Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

The decedent in this case was killed by her former boyfriend, Mark Tannenbaum, shortly after Tannenbaum was released from police custody. Plaintiff, the adminstratrix of the decedent’s estate, filed this action against the town of Watertown and three police officers. Five years later, Plaintiff withdrew her initial action and commenced the present action against the town and John Carroll, alleging that Carroll, the ranking officer at the time of Tannenbaum’s release from police custody, released him without proper conditions and restrictions. The trial court granted Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, concluding that Plaintiff’s claims were barred by the applicable statute of limitations. The Appellate Court affirmed. Plaintiff appealed, arguing that the Appellate Court erred in concluding that Conn. Gen. Stat. 52-593 did not save this case from the statute of limitations where she failed to name Carroll as a defendant in her original action and, therefore, would have failed to obtain a judgment in that action. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Carroll’s absence from the original action did not entitle Plaintiff to use section 52-593 to save this case. View "Finkle v. Carroll" on Justia Law

James H. Goldthwaite lived in his Birmingham house for approximately 45 years. The house was adjacent to or near property on which were actively used railroad tracks owned by Norfolk Southern. The record reflected that Norfolk Southern used one of the railroad tracks located near Goldthwaite's house as a staging or temporary storage area for coal trains, which consist of empty rail cars and cars loaded with coal. In October 2013, Goldthwaite filed a complaint against Norfolk Southern alleging that his "life, health, liberty and possessions" have been harmed by noise and "noxious fumes" from the diesel locomotives that were left running in coal trains that are temporarily stored near his house. Norfolk Southern had the case removed to the United States District Court on the ground that Goldthwaite's claims were completely preempted by the Interstate Commerce Commission Termination Act of 1995, and that the federal district court had federal question jurisdiction for the limited purpose of dismissing the action. In April 2014, the federal district court held that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over the action because Goldthwaite's state-law claims were not completely preempted by the ICCTA. Holding that removal of the action from state court was not proper, the federal district court remanded the case to the Jefferson Circuit Court. On remand, Norfolk Southern moved the circuit court to dismiss the action, arguing, among other things, that Goldthwaite's claims were preempted under the ICCTA because, it maintained, the nuisance action was an attempt to regulate transportation by rail carrier and actions related to the regulation and operation of rail carriers, pursuant to the ICCTA, were within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Surface Transportation Board. The Alabama Supreme Court agreed that Goldthwaite's claims were preempted by the ICCTA, the circuit court erred in denying Norfolk Southern's motion to dismiss. Therefore, the Court reversed the circuit court's order denying Norfolk Southern's motion to dismiss and rendered a judgment for Norfolk Southern, dismissing Goldthwaite's state court action. View "Norfolk Southern Railway Company v. Goldthwaite" on Justia Law

Willie Kinzie sued Belk Department Stores, L.P., Belk, Inc., David Flowers, Shanay Grant, Kathy Coffey, Donald Smith, Nikki Daggins, Ray Faja, Staffmark Investment, LLC, and John Does 1-5 (Belk Defendants) for injuries he sustained while unloading a trailer that had transported merchandise to a Belk retail store. The trial court dismissed Kinzie’s lawsuit with prejudice, finding that Kinzie had misrepresented his injuries during discovery. The Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of the trial court and remanded the case, holding that Kinzie had not misrepresented his injuries and that the ultimate sanction of dismissal with prejudice was not warranted. "Dismissal is appropriate only under the most extreme circumstances and only where lesser sanctions will not suffice." The Supreme Court, after review, concluded that this was not an extreme case, and lesser sanctions could deter misleading responses without dismissing Kinzie’s claims altogether. The Court therefore affirmed that portion of the judgment of the Court of Appeals which held that dismissal with prejudice was not warranted. However, the Court reversed the Court of Appeals’ finding that the trial court abused its discretion when it determined that Kinzie had committed a discovery violation. The Court reversed the circuit court's judgment and remanded the case for trial. View "Kinzie v. Belk Department Stores, L.P." on Justia Law

