Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff was injured when her vehicle was struck by a vehicle driven by Defendant. In 2011, Plaintiff filed a complaint to recover damages for injuries she suffered in the collision, but the complaint contained a misnomer that misnamed Defendant. Plaintiff subsequently moved to nonsuit her claim, and the trial court granted the nonsuit. In 2012, Plaintiff refiled her complaint properly naming Defendant. Defendant filed a special plea in bar asserting that Plaintiff’s claim was barred by the statute of limitations. Specifically, Plaintiff argued that the 2011 complaint did not toll the statute of limitations where Plaintiff failed to correct the misnomer within the time period contemplated by Va. Code 8.01-6. The trial court sustained Plaintiff’s plea in bar. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that although Plaintiff was not properly named in the 2011 complaint, there was no doubt that she was the party identified, and therefore, the tolling provisions of Va. Code 8.01-229(E) applied, and Plaintiff’s 2012 complaint was timely filed. View "Richmond v. Volk" on Justia Law

Respondents filed suit against Petitioner, an Arkansas corporation with its principal place of business in Faulkner County, alleging strict liability and negligence and seeking damages resulting from the noise, pollution, and vibrations of compressor stations owned and operated by Petitioner. The compressor stations were located in Van Buren County and White County. Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss or transfer for improper venue. The circuit court denied the motion to dismiss. Thereafter, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of prohibition requesting that the Supreme Court issue the writ to prevent the circuit court from proceeding for lack of proper venue. The Supreme Court denied the requested writ of prohibition, holding that Petitioner was not entitled to a writ of prohibition where Petitioner failed to demonstrate that Faulker County was wholly without jurisdiction on the issue of venue. View "Desoto Gathering Co. v. Ramsey" on Justia Law

In 2011, Henderson Square Condominium Association sued, alleging: breach of the implied warranty of habitability, fraud, negligence, breach of the Chicago Municipal Code’s prohibition against misrepresenting material facts in marketing and selling real estate, and breach of a fiduciary duty. The defendants were developers that entered into a contract with the city for a mixed use project, the Lincoln-Belmont-Ashland Redevelopment Project. Sales in the project had begun in 1996. The trial court dismissed, finding that plaintiffs failed to adequately plead the Chicago Municipal Code violation and breach of fiduciary duty and that counts were time-barred under the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/13-214). The appellate court reversed. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed. A condominium association generally has standing to pursue claims that affect the unit owners or the common elements. A question of fact remains as to whether defendants’ failure to speak about construction deficiencies or to adequately fund reserves, coupled with earlier alleged misrepresentations, amounted to fraudulent concealment for purposes of exceptions to the limitation and repose periods. It is possible that minor repairs, along with the limited nature of water infiltration, reasonably delayed plaintiffs’ hiring of professional contractors to open the wall and discover latent defects. The date when plaintiffs reasonably should have known that an injury occurred and that it was wrongfully caused was a question of fact. View "Henderson Square Condo. Ass'n v. LAB Townhomes, LLC" on Justia Law

Kathy Seacrist and her son, John McDonald sued Southern California Edison (Edison); the City of Palm Desert; J.R. Roberts; and Does 5 through 100. Seacrist owned a home near an Edison substation. Plaintiffs Seacrist and McDonald alleged stray electrical currents from the substation were causing them to suffer various medical issues. The Fourth Amended Complaint included seven causes of action against Edison: (a) negligence; (b) nuisance; (c) trespass; (d) strict liability/products liability; (e) strict liability/implied warranty of fitness; (f) strict liability/ultra hazardous activity; and (g) intentional infliction of emotional distress. The trial court sustained Edison’s demurrer without leave to amend, concluding “Plaintiffs claims are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the California Public Utilities Commission,” and thus, the trial court did not have jurisdiction over the dispute with Edison. The Court of Appeal held previously that the California Public Utilities Commission (PUC) did not have exclusive jurisdiction over a case involving injuries resulting from stray electrical currents from a substation. On appeal, plaintiffs contended the trial court erred by sustaining Edison’s demurrer because the PUC did not have exclusive jurisdiction over claims related to injuries from stray electrical currents. Edison asserts, among other things, that controlling case law was wrongly decided. The Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's judgment. View "Seacrist v. So. Cal. Edison" on Justia Law

According to plaintiff-appellant Randall Blackwell, as he was at the top of a ladder installing rain gutters at an investment property owned by defendant-respondent Ray Vasilas, Blackwell stepped on scaffolding that another contractor had erected at the job site, and the scaffolding collapsed. The collapse caused Blackwell to fall, and he suffered injuries when he landed on a pile of bricks approximately 10 feet below. Blackwell sued Vasilas for negligence. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Vasilas. After review of the arguments made on appeal, the Court of Appeal found that as the moving party, Vasilas did not meet his initial burden of production to make a prima facie showing of the nonexistence of any triable issue of material fact. Accordingly, the trial court erred in granting Vasilas's motion, and the resulting judgment was reversed. View "Blackwell v. Vasilas" on Justia Law

