Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries
Articles Posted in Injury Law
W. World Ins. Co. v. Armbruster
Hoey, who owns a farmers’ market that offers hay rides, pony rides, and pumpkin picking, hired Armbruster to run the hay wagon for eight weekends. Armbruster is now a paraplegic because an accident with the wagon crushed her spine. She sued for negligence in Michigan state court. Armbruster and Hoey also sought a declaratory judgment, again in state court, that Armbruster was covered by Hoey’s General Commercial Liability insurance policy. The insurer, Western, sought a federal declaratory judgment that Armbruster was not covered by the insurance policy. The cases were consolidated in federal court. Counsel, provided by Western to Hoey, filed a workers’ compensation claim on the theory that Armbruster was an “employee” eligible for workers’ compensation. The state tort claim has been stayed until the workers’ compensation claim is resolved. The district court accepted jurisdiction and construed the policy to exclude Armbruster’s injury from coverage. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, agreeing that it would be helpful for the parties to know whether Western was liable for Hoey’s legal fees, that Western was not playing procedural games, and that the federal forum could resolve the action without interfering in Armbruster’s tort suit or taking on difficult questions of state law.View "W. World Ins. Co. v. Armbruster" on Justia Law
Ex parte Progressive Direct Insurance Company.
Progressive Direct Insurance Company petitioned the Alabama Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to direct the Wilcox Circuit Court to vacate its order denying Progressive's motion to transfer this action from the Wilcox Circuit Court to the Tuscaloosa Circuit Court and to enter an order granting the motion. The underlying action stemmed from a motor-vehicle accident that occurred in Tuscaloosa County in 2010, between an automobile driven by Ira Robinson and an automobile driven by Amber Clayton. In 2012, Robinson filed a complaint in the Wilcox Circuit Court against Clayton, a resident of Tuscaloosa, and Progressive, a foreign corporation doing business in both Tuscaloosa and Wilcox Counties. In his complaint, Robinson alleged that he was a resident of Wilcox County and that he had suffered injuries as a result of the negligent and/or wanton conduct of Clayton when the vehicle she was driving collided with the vehicle he was driving. Additionally, Robinson alleged that at the time of the accident he had a policy of insurance with Progressive, which included uninsured/underinsured-motorist coverage. Progressive filed a motion to transfer the action to Tuscaloosa County, alleging that venue in Wilcox County was improper because, it claimed, the accident occurred in Tuscaloosa County and both Robinson and Clayton resided in Tuscaloosa County at the time of the accident. Alternatively, Progressive claimed that the action was due to be transferred to Tuscaloosa County on the ground of the doctrine of forum non conveniens. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that, based on the evidence before the trial court at the time of its ruling, it should have granted Progressive's motion for a change of venue.View "Ex parte Progressive Direct Insurance Company." on Justia Law
Posted in:
Civil Procedure, Injury Law
Ex parte Linda Manning
Defendant Linda Manning petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to direct the Macon Circuit Court to vacate its order denying her motion to transfer this action to the Montgomery Circuit Court and to enter an order granting the motion. In early 2014, Shannon Richardson filed a complaint in the Macon Circuit Court against Manning, stating claims of negligence and wantonness as a result of a motor vehicle accident that occurred in Montgomery County in October 2012. Richardson sustained injuries and was taken by ambulance to Baptist South Hospital in Montgomery after the accident. Law-enforcement personnel who responded to the accident worked in Montgomery County. At all material times, Richardson was a resident of Montgomery County, and Manning was a resident of Macon County. Manning filed a motion to transfer the action to Montgomery County based on the doctrine of forum non conveniens. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court exceeded its discretion in denying Manning's motion for a change of venue based on the interest-of-justice prong of the forum non conveniens statute. Accordingly, the Court granted Manning's petition for the writ of mandamus and directed the trial court to enter an order transferring the case from the Macon Circuit Court to the
Montgomery Circuit Court.View "Ex parte Linda Manning" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Civil Procedure, Injury Law
Westby, et al v. Schaefer, M.D.
Christian Westby, James Westby, and Kristina Westby appealed the district court’s denial of their motion to reconsider the court’s protective order granted to Mercy Medical Center and Dr. Gregory Schaefer. This case arose from the Westbys’ claim that Dr. Schaefer’s and Mercy Medical’s negligence resulted in lifelong brain damage to Christian Westby. Near the end of discovery, the district court granted Mercy Medical and Dr. Schaefer’s protective order motion to prohibit the Westbys from deposing Mercy Medical and Dr. Schaefer’s expert witnesses. The district court later denied the Westbys’ motion to reconsider that protective order. The Westbys argued on appeal to the Supreme Court that the district court abused its discretion by not requiring any showing of good cause or unreasonable delay and basing its decision on a mistaken belief that the Westbys were dilatory. The Supreme Court agreed that the trial court erred, vacated the order and
remanded the case for further proceedings.View "Westby, et al v. Schaefer, M.D." on Justia Law
Nyambal v. International Monetary Fund
Plaintiff filed suit against the Fund, asserting claims for assault, false imprisonment, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The Fund's motion to dismiss was converted into a discovery dispute when the district court granted plaintiff's request for jurisdictional discovery over the Fund's objections. The court concluded that, because plaintiff's assertions amount to mere conjecture and surmise, they cannot provide sufficient support to justify jurisdictional discovery. Further, the Fund's subsequent voluntary disclosure of the contract at issue conclusively resolved any question of waiver. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's orders permitting jurisdictional discovery and remanded for further proceedings.View "Nyambal v. International Monetary Fund" on Justia Law
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Civil Procedure, Injury Law
In re Essex Ins. Co.
