Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Lillian Malm filed suit against Marion Villegas by filing a complaint with the district court in 2005.The complaint alleged that Villegas caused Malm to suffer personal injuries in an automobile accident in 2002 (two years and eleven months earlier). It was undisputed that the complaint was filed approximately one month before expiration of the applicable three-year statute of limitations. In September 2006, having failed to find and personally serve Villegas, Malm moved for permission to establish quasi in rem jurisdiction by attaching Villegas's insurance policy and accomplishing service through publication. Although the court granted her motion and she demonstrated service by publication, in response to a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction by Villegas's insurer, the court ultimately found quasi in rem jurisdiction to be an improper means of acquiring jurisdiction over Villegas's property. Nonetheless, the court denied the motion to dismiss, finding that additional time was warranted to allow Malm to attempt personal service. In September 2007, Malm filed a status report with the court, noting that she had been unable to locate and personally serve Villegas and requesting that the court take no further action at that time. No activity of record occurred for the next five years, but on June 27, 2013, Malm moved to reopen, alleging that "[i]n early 2013 investigators retained by Plaintiff's counsel got a 'lead' that Defendant Villegas was living in Germany," and as a result, Villegas was served in Germany "[i]n accordance with the Hague Convention . . . on May 24, 2013." The district court granted the motion in August 2013. Once the case was reopened, Villegas moved to reconsider, arguing that Malm's failure to make reasonable efforts after the case was closed in 2007 or to serve her within a reasonable time amounted to failure to prosecute. Villegas appealed the district court granting of Malm's motion to reopen her personal injury lawsuit. The Supreme Court reversed, finding that because service following commencement of the action by filing a complaint with the court was delayed for an unreasonable length of time, the district court abused its discretion in declining to dismiss the lawsuit for failure to prosecute. View "In re Malm v. Villegas" on Justia Law

Bertoli was struck by a car as she walked inside a crosswalk on state Highway 116, and was rendered permanently physically and mentally disabled. Her attorney, Rouda, erved the Sebastopol Police Department with a request under the Public Records Act (Gov. Code, 6250) seeking all evidence, including photos, reports, audio logs, handwritten notes, and emails, with respect to the accident, and any surveys, traffic or pedestrian counts, and letters or complaints received with respect to the intersection, for the past 10 years. The city claims never to have received the request, but that, in response to an earlier request, had produced a copy of the collision report, notes of the investigating officer, and a report listing all accidents on Healdsburg Avenue for the past 10 years. Rouda submitted an additional PRA request, seeking 62 different categories of records. The city characterized the request as “overly extensive, overly broad and, in some cases, unlimited in time.” Ultimately, the trial court denied Rouda’s request for a writ of mandate, found the litigation “clearly frivolous” and awarded the city costs and attorneys fees. The court of appeal reversed with respect to fees and costs, reasoning that the city was not justified with respect to requested electronically stored information. View "Bertoli v. City of Sebastopol" on Justia Law

Plaintiff purchased a home from Laux. Almost two years later, she sued the homebuilder, Shapell for strict liability, negligence, and fraudulent concealment, claiming Shapell built the home on unstable and uncompacted “fill” soil and with an inadequate foundation, causing “substantial differential movement” and numerous defects such as cracked floors, walls, and ceilings. The court granted Shappel summary judgment as to fraudulent concealment and later and entered judgment for Shapell on the other claims, concluding plaintiff lacked standing because her claims accrued when Laux owned the home and he did not assign the claims to plaintiff. The court of appeal reversed. Construing the facts in a light most favorable to plaintiff, there is a triable issue of material fact regarding whether Shapell fraudulently concealed information about the property’s soil conditions. Plaintiff was entitled to have a jury determine the disputed factual issues of when and to whom the causes of action accrued. View "Stofer v. Shapell Indus., Inc." on Justia Law

Li crashed a new BMW during a test drive. Gonsalves, a salesperson for the BMW dealership, was a passenger in the vehicle. Gonsalves sued, alleging that Li drove recklessly during the test drive, causing the accident, and that Gonsalves suffered significant back injuries as a result. A jury found that Li was negligent, that Gonsalves was not comparatively negligent, and awarded Gonsalves more than $1.2 million in damages. The court of appeal remanded for a new trial, finding that the trial court erred in admission of certain evidence and that Gonsalves’s counsel committed misconduct in at least two instances, resulting in cumulative prejudice. The discovery statutes do not authorize admission at trial of denials to requests for admissions; the court erred in allowing plaintiff’s counsel to examine him about his qualified denials and in admitting the written responses. The court also erred in in allowing plaintiff’s counsel to examine Li on “substantial factor” causation and in admitting evidence of prior speeding tickets. View "Gonsalves v. Li" on Justia Law

