Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries
Articles Posted in Injury Law
Yoder & Frey Auctioneers, Inc v. EquipmentFacts, LLC
Yoder hosts auctions for used construction equipment. Its largest annual auction is in Florida. Efacts, owned by Garafola, provides auctioneers with online bidding platforms. In 2003, Yoder began accepting live Internet bids during the Florida auction. Efacts provided services. Efacts received and maintained confidential customer information relating to Yoder’s auctions. In 2008 the companies had a falling out. Yoder terminated the contract and hired RTB, another online bidding services company. On February 7-9, 2010, Efacts accessed the RTB bidding platform without authorization, using an RTB administrative username and password. Garafola was aware of the username and password combination from Efacts’ prior relationship with Yoder and submitted winning bids with a combined price of $41,000 for which it did not pay. On February 10- 11, an Efacts employee gained unauthorized access to the RTB platform, posing as a Yoder customer, and placed 18 winning bids with a combined price of $1,212,074 which were not paid. The Sixth Circuit affirmed judgment in favor of Yoder, rejecting claims based on denial of spoliation sanctions; denial of hearsay objections to documents produced by internet service providers; denial of summary judgment on Computer Fraud and Abuse Act claim; and imposition of sanctions under FRCP 37. View "Yoder & Frey Auctioneers, Inc v. EquipmentFacts, LLC" on Justia Law
Graus v. Ok Invs., Inc.
Plaintiffs, individually and on behalf of their children, filed a complaint against Defendants, alleging injury resulting from their rental of a house containing black mold. Defendants made an offer of settlement pursuant to Wyo. R. Civ. P. 68, which Plaintiffs did not accept. Plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed certain claims, and the district court entered judgment as a matter of law for Defendants on the remaining claims. Thereafter, Defendants filed a certificate of costs through which they sought an award of costs pursuant to Wyo. R. Civ. P. 68 and 54(d) and Uniform Rules for District Courts (U.R.D.C.) 501. The district court awarded costs. Plaintiffs appealed, arguing, among other things, that the court erred in awarding costs pursuant to rule 68. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the district court’s award of costs, holding that Rule 68 did not apply to the award of costs in this matter, and that, instead, costs were governed by Rule 54(d). View "Graus v. Ok Invs., Inc." on Justia Law
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Civil Procedure, Injury Law
Ex parte Robert Bosch LLC.
One of the defendants in this case, Robert Bosch LLC, petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to direct the Etowah Circuit Court to vacate or, in the alternative, to amend the provisions of its order granting the request for production of Bosch's "air bag system Electronic Control Unit" ("ECU") filed by plaintiff Dorothy Kilgo, individually and as the personal representative of the estate of Ernest Ronald Kilgo, Jr. In 2011, Kilgo and her husband "Ron" were passengers in a 2008 PT Cruiser that Ron's stepson was driving in Etowah County. While they were waiting for an oncoming motor vehicle to pass through an intersection so that they could make a left turn, the Kilgos' vehicle was struck from behind by another motor vehicle. The impact of that collision propelled the Kilgos' vehicle into the intersection, where it was struck head-on by an oncoming motor vehicle. Ron, who was sitting in the front passenger-side seat, suffered severe injuries and died several days later as a result of those injuries. The front passenger-seat air bag failed to deploy during either the rear or the head-on collisions, and the front passenger-side seatbelt "pretensioner," which is supposed to cause the seat belt to "lock" immediately after a collision, did not activate. However, one of the two front driver-side air bags deployed during the collisions, and the front driver-side seat-belt pretensioner was activated as well. Kilgo thereafter filed a wrongful-death lawsuit, naming several defendants, including, among others, Bosch, who designed and manufactured the ECU in the Kilgos' vehicle. Sometime thereafter, Kilgo served a notice of taking the deposition of a corporate representative of Bosch. The trial court entered an order denying Bosch's motion to amend the protective order and, in that order, required Kilgo to "submit a proposed Order including safeguards it will employ to review the requested discovery." In 2014, Kilgo submitted to the trial court a proposed protective order. On the following day, the trial court entered an amended protective order, which required Bosch to produce the entire algorithm for inspection by Kilgo's two experts, subject to 12 confidentiality and disclosure safeguards set forth in the order. After review, the Supreme Court granted Bosh's petition and issued the writ: the trial court was directed to vacate its protective order and to enter a more comprehensive and restrictive protective order with regard to the algorithm. View "Ex parte Robert Bosch LLC." on Justia Law
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Civil Procedure, Injury Law
Ljuljdjuraj v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.
