Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Jose Lopez sued the national Jehovah's Witnesses organization, Watchtower Bible and Tract Society of New York, Inc. (Watchtower), alleging his Bible instructor sexually abused him in 1986 when he was a child. Lopez asserted several legal theories, including failure to warn, negligent supervision, and negligent hiring/retention. After contentious discovery disputes, the court issued two discovery orders against Watchtower: (1) compelling the deposition of an individual (Gerrit Losch) whom the court found was a "managing agent" of Watchtower; and (2) ordering the production of documents in Watchtower's files pertaining to other perpetrators of child sexual abuse. When Watchtower failed to comply with these orders, the court granted Lopez's motion for monetary and terminating sanctions, struck Watchtower's answer, and entered Watchtower's default. Watchtower appealed, challenging the validity of the discovery orders and an abuse of discretion in failing to impose lesser sanctions. After review, the Court of Appeal rejecte Watchtower's challenges to the production order, but concluded the court erred in ordering Watchtower to produce Losch for deposition and the subsequent sanctions. The Court remanded for the trial court to consider the appropriate sanctions for Watchtower's violation of the document production order. "The initial measure should be a remedy that is less onerous than a terminating sanction." View "Lopez v. Watchtower Bible & Tract Society" on Justia Law

Appellants filed a complaint for breach of contract, non-disclosure, rescission, damages, and negligence against Appellees. Appellants obtained a default judgment. Appellees moved to set aside the default judgment on the grounds that the summons was defective on its face. The circuit court granted the motion and set aside the default judgment due to the defective summons and resulting lack of personal jurisdiction over Appellees. Appellees then filed a motion to dismiss the case with prejudice on the grounds that service was never completed and that the savings statute did not apply. The circuit court granted the motion to dismiss. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the circuit court’s ruling setting aside the default judgment, as the summons failed strictly to comply with the requirements of Ark. R. Civ. P. 4(b); and (2) reversed the dismissal with prejudice, holding that Appellants were entitled to the benefit of the savings statute. View "Jones v. Douglas" on Justia Law

In 2007, Lahoma Pierson Hall (Ms. Hall) died in the care of hospice after a seven-day stay in AHS Tulsa Regional Medical Center (Hospital). On March 20, 2009, Appellants Kenneth Pierson, and Paula Taylor, (Ms. Hall's son and granddaughter) filed a petition (Pierson I), against the Hospital stating claims on their own behalf. After amending the petition several times, Appellants filed their fourth amended petition on October 23, 2009. Appellants stated therein "[t]he plaintiffs are not pleading to have the court act on Ms. Lahoma Hall's rights for relief for actions such as medical malpractice or wrongful death." On February 24, 2010, the trial court dismissed the petition in Pierson I without prejudice for failure to state a claim. Appellants filed "Pierson II" in 2012, appealing the dismissal of their wrongful death case. In early 2013, the Court of Civil Appeals affirmed the trial court's dismissal, noting that "[e]ven if the Third Amended Petition relates back to the original petition, the original petition was filed more than two years after Decedent's death. Therefore, Appellant's wrongful death action is barred by the two-year statute of limitations." The questions presented for the Oklahoma Supreme Court's review were whether the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure applied to state court actions and whether the Appellees, judges on the Court of Civil Appeals, were immune from suit. The Court answered the first question in the negative and the second in the affirmative. View "Pierson v. Joplin" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-appellee Amber Lompe was exposed to high levels of carbon monoxide (CO) from a malfunctioning furnace in her apartment at the Sunridge Apartments in Casper, Wyoming. Plaintiff brought a diversity action in the Federal District Court for the District of Wyoming against Sunridge Partners LLC (Sunridge) and Apartment Management Consultants, L.L.C. (AMC), the owner and the property manager. The jury found both Defendants liable for negligence and awarded plaintiff compensatory damages totaling $3,000,000 and punitive damages totaling $25,500,000, of which the jury apportioned $3,000,000 against Sunridge and $22,500,000 against AMC. Defendants challenged the jury’s award of punitive damages, arguing the district court erred in failing to grant their motion for judgment as a matter of law (JMOL) as to punitive damages. Alternatively, they contended the district court’s jury instructions on punitive damages were erroneous and the amount of punitive damages awarded against each Defendant was excessive under common law and constitutional standards. After review, the Tenth Circuit held that the evidence was insufficient to submit the question of punitive damages to the jury as to Sunridge, and the amount of punitive damages awarded against AMC was grossly excessive and arbitrary in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Accordingly, the Court vacated the award of punitive damages against Sunridge and reduce the punitive damages awarded against AMC from $22,500,000 to $1,950,000. View "Lompe v. Sunridge Partners LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-appellee Amber Lompe was exposed to high levels of carbon monoxide (CO) from a malfunctioning furnace in her apartment at the Sunridge Apartments in Casper, Wyoming. Plaintiff brought a diversity action in the Federal District Court for the District of Wyoming against Sunridge Partners LLC (Sunridge) and Apartment Management Consultants, L.L.C. (AMC), the owner and the property manager. The jury found both Defendants liable for negligence and awarded plaintiff compensatory damages totaling $3,000,000 and punitive damages totaling $25,500,000, of which the jury apportioned $3,000,000 against Sunridge and $22,500,000 against AMC. Defendants challenged the jury’s award of punitive damages, arguing the district court erred in failing to grant their motion for judgment as a matter of law (JMOL) as to punitive damages. Alternatively, they contended the district court’s jury instructions on punitive damages were erroneous and the amount of punitive damages awarded against each Defendant was excessive under common law and constitutional standards. After review, the Tenth Circuit held that the evidence was insufficient to submit the question of punitive damages to the jury as to Sunridge, and the amount