Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Stephens visited the Oaklawn Club for gambling. After winning, playing slot machines, Stephens cashed out and left the casino. He returned later that evening and purchased another ticket for use in the slot machines. He was approached by uniformed security personnel and Jessup, a uniformed Hot Springs police officer. They accused Stephens of stealing the cashed-out ticket and detained Stephens while employees reviewed surveillance footage. Stephens alleges that Jessup threatened to “take him to jail immediately” if he did not return the money. Jessup recited Miranda warnings, escorted Stephens to his vehicle, and retrieved the money. An Arkansas state court granted Oaklawn summary judgment. Neither Jessup nor Amtote was a party to that action. Stephens then filed a federal suit against Jessup and Amtote, alleging the same causes of action against these new defendants. The court dismissed, citing issue preclusion. The Eighth Circuit reversed in part, finding that Stephens did not perfect an appeal with respect to Amtote. The court expressed no view on the merits of the Jessup claims, stating that the record is not clear that Stephens is trying to relitigate an issue that was previously decided or that Jessup and Oaklawn represent the same legal right. View "Stephens v. Jessup" on Justia Law

The Higginses visited an Indiana amusement park. The filter pump connected to the park’s lazy river malfunctioned. As staff worked to fix the problem, pool chemicals—bleach and hydrochloric acid—accumulated in the pump. When the pump restarted, the chemicals discharged into the water and a cloud of chlorine gas released into the air. The Higginses were not nearby, but their niece was, and they received a cell phone call, prompting them to head in that direction. When they arrived, Kent Higgins inhaled an unspecified amount of chemical fumes that lingered. Complaining of chest tightness, burning eyes, shortness of breath, and nausea, Higgins visited the emergency room, where he was diagnosed with “mild chemical exposure” and discharged with instructions to follow up with his primary care physician. Higgins saw a pulmonologist later that summer, but waited more than a year before consulting his primary physician. He was diagnosed with reactive airways dysfunction syndrome and chronic asthma more than 14 months after the incident. In his negligence suit, the court disqualified Higgins's expert concerning causation. The Seventh Circuit affirmed and agreed that the causation issue was too complex for an unassisted jury and that Higgins’s treating physician’s qualifications and methodology were too uncertain to permit her to opine on such matters. View "Higgins v. Koch Dev. Corp." on Justia Law

On August 20, 2013, Lee, an Arkansas citizen, sued VTI and 10 John Does, alleging that while preparing for a welding project on August 21, 2010, he attached a newly purchased oxygen tank to his existing pressure regulator, manufactured by VTI. Lee “tried without success to adjust the regulator pressure” when “[s]uddenly, and without warning, the metal crimped end of the oxygen hose came loose from the metal handpiece, striking him in the right eye” and causing blindness in that eye. On December 18, 2013, Lee dismissed VTI and moved for leave to amend his complaint to substitute Airgas LLC and Airgas-Mid South (the alleged supplier of the tank) for two Doe defendants. The district court denied the motion, noting Lee failed to allege Airgas-Mid South’s principal place of business, the citizenship of Airgas LLC’s members, and the citizenship of any John Doe defendants. The order imposed a deadline by which Lee was to correct these errors. The district court permitted amendment as to Airgas Mid-South but ultimately dismissed. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, agreeing that Lee’s claims against Airgas Mid-South were time-barred and the district court lacked diversity jurisdiction over the claims against the John Does. View "Lee v. Airgas - Mid South, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against Phillip Morris after her husband's death, alleging claims of fraudulent concealment, conspiracy, negligence, and strict liability under Florida law. The jury found Phillip Morris comparatively liable for the husband's injuries and death but awarded plaintiff no damages. Plaintiff argued to the district court that the verdict was inconsistent with liability and that the jury did not follow the district court's instructions. The district court denied plaintiff's request and then plaintiff moved for a mistrial based on the same reasons. The district court denied the motion. The court held that a party’s post-trial claim that a jury verdict is inconsistent does not preserve for appeal the separate and legally distinct claim that the verdict was the result of an unlawful jury compromise. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's order denying plaintiff's motion for a new trial, as well as the final judgment entered on the jury's verdict. View "Reider v. Phillip Morris USA, Inc." on Justia Law

On July 25, 2008, Jason Patterson died at the scene when the southbound motorcycle he was driving at highway speed impaled onto the front driver side windshield of Merrill's northbound vehicle after it crossed into Patterson's lane of traffic. Plaintiff Misty Fargo, a passenger on the motorcycle, was thrown from the motorcycle, receiving multiple injuries. Plaintiffs Fargo and Patterson's estate initially filed this action against Teresa Hays-Kuehn, Ginger Merrill and Angeline Sankey for negligence in the operation of their respective vehicles, but later filed a dismissal without prejudice against Merrill and Sankey. Kuehn was the only remaining defendant in this matter. Kuehn, whose vehicle did not collide with the motorcycle, moved for summary judgment asserting that even if her actions were negligent, at most they created a condition and were not the proximate cause of plaintiffs' damages thereby relieving her of liability. The trial court sustained the motion and plaintiffs appealed. The Court of Civil Appeals affirmed finding Kuehn's actions were not the proximate cause of Plaintiffs' injuries and damages. After review, the Supreme Court held that whether Kuehn's actions were the proximate cause of the accident or merely a "condition" was a question for the trier of fact, making summary judgment inappropriate. View "Fargo v. Hays-Kuehn" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Rosa Elena Munoz appealed the dismissal of her personal injury action against the City of Tracy for failure to bring the action to trial within five years, as required by Code of Civil Procedure section 583.310 et seq. She argued on appeal that the trial court erred in dismissing her case because the parties had executed a written stipulation extending the time for trial to a date certain beyond the five-year deadline. After review of the stipulation, the Court of Appeal agreed and reversed. View "Munoz v. City of Tracy" on Justia Law

