Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Injury Law
by
Riverstone Development Co., Inc. sued Garrett & Associates Appraisals, Inc. ("G&A Appraisals"), asserting negligence, wantonness, and conspiracy claims stemming from a July 2010 appraisal G&A Appraisals conducted on waterfront property Riverstone Development owned on Lake Guntersville. During the course of the eventual trial on those claims, the trial court entered a judgment as a matter of law in favor of G&A Appraisals on the negligence claim, and, at the conclusion of the trial, the jury returned a verdict in favor of G&A Appraisals on the wantonness and conspiracy claims. Riverstone Development appealed, arguing that the judgment as a matter of law was improperly entered on the negligence claim and that it is entitled to a new trial based on juror misconduct. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Riverstone Development Co., Inc. v. Garrett & Associates Appraisals, Inc." on Justia Law

by
Plaintiffs were two individuals who purchased Marlboro Light cigarettes in Oregon. Defendant Philip Morris was the company that manufactured, marketed, and sold Marlboro Lights. Plaintiffs brought this action under Oregon’s Unlawful Trade Practices Act (UTPA), alleging that defendant misrepresented that Marlboro Lights would deliver less tar and nicotine than regular Marlboros and that, as a result of that misrepresentation, plaintiffs suffered economic losses. Plaintiffs moved to certify a class consisting of approximately 100,000 individuals who had purchased at least one pack of Marlboro Lights in Oregon over a 30-year period (from 1971 to 2001). The trial court denied plaintiffs’ motion after concluding that individual inquiries so predominated over common ones that a class action was not a superior means to adjudicate the putative class’s UTPA claim. On appeal, a majority of the Court of Appeals disagreed with the trial court’s predominance assessment, concluding that the essential elements of the UTPA claim could be proved through evidence common to the class. The majority remanded to the trial court to reconsider whether, without the trial court’s predominance assessment, a class action was a superior means of litigating the class claims. In granting defendant’s petition for review, the Supreme Court considered whether common issues predominated for purposes of the class action certification decision, and what a private plaintiff in a UTPA case of this nature had to prove. The Supreme Court concluded that the trial court properly denied class certification, and accordingly, it reversed the contrary decision of the Court of Appeals and remanded to the trial court for further proceedings on the individual plaintiffs’ claims. View "Pearson v. Philip Morris, Inc." on Justia Law

by
Victoria was born in Mexico in 1997 and later moved to Texas. The Office of Refugee Resettlement designated Victoria as an unaccompanied refugee minor and assigned her for placement in Massachusetts. Three weeks after Victoria’s arrival in Massachusetts, the Department of Children and Families filed a petition for custody of Victoria in the Probate and Family Court. The probate and family court judge concluded that Massachusetts lacked child custody jurisdiction under the Massachusetts Child Custody Jurisdiction Act but that jurisdiction was proper where Massachusetts was an “appropriate court” under federal law governing custody and resettlement of unaccompanied refugee minors. The judge stayed further custody proceedings pending resolution of questions regarding jurisdiction. The Supreme Judicial Court held that Massachusetts has jurisdiction over the custody proceeding under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 209B, 2(a)(2) because (1) no other state has home state jurisdiction, and (2) it is in the best interest of Victoria that a Massachusetts court assume jurisdiction of the custody proceeding. View "In re Custody of Victoria" on Justia Law

by
Plaintiff Dow Tillson underwent an elective procedure to remove a cataract in his left eye. Defendant Dr. Richard Lane, M.D., performed the procedure at Springfield Hospital. Plaintiffs alleged in their amended complaint that within twenty-four hours of surgery, Mr. Tillson’s left eye showed signs of infection. Dr. Lane made a presumptive diagnosis of endopthalmitis, but did not refer Mr. Tillson to a retinologist for treatment. Within forty-eight hours of surgery, Mr. Tillson was permanently blind in his left eye. Plaintiff sued for medical malpractice, and defendants the doctor and hospital, moved for summary judgment. Plaintiffs appealed the superior court’s decision to grant defendants’ motion. Upon review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court concluded that deposition testimony of plaintiff’s expert witness was sufficient to withstand a motion for summary judgment. Accordingly, the Court reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Tillson v. Lane" on Justia Law

