Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Injury Law
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Defendants Quality Carriers, Inc. and Bennie Hugh Orcutt filed a petition for a writ of mandamus to direct the Dallas Circuit Court to vacate its order denying their motion to transfer the underlying action to the Autauga Circuit Court and to enter an order granting the motion. Desmond Woods was driving northbound on Interstate 65 in Autauga County; Kimberly Livingston, Tory Cooper, Marquita Speer ("Marquita"), and Aaron Jones were passengers in the automobile. The automobile Woods was driving had a mechanical problem and stalled in the right travel lane; it was nighttime, and the lights on the automobile were not on. Woods, Cooper, and Jones got out of the automobile and started looking under the hood. Livingston and Marquita remained in the automobile. Orcutt, who was employed by Quality Carriers, was also traveling northbound on Interstate 65 in a tractor-trailer rig that was owned by Quality Carriers. The tractor-trailer rig Orcutt was driving collided with the back of the automobile. Both vehicles caught fire. Livingston and Marquita, who were in the automobile when it caught fire, were pronounced dead at the scene by the Autauga County coroner. Woods and Cooper were transported to Prattville Hospital. According to the accident report, marijuana was found on Woods's person at the hospital. At the time the accident report was filed, toxicology results were pending to determine whether Woods was under the influence of marijuana at the time of the crash. Upon review of defendants' argment on appeal, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court exceeded its discretion in denying Quality Carriers and Orcutt's motion for a transfer based on the interest-of-justice prong of the forum non conveniens statute. Accordingly, the Court granted the petition for the writ of mandamus and directed the trial court, in the interest of justice, to enter an order transferring the case from the Dallas Circuit Court to the Autauga Circuit Court. View "Ex parte Quality Carriers, Inc." on Justia Law

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In 2008, Donald Stewart, driving a semi-tractor trailer, hit the back of a tow truck driven by Melvin Mathis. Mathis sued Stewart and his employer, Huff & Puff Trucking, Inc., for negligence in the District of Wyoming. After a bench trial, the district court issued findings of fact and conclusions of law. The court determined Stewart was 100 percent at fault for the accident, and entered judgment in favor of Mathis. The damages award, which was significantly less than Mathis sought, was based on findings that his spinal injuries from the accident were only temporary and he did not suffer a mild traumatic brain injury (“MTBI”). Mathis moved for a new trial, arguing, among other things, that the judge’s law clerk had an undisclosed conflict of interest. The court denied the motion. On appeal, Mathis challenged: (1) the district court’s factual findings relating to his back and head injuries; (2) whether the court impermissibly allowed a defense expert to testify beyond his qualifications as a biomechanical engineer; and (3) the court’s denial of his motion for a new trial based on the alleged law clerk conflict. Finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed. View "Mathis v. Huff & Puff Trucking" on Justia Law

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The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review centered on recovery under an uninsured motorist (UM) insurance policy. Specifically, the issue was whether the burden of proof on summary judgment between the insured and the UM carrier was misallocated. The UM carrier denied coverage based on a claim that the at-fault driver was not "uninsured" as defined in the UM policy at issue here because the drive's liability carrier had not "legally denied" coverage. After review, the Supreme Court concluded the Court of Appeals erred in placing the burden of proof on the UM carrier in this instance, and therefore reversed. View "Travelers Home & Marine Ins. Co. v. Castellanos" on Justia Law

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Gudel AG, one of several defendants to this case, petitioned for a writ of mandamus to direct the Crenshaw Circuit Court to vacate its order denying Gudel's motion to dismiss the personal-injury claims filed against it by Robert and Cindy Rutledge, and to enter an order dismissing the Rutledges' claims on the basis of a lack of in personam jurisdiction. In February 2013, Robert sued Smart Alabama, LLC ("SAL"), an automotive-parts manufacturer located in Crenshaw County, seeking to recover worker's compensation benefits in connection with an alleged work-related injury Robert suffered in November 2011 while in SAL's employ. In November 2013, Robert amended his original complaint to add a count pursuant to Alabama's Extended Manufacturer's Liability Doctrine as well as negligence and wantonness claims. In addition, the amended complaint added both Hyundai WIA ("Hyundai") and Gudel, as well as several fictitiously named entities, as defendants. The amended complaint alleged that Gudel, a foreign corporation headquartered in Switzerland, "designed, built, manufactured, tested and sold [the] subject machine/equipment that is the subject matter of [the Rutledges'] lawsuit." After review, the Supreme Court held that the trial court exceeded its discretion in determining that it possessed personal jurisdiction over Gudel. Accordingly, Gudel has established a clear legal right to the dismissal of the claims against it; therefore, the Alabama Court granted the petition and directed the trial court to vacate its order denying Gudel's motion to dismiss and to dismiss the Rutledges' claims against Gudel. View "Ex parte Gudel AG." on Justia Law

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Father John Feeney was employed as a priest by the Catholic Diocese of Green Bay, a religious organization incorporated and headquartered in Wisconsin. Feeney later came to the Diocese of Reno-Las Vegas. John Doe 119 alleged that Feeney sexually assaulted him during Feeney’s time in Las Vegas and sued the Diocese of Green Bay for negligently hiring and retaining Feeney and for failing to warn others that Feeney was a danger to children. The district court concluded that it had jurisdiction over the Diocese and returned a verdict in favor of Doe on the negligence claims. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Feeney was not the agent of the Diocese of Green Bay during his ministry in Las Vegas; and (2) the district court did not have personal jurisdiction over the Diocese because the Diocese did not have sufficient contacts with Nevada. View "Catholic Diocese of Green Bay v. John Doe 119" on Justia Law

