Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs-appellants Miriam Navarrete and her minor children Bryan, Stephanie, and Steven Navarette (collectively Navarrete) appealed the grant of summary judgment in favor of defendant-respondent Hayley Meyer on plaintiffs' claims for violation of Vehicle Code section 21701 and civil conspiracy arising from allegations that Meyer, as passenger in a vehicle, told the driver to drive at an unsafe speed over a road Meyer knew had unusual conditions that would cause the car to become airborne, resulting in a fatal accident. In granting summary judgment, the trial court ruled there was no evidence to suggest Meyer's act of telling the driver to drive faster affected his control over the vehicle, and therefore no triable issues of material fact as to either cause of action. Navarrete argued on appeal that the evidence raised triable issues for a jury as to whether to impose joint liability on Meyer for her conduct on the night in question on a theory of concert of action or conspiracy, and also as to whether she unreasonably interfered with the safe operation of a vehicle within the meaning of Vehicle Code section 21701 to support a cause of action. The Court of Appeal agreed with plaintiff, reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Navarrete v. Meyer" on Justia Law

Lawrence and Evelyn Morrow filed a lawsuit against THI of South Carolina at Magnolia Place at Spartanburg, LLC (Magnolia Place) alleging personal injuries to Lawrence as a resident. The Morrows alleged that due to Magnolia Place's negligence, Lawrence sustained an injury while being assisted in the shower and was required to undergo surgery to remove a penile implant. They also alleged the nursing home failed to properly monitor Lawrence's diabetes or properly care for his pressure wounds. The Morrows also brought suit against Fundamental Long-Term Care Holdings, LLC, Fundamental Clinical Consulting, LLC, Fundamental Administrative Services, LLC, THI of Baltimore, Inc., THI of South Carolina, Inc., and THI Holdings, LLC (collectively, Fundamental Entities). The Morrows alleged the Fundamental Entities were vicariously liable for the negligence of Magnolia Place, and furthermore were directly responsible for Lawrence's injuries by way of their conscious disregard for his health in underfunding Magnolia Place, which led to issues with staffing, training, and nutrition. The Fundamental Entities thereafter filed a motion to bifurcate the trial pursuant to Rule 42(b), SCRCP between the nursing home negligence claims and the corporate negligence claims, and further, to stay discovery related to the corporate negligence claims. The Fundamental Entities argued bifurcation was proper because the issues of nursing home negligence and corporate negligence were distinct, and the Morrows could only move forward on the corporate negligence claims if they were first successful against Magnolia Place. As an extension, the Fundamental Entities argued bifurcation of the trial would simplify the issues, save significant judicial resources, and cut costs related to discovery. The trial court granted the motion, finding that without first proving negligence against the nursing home the Morrows' claims for corporate negligence could not proceed. Accordingly, the trial court ordered that discovery and a trial on the nursing home negligence claims could go forward, and only if the Morrows were successful, a new jury could hear the corporate negligence claims in a later proceeding. The court of appeals dismissed as interlocutory an appeal which severed a number of defendants from this lawsuit, ostensibly under the label of "bifurcation." The Morrows appealed, and the Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court's order went "far beyond our common understanding of bifurcation," thereby affecting a substantial right of the petitioners. View "Morrow v. Fundamental Long-Term Care" on Justia Law

Charles and Deborah Bate were both seriously injured in a head-on vehicle collision. After obtaining a judgment against the driver of the opposing vehicle the Bates sued Greenwich Insurance Company seeking underinsured motorist coverage under a policy allegedly issued to Charles Bate’s employer by Greenwich. Greenwich did not answer the petition, and the Bates obtained a default judgment in the amount of $3 million. More than two years later, Greenwich filed an amended motion to set aside the default judgment as void, arguing that service of process was invalid. The trial court set aside the default judgment as void, stating that there was no valid service of process. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Bates properly effected service of process under Mo. Rev. Stat. 375.906 and complied with all service requirements of that statute. View "Bate v. Greenwich Ins. Co." on Justia Law