This is a consolidated case of two medical malpractice suits. In each case, the trial judge gave the jury instruction on a physician's exercise of judgment, similar to 6 Washington Practice: Washington Pattern Jury Instructions: Civil105.08 (6th ed. 2012) (WPI) was given. Both juries found in favor of the defendants and both plaintiffs appealed. After review of both cases, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's use of the exercise of judgment jury instruction. Furthermore, the Court held that evidence of consciously ruling out other diagnoses is not required; a defendant need only produce sufficient evidence of use of clinical judgment in diagnosis or treatment to satisfy a trial judge that the instruction is appropriate. "We reaffirm that this instruction is supported in Washington law and has not been shown to be incorrect or harmful." View "Fergen v. Sestero" on Justia Law

The tragic accident that gave rise to this litigation occurred during the evening of August 9, 2008 in Willingboro Township. The accident occurred as the driver of the automobile Noah Pierre was turning left at an intersection controlled by a stop sign. Among the defendants named in plaintiffs' wrongful death and survival actions were the owner and lessee of a property located on a corner of the intersection where the accident occurred. Plaintiffs alleged that these defendants negligently maintained overgrown shrubbery on their property, blocking Pierre's view of oncoming traffic at the intersection. Pierre testified that shrubbery on the property initially obscured her view when she was stopped at the stop sign at the intersection, but that she edged forward, starting and stopping four times until her view of oncoming traffic was unimpeded. A passenger in Pierre's vehicle corroborated Pierre's testimony that when she turned left, she had an unobstructed view of approaching traffic. The record contained no testimony to the contrary. However, an engineering expert retained by plaintiffs opined that the overgrown shrubbery on the property next to the intersection was a proximate cause of the fatal collision. He acknowledged Pierre's testimony that she stopped four times before proceeding and that the shrubbery on the adjoining property did not obstruct her view, but contended that Pierre's account of the accident was mistaken. The trial court granted defendants motion to strike the expert's testimony as a net opinion lacking support in the record. The court then granted defendants motion for summary judgment dismissing plaintiffs' claims against the property owner and lessee. The Appellate Division vacated the trial court's order barring the expert's report and reversed the grant of summary judgment, holding that the expert's conclusion was sufficiently grounded in the record and that plaintiffs could elicit the expert's opinion disputing Pierre's testimony in the form of a hypothetical question at trial. Given the uncontradicted testimony of Pierre and her passenger that Pierre's view of oncoming traffic was unimpeded by the shrubbery on defendants property when she made her left turn, the Supreme Court held that the trial court properly barred the causation opinion of plaintiffs' expert and granted summary judgment. The expert's opinion that the defendant property owner and defendant lessee both had a duty to maintain the landscaping on their property so that it did not obstruct the view of drivers was properly substantiated and was therefore admissible under the New Jersey Rules of Evidence. However, his opinion on the issue of causation was a net opinion that was not only unsupported by the factual evidence, but directly contradicted that evidence. View "Townsend v. Pierre" on Justia Law

After being awarded benefits for injury and re-injury in 1997 and in 2000, claimant-respondent Anthony Cellino filed a request in 2003 for payment of principal and post award interest. He also sought certification for a class action with the Workers' Compensation Court to establish a class of others who had claims of unpaid interest on benefits awarded against The Multiple Injury Trust Fund after May 9, 1996. From 2003 until 2009, nothing was filed in the case. In August 2009, the Multiple Injury Trust Fund filed a motion for summary judgment arguing for dismissal for failure to prosecute. After the trial court granted the motion, a three-judge panel reversed and remanded. The trial court subsequently certified the class and the three-judge panel affirmed in part and modified in part the certification of the class. The issue left for the Supreme Court's review was whether claimant's request for class certification is a "claim for compensation" and subject to a five-year statute of limitations. Upon review, the Court concluded that the request was indeed a claim for compensation, and that claimant failed to diligently prosecute this claim. View "Multiple Injury Trust Fund v. Cellino" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed an amended revised complaint alleging that he suffered personal injury and damages that were caused by the negligence and carelessness of Defendant, the Town of Orange. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s claim because Plaintiff failed to comply with the notice requirement of the municipal highway defect statute, Conn. Gen. Stat. 13a-149. The trial court agreed with Defendant and dismissed the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Plaintiff appealed, claiming that because he did not assert his claim under section 13a-149, the trial court should not have found that Defendant could raise its jurisdiction argument regarding section 13a-149 in a motion to dismiss. The Appellate Court reversed on the ground that the facts in the record did not support a determination that Plaintiff’s claim fell within the ambit of section 13a-149. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because a factual dispute regarding jurisdiction remained unresolved at this stage of the proceedings, the Appellate Court properly reversed the trial court’s decision to dismiss Plaintiff’s action. View "Cuozzo v. Orange" on Justia Law

