise of reasonable care. After considering the complex nature of the Uniform Fire Code and other factors relevant to sprinkler inspections, the New Jersey Supreme Court concluded that a jury should not be allowed to speculate as to the proper standard of care in this case. Instead, the Court held that plaintiffs were required to establish the applicable standard of care through expert testimony. Although plaintiffs presented an expert during pretrial proceedings, the standard of care he set forth represented only his personal view and was not founded upon any objective support. As a result of plaintiffs' failure to support their asserted standard of care with admissible expert testimony, they were unable to establish the required elements of their negligence cause of action. View "Davis v. Brickman Landscaping, Ltd." on Justia Law

These consolidated appeals concern the ongoing tobacco litigation that began as a class action in Florida courts more than two decades ago. At issue is the fate of 588 personal injury cases filed on behalf of purportedly living cigarette smokers who, as it turns out, were dead at the time of filing (predeceased plaintiffs), 160 loss of consortium cases filed on behalf of spouses and children of these predeceased plaintiffs, and two wrongful death cases filed more than two years after the decedent-smoker's death. Plaintiffs' counsel sought leave to amend the complaints, but the district court denied those requests and dismissed the cases. The root of the problem occurred back in 2008 when these cases were originally filed where the law firm that brought the cases did not have the time or resources required to fully investigate all the complaints. Consequently, problem after problem cropped up once the district court started going through the inventory of cases. The defects that led to these consolidated appeals stemmed from counsel's failure to obtain accurate information regarding whether or when certain smokers died. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal of these cases where, among other reasons, the problems could have been avoided if counsel had properly investigated the claims, and even if that lack of diligence were somehow excusable, counsel failed to inform the court that so many complaints were defective.View "4432 Ind. Tobacco Plaintiffs v. Various Tobacco Companies, et al." on Justia Law

Satkar owns Schaumburg, Illinois hotel and was mentioned in blog posts and a television news report as having made a large donation to a local politician and later won a property-tax appeal. In response, the Cook County Board of Review revoked Satkar’s property-tax reduction and opened an inquiry. Satkar sued the Board, its members and staff, the blog, the television station, and reporters, under 42 U.S.C. 1983, and for defamation and false light. The district court dismissed the 1983 claims against the Board and the officials. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The court separately dismissed the state-law claims against the media defendants, applying the Illinois Anti-SLAPP statute. Because the section 1983 claims were still pending, the judge entered final judgment under FRCP 54(b) to permit appeal of the SLAPP issue. Later, the judge orally invited Satkar to ask for a Rule 54(b) judgment on the SLAPP dismissal, forgetting that he had already entered final judgment. Satkar did not correct the judge, did not seek clarification, and did not file a notice of appeal. After the deadline to appeal expired, Satkar sought an extension, claiming that the judge’s comment created confusion. The judge granted the extension, relying on the defunct “unique circumstances” doctrine. The Seventh Circuit dismissed an appeal, noting that the Supreme Court has disavowed the unique circumstances doctrine and Satkar has not otherwise demonstrated excusable neglect. View "Satkar Hospitality, Inc.v. Fox Television Stations, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a complaint against four defendants alleging that they conspired to fabricate a mental incompetency determination in connection with criminal proceedings filed against Plaintiff in Utah. The district court dismissed Plaintiff’s case for failing to properly serve the defendants within ninety days of filing the complaint. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) questions existed whether the affidavits of service on three of the defendants established a prima case of valid service, and the fourth defendant waived any objection to lack of proper service; (2) the district court did not err in failing to enter a default against the defendants; and (3) the district judge did not err in not granting Plaintiff’s motion to transfer the case to another district court. Remanded for a hearing to determine the validity of service of process.View "Lundahl v. Gregg" on Justia Law

In 2011, Elizabeth Morton, a resident of Greene County, and Annie Watkins, a resident of Jefferson County, were involved in a motor-vehicle collision in Jefferson County. Watkins was treated at a hospital in Jefferson County and subsequently received medical treatment at four health-care facilities located in Jefferson County. In 2013, Watkins filed a complaint in Greene County against Morton, asserting claims arising out of the 2011 collision. Morton filed a motion to transfer this case to the Jefferson Circuit Court pursuant to the doctrine of forum non conveniens. Watkins responded, and the Greene Circuit Court entered an order denying Morton's motion, stating: "After review of [Watkins's] response, the Motion to Transfer Venue of defendant [. . .] is hereby denied. . ." Morton then filed a petition for a writ of mandamus. The Supreme Court granted the writ: Jefferson County had a significantly stronger connection to this case than did Greene County, "which is connected to this case only by the fact that Morton resides there –- a connection this Court has characterized as 'weak.' Morton has met her burden of showing that transfer of this action to Jefferson County is justified in the interest of justice." View "Watkins v. Morton " on Justia Law