“In Texas, the general rule…is that an injured party cannot sue the tortfeasor’s insurer directly until the tortfeasor’s liability has been finally determined by agreement or judgment.” Plaintiff sued San Diego Tortilla (SDT) for personal injuries after he lost his hand operating a tortilla machine. Plaintiff then added a declaratory judgment claim against SDT’s liability insurer, Essex Insurance Company, seeking a declaration that Essex must indemnify SDT for its liability to Plaintiff. Essex filed motions to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims, arguing that the “no direct action” rule barred Plaintiff from suing Essex until SDT’s liability to Plaintiff was determined. The trial court denied the motions, and the court of appeals denied Essex’s petition for writ of mandamus. The Supreme Court conditionally granted mandamus and directed the trial court to grant Essex’s motions to dismiss, holding that no exception to the “no direct action” rule applied in this case.View "In re Essex Ins. Co." on Justia Law
Cuomo v. Crane Co.
Plaintiff filed suit against Crane, alleging that Crane, a supplier of shipboard equipment to the Navy, caused her husband to be exposed to asbestos during his service from 1974 to 1980 by failing to affix adequate asbestos warnings to the valves it supplied for the Navy's vessels. Crane removed the suit to federal court under the federal officer removal statute, 28 U.S.C. 1442(a)(1). Plaintiff then moved to remand to state court and the district court granted the motion. The court concluded that Crane has provided evidence that the Navy issued detailed and comprehensive specifications regarding the production and packaging of its valves. Therefore, Crane has provided sufficient evidence to create a colorable federal defense at this preliminary stage. The court reversed the judgment of the district court.View "Cuomo v. Crane Co." on Justia Law
Posted in:
Civil Procedure, Injury Law
Scanlan v. Townsend
After Theresa Scanlan filed a personal injury action against Karlin Townsend, a process server delivered a copy of the summons and complaint to Townsend's father at his home. But Townsend did not live at her father's home. Townsend's father later handed the summons and complaint directly
to Townsend within the statute of limitations. The trial court dismissed for lack of service, and the Court of Appeals
reversed. Finding no error with the appellate court's decision, the Supreme Court affirmed.View "Scanlan v. Townsend" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Civil Procedure, Injury Law
Doe v. Archdiocese of Milwaukee
Doe settled his sexual abuse claims against the Archdiocese of Milwaukee for $80,000 after participating in a voluntary mediation program. He later filed a claim against the Archdiocese in its bankruptcy proceedings for the same sexual abuse. Doe responded to the Archdiocese’s motion for summary judgment by contending that his settlement was fraudulently induced. The argument depends upon statements made during the mediation, but Wisconsin law prohibits the admission in judicial proceedings of nearly all communications made during mediation. Doe argued that an exception applies here because the later action is “distinct from the dispute whose settlement is attempted through mediation,” Wis. Stat. 904.085(4)(e). The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the Archdiocese. Doe’s bankruptcy claim is not distinct from the dispute settled in mediation. The issue in both proceedings, which involved the same parties, is the Archdiocese’s responsibility for the sexual abuse Doe suffered. Doe sought damages in both the mediation and bankruptcy for the same sexual abuse; he did not seek separate or additional damages for the alleged fraudulent inducement.View "Doe v. Archdiocese of Milwaukee" on Justia Law
Aguayo-Cuevas v. P.R. Elec. Power Auth.
The decedent died from electrocution while working on a telephone pole that was the purported partial responsibility of Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority (PREPA). Appellants, the decedent’s sisters, filed a wrongful death suit against PREPA and others in federal district court. PREPA filed a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, arguing that an additional, non-diverse member of the decedent’s estate, who was not made a party to the action, was indispensable, and his joinder destroyed the parties’ complete diversity. The district court agreed and dismissed the entire action, including the decedent’s estate survivorship action as well as individual actions by estate members and Appellants, who were not the decedent’s heirs. The First Circuit reversed, holding that the district court erred in dismissing Appellants’ personal actions, as the non-diverse absent party was not required to adjudicate the action because the members of the estate requested voluntary dismissal of their claims, which eliminated the survivorship action, leaving only Appellants’ claims, which were jurisdictionally sound.View "Aguayo-Cuevas v. P.R. Elec. Power Auth." on Justia Law