Elvira was driving a car, owned by Mullalli, when she hit ice and collided with a negligently parked vehicle. Elvira, who suffered a traumatic brain injury, acute cervical and lumbar sprains, bulging discs, and other injuries, sued in federal court to recover under Mullalli’s no-fault State Farm automobile insurance policy,. Elvira and Mullalli are citizens of Michigan; State Farm is an Illinois citizen. The district court dismissed for lack of diversity jurisdiction, reasoning that the suit was a “direct action” under 28 U.S.C. 1332(c)(1), requiring Mullalli’s Michigan citizenship to be imputed to State Farm. The Sixth Circuit reversed. Because the direct action proviso does not apply to suits brought against the insurer by insured persons identifiable before the accident occurs, this suit was not a direct action and Mullalli’s citizenship should not have been imputed to State Farm. The court distinguished between the personal protection provisions of Michigan’s no-fault law that require coverage of an identifiable group of individuals: the named insured, a spouse, any relatives living with them, and any occupant of a car they own and the property protection provision of the statute, which states simply that “an insurer is liable to pay benefits for accidental damage.” View "Ljuljdjuraj v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co." on Justia Law
Stuhlmacher v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc.
Stuhlmacher’s parents purchased a ladder from Home Depot so that their son, Kurt, a millwright technician, could work on the roof of a cabin he was building for them in Indiana. Kurt was using the ladder for the first time when it fell, causing him to fall. Kurt sued Home Depot and the ladder’s manufacturer, Tricam. The Stuhlmachers’ expert, Dr. Conry, testified that the ladder was defective, likely causing Kurt to sense instability and involuntarily shift his weight. The magistrate judge struck Dr. Conry’s testimony, finding that his explanation of how the accident occurred did not “square” with Kurt’s testimony that the ladder shot out to his left. Because the testimony was stricken, the Stuhlmachers did not have any evidence showing causation, so the judge entered judgment as a matter of law for the defendants. The Seventh Circuit reversed. An expert’s testimony qualifies as relevant under Rule 702 so long as it assists the jury in determining any fact at issue in the case. Experts are allowed to posit alternate models to explain their conclusions.View "Stuhlmacher v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc." on Justia Law
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Civil Procedure, Injury Law
Powers v. WB Mobile Servs., Inc.
In 2006, a handicap access ramp platform at a residential construction site in Spanaway collapsed when plaintiff Jesse Powers used it. Powers fell while working for Awning Solutions, a company hired by Premier Communities Inc. to install an awning on a modular building. Premier also contracted with Pacific Mobile Structures Inc. to supply the ramp that collapsed. Unknown to Powers, Awning Solutions, or Premier, Pacific had subcontracted with W.B. Mobile to install the ramp that collapsed. After falling, Powers attempted to find out who "put the ramp the together," including making inquiries to Awning Solutions, but Awning Solutions thought that Pacific installed the ramp. In 2009, Powers filed a personal injury suit against Premier, Pacific, and John Doe One and John Doe Two, identifying "John Doe One" as the "builder of the handicap access ramp where the incident occurred." The statute of limitations for Powers' suit expired on June 2, 2009. Powers timely served Pacific on June 5, 2009, and Premier on June 12, 2009. Powers did not serve the John Does or W.B. Mobile at that time. Finally, over a year after filing his complaint, Powers obtained a discovery response from Pacific in October 2010 identifying W.B. Mobile as the installer of the ramp. Four months after Pacific's discovery response, in February 2011, Powers moved to amend his pleading to replace John Doe One with "W.B. Mobile." The trial court granted W.B. Mobile's motion to dismiss for failure to bring claims within the statute of limitations. The Court of Appeals reversed, finding Powers' serving Pacific and Premier within ninety days of filing his complaint tolled the statute of limitations on Powers' claim against W.B. Mobile, and remanded for a trial on the merits. Finding no error with the Court of Appeals' judgment, the Supreme Court affirmed.View "Powers v. WB Mobile Servs., Inc." on Justia Law
Kennedy v. Wheeler
Defendant drove through a stop sign and collided with a car in which plaintiff was a passenger. Plaintiff filed a negligence action, which was tried to a jury of twelve. The trial court instructed the jury that defendant had “admitted liability so that the only issue to be decided by you [. . .] is the amount of the damages to be awarded to the plaintiff.” The court defined both economic and noneconomic damages for the jury. The court told the jury that it should answer the questions on the verdict form “according to the directions on the form and all the instructions of the court.” The court then explained that “[a]t least the same nine jurors must agree on each answer unless the verdict form instructs you otherwise as to a particular question.” After deliberations, the jury returned its verdict. The trial court read the verdict form to the parties and asked the presiding juror whether at least nine jurors had answered Question 2; she answered, “yes, sir.” Defendant asked that the jury be polled. When the court asked each juror whether the vote of $65,386 in economic damages was “your vote,” ten jurors said “yes.” Jurors one and three said “no.” When the court asked whether the vote of $300,000 was “your vote,” nine jurors said “yes”; jurors two, three, and twelve said “no.” The court indicated that it would accept the verdict and thanked the jurors for their service. Defendant then asked the court to wait, stating, “I don’t think there’s nine agreeing, if I counted right.” The court stated that it counted ten jurors agreeing on economic damages and nine agreeing on noneconomic damages. After the jury was discharged, defendant took exception for the record: looking for nine common people on economic and noneconomic, I add that up as only being eight people who agree." The trial judge replied: I agree with you that there were only eight that answered yes to the same—for the economic and noneconomic damages that answered the same way, and if your theory is that the same nine had to vote on both, then that will have to go up for the appeal…" Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the jury's verdict met the requirements of Oregon law. The Court reversed the court of appeals and affirmed the trial court.View "Kennedy v. Wheeler" on Justia Law
