Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

At issue in this case was whether appellants waived the mental health records privilege provided under the Mental Health Procedures Act (MHPA) by filing a negligence suit to recover for physical injuries sustained by James Octave upon being struck by a tractor-trailer driven by appellee David Walker. The incident occurred in 2007; based on eyewitness reports, the state police concluded James attempted to commit suicide by jumping under the truck's trailer. Appellant Susan Octave, James's wife, filed a complaint in her own right and on behalf of James, an incapacitated person, against the Pennsylvania Department of Transportation (DOT), Walker, and a number of other parties based upon their purported negligence. Because the state police concluded James was attempting to commit suicide, appellees sought discovery information regarding his mental health history and access to his mental health records, which Susan refused to provide. Appellees filed a motion for leave to access and copy sealed files pertaining to James's involuntary commitments pursuant to the MHPA and a motion to compel the execution of authorizations pertaining to his mental health and involuntary commitment records and full and complete answers to interrogatories. Thereafter, appellants filed an amended complaint, alleging James only suffered physical injuries as a result of the incident. The trial court issued denying appellees' motions, reasoning that because the amended complaint removed allegations pertaining to mental injuries, it did not place James's mental condition at issue. Appellees appealed to the Commonwealth Court, contending the trial court erred when it denied them access to James's mental health records specifically arguing the MHPA's confidentiality provisions were waived by Susan because she placed James's mental health at issue by filing the complaint. The Commonwealth Court reversed and remanded, finding "Susan Octave directly put James Octave's mental history, especially as it pertains to his previous suicide attempts, or considerations or contemplations of suicide at issue. The Supreme Court granted allocatur to address whether, given that petitioners amended their complaint to no longer raised a question of mental health, did the petitioners still put mental health at issue and impliedly waive the protections of 50 P.S. sec. 7111 though the act of filing the lawsuit. The Supreme Court held that a patient waives his confidentiality protections under the MHPA where, judged by an objective standard, he knew or reasonably should have known his mental health would be placed directly at issue by filing the lawsuit.View "Octave v. Walker" on Justia Law

Relators, an employee of Precision Directional Boring, LLC and his wife, commenced an action in the Cuyahoga County Common Pleas Court against Precision and Gary Cole, a coworker at Precision. Cole, a resident of Cuyahoga County, was the only party with a connection to that forum. The Cuyahoga County court granted Precision’s motion to transfer for improper venue and transferred the case to the Medina County Common Pleas Court. The case was subsequently transferred back to Cuyahoga County and then again to Medina County. Relators then filed a complaint in the court of appeals seeking writs of mandamus and procedendo to compel the Cuyahoga County court judge to vacate that court’s transfer orders and adjudicate the underlying action on the merits. The appellate court granted Relators’ motion, concluding that venue was proper in Cuyahoga County. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Cole’s status as a nominal party prevented Relators from establishing a clear legal right to the vacation of the transfer orders in Cuyahoga county or a clear legal duty by the Cuyahoga County court judge to perform that act, and an appeal would provide an adequate remedy.View "State ex rel. Yeaples v. Gall" on Justia Law