In 2010, Blevins had knee surgery at a surgical facility. The knee later became infected by bacteria, subsequently found on a sponge manufactured by Ruhof that had been used to clean surgical equipment before the surgery. The bacteria had apparently "survived the sterilization process." The surgical center paid Blevins $4,118.23 for medical expenses he incurred in treating the infection. Blevins did not sign an agreement releasing the center from liability; he was not represented by counsel and the center did not give him written notice of the statute of limitations for a medical malpractice action. More than 15 months after receiving the payment, Blevins filed suit. Ruhof settled for $100,000. The trial court, relying on Insurance Code section 11583, ruled that the one-year limitations period was tolled by the payment of medical expenses. The trial court reduced a jury’s award of damages against the surgical facility to $285,114. The court of appeal affirmed. Section 11583, which provides that the applicable statute of limitations is tolled when advance or partial payment is made to an injured and unrepresented person without notifying him of the applicable limitations period, applies to the one-year limitations period for medical malpractice actions. View "Coastal Surgical Inst. v. Blevins" on Justia Law

Donald Martin was killed by a machine at a paper plant. His widow Nina Martin tried to sue the company that installed the machine, but that company no longer existed. Martin had difficulty discerning which company was responsible for the installation company's liability because the merger and acquisition history of the installation company was complicated. Because of that complicated history, Martin sued the incorrect company and did not realize who the responsible party was until after the statute of limitations period expired. The issue this case presented for the Washington Supreme Court's review centered on whether Martin met the requirements of the rule that allowed such plaintiffs to add the correct defendant after the statute of limitations period expired, and whether her inability to identify the correct defendant was due to inexcusable neglect. The Court held that it was not: the record did not show that the proper defendant's identity was easily ascertainable by Martin during the limitations period. Accordingly, the Court reversed the Court of Appeals. View "Martin v. Dematic" on Justia Law

John Tyler and his wife filed suit seeking damages from various companies that manufacture products containing asbestos that he had been exposed. After Tyler died from a form of lung cancer caused by asbestos, Stephen Wannall became the personal representative of Tyler's estate. Honeywell was named in the suit as the successor-in-interest to the Bendix Corporation, which manufactured brake shoes that Tyler used in helping friends, family, and neighbors perform automobile repairs for over 50 years. Honeywell moved for summary judgment, arguing that plaintiff failed to establish the causal link required under Virginia law between Tyler's exposure to Bendix brakes and his disease. The district court denied the motion. While the parties were preparing for trial, the Supreme Court of Virginia issued Ford Motor Company v. Boomer, which rejected the "substantial" cause standard that the parties had previously understood as controlling, and ruled instead that plaintiffs must demonstrate that "exposure to the defendant's product alone must have been sufficient to have caused the harm." Honeywell moved for reconsideration of its motion for summary judgment in light of Boomer. Plaintiff opposed the motion but did not seek leave to file a new declaration of their expert under Rule 26(e). Nor did plaintiff move under Rule 56(d) for permission to take additional discovery in response to Honeywell's motion. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's grant of Honeywell's motion to strike the new expert declaration and its renewed motion for summary judgment pursuant to Boomer. View "Wannall v. Honeywell, Inc." on Justia Law

Appellant filed suit against the Republic of Cuba and others in Florida state court, alleging that appellees tortured appellant and that appellant continues to suffer the consequences of the torture. Appellant was incarcerated in Cuba in the 1960s and 1970s, and endured unlawful incarceration and torture committed by the Cuban government and its codefendants. Appellant obtained a default judgment in state court and now seeks to execute that judgment on patents and trademarks held or managed by appellees in this action, who are allegedly agents and instrumentalities of Cuba. The court affirmed the district court's denial of appellant's request because the Florida state court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to grant the default judgment. View "Jerez v. Republic of Cuba" on Justia Law

Howard allegedly rear-ended Gumby's vehicle, Gumby sued Howard and his employer, UPS. Contending that Gumby’s health might have contributed to the accident, UPS requested information including medical records and the identity of anyone with knowledge concerning this defense. Gumby provided the names of one physician and one hospital from which he had received pre-accident care. Gumby died a year later. Comstock, Gumby’s daughter and estate administrator, was substituted as plaintiff. A year after discovery began, Comstock produced documents revealing more medical providers, but did not produce all requested information. The court ordered Comstock to complete production by September 28. She failed to do so. In December 2012, Comstock provided UPS with over 3,000 pages of documents. Some were duplicates, but new documents showed that Gumby had vision problems; suffered dizziness, paranoia, and hallucinations while driving; had been instructed not to drive at night; and had been hospitalized hours before the accident. Comstock had called law enforcement that night, worried because Gumby, had left Pennsylvania to drive to Arkansas. UPS had already deposed Gumby and family members. The district court noted further misconduct concerning expert test results. The court found “extreme prejudice” and sanctioned Comstock under FRCP37(b)(2) by dismissal. The Eighth Circuit affirmed. View "Comstock v. UPS Ground Freight, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff Kathryn Kipling sued State Farm Automobile Insurance Company in Colorado federal district court for breach of contract because it did not pay her benefits under four insurance policies issued in Minnesota. The court determined that she would be entitled to benefits under Colorado law but not under Minnesota law. It then applied tort conflict-of-laws principles to rule that Colorado law governed. After its review, the Tenth Circuit held that the court erred by not applying contract conflict-of-laws principles. The district court was reversed and the matter remanded for further consideration. View "Kipling v. State Farm Mutual Automobile" on Justia Law