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Plaintiff filed a wrongful death suit related to her husband’s exposure to asbestos. Plaintiff served numerous defendants within within 120 days of filing in accordance with the service-of-process provisions of Utah R. Civ. P. 4(b) but did not serve defendant Kerr Corporation until five years later. Kerr filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that it had not been timely served. The district court denied the motion. At issue in this appeal was Rule 4(b)’s provision that “where one defendant in a case is served, other defendants may be served at any time prior to trial.” The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Plaintiff complied with Rule 4(b)’s service of process requirements because she served Kerr prior to trial and while previously served defendants remained parties to the action. View "St. Jeor v. Kerr Corp." on Justia Law

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In April 2010, Officer Brandon Brown, a police officer with the City of Fultondale, received a be-on-the-lookout ("BOLO") from dispatch for a blue Mitsubishi automobile, the occupants of which were suspected of having committed a theft, engaged in the pursuit of a blue Mitsubishi that he saw leaving the area of the offense. Moments after Officer Brown ceased pursuit of the blue Mitsubishi, the driver, Christopher Mitchell, ran a red light at an intersection and struck a vehicle being driven by Pamela Cupps in which David Cupps was a passenger. Pamela Cupps was killed and David Cupps was injured. David Cupps, on behalf of himself and as administrator of Pamela Cupps' estate, sued Mitchell, Officer Brown, and others. With regard to Officer Brown, David Cupps alleged that Officer Brown negligently and/or wantonly pursued Mitchell's vehicle by driving recklessly, that he negligently and/or wantonly pursued Mitchell's vehicle in violation of the City of Fultondale Police Department's pursuit policy and procedure, and that he violated section 32-5A-7(c), Ala. Code 1975, by operating his patrol vehicle in pursuit of another vehicle without the use of an audible signal. After the complaint was filed, David Cupps died; Allison Cupps, the administrator of the estates of David Cupps and Pamela Cupps, was substituted as the plaintiff. Officer Brown petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to direct the Jefferson Circuit Court to vacate its order denying his summary-judgment motion and to enter a summary judgment in his favor based on State-agent immunity and statutory immunity on claims filed against him by Allison Cupps. Finding that Officer Brown established, as a matter of law, that he was entitled to State-agent immunity from Cupps' action, the Supreme Court granted his petition and issued the writ. View "Ex parte Brandon Brown." on Justia Law

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Humphrey sued under the Federal Tort Claims Act on behalf of her daughter Teniscia, alleging that medical malpractice during Teniscia’s 2008 birth left her permanently disabled. Teniscia’s father, Lee, participated in the litigation, but did not ask to be joined as a party. Humphrey and Lee are not married; Teniscia lives with Humphrey, but both are Teniscia’s legal custodians. The case was settled for $13 million, used to buy an annuity to provide care over the course of Teniscia’s life. Porter, who represents Lee, demanded a share of the 25% contingent fee that had been negotiated between Humphrey and her lawyer, who opposed this request, arguing that Lee was not a party and that Porter had not performed any of the legal work that led to the settlement. After the settlement Lee moved to file an amended complaint naming himself as a plaintiff. The district court denied Lee’s motion, stating that Lee not only had approved the settlement but also had not filed an administrative claim, as the FTCA requires. Lee then moved to intervene. The court denied that motion as untimely. Porter unsuccessfully sought fees notwithstanding Lee’s non-party status. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, concluding that the district court could not have allowed intervention even on a timely motion. View "Lee v. United States" on Justia Law

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GE manufactures Omniscan, an FDA-approved gadolinium-based contrast agent that has been associated in some patients with development of nephrogenic systemic fibrosis (NSF), a rare and deadly condition that leads to the hardening (fibrosis) of the kidneys. Omniscan was administered to Wahl for two MRIs she received in Nashville in 2006. About one year later, she displayed the first symptoms of NSF. She was officially diagnosed with NSF in 2010. The Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation consolidated all pre-trial litigation of Omniscan-related cases in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Ohio. In 2011, Wahl filed a complaint in that court. With the agreement of Wahl and GE, the MDL judge transferred the case, in 2013, to the Middle District of Tennessee, the “proper venue.” GE then moved for summary judgment, arguing that all Omniscan doses produced from 2004 to 2006 were marked with expiration dates two years after manufacture, so the Omniscan administered to Wahl must have expired no later than 2008; the Tennessee Products Liability Act’s statute of repose requires suits to be instituted within one year of the expiration date appearing on a product’s packaging. The Sixth Circuit affirmed summary judgment, favoring GE, applying Tennessee choice-of-law rules. View "Wahl v. Gen. Elec. Co." on Justia Law

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Plaintiff-appellant Gary Holdaway filed suit against Broulim’s Supermarket, alleging that a titanium screw implanted in his leg was fractured when an automatic door at Broulim’s malfunctioned and closed on the leg. Broulim’s filed a motion for summary judgment arguing that Holdaway failed to provide admissible evidence that the malfunctioning door fractured the screw and caused the resulting medical complications. The district court agreed, granted the motion, and Holdaway appealed. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Holdaway v. Broulim's Supermarket" on Justia Law