of punitive damages awarded against AMC was grossly excessive and arbitrary in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Accordingly, the Court vacated the award of punitive damages against Sunridge and reduce the punitive damages awarded against AMC from $22,500,000 to $1,950,000. View "Lompe v. Sunridge Partners LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff prevailed in an action filed against GEICO General Insurance Company. Thereafter, Plaintiff moved for attorney’s fees. Plaintiff sought discovery related to her opposition’s attorneys’ time records and propounded Lodestar/Multiplier Fee Determination Interrogatories. GEICO objected to the discovery requests, but the circuit court overruled the objections. GEICO filed a petition for writ of certiorari requesting that the Fourth District quash the orders relating to the request to produce and the interrogatory. The Fourth District granted the petition, concluding that Plaintiff failed to establish that the billing records of opposing counsel were actually relevant and necessary and that their substantial equivalent could not be obtained elsewhere. The Supreme Court quashed the decision of the Fourth District, holding that hours expended by counsel for a defendant insurance company in a contested claim for attorney’s fees filed pursuant to Fla. Stat. 624.155 and 627.428 is relevant to the issue of the reasonableness of time expended by counsel for the plaintiff, and discovery of such information, where disputed, falls within the sound decision of the trial court. View "Paton v. Geico Gen. Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Alan Jesperson was injured in a motor vehicle accident when his motorcycle was struck from behind by a vehicle owned by Mary Basha and driven by Matthew Badelalla while Badelalla was making deliveries for Jet’s Pizza. Auto Club Insurance Association (ACIA) was notified of Jesperson’s injuries and that it was the highest-priority no-fault insurer. It began making payments to Jesperson shortly after it received that notice. Jesperson brought an action against Basha, Badelalla, and Jet’s seeking damages for the injuries he had sustained. He later moved to amend his complaint to add a claim against ACIA after it stopped paying him no-fault benefits. The trial court entered a default judgment against Badelalla and Basha, entered an order allowing Jesperson to amend the complaint, and entered an order severing Jesperson’s claims for trial. A jury returned a verdict of no cause of action with regard to Jesperson’s claims against Jet’s. Before trial on the remaining claim, ACIA moved for summary judgment, arguing that Jesperson’s claim against it was barred by the statute of limitations in MCL 500.3145(1). The court agreed that the statute of limitations barred Jesperson’s claim and granted ACIA’s motion for summary disposition. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the exception in MCL 500.3145(1) to the one-year limitations period when the insurer has previously made a payment applied only if the insurer has made a payment within one year after the date of the accident. Jesperson appealed, and the Supreme Court reversed. The Supreme Court found that the insurer's payment of no-fault benefits more than a year after the date of the accident satisfied the second exception to the one-year statute of limitations in MCL 500.3145(1). The Court vacated the trial court's order granting summary judgment in favor of the insurer and the case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Jesperson v. Auto Club Insurance Association" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, individually and on behalf of her daughter, filed a civil suit against Defendant for assault, false imprisonment, emotional distress, and loss of consortium. Plaintiff requested compensatory and punitive damages. After Defendant failed to respond to the complaint, the trial court entered a default judgment against her. Before the damages hearing, Defendant died. The administrator of Defendant’s estate was substituted as a party. After a hearing, the trial court awarded compensatory damages to Plaintiff’s two daughters and concluded that punitive damages could not be properly awarded against the estate of a deceased tortfeasor. The Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that Ohio law permits an award of punitive damages against a deceased tortfeasor. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that a punitive damages award is available in the limited circumstances presented in this case. Remanded to the trial court for a hearing on punitive damages and attorney fees. View "Whetstone v. Binner" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs - all minors at the relevant times - were all trafficked through advertisements posted on Backpage.com. Plaintiffs filed suit against Backpage, alleging that Backpage tailored its website to facilitate sex traffickers’ efforts to advertise their victims on the website, leading to Appellants’ victimization. Specifically, Plaintiffs alleged that Backpage engaged in sex trafficking of minors as defined by the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act and its Massachusetts counterpart, violations of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A, and abridgments of intellectual property rights. The district court dismissed the action for failure to state claims upon which relief could be granted. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the facts alleged here did not state grounds that Plaintiffs were plausibly entitled to relief on their claims. View "Doe No. 1 v. Backpage.com, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was injured when forced to stop suddenly near a construction crew on a Utah road. Plaintiff submitted a notice of claim against the Utah Department of Transportation (UDOT). UDOT did not respond to the notice of claim within sixty days, and therefore, Plaintiff’s claim was deemed denied. One month later, UDOT sent a letter to Plaintiff stating that UDOT denied the claim. Plaintiff subsequently filed suit against UDOT and several unnamed “John Does.” UDOT moved for summary judgment, arguing that the Utah Governmental Immunity Act (GIA) barred Plaintiff’s claim because he did not file within one year of the date on which it was deemed denied. The trial court granted UDOT’s motion and dismissed Plaintiff’s entire suit with prejudice, including his claim against the Doe Defendants. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the denial letter sent after the deemed denial had occurred did not restart the limitations period and was a legal superfluity, and therefore, Plaintiff did not timely file his suit under the GIA; (2) estoppel was not warranted in this case; and (3) the dismissal of the Doe Defendants was proper where they were described as employees of UDOT. View "Monarrez v. Utah Dep’t of Transp." on Justia Law