Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Dusty McIlwain brought his two-year-old son Hunter to the Natchez Community Hospital emergency room because Hunter had been vomiting, crying, and complaining of pain. Dr. Michael Wheelis, the emergency room doctor, knew Dusty and previously had worked with Carol McIlwain (a nurse), Dusty’s mother and Hunter’s grandmother. Dr. Wheelis was aware that Hunter had suffered a subarachnoid hemorrhage previously as a result of a motor vehicle accident. That night, Dusty and Carol McIlwain informed Dr. Wheelis only that Hunter had abdominal pain and had vomited. Dr. Wheelis did not observe any neurological symptoms. After deciding that Hunter should be kept overnight in the hospital for observation, Dr. Wheelis, who had no authority to admit patients, spoke with Dr. Jennifer Russ, a pediatrician, at the request of the family, at approximately 2:10 a.m. After conferring, Drs. Russ and Wheelis diagnosed Hunter with dehydration and gastroenteritis. Several hours later, Hunter had a seizure, and was moved to the intensive care unit (ICU). Approximately 24 hours after he was admitted to the hospital, a CT scan of Hunter revealed that he suffered an aneurysm. He slipped into a coma and was pronounced dead several hours after the test. Jennifer McIlwain filed a medical malpractice suit against the doctors involved with Hunter's treatment. Trial was held more than ten years after Hunter had died, and ended in a deadlock. The trial court declared a mistrial. Following entry of the Order of Mistrial, the defendants filed motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV), arguing that Jennifer McIlwain had failed to establish her burden of proof as to the issue of causation. The trial court granted the motions and entered a final judgment of dismissal as to all claims in favor of all defendants. Jennifer timely filed this appeal. The Supreme Court affirmed in part, and reversed in part. The Court found that Jennifer offered sufficient evidence of the requisite elements of a medical-negligence case against Dr. Wheelis; therefore, the trial court erred in granting Dr. Wheelis’s motion for JNOV. However, Plaintiff’s expert Dr. Miller failed to develop evidence that a violation of the standard of care in the setting in which she practiced was equivalent to that as applied to Dr. Russ, and the Court found the trial court did not err in granting Dr. Russ’s motion for JNOV. View "McIlwain v. Natchez Community Hospital, Inc." on Justia Law

This case arose out of the claims of several men who joined Boy Scout troops when they were children and were allegedly sexually abused by their scout leaders. The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints (LDS Church) sponsored some of the troops at issue in this case. In 2013, Does I–IV filed a complaint (later amended) at the federal district court against Boy Scouts of America and the LDS Church (collectively, Respondents), alleging constructive fraud. The complaint alleged that Respondents knew that boys were in danger of being sexually abused by adult volunteers and that Respondents failed to disclose that danger. The complaint further alleged that Respondents not only remained silent about the dangers of pedophilic scoutmasters, but also affirmatively represented to the boys that each scout leader was a “great guy,” a “wonderful man,” or a “friend to whom you can always turn for advice.” Respondents subsequently moved to certify questions to the Idaho Supreme Court, challenging the constructive fraud claims on several grounds. The United States District Court certified two narrow questions to the Idaho Court regarding the statute of limitations that applied to a constructive fraud claim where the plaintiff alleged a breach of duty resulted in sexual abuse, and when a claim for constructive fraud related to childhood sex abuse accrued. The Idaho Supreme Court found that: (1) Idaho Code section 5-218(4)'s statute of limitations applied to constructive fraud cases; and (2) the "discovery rule" applied to constructive fraud claims for purposes of determining when the cause of action accrued. View "DOE(s) v. Boy Scouts of America" on Justia Law

In 2012, Plaintiff filed suit seeking money damages against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act, alleging that, in 1998-1999, he was wrongfully detained and deported as an unauthorized alien despite his true status as a United States citizen. The district court granted the government’s motion to dismiss the case as time barred, thus rejecting Plaintiff’s claim that the federal discovery rule applied in his case to preclude dismissal. The First Circuit affirmed on statute of limitations grounds, holding that delayed accrual under the discovery rule was foreclosed by the factual allegations in Plaintiff’s complaint. View "Dominguez v. United States" on Justia Law