by
Plaintiffs filed these consolidated cases, alleging exposure to asbestos aboard vessels operated or owned by the various defendants. At issue was whether the cases, originally filed in state court, properly belong in federal court. Defendants argue that removal was warranted under the Federal Officer Removal Statute, 28 U.S.C. 1442(a)(1). In adopting the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation, the district court found that defendants failed to establish an adequate causal link because plaintiffs’ claims were “analogous” to “failure to warn cases” where the government owns a work space infected with asbestos and the civilian contractor operating the facility fails to warn of the danger or otherwise mitigate the risk. The court found that the evidence suggests that the Federal Officer Defendants operated the vessels in a largely independent fashion and, at a minimum, were free to adopt the safety measures plaintiffs now allege would have prevented their injuries. The court concluded that the district court properly found that remand was proper based upon this ground. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Bartel v. Alcoa Steamship Co." on Justia Law

by
Michelle Tidd appeals from a judgment entered on a jury verdict dismissing her negligence action against Scott Kroshus arising out of a collision between Tidd's bike and Kroshus' car. Tidd was riding her bike on a sidewalk in Fargo when she collided with Kroshus' car. Kroshus was entering the street from the alley when he collided with Tidd. Tidd sued Kroshus alleging Kroshus' negligence caused the collision and Tidd's bodily injuries. Over Tidd's objection, the district court instructed the jury on “sudden emergency.” Tidd argued on appeal that the sudden emergency instruction was unnecessary because there was no evidence of a sudden emergency. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, concluding under the facts presented, the district court erred in instructing the jury on the sudden emergency doctrine. View "Tidd v. Kroshus" on Justia Law

by
This civil suit was filed by five alumni of Manchester Educational Foundation, Inc., after the dean of students, Richard Darden, admitted to viewing male students while they showered in his home. The five alumni attended Manchester at various times from 1997 until 2003. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Manchester, Dr. William Thompson, and The Yazoo City Medical Clinic, P.A., holding that the statute of limitations as to Plaintiffs' alleged claims was not tolled until Plaintiffs learned of Darden's confession to voyeurism, because the five alumni should have known, with due diligence, that they were injured by the activities they engaged in with Darden for several years. Finding that the trial court did not err in awarding summary judgment in favor of these defendants, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court. View "Raddin v. Manchester Educational Foundation, Inc." on Justia Law

by
This case was a latent-injury silicosis case filed against a Florida corporation that was dissolved. The issue this case presented for the Mississippi Supreme Court's review centered on whether the Florida corporate-survival statute applied to a Mississippi plaintiff, or whether the discovery rule for latent injuries permitted claims to be brought against the foreign corporation after dissolution. Sixteen plaintiffs sued Clark Sand Company, Inc. more than four years after the corporation’s dissolution. The circuit court judge sustained Clark Sand’s motion for summary judgment. "At common law, when a corporation dissolved, it no longer existed, and it could not be sued. But because of the harshness of this rule, Florida, like most states, has adopted a corporate-survival statute that allows plaintiffs to bring suit against a Florida corporation for up to four years after dissolution." Finding no error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Williams v. Clark Sand Company, Inc." on Justia Law

by
A wrongful-death beneficiary failed to prosecute this medical-malpractice case for four years, so, on the defendant’s motion, the circuit judge dismissed the complaint. The plaintiff refiled, and the defendant twice moved to dismiss, arguing that the statute of limitations had lapsed. Both motions were denied, and the Mississippi Supreme Court granted interlocutory appeal. Because the statute of limitations was not tolled when cases are dismissed for lack of prosecution, the second complaint was untimely. Accordingly, the Court reversed and remanded for dismissal. View "Thornhill v. Ingram" on Justia Law

by
Relator filed a qui tam action on behalf of the United States, twenty-five states, and the District of Columbia, naming his former employer as the defendant and asserting several claims under the False Claims Act (FCA) and analogous state statutes. Thereafter, Relator filed three amended complaints adding five defendants. Defendants filed motions to dismiss. Relator subsequently filed a fourth amended complaint, asserting that he had an absolute right to amend his complaint under Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(1). The district court granted Defendants’ motion to strike the fourth amended complaint after construing Relator’s filings as a request for leave to amend, concluding that Relator had not established good cause for amending his complaint once again. The district court then dismissed the case with prejudice, concluding that the FCA’s public disclosure bar deprived it of jurisdiction over certain allegations and that, as to the remaining allegations, the third amended complaint failed to state a cognizable claim. The First Circuit vacated the judgment below and remanded, holding that the district court (1) did not err in concluding that Relator exhausted his one-time right to amend under Rule 15(a)(1); but (2) appraised Relator’s request for leave to amend under the wrong legal standard. View "D'Agostino v. ev3, Inc." on Justia Law