Intercon, which provides electronic recycling services, engaged BAN to evaluate its business for certification as environmentally friendly. BAN concluded that Intercon shipped hazardous waste to companies in China that use disposal methods that violate policy in Illinois, where Intercon operates and were inconsistent with Intercon’s public representations. BAN reported its conclusion to state and federal agencies. Intercon sued for defamation. BAN asserted an Anti-SLAPP (strategic lawsuit against public participation) defense. The district court declined to dismiss, the remedy under the state Anti-SLAPP law, reasoning that a special motion to strike was inconsistent with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, concluding that the Washington State Anti-SLAPP law cited by BAN would require the judge to resolve jury questions. View "Intercon Solutions, Inc. v. Puckett" on Justia Law

Alfa Mutual General Insurance Company ("Alfa") petitioned for a writ of mandamus to direct the Mobile Circuit Court to grant its motion seeking to realign the parties to the underlying litigation so that Alfa may "opt out" of participation in the trial. In October 2012, respondent Mark Trotter was injured when a "road sweeper" he was operating was struck by a vehicle being operated by Daniel Elijah Davis, an uninsured motorist. In October 2014, Trotter sued Alfa seeking to recover uninsured/underinsured motorist ("UIM") benefits pursuant to a policy of insurance issued by Alfa to Trotter, which was in place at the time of the 2012 accident. Trotter did not include Davis as a codefendant in his action against Alfa. Alfa subsequently filed a third-party complaint adding Davis as a third-party defendant. Specifically, Alfa's third-party complaint alleged that, to the extent it was determined to be liable to Trotter for UIM benefits, then Alfa was subrogated to and entitled to recover the amount of that liability from Davis. Thereafter, Alfa filed a "Motion to Realign Parties" in which it asked to "opt out" of the litigation. Without explaining the findings on which its decision was based, the trial court denied Alfa's motion. The Alabama Supreme Court concluded after a review of the record, that Alfa has demonstrated a clear legal right to have its motion to realign the parties granted and to allow it to opt out of the underlying litigation. No authority is cited requiring that, in order to make the permitted election, Alfa must first release the right of subrogation to which it was also clearly entitled. View "Ex parte Alfa Mutual General Insurance Company." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Jourdan Rivers Estates, LLC (JRE) and Jourdan River Resort and Yacht Club (Yacht Club), filed suit for damages in December 2011 against Defendants Scott Favre, Cindy Favre, Jefferson Parker, and CB Partners, LLC d/b/a Cinque Bambini. CB Partners, LLC d/b/a Cinque Bambini was later dismissed from the action without prejudice. The complaint alleged multiple claims against Defendants, including slander of title; slander and/or defamation; trespass; nuisance; tortious interference with use of property; tortious interference with contractual relationships; harassment and intimidation of plaintiffs' agents and intentional infliction of emotional distress upon plaintiffs' agents; assault upon plaintiffs' agents; willful destruction of plaintiffs' property; negligence; gross, willful, and wanton negligence; malicious prosecution; unjust enrichment; false imprisonment; and any other applicable theory of law giving rise to a cause of action. Defendants moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure. The circuit court granted the motion in part and denied it in part. The circuit court dismissed all of Yacht Club's claims in relation to the claim(s) that Defendants made false representations to the Hancock County Board of Supervisors and/or Hancock County employees, finding that such allegations fell under the "Noerr-Pennington" doctrine, expressly adopted by the Mississippi Supreme Court. The circuit court dismissed JRE's claims of slander of title, slander and/or defamation; harassment; assault; and false imprisonment and intentional infliction of emotional distress because each claim constituted an intentional tort and was barred under the statute of limitations. The circuit court denied Defendants' motion to dismiss as to JRE's claims for trespass; nuisance; tortious interference with use of property; tortious interference with contractual relationships; willful destruction of property; negligence; gross, willful, and wanton negligence; malicious prosecution; and unjust enrichment. Plaintiffs thereafter petitioned for an interlocutory appeal. Because the Supreme Court found that Defendants' Rule 12(b)(6) motion should have been converted into a motion for summary judgment, as provided in Rule 56 of the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure, it reversed the circuit court's order granting the Rule 12(b)(6) motion and remanded for further proceedings. View "Jourdan River Estates, LLC v. Favre" on Justia Law

The State of Idaho appealed a district court judgment denying its motion to vacate portions of a Stipulated Partial Settlement and Award entered by an arbitration panel. This case stemmed from the 1998 Tobacco Master Settlement Agreement, wherein certain cigarette manufacturers entered into an agreement with the State to pay damages for the cost of treating smoking-related illnesses. A dispute arose between the parties as to the amount owed in 2003 and the district court entered an order compelling arbitration. The arbitration panel entered a Stipulated Partial Settlement and Award in March of 2013. In June of 2013, the State moved the district court to vacate, modify, or correct the award. The district court concluded the State did not have standing to move to vacate or modify the award. The State appealed. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Idaho v. Philip Morris, Inc." on Justia Law