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Civil Procedure, Injury Law
Warger v. Shauers
Warger sued Shauers for negligence for injuries suffered in a motor vehicle accident. After the jury returned a verdict for Shauers, a juror contacted Warger’s counsel, claiming that Whipple, the jury foreperson, had revealed during deliberations that her daughter had been at fault in a fatal motor vehicle accident and that a lawsuit would have ruined her daughter’s life. With an affidavit from the juror, Warger moved for a new trial, arguing that Whipple had deliberately lied during voir dire about her impartiality and ability to award damages. The district court denied Warger’s motion, citing Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b), which bars evidence “about any statement made . . . during the jury’s deliberations.” The Eighth Circuit and a unanimous Supreme Court affirmed. Rule 606(b) unambiguously applies to “an inquiry into the validity of [the] verdict,” even to demonstrate dishonesty during voir dire. Warger’s right to an impartial jury remains protected; even if a juror lies to conceal bias, parties may bring to the court’s attention evidence of bias before the verdict is rendered and use nonjuror evidence after the verdict is rendered. The excluded affidavit is “internal.”View "Warger v. Shauers" on Justia Law
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Civil Procedure, Injury Law
Oleszkowicz v. Exxon Mobil Corp.
In 2002, Warren Lester and hundreds of other plaintiffs filed a lawsuit against Exxon Mobil Corp. and others seeking personal injury damages allegedly caused by exposure to naturally occurring radioactive material (“NORM”) and other hazardous materials at various Louisiana pipeyards operated by Intracoastal Tubular Services, Inc. (“ITCO”). A flight of several plaintiffs, including John Oleszkowicz, was severed and transferred to the 24th Judicial District Court, at which point the only remaining defendants were ITCO and Exxon. The jury considered each of the plaintiffs’ compensatory claims for increased risk of cancer, as well as a claim for exemplary damages pursuant to former La. Civ. Code art. 2315.3. During the course of trial, the district court instructed the jurors that plaintiffs could bring a “new lawsuit” in the event they actually contracted cancer. The jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiffs and awarded damages for the increased risk of cancer. Oleszkowicz was personally awarded $115,000 in compensatory damages. Significantly, the jury did not award exemplary damages to the plaintiffs for increased risk of cancer, based on a finding that Exxon did not engage in wanton or reckless conduct in the storage, handling, or transportation of hazardous or toxic substances. The court of appeal affirmed the judgment on appeal, and the Supreme Court denied writs. Several months after the verdict, Oleszkowicz was diagnosed with prostate cancer. As a result, he filed the instant suit against Exxon and others, alleging his cancer stemmed from the same NORM exposure at ITCO’s pipeyard. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether the plaintiff’s claim for punitive and exemplary damages was barred by res judicata and, if so, whether “exceptional circumstances” existed to justify not applying res judicata to bar the claim, as set forth in La. Rev. Stat. 13:4232(A). Although the court of appeal cited “exceptional circumstances” to justify relief from the res judicata effect of the jury’s verdict on the issue of punitive damages, the Supreme Court found no such “exceptional circumstances” exist under the facts of this case and reversed the appellate court's ruling.View "Oleszkowicz v. Exxon Mobil Corp." on Justia Law
Chauvin v. Exxon Mobil Corp.
The Supreme Court granted the writ application in this case to determine whether the plaintiff was precluded from asserting a claim for punitive damages after having settled such claims relating to fear of contracting cancer and increased risk of developing cancer in a prior suit, albeit with a reservation of rights as to a claim for damages related to future cancer diagnosed after the effective date of the settlement agreement. The trial court found res judicata barred the plaintiff’s subsequent claim for punitive damages relating to the diagnosis of cancer where the same alleged misconduct had given rise to the plaintiff’s claim for punitive damages in the earlier litigation asserting fear of contracting cancer and increased risk of developing cancer. The court of appeal granted writs and summarily reversed the trial court’s ruling, holding the plaintiff had established an exception to res judicata under La. Rev. Stat. 13:4232(A)(3), because he had reserved his right to bring another action based on the future diagnosis of cancer. After its review, the Supreme Court held that the punitive damages related to conduct and were separate from compensatory damages for injury. Because the plaintiff in this case specifically released all punitive and exemplary damages arising out of the defendant’s alleged misconduct, his subsequent claim for punitive damages was barred by res judicata.View "Chauvin v. Exxon Mobil Corp." on Justia Law