In the name of controlling litigation costs, a heating and air conditioning contractor, Blue Hen Mechanical, Inc. sued Christian Brothers Risk Pooling Trust as subrogee for the Little Sisters of the Poor for malicious prosecution. In January 2008, the Little Sisters of the Poor contracted with Blue Hen to maintain the heating, ventilation, and air conditioning equipment at its nonprofit residential nursing home facility. Two months later, the nursing home's air conditioner broke, requiring the unit to be replaced at a cost of $168,740. The Little Sisters of the Poor filed suit against Blue Hen, alleging that the unit's failure was due to Blue Hen's negligence in inspecting and maintaining the equipment. After briefing and oral argument, the Superior Court determined that the Little Sisters of the Poor had not produced sufficient evidence of Blue Hen's negligence, and granted Blue Hen's motion for summary judgment. Rather than seek costs in that lawsuit, Blue Hen initiated another suit against the Little Sisters of the Poor, alleging malicious prosecution and abuse of process. Blue Hen conceded that the Little Sisters of the Poor initially had good cause to sue. But it contended that during the course of that litigation, the Little Sisters of the Poor should have realized that its suit lacked probable cause, and should have dismissed its claims against Blue Hen. The Superior Court refused to enlarge the tort of malicious prosecution, which has historically been disfavored by Delaware courts, and determined that under the tort (as Delaware court have defined it), Blue Hen failed to demonstrate that the Little Sisters of the Poor acted maliciously in bringing its action and granted summary judgment to the Little Sisters of the Poor. Blue Hen appealed, and the Supreme Court affirmed: "[w]hatever the original wisdom for sanctioning the tort of malicious prosecution, we refuse to extend it to encompass claims properly brought before the court in the first instance. As important, there is no basis in the summary judgment record to support a rational jury finding that the Little Sisters of the Poor acted maliciously in the original suit, rather than in a good faith belief that Blue Hen was responsible for the serious losses that the Little Sisters of the Poor had suffered." View "Blue Hen Mechanical, Inc. v. Christian Brothers Risk Pooling Trust" on Justia Law

At issue in this residential construction dispute was whether the statutory cap on exemplary damages is waived if not pleaded as an affirmative defense or avoidance. The trial court affirmed an exemplary damages award in excess of the statutory cap because Petitioner did not assert the cap until her motion for a new trial. The court of appeals affirmed the exemplary damages award, concluding that the statutory cap on exemplary damages did not apply because Petitioner failed to expressly plead the cap as an affirmative defense. The Supreme Court (1) reversed the court of appeals’ judgment in relation to the exemplary cap, holding (i) the exemplary damages cap is not a matter ”constituting an avoidance or affirmative defense” and need not be affirmatively pleaded because it applies automatically when invoked and does not require proof of additional facts, and (ii) because Petitioner timely asserted the cap in her motion for new trial, the exemplary damages must be capped at $200,000; and (2) affirmed in all other respects. View "Zorilla v. Aypco Constr. II, LLC" on Justia Law

Defendants Courtyard Citiflats, LLC, and Action Property Management, L.L.C. (collectively, "Citiflats"), petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to direct the Circuit Court to dismiss the complaint of the plaintiff Coretta Arrington as untimely filed. On July 18, 2014, Arrington filed, both individually and in her capacity as the administrator of the estate of her deceased minor child, a complaint against Citiflats. Arrington's complaint alleged tort-based claims in connection with the death of Arrington's child as the result of injuries allegedly sustained in 2012, on premises owned and managed by Citiflats. Arrington's complaint was accompanied by an "Affidavit of Substantial Hardship," alleging that Arrington was unable to pay the corresponding filing fee. At the time it was filed, the hardship statement had not been approved by the trial court as required by statute. Arrington's complaint was also accompanied by the summonses necessary for service on the named defendants, which were stamped "filed" by the clerk of the trial court on the filing date. On August 18, 2014, after the July 24, 2014 expiration of the applicable two-year statute of limitations, the trial court entered an order approving the hardship statement. On August 19, 2014, the clerk of the trial court issued the previously filed summonses for service. Citiflats filed a Rule 12(b)(6) motion seeking to dismiss Arrington's complaint on the ground that the statutory limitations period had expired without the payment of a filing fee or the approval of a hardship statement. The Circuit Court denied Citiflats' motion. Because the Supreme Court held that the trial court erred in refusing to dismiss Arrington's complaint as untimely, it concluded that Citiflats made the requisite showing of a clear legal right to the relief sought. View "Ex parte Courtyard Citiflats, LLC, and Action Property Management LLC." on Justia Law