In 2009, on Highway 101 in Monterey County, a bus driver lost control of the vehicle, which collided with bridge rails. The bus, carrying 34 French tourists, rolled; 18 occupants were ejected. Several were thrown over the bridge onto railroad tracks. The driver and four passengers were killed; 21 were severely injured. Capitales Tours and other defendants moved to dismiss or stay California lawsuits, asserting that France was the suitable forum. Plaintiffs argued that most of the documents and witnesses were in California, and that medical personnel and hospitals would likely receive nothing if the cases were transferred. There were more than $5 million in outstanding medical bills. The court found that public and private interest factors favored France because plaintiffs sought application of the French Tourism Code and would require translation. The court stayed the actions for one year. If France accepted jurisdiction, the actions would be dismissed. Capitales initiated proceedings in Paris, but the pretrial judge invoked lis pendens, because the Monterey court had not completely declined jurisdiction. While appeal was pending in France, the California court of appeal affirmed the stay. On remittitur, Capitales moved to dismiss, citing plaintiffs’ failure to initiate proceedings in France and resistance to their jurisdiction. The court dismissed. The court of appeal reversed, holding that further proceedings are necessary before dismissal. View "Auffert v. Capitales Tours" on Justia Law

Diamond was injured while riding as a passenger in a taxi that was involved in a collision with another car. She settled claims against the taxi driver, the owner of the cab, and the Yellow Cab Collective. The Yellow Cab parties agreed to participate at the Diamonds’ trial. A jury found both drivers were negligent and attributed 60 percent responsibility to the driver of the other car, Reshko. The Diamonds were awarded $406,698.00, plus fees and costs. The court of appeal reversed, holding that the trial court erred by excluding evidence of the pretrial settlement between the Diamonds and the Yellow Cab parties. Because it was prevented from learning about the settlement, the jury was denied the opportunity to consider the effect of that settlement on the trial strategies the parties employed with respect to material conflicts in the trial evidence. Many of those conflicts bore directly on determining the primary cause of the accident and the extent of damages. It is reasonably probable that the jury’s resolution of conflicting evidence pertaining to at least some of the material disputed issues would have been more favorable to the Reshkos if the jury had been made aware of the settlement. View "Diamond v. Reshko" on Justia Law

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted the Third Circuit's petition for certification in a defamation case. Robert Schanne taught physics at Lower Merion High School in Ardmore, Pennsylvania. Jenna Addis was his student during her junior and senior years, from 2001 until her graduation in 2003. After Addis graduated, she attended Tulane University in New Orleans. In late November 2010, Addis (then age 26) was visiting Pennsylvania for the Thanksgiving weekend. During her visit, Addis spoke to Susan O'Bannon, a friend who was employed by Lower Merion High School. Addis told O'Bannon that she and Schanne had been romantically involved while Addis was a high school senior and during the summer after she graduated. O'Bannon reported Addis' allegation to school officials. Addis testified in her deposition that she discussed the matter with O'Bannon as a friend and not as an agent of the school. Addis stated, moreover, that she did not intend for O'Bannon to report the information to the school, that she was not aware O'Bannon would feel obligated to make such a report, and that she was surprised to learn that O'Bannon had done so. Based on Addis's statement, school officials provided Schanne with a pre-termination "Loudermill" hearing, and ultimately terminated his employment. Schanne filed a defamation action against Addis pursuant to the federal court's diversity jurisdiction. In his amended complaint, Schanne alleged that his romantic involvement with Addis did not begin until after she graduated from high school, and that any contrary assertions by Addis were false and made with malice due to Addis' jealousy over Schanne's relationship with another woman. Schanne averred that Addis' statements were not judicially privileged because: they were not made during a school board meeting, hearing, or other judicial or quasi-judicial proceeding; no judicial or quasi-judicial proceeding regarding Schanne was "convened or contemplated" at the time Addis made her allegations; and no other privilege applied to the statements. Addis moved for summary judgment which the federal court granted on the basis that all of her assertions were protected by the judicial privilege. On appeal, Schanne argued that Addis's statement to O'Bannon was not made in the regular course of a judicial action, because Addis had gone to O'Bannon as a friend and did not contemplate possible judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings. The Third Circuit certified the question of whether, under Pennsylvania law, absolute judicial privilege applied to the allegation made prior to the commencement of any quasi-judicial proceeding and without an intent that the allegation lead to a quasi-judicial proceeding. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that judicial privilege was not limited to statements made in open court, but encompassed pleadings too. "Perhaps the most salient aspect of the issue as framed is that, not only was the allegation made before the commencement of proceedings, it was made 'without an intent that [it] lead to a quasi-judicial proceeding.' [. . .] Where a declarant has no intention of initiating proceedings or otherwise obtaining a remedy, clothing his or her statement with immunity cannot serve this goal. Assuming the declaration is otherwise actionable, then, protecting it under the cloak of the judicial privilege would do little to advance the privilege's objectives, while undermining the plaintiff's right to obtain recompense for any injury to his or her reputation." View "Schanne v. Addis" on Justia Law