Defendant Adam Dan Hilyer appealed the denial of his motion to set aside a default judgment entered against him and in favor of plaintiff Betti Fortier. In 2013, Hilyer was backing a tractor-trailer rig used to transport logs into his private driveway. At the time, Hilyer was blocking both lanes of traffic on Kennedy Avenue. M.M., a minor, was driving Fortier's van and was traveling westbound on Kennedy Avenue. B.D., M.M.'s brother; R.W., M.M.'s fiancé; and B.H., a friend of B.D.'s, were also in the vehicle. M.M.'s vehicle collided with Hilyer's trailer, and M.M. sustained injuries. In early 2014, the trial court entered a judgment against Hilyer in the amount of $550,000 and found "that the proposed settlement of the claim of the minor, M.M. is just, fair, reasonable, in keeping with the evidence, and is in the minor's best interest." A month later, Hilyer filed a motion to set aside the default judgment. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded for further proceedings, finding that Hilyer, in his motion to set aside the default judgment, met the threshold showing of each of the three "Kirtland" factors. Additionally, Hilyer supported his motion with affidavits and copies of correspondence. Fortier submitted evidence in support of her opposition to the motion to set aside that controverted the facts and evidence submitted by Hilyer. However, after conducting a hearing and taking the matter under advisement, the trial court allowed the motion to set aside to be denied by operation of law without any indication that the denial of the motion was the product of due deliberation and without any indication that the denial was based upon a consideration of the Kirtland factors. Therefore, the Supreme Court reversed the denial by operation of law of Hilyer's motion to set aside the default judgment and remanded this case for the trial court to consider the Kirtland factors in determining whether to set aside the default judgment. View "Hilyer v. Fortier" on Justia Law

The defendants were involved in various aspects of the design, construction, and installation of a ventilation system in a research laboratory at the University of New Hampshire (UNH). By November 2003, the project was substantially complete. In November 2009, plaintiff suffered injuries while working in the laboratory due to a faulty vent pipe that exposed her to toxic fumes. In February 2012, plaintiff filed a negligence action against Oak Point, and in November 2012, she added Ambient as a defendant. Plaintiff also sued UNH, which owned the laboratory where plaintiff was injured, but she eventually settled her claims with UNH. Defendants subsequently filed motions for summary judgment, arguing that plaintiff’s claims were barred by the statute of repose found in RSA 508:4-b, I. Plaintiff appealed. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Lennartz v. Oak Point Associates, P.A." on Justia Law

Plaintiff Augustine Badiali was injured when his motor vehicle was rear-ended by an uninsured motorist. Plaintiff filed a UM claim, which proceeded to arbitration and resulted in an award in plaintiff s favor. Plaintiff filed suit against his insurer, defendant New Jersey Manufacturers Insurance Group ( NJM ), after NJM rejected the arbitration award and refused to pay its share. The trial court confirmed the arbitration award in a summary action and found NJM liable for its share of the award. In a subsequent action, plaintiff asserted that NJM litigated in bad faith by advocating that its policy language allowed for a rejection of the arbitration award at issue. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of NJM. The court agreed that the case was ripe for summary judgment although discovery had not been completed. The court was further persuaded that NJM s position was fairly debatable based on its policy language and on the existence of an unpublished Appellate Division decision involving nearly identical facts, in which NJM was also a party. The Appellate Division affirmed, holding that NJM s position was fairly debatable because it was supported by a prior, unpublished opinion of the court. Plaintiff was thereby barred from recovering counsel fees or any other consequential damages. Finding no reversible error in the appellate court's judgment, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Badiali v. N.J. Mfg. Ins. Grp." on Justia Law