Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Valerie Audiffred and her husband, Robert Kimmons, filed an action against Thomas Arnold that arose from an automobile collision. A settlement proposal was filed on behalf of Audiffred, which Arnold constructively rejected. After a trial, a verdict was entered against Arnold for Audiffred’s past medical expenses. The jury did not award anything to Kimmons for his loss of consortium claim. Audiffred and Kimmons subsequently filed a motion seeking an award of attorney’s fees pursuant to Fla. Stat. 768.79 and Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.442. Arnold moved to strike the settlement proposal, arguing that it was defective because it did not apportion the settlement amount between Audiffred and Kimmons. The trial court denied the motion to strike and awarded attorney’s fees. The district court reversed the award of attorney’s fees, concluding that the settlement offer constituted a joint proposal and that the proposal was invalid for failing to comply with the statute and rule. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that when a single offeror submits a settlement proposal to a single offeree pursuant to section 768.79 and rule 1.442 and the offer resolves pending claims by or against additional parties who are neither offerors nor offerees, it constitutes a joint proposal that is subject to the apportionment requirement of the rule. View "Audiffred v. Arnold" on Justia Law

Kipp, an Illinois resident, purchased a chairlift ticket at Devil’s Head Ski Resort in Merrimac, Wisconsin. He claims that as a result of the “unreasonably fast speed” of the lift in the boarding area, he was injured (broken collarbone) as he was attempting to board it. After allowing Kipp to conduct limited discovery, the Illinois district court dismissed the suit for lack of personal jurisdiction, noting that the defendant’s only offices are in Wisconsin. The company does not engage in print or broadcast advertising in Illinois, but it does attend a trade show that takes place in Chicago every year. At the show, Ski Enterprise representatives speak with potential customers and obtain their email addresses. The company later sends out “email E blasts” to those contacts. There is also a website, through which customers can reserve rooms at the resort; they cannot purchase lift tickets on the site. The resort offers a vacation package called the “Chicagoland Express,” but the package is not limited to Illinois residents. Approximately 60 to 75 percent of the resort’s clients are from Illinois. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, describing defendant’s contacts with Illinois as insubstantial and episodic. View "Kipp v. Ski Enter. Corp." on Justia Law

Nineteen unrelated mothers brought in the Circuit Court of Wayne County claims against Pfizer, Inc. and related entities (collectively, Respondents) on behalf of their respective minor children, alleging that their ingestion of Zoloft during their pregnancies caused their children to suffer birth defects. Petitioners hailed from fifteen different states. Respondents moved to refer the litigation to the Mass Litigation Panel. After the motion was denied, a virtually identical complaint was filed in the Wayne County Circuit Court by six unrelated plaintiff families against Respondents. The circuit court consolidated the two civil actions. The twenty-five plaintiff families then moved to refer the litigation to the Panel. The chief justice transferred the two civil actions to the Panel. Respondents filed a motion seeking to dismiss twenty-two non-resident plaintiff families on the basis of forum non conveniens. The Panel granted, in part, the motion to dismiss and dismissed twenty of the twenty-two plaintiff families. Petitioner sought a writ of prohibition to prevent enforcement of the Panel’s dismissal order. The Supreme Court denied the writ, holding that there was no basis to prevent the Panel from enforcing its dismissal order. View "State ex rel. J.C. v. Hon. James P. Mazzone" on Justia Law

Bell Helicopter Textron Inc. appealed a Superior Court order determining that Texas law should govern litigation involving a helicopter that crashed in Mexico in 2010. Despite the presumption in the Restatement (Second) of Conflicts that the law of the place where the injury occurred should govern the dispute, the Superior Court found that Texas law had the most significant relationship to the liability, damages, and remedies at issue. The court also opined that Texas law would be easier to apply than Mexican law because there would be no need to hire interpreters. In this interlocutory appeal to the Delaware Supreme Court, Bell argued that Mexican law was more appropriate because the decedents were all Mexican citizens, their relatives bringing this suit are all Mexican citizens, the helicopter was owned by a Mexican company, and it had been operated solely within Mexico for over thirty years when it crashed. Because the governing Restatement test to determine which sovereign's law to apply strongly favors Mexico, the Delaware Court reversed: in this case, those principles unambiguously favor applying Mexican law to the liability, damages, and remedies at issue. View "Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc. v. Arteaga" on Justia Law

