Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff filed a petition to have her husband classified as her immediate relative so that he would be eligible to adjust his immigration status. The Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security approved the petition but later revoked that approval because Plaintiff’s husband had entered a previous marriage for the purpose of evading immigration laws. Plaintiff sought judicial review of the Secretary’s marriage-fraud determination. The district court dismissed her complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction because it determined that Plaintiff’s complaint challenged a discretionary decision.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the judgment in favor of the Secretary and Director. The court explained that Plaintiff asserted that the Secretary reached the wrong outcome when he determined that there was good and sufficient cause to revoke the approval of her petition. The court wrote that the agency has articulated a standard to guide its evaluation of whether good and sufficient cause exists. But the court explained it cannot review Plaintiff’s complaint that the Secretary reached the wrong conclusion in her case. The sole statutory predicate for revocation is that the Secretary deem that there is good and sufficient cause. That the Secretary has, in his discretion, created additional standards to explain what constitutes good and sufficient cause and linked that determination in Plaintiff’s case to the marriage-fraud provision does not alter the bar on judicial review of the Secretary’s discretionary decision. View "Amina Bouarfa v. Secretary, Department of Homeland Security, et al" on Justia Law

Petitioner is a native of El Salvador. He first entered the United States around 2003 and was ordered removed in 2007. He then returned three more times—in 2010, 2018, and 2019. This appeal concerns his 2019 visit. In September 2019, the federal government reinstated Petitioner’s 2007 removal order. Petitioner sought withholding of removal and CAT relief. An immigration judge denied his application and, on April 27, 2022, the BIA dismissed his appeal. Petitioner petitioned for review on May 26, 2022.   The Fifth Circuit dismissed Petitioner’s petition for lack of jurisdiction. The court explained that Congress has limited the court’s jurisdiction to final orders “concluding that the alien is deportable or ordering deportation.  And it imposed another condition: the petition must be filed within 30 days of that order. The BIA’s denial of Petitioner’s application for withholding of removal and CAT relief is not a final order of removal. And his petition is untimely because it was filed over 30 days after his reinstatement order became final. View "Argueta-Hernandez v. Garland" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit denied a petition for rehearing en banc after a request for a vote on whether to rehear the matter en banc, and the matter failed to receive a majority of the votes of the nonrecused active judges in favor of en banc consideration in a case in which the panel held that: (1) subject only to a very limited form of habeas corpus review that is inapplicable in this case, Section 242 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), “clearly and unambiguously” precludes judicial review of expedited removal orders, even with regard to constitutional challenges to such orders; and (2) as applied in this case—which involved an arriving alien with no previous ties to the United States—that denial of all judicial review was constitutional. View "HEVER MENDOZA LINARES V. MERRICK GARLAND" on Justia Law

In 2019, Appellant filed a Form I-140 petition for a work visa under 8 USC Sec. 1153(b)(2) and Form I-485 applications for himself and his spouse to adjust their immigration statuses. Appellant's I-140 petition asserted that he satisfied the requirements to obtain a national-interest waiver under Sec. 1153(b)(2)(B)(i). USCIS declined to grant Appellant's request and denied his request for reconsideration.Appellant sued the US government, challenging the denials of his I-140 petition, his motion for reopening or reconsideration, and his I-485 applications. The Government moved to dismiss Appellant's complaint under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6), arguing that the jurisdictional bar in 8 USC § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) applies to national-interest waiver denials. The district court dismissed Appellant's case, citing a lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.On appeal to the Fifth Circuit, Appellant claimed the district court erred in concluding that Sec. 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) bars jurisdiction over the denial of an I140 petition. Joining the Ninth, Eleventh, Third and D.C. Circuits, the court affirmed, finding Sec. 1153(b)(2)(B)(i) “expressly and specifically vest discretion in the Attorney General” to deny national-interest waivers. Thus, the jurisdiction bar in Sec. 1252(a)(2)(B) applies. View "Flores v. Garland" on Justia Law

Petitioner Sarah Farum filed a frivolous asylum application. An immigration judge determined the application rendered her permanently ineligible for immigration benefits under the Immigration and Nationality Act. Farnum did not challenge the frivolousness finding made by the immigration judge, nor did she challenge she had proper notice of the consequences of filing a false application. She instead challenged the timing of when the frivolous-asylum bar was effective. In her view, the frivolous-application bar outlined in 8 U.S.C. § 1158(d)(6) could not be invoked in the same proceeding as a frivolousness finding was made, thus allowing an immigration court to consider other potential claims that might support a finding that the Attorney General should withhold her deportation. To this, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals disagreed: "Once an immigration judge or the Board of Immigration Appeals makes the required frivolousness finding, the statutory bar is effective." View "Farnum v. Garland" on Justia Law