More than 200 foreign agricultural workers allege they were exposed to the pesticide DBCP on banana farms throughout Central America, in the 1960s through the 1980s, resulting in health problems. Litigation began in 1993 with a putative class against Dole and related companies in Texas state court. Numerous suits were filed (and consolidated) in 2011 in the Eastern District of Louisiana against Dole and others. The court agreed granted Dole summary judgment based on the statute of limitations; the Fifth Circuit affirmed. Meanwhile, in 2012, several actions were filed in the District of Delaware against the same defendants and alleging the same causes of action. Dole moved to dismiss the Delaware lawsuits, arguing for the application of the first-filed rule. The court held that the rule applied while the case was on appeal to the Fifth Circuit and dismissed, reasoning that “one fair bite at the apple is sufficient.” Delaware subsequently dismissed other defendants. The Third Circuit affirmed: where there is federal concurrent jurisdiction over a matter, “the court which first ha[d] possession of the subject must decide it.” Plaintiffs conceded that the Delaware cases were “materially identical” to those previously filed in Louisiana. Concurrent jurisdiction existed at the time. View "Chavez v. Dole Food Co., Inc" on Justia Law

Ken Snow worked as an operator for the Navajo Refinery. During a procedure called a "turn-around" at the refinery, a hose assembly came loose and struck Snow, causing "serious, life-changing injuries." Snow and his wife filed suit against the Refinery, complaining of personal injury, loss of consortium, and asked for punitive damages. Snow named as defendants Midwest Hose & Specialty, Inc., Gandy Corporation, Repcon, Inc., and Holly Corporation as defendants. After a period of discovery, Snow sought to amend his complaint to add Warren Power & Machinery, Inc. d/b/a Warren CAT and Brininstool Equipment Sales. What this case presented for the Supreme Court's review centered on the "unusual" issue dealing with the procedure for seeking leave to amend a complaint to add parties as additional defendants. When the motion for leave is filed before the statute of limitations has run, but the order granting leave is filed after the statute has run, is the amended complaint time barred? Adopting a new rule for this situation, the Court held that the subsequently filed amended complaint, post-statute of limitations, was deemed filed as of the date of the original motion for leave to file and accordingly, the statute of limitations was not a bar. The Court of Appeals held to the contrary, and the Supreme Court reversed. View "Snow v. Warren Power & Mach., Inc." on Justia Law

Minor O.D. filed a petition for approval of a settlement her parents had negotiated with car insurance companies for injuries she had suffered in a car accident. On the day of the hearing, O.D.'s health insurance coverage provider Ashley Healthcare Plan, which had a subrogation lien against the proceeds of O.D.'s claim, removed the case to federal court, arguing that Mississippi Code Section 93-13-59 (which requires chancery court approval of settlement claims) was preempted by the federal Employment Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA"). The federal district court held that ERISA did not preempt the state law and remanded the case to the chancery court without awarding attorney's fees to O.D. On motion from O.D.'s parents, the Pontotoc County Chancery Court awarded O.D. attorney's fees, holding that Ashley Healthcare Plan's removal to federal court was contrary to clearly established law and that it was done for the purpose of delaying litigation. Ashley Healthcare Plan appealed the grant of attorney fees. The Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed. Although O.D. could have sought recovery of attorney's fees under Rule 54 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, frivolous removals to federal court were also subject to the Mississippi Litigation Accountability Act. Furthermore, Ashley Healthcare Plan's removal to federal court was contrary to two decades of case law which uniformly held that Mississippi's law requiring chancery court approval of minors' settlements was not preempted by ERISA and that Ashley Healthcare Plan was seeking a remedy in federal court that was unavailable to it under the ERISA Civil Enforcement Clause. View "In the Matter of the Guardianship of O. D." on Justia Law

The trial court entered summary judgment in favor of Defendants on Plaintiff’s claims for wrongful use of civil proceedings and abuse of process. Plaintiff appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in concluding that Plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case for each element of both causes of action. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed but noted that the trial court would have been well within its discretion to have granted a summary judgment in favor of Defendant based solely on Plaintiff’s failure to comply with the requirements of Me. R. Civ. P. 56(h), or to have denied summary judgment altogether based on the manner in which both parties availed themselves of the summary judgment process. View "First Tracks Invs., LLC v. Murray, Plumb & Murray" on Justia Law