Zuppardi slipped and fell on the floor of a Wal-Mart store. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Wal-Mart, finding that Wal-Mart had not caused the puddle and did not have actual or constructive notice of the puddle before Zuppardi’s fall, and denying Zuppardi’s motion to strike Wal-Mart’s reply for submitting a declaration in bad faith and violating a district court local rule. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The declaration was not a bad faith filing and the district court was within its discretion in deeming certain facts admitted and in determining that the local rule did not prevent Wal-Mart from replying in the manner it did.View "Zuppardi v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff was an exotic dancer employed by an adult entertainment club (“Club”) operated in Providence, Rhode Island by Defendant, a Rhode Island corporation. Plaintiff sued the Club, alleging that she was injured when a fellow dancer assaulted her. The Club removed the action to the United States District Court of the District of Massachusetts and then moved to dismiss the action for improper venue and want of in personam jurisdiction. The district court’s Judge Saylor subsequently transferred the case to the District of Rhode Island, determining that the Club had insufficient contacts with Massachusetts to warrant the exercise of personal jurisdiction. The Club again moved to dismiss, alleging that the suit had been commenced outside the applicable limitations period. Plaintiff did not respond to this motion. The district court summarily granted the motion and dismissed the action. On appeal, Plaintiff challenged Judge Saylor’s determination that the Massachusetts district court lacked personal jurisdiction over the Club. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that Plaintiff’s argument was not reviewable on appeal.View "Cioffi v. Gilbert Enters., Inc." on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Court of Appeal's review centered on whether a plaintiff's claims for battery and intentional infliction of emotional distress were based on a health care provider's professional negligence and therefore subject to the one-year limitations period set forth in Code of Civil Procedure section 340.5. Plaintiff-appellant Wayne Larson alleged defendant-respondent Richard Shuman, M.D., served as the anesthesiologist on Larson's kidney stone surgery performed at defendant and respondent UHS of Rancho Springs, Inc.'s hospital. In performing a preoperative checkup and administering the anesthesia, Larson alleged Shuman committed a battery and intentionally inflicted severe emotional distress by grabbing and twisting Larson's arm, prying open his mouth, and lifting, pulling, and pushing on his face and head. The trial court sustained Shuman's and UHS's demurrers without leave to amend on the ground section 340.5's one-year limitation period applied and barred his claims. On appeal, Larson argued the two-year limitations period generally applicable to personal injury claims governs because he alleged intentional tort claims, not claims for professional negligence. The Court of Appeal disagreed with Larson's contention and affirmed the trial court's judgment: "we must look past the labels Larson uses and examine the specific conduct Larson alleged to determine which limitations period applies. Larson bases his lawsuit on Shuman's conduct in providing professional health care by performing a preoperative checkup and administering anesthesia. Larson does not allege any other purpose for the challenged conduct. Because his claims constitute a challenge to how Shuman performed his professional services, Larson's claims are based on professional negligence and barred by section 340.5's one-year limitations period." View "Larson v. UHS of Rancho Springs" on Justia Law

Robert E. Anderson, M.D. and Selma Doctors Clinic, PC, d/b/a Selma Doctors Clinic ("SDC") petitioned for a writ of mandamus to direct the Circuit Court to vacate its order granting plaintiff Barbara Craig's Rule 60(b), Ala. R. Civ. P., motion, and to reinstate the final judgment entered in favor of Dr. Anderson and SDC. This matter stemmed from a medical-malpractice/wrongful-death action filed by Barbara G. Craig as the administrator of the estate of her husband William Craig. Dr. Anderson performed hernia surgery on Mr. Craig at Vaughan Regional Medical Center ("VRMC"), following which, he died. Mrs. Craig sued Dr. Anderson, SDC, and VRMC alleging that the defendants were negligent in their care and treatment of Mr. Craig and that their conduct proximately caused his death. The trial court found that Mrs. Craig failed to qualify her expert on the applicable standard of care, and accordingly, was unable to establish that Dr. Anderson violated the applicable standard of care. Mrs. Craig filed a Rule 59, Ala. R. Civ. P., motion to vacate the judgment or for a new trial. In the motion, Mrs. Craig contended that the trial court erred in excluding the expert's testimony. The trial court denied this motion, but granted her Rule 60(b)(3), Ala. R. Civ. P., in which she argued that Dr. Anderson had committed perjury and had perpetrated a fraud upon the trial court by testifying that he had performed an ulcer surgery when, in fact, he had not done so. Upon review of the record, the Supreme Court concluded the trial court exceeded its discretion in granting Mrs. Craig's Rule 60(b)(3) motion. The Court therefore granted Dr. Anderson's request and issued the writ. View "Craig v. Anderson" on Justia Law