Devin Witt allegedly drove a pickup truck over Benjamin Carrel’s foot in a parking lot in Beatrice, Nebraska. The truck was registered to Serco, Inc. Carrel brought a personal injury action against Serco and Witt. When Serco did not respond to a service of summons, a show cause order, or notice of Carrel’s motion for a default judgment, the district court entered a default judgment against Serco. The district court denied Serco’s motion to vacate the default judgment. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court erred in denying Serco’s motion to vacate the default judgment, holding that, where Serco placed Carrel on notice of its meritorious defense that it did not employ Witt or own the vehicle he was driving at the time of the incident and where any negligence on the part of Serco in responding to the suit was excusable, permitting the default judgment to stand would unfairly deprive Serco of a substantial right and produce an unjust result. Remanded with directions to vacate the default judgment and to give Serco a reasonable time in which to file an appropriate responsive pleading. View "Carrel v. Serco Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff injured himself while bowling at a center operated by Defendant. After the deadline passed that had been for seeking an amendment of a pleading, Plaintiff filed a motion seeking leave to amend his complaint pursuant to Nev. R. Civ. P. 15(a) seeking to amend his theory of liability. The district court denied Plaintiff’s motion, concluding that the motion was untimely and, furthermore, even if leave were granted, the proposed amendment would be futile “given the results of the discovery already conducted.” The district court subsequently granted summary judgment as to the theory of liability set forth in the original complaint. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court (1) erred by failing to independently analyze whether the proposed amendment was timely under the standards of Nev. R. Civ. P. 16(b), which requires a showing of “good cause” for missing a deadline, before considering whether it was warranted under the standards of Rule 15(a); (2) incorrectly applied the futility exception to Rule 15(a): but (3) nonetheless reached the correct conclusion under the facts of this case. View "Nutton v. Sunset Station, Inc." on Justia Law

Ideker sued, alleging she developed non-Hodgkins lymphoma from exposure to benzene while working in HD’s paint department. The district court dismissed, predicting that the Missouri Supreme Court would require Ideker to raise her claim before Missouri’s labor and industrial relations commission because it was covered by Missouri’s Workers’ Compensation Law. Ideker then filed a workers’ compensation claim, which is pending. The dismissal became final. Less than 30 days later, the Missouri Court of Appeals issued an opinion that cast doubt on that prediction. Although Ideker’s counsel was aware of the decision before time to appeal expired, counsel stated that “there was little incentive for Ideker to seek appellate review requiring a second federal court to predict how Missouri courts would rule.” Ideker filed a complaint in state court, reasserting her occupational disease claim. Harley-Davidson removed the case to federal court. The court dismissed without prejudice on collateral estoppel grounds, concluding that its prior decision was binding because Missouri law precluded Ideker “from relitigating issues finally decided in [an] incorrect order[].” The Eighth Circuit affirmed. Any purported “mistake” the court made in predicting Missouri law does not enable Ideker to circumvent the dismissal by refiling the same injury claim based on the same historical facts in a second case. View "Ideker v. Harley-Davidson, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, individually on and behalf of the Estate of Sharon Hanna (the decedent), brought an action against HCR ManorCare, LLC and other entities and individuals engaged in the operation of nursing homes and assisted living facilities (collectively, ManorCare) alleging that the decedent died as a result of substandard care she received at Heartland of Charleston, a ManorCare nursing home. This appeal concerned Plaintiff’s request for production seeking “Center Visit Summaries,” which concerned the treatment of patients at Heartland during the decedent’s residency, and “Briefing Packets,” which consisted of reports and meeting minutes received by the board of directors of each ManorCare corporate entity relating to the decedent’s residency at Heartland. The circuit court directed ManorCare to produce the documents requested. Defendants asked the Supreme Court for relief in prohibition to prevent the enforcement of the circuit court’s orders. The Supreme Court granted the requested relief as moulded, holding (1) ManorCare’s requested relief concerning the Center Visit Summaries was without merit; but (2) the circuit court exceeded its jurisdiction in ordering the production of the board of director Briefing Packets, as the court should have conducted an in camera proceeding to make an independent determination as to whether the Briefing Packets were excluded from discovery pursuant to the attorney-client privilege. View "State ex rel. HCR Manorcare, LLC v. Hon. Stucky" on Justia Law