Donald and Crystal Peel were traveling in their van when they were struck by a truck driven by Michael Conner and owned by Conner's employer. In 2004, the Peels sued Conner and his employer (collectively, Conner). Conner timely answered and requested discovery. The Peels did not respond. In 2013, when the Peels had done nothing to pursue their claims, Conner moved to dismiss for want of prosecution. The trial court refused to dismiss and directed the Peels to respond to Conner’s requests for discovery served more than eight years earlier. Conner filed a petition for mandamus directing the trial court to dismiss the case. The court of appeals denied relief. Conner subsequently petitioned the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court conditionally granted the petition for writ of mandamus and directed the trial court to vacate its order denying Conner’s motion to dismiss and directed the court to dismiss this suit for want of prosecution. View "In re Conner" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Tenth Circuit's review centered on a dispute over insurance coverage following a private airplane crash. Garmin International, Inc., purchased an insurance policy from Appellees (the insurance companies). In 2008, while the insurance policy was in effect, Appellant Henry Bartle, an individual who had some dealings with Garmin, crashed while piloting his malfunctioning personal aircraft, injuring himself and his passengers. Bartle sought coverage under Garmin’s insurance policy for indemnification from claims brought against Bartle by his injured passengers. Appellees, the insurers, brought suit federal district court seeking a declaration under the Declaratory Judgment Act that Bartle did not qualify as an "Insured" under Garmin’s policy. Bartle submitted evidence to the district court to demonstrate he was indeed an "Insured," but the district court refused to consider much of the evidence because the evidence failed to conform to district court rules regarding proper citation. Without considering this evidence, the district court granted summary judgment to the insurers, finding that Bartle was not an "Insured" under the policy. Bartle appealed both the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the insurers and its refusal to consider the excluded evidence. Finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed: "[t]he district court concluded, and Mr. Bartle acknowledged, that the exhibits submitted could not be feasibly used by the district court without great difficulty. The district court cannot be expected to review evidence, evaluate arguments, or arrive at reasoned conclusions without usable citations. In this case the merits cannot be separated from the process, and ultimately Mr. Bartle bore the responsibility to present evidence that would allow a rational trier of fact to find in his favor." View "Certain Underwriters v. Bartle" on Justia Law

Appellee Maria Brady had a lengthy history of foot problems. By 2007, both of her feet were in pain due to toe deformities. Appellee’s podiatrist, William Urbas, D.P.M., successfully treated toes on her left foot with surgery; he then turned his attention to her right foot. One of Appellee’s primary complaints on her right foot pertained to a hammer-toe condition of her second toe: this deformity caused the middle of Appellee’s second toe to rise above the plane of the foot, which in turn caused rubbing and pain when Appellee wore shoes. Dr. Urbas performed a total of four operations between March 2008 and January 2010. Before each surgery, he explained the risks and complications that could occur, and Appellee signed a consent form acknowledging her awareness of these possible outcomes. The first operation did not finally alleviate Appellee’s condition, and Dr. Urbas eventually performed three more surgeries, each involving, among other things, the removal of additional bone material with the expectation that the foot would, over time, generate soft tissue to fill the gap and provide flexibility. Nevertheless, Appellee’s pain persisted and, in the end, her toe was less stable and significantly shorter than it had been initially. In August 2010, Appellee consulted a different podiatrist, Dr. Harold Schoenhaus, who performed a bone-graft operation which returned the toe to approximately ninety percent of its original length. This procedure also had the effect of restoring some of the toe’s stability and substantially reducing the pain. Appellee testified that she was pleased with the outcome of Dr. Schoenhaus’ surgery and that she returned to all levels of activity. In December 2010, Appellee filed a complaint against Dr. Urbas, alleging that he negligently treated her toe in the three follow-up surgeries performed after March 2008. In this appeal by allowance involving alleged medical negligence, the issue before the Supreme Court centered on whether a doctor may introduce evidence that the patient was informed of and acknowledged various risks of surgery, although the complaint does not assert a cause of action based on a lack of informed consent. After unsuccessfully moving for a new trial on the basis that the trial court erred in admitting the consent evidence, Appellee appealed. The Superior Court vacated and remanded for a new trial. In concluding that the trial court had abused its discretion, the Superior Court court adopted the reasoning of the Supreme Court of Virginia regarding the relevancy of consent evidence in a medical malpractice case: assent to treatment does not amount to consent to negligence, regardless of the enumerated risks and complications of which the patient was made aware. In a trial on a malpractice complaint that only asserts negligence, and not lack of informed consent, evidence that a patient agreed to go forward with the operation in spite of the risks of which she was informed is irrelevant and should be excluded. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that evidence that a patient affirmatively consented to treatment after being informed of the risks of that treatment is generally irrelevant to a cause of action sounding in medical negligence. View "Brady v. Urbas" on Justia Law