Texas and Missouri filed suit seeking to compel DHS to employ the $2.75 billion Congress allocated “for the construction of [a] barrier system along the southwest border” before those funds expire. The district court dismissed Texas for “claim splitting,” held that Missouri did not have standing to sue, and denied the States’ motion for a preliminary injunction as moot. The states appealed.On appeal, the Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded with instructions for the district court to "expeditiously consider the States’ motion for a preliminary injunction." The court explained Texas should not have been dismissed for claim splitting because Texas’s Article III standing confers federal jurisdiction. In terms of causation, Texas needs only to have alleged facts showing the Federal Defendants’ conduct is a cause-in-fact of the injury that the State asserts. Here, Texas claimed that border barriers (i) reduce illegal entries in areas where constructed, and (ii) increase the rate at which illegal aliens are detected and apprehended.However, the court declined to order the states' requested remedy, instead remanding the case to the district court. View "State of Missouri v. Biden" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native of Côte d’Ivoire and citizen of Burkina Faso was admitted to the United States in 2016 with an F-1 student visa. Petitioner soon withdrew from the university, terminating his student visa. He sought asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT relief based on his fears of harm from his political opinions and affiliation with the Congress for Democracy and Progress. Three years later, he updated his affidavit with two additional bases for fear of future persecution: his Christian faith and Fulani ethnicity. Petitioner petitioned for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ denial of asylum, withholding of removal, and Convention Against Torture protections. Petitioner argued that the BIA abused its discretion by finding no clear error in the IJ’s adverse credibility determination.   The Eighth Circuit denied the petition. The court held that because the IJ identified specific, cogent reasons to disbelieve Petitioner’s testimony, sufficient evidence supports the IJ’s adverse credibility determination. The BIA did not err in affirming the IJ’s denial of asylum or withholding of removal. Petitioner argued that the IJ’s adverse credibility determination for his asylum and withholding-of-removal applications should not foreclose his application for CAT protections. Because Petitioner did not raise these arguments before the BIA, they are unexhausted, and the Eighth Circuit lacks jurisdiction to consider them. View "Wendkouni Zongo v. Merrick B. Garland" on Justia Law

In 2019, the Department of Homeland Security charged Petitioner with removability for two counts of being an aggravated felon and for having been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude within five years of being admitted to the United States. Petitioner conceded her removability, making her inadmissible to the United States and subject to deportation. Seeking relief from removal, Petitioner applied for a waiver of inadmissibility. To qualify for the waiver, Petitioner needed to demonstrate statutory eligibility and that the equities warranted a favorable exercise of discretion. The Immigration Judge denied Petitioner’s application. Petitioner petitioned for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ denial of her waiver of inadmissibility.   The Eighth Circuit denied in part and dismissed in part. The court explained that although the BIA did not include hardship to Petitioner’s relatives when it listed Petitioner’s positive equities, it still considered hardship in its decision. The BIA recognized that Petitioner’s removal would “likely result in a considerable level of hardship to herself, her spouse, and her children.” Accordingly, the court denied Petitioner’s petition on this ground. Further, Petitioner challenged the BIA’s weighing of equities, specifically how it weighed her crimes. The court wrote that this is not a reviewable question of law. It is a challenge to “the discretionary conclusion of not meriting a favorable exercise of discretion,” which the court does not have jurisdiction to review. View "Aisha King v. Merrick B. Garland" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a citizen of Mexico, petitioned for review of a decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals. The Board concluded that Petitioner’s prior conviction in Kansas for possession of methamphetamine made him removable from the United States.   The Eighth Circuit concluded that Petitioner is removable and therefore denied the petition for review. Petitioner contends that the approved instruction allows a prosecutor to charge a defendant with possession of multiple drugs in the alternative. But the instruction calls for insertion of a “controlled substance” in the singular, and recommends that “an alternative charge instruction not be given” because “the defendant cannot be convicted of multiplicitous crimes.”   Petitioner further asserted that drug type must be a “means” of committing the offense because Section 21-5706(c)(1) imposes the same punishment for possession of each substance. But while different punishments would conclusively establish that drug type is an element, equivalent punishments do not show that drug type is a means. The legislature may simply have concluded that each separate drug possession offense deserves the same punishment, regardless of whether the offender possessed cocaine, heroin, or methamphetamine. Accordingly, the court held that the Board correctly concluded Petitioner was removable for committing a controlled substance offense. View "Humberto Barbosa v. Merrick Garland" on Justia Law

Petitioner was born in 1967 in Western Samoa to a Western Samoan father and an American Samoan mother. His mother is now a non-citizen national, but she only became eligible under the 1986 amendments and did not attain her status until after Petitioner was born. Petitioner sought a declaration that his mother’s status qualifies him to be a non-citizen national. The district court held that Petitioner’s mother’s status as a national commenced only on the date it was conferred and was not retroactive to her date of birth. The court, therefore, found Petitioner did not qualify to be a non-citizen national.   The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s grant of the Government’s motion to dismiss. The panel explained that Congress has extended citizenship to individuals born in every United States territory except American Samoa, meaning that those with ties to American Samoa are the only group eligible for noncitizen national status. The status of an American Samoan is a hybrid. The panel concluded that the text of the 1986 amendments makes clear that Congress intended for the addition to apply retroactively and to bestow the same status on those born before, on, or after the date of enactment: “national, but not citizen, of the United States at birth.” The panel concluded that Petitioner’s