Appellant Alesa Easterling brought this medical malpractice suit against Respondent Eric Kendall, M.D., alleging that Kendall was negligent in failing to diagnose her with a carotid artery dissection, and that such misdiagnosis delayed her treatment and resulted in her suffering permanent neurological damage. At trial, the district court granted Kendall’s motion for a directed verdict. The district court concluded that Easterling failed to prove a medical malpractice claim because she failed to present expert testimony to show that Kendall’s misdiagnosis was the proximate cause of her injuries. Easterling appealed, contending that expert testimony was not required under Idaho law to prove proximate cause in a medical malpractice action. Additionally, Easterling appealed the district court’s orders excluding opinion testimony from Easterling’s retained expert and treating physicians on the issue of causation and denying her motion to present rebuttal opinion testimony on causation in her case in chief. Kendall requested attorney fees on appeal. As to Easterling's claims of error on appeal, the Supreme Court found no reversible error and affirmed. The Court found Kendall was not entitled to attorney fees on appeal. View "Easterling v. Kendall, M.D." on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Colorado Supreme Court's review stemmed from a medical malpractice action, and whether, as a matter of law, a known suicidal patient admitted to the secure mental health unit of a hospital and place under high risk precautions, could be subject to a comparative negligence defense when the patient attempted suicide while in the hospital's custody. P.W. sued Children's Hospital both individually and as conservator of his son K.W., who was in a minimally conscious state after an unsuccessful attempt to kill himself by hanging while at the Hospital. The trial court granted P.W.'s motion for summary judgment and dismissed the Hospital's comparative negligence and assumption of risk defenses. The trial court also issued an order preventing the Hospital from obtaining K.W.'s pre-incident mental health records. The Hospital petitioned the Supreme Court to review: (1) whether the trial court abused its discretion by precluding discovery of K.W.'s mental health records; (2) whether the trial court abused its discretion by precluding discovery of K.W.'s treating psychiatrist's records when they were a part of a continuing course of treatment that included Children's Hospital; and (3) whether the trial court erred in granting P.W. summary judgment dismissing the comparative negligence and assumption of risk defenses despite evidence K.W. could think rationally and protect himself from harm during the hospitalization. The Supreme Court concluded that the Hospital could not assert comparative negligence or assumption of risk as a matter of law, and that it did not need to address the trial court's discovery order. View "P.W. v. Children's Hospital" on Justia Law

Defendant Jim Burke Automotive, Inc. petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus directing the Hale Circuit Court to vacate its order denying Jim Burke Automotive's motion to transfer the action to the Jefferson Circuit Court and to enter an order transferring the action. After Jim Burke Automotive had performed some repair work on a vehicle owned by Vulah and Andrew Smith, the vehicle was involved in an accident in Hale County. The Smiths sued Jim Burke Automotive at the Hale Circuit Court, asserting claims of negligent repair of the vehicle, wanton repair of the vehicle, breach of contract, and fraud. Andrew Smith also claimed damages for loss of consortium. Jim Burke Automotive moved to transfer the case to the Jefferson Court for improper venue, because the all repair work was performed in Jefferson County, and all the alleged acts or omissions giving rise the the Smiths' claims took place in Jefferson County. Upon review of Jim Burke Automotive's petition, the Supreme Court concluded it demonstrated a clear legal right to a writ of mandamus. The Court directed the Hale Court to vacate its order and transfer this action to Jefferson. View "Ex parte Jim Burke Automotive, Inc." on Justia Law

This appeal arose from a transfer of real property located in Cassia County. Appellants-buyers Robert and Becky Humphries accused Respondents-sellers Eileen Becker, her son, Allen Becker, and daughter-in-law, Jane Becker of: (1) fraud though misrepresenting, concealing, and/or failing to disclose material information with regards to (a) the sources of water to the Property and (b) the Property’s sprinkler/irrigation system; and (2) violating the Idaho Condition Disclosure Act. The district court entered an order granting the Beckers' motion for summary judgment. The court held that: (1) The Humphries had pled fraud with sufficient particularity with regards to statements in the MLS Listing and Disclosure Form; (2) the Beckers did not make any false representations in either the MLS Listing or the Disclosure Form; (3) any duty that the Beckers may have had to disclose the existence of a Farm Well was satisfied by the Joint Well Use Agreement; (3) the representation in the MLS Listing that the sprinkler system was automatic could not serve as the basis for fraud; and (4) the Disclosure Form did not violate the Disclosure Act. The Humphries unsuccessfully moved for reconsideration, and subsequently appealed to the Supreme Court. After review, the Supreme Court concluded the district court erred in granting summary judgment as to Eileen Becker, and upheld summary judgment granted in favor of Allen and Jane. The Court upheld the grant of attorney's fees and costs to Allen and Jane, and granted them fees on appeal. The Court vacated the grant of fees as to Eileen, and the case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Humphries v. Becker" on Justia Law

On May 8, 2014, petitioner City of San Diego (City) denied the application of Jeri Dines, the real party in interest, for leave to file a late claim filed pursuant to the California Government Claims Act. Dines did not file a petition with the trial court for an order relieving her from the claims presentation requirements until November 13, 2014 (i.e., more than six months after the City denied her application). Dines alleged former City Mayor Bob Filner inappropriately touched her. However, citing section 915.2, subdivision (b) of the Act that extends by five days the period for a recipient of a mailed notice to respond to the notice, the trial court granted her petition, concluding section 915.2, subdivision (b), gave her an additional five days to file her section 946.6 petition. The City filed a petition for writ of mandate to the Court of Appeal, challenging the trial court's order. The City argued section 915.2, subdivision (b), was inapplicable to, and did not extend, the Act's section 946.6's six-month limitations period for filing a petition with the court. After review, the Court of Appeal agreed with the City and granted the requested relief. View "City of San Diego v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law