In 2005 E3’s predecessor began construction of an ethanol plant, to be powered, in part, by methane, and contracted with Biothane for a boiler system. Biothane, an expert in systems integration but not in boilers specifically, subcontracted with PEI to install and integrate the boilers. Biothane retained overall responsibility. Both are engineering companies. In 2007, PEI’s engineer repeatedly tried and failed to light the main flame of one of the boilers. The repeated attempts caused gas to build up and explode. E3 claims that the boiler never worked properly afterward and that the plant failed as a result. The plant’s owners eventually reorganized in bankruptcy. In 2011 (3 years and 364 days after the explosion) E3 sued, alleging torts against both companies and breach of contract against Biothane. The district court granted defendants summary judgment, finding all of E3’s claims time-barred under Neb. Rev. Stat. 25-222, Nebraska’s two-year limitations period for actions based on professional negligence. The Eighth Circuit affirmed. Regardless of whether the chain of events ultimately led to the breach of a contract, E3 still sued Biothane “for an action performed in a professional capacity.” View "E3 Biofuels, LLC v. Biothane, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a resident of California, and Defendant, a resident of Michigan, worked together with a third man to develop and market an electrolyte for use in hydrogen fuel cells. When Plaintiff and the third man sold the electrolyte technology without telling Defendant, Defendant threatened to sue if he was not paid what he claimed was his one-third share of the proceeds under an oral agreement. Thereafter, Plaintiff sued Defendant in California seeking a declaration that no oral agreement existed between the parties and for damages for intentional interference with a sales contract. The district court dismissed the suit, concluding that it lacked jurisdiction over Defendant on either of the two claims. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because Defendant neither purposefully availed himself of the privilege of conducting activities in California nor expressly aimed his conduct at California, the district court did not err in dismissing the case for lack of personal jurisdiction. View "Picot v. Weston" on Justia Law

One Hope contracts with the Illinois Department of Children and Family Services to provide services with the objective of keeping troubled families together. Seven-month-old Marshana died while her family participated in One Hope’s program. The Cook County public guardian, as administrator of Marshana’s estate, filed a wrongful death case to recover damages against One Hope and Marshana’s mother,alleging that One Hope failed to protect Marshana from abuse or neglect and should not have allowed Marshana to be returned to her mother because of her unfavorable history and failure to complete parenting classes. Attorneys for the Public Guardian deposed the executive director of One Hope, who revealed the existence of a “Priority Review” report regarding Marshana’s case. The priority review process considers whether One Hope’s services were professionally sound, identifies “gaps in service delivery” and evaluates “whether certain outcomes have been successful or unsuccessful.” The Public Guardian moved to compel production of the report. One Hope argued that the report was protected from disclosure by the self-critical analysis privilege. The circuit court determined that the privilege did not apply. The appellate court and Illinois Supreme Court affirmed. Relevant legislative acts and omissions evince a public policy determination by the General Assembly that the type of information sought in discovery here is not subject to a “self-critical analysis privilege.” View "Harris v. One Hope United, Inc." on Justia Law