In this case, a jury determined that two New Jersey public entities, South Jersey Transportation Authority and the New Jersey State Police, were liable for injuries sustained by plaintiff as a result of a multi-vehicle pile-up on the Atlantic City Expressway during a 2005 heavy snowstorm. Plaintiff alleged that the public entities were negligent in failing to adhere to standard operating procedures with respect to competing 9-1-1 calls for motorist assistance. The jury found no negligence on the part of plaintiff or the owners or drivers of the other vehicles involved in the several collisions. On appeal, the Appellate Division reversed the liability verdict against the public-entity defendants based on errors in the jury instructions with respect to the liability of the public entities for discretionary versus ministerial acts. The Appellate Division determined the trial court erred in failing to allow the jury to determine predicate facts that resolved whether ministerial or discretionary acts were involved. The Appellate Division remanded the matter for retrial only with respect to the liability of the public-entity defendants. The public-entity defendants argued on appeal to the Supreme Court that, at the retrial, the second jury should decide anew the liability of all parties. The Supreme Court disagreed and affirmed the Appellate Division's decision. View "Henebema v. South Jersey Transportation Authority" on Justia Law

Kenyatta Cheeks was entering an AutoZone store when he was struck by a vehicle driven by Jason Johnson. The jury returned a verdict for Cheeks in the amount of $2.5 million, finding that AutoZone was forty-five percent at fault and Johnson was fifty-five percent at fault. Later, the trial court granted AutoZone’s motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV). Cheeks appealed, arguing that granting AutoZone's motion was made in error. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to non-movant Cheeks, the jury had credible evidence to determine that an injury was reasonably foreseeable. The Supreme Court therefore reversed the trial court’s grant of JNOV in favor of AutoZone and remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Cheeks v. AutoZone, Inc." on Justia Law

Nguyen was born in 1994. She was 16 years old when she filed a complaint, alleging that her mother’s occupational exposure and her in utero exposure to hazardous and toxic chemicals at Western Digital Corporation (WDC) caused her to be born with agenesis of the corpus callosum (a birth defect affecting the structure of the brain) and other birth defects. She alleged that her parents did not know of the connection until 2008, when relatives heard on the radio that attorneys were investigating cases of birth defects caused by chemical exposures in the semiconductor industry. The trial court dismissed the action as barred by the statute of limitations for pre-birth injuries in Code of Civil Procedure section 340.4, as opposed to section 340.8, applicable to claims based on exposure to hazardous substances, which includes tolling for minority and mental incapacity. She also claimed equitable estoppel, arguing that WDC knew the chemicals it used caused reproductive harm and concealed the connection to her injuries. The appeals court reversed, holding that the claims were subject to section 340.8; that even though section 340.8 did not take effect until 10 years after Nguyen was born, it applies in this case because the allegations supported a claim of delayed accrual until December 1998; and that Nguyen is also entitled to tolling for minority. View "Nguyen v. Western Digital Corp." on Justia Law

All but one of the events giving rise to Plaintiff’s claims occurred in Florida. Plaintiff sued Defendants, alleging that Defendants had procured a wire transfer from Plaintiff to a public adjusting company under false pretenses and with the intent to defraud him. The district court granted summary judgment to Defendants, concluding that general personal jurisdiction did not exist because Defendants’ contacts with Montana were neither continuous nor systematic and that specific personal jurisdiction did not exist because all of the substantial activity underlying Plaintiff’s claims occurred in Florida. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court correctly concluded that it lacked personal jurisdiction because Defendants formed no “jurisdictionally relevant contacts” with Montana, and Plaintiff’s single act of authorizing his local bank in Montana to wire funds to the public adjusting company was insufficient to establish that his action accrued in Montana for purposes of Mont. R. Civ. P. 4(b)(1)(B).View "Tackett v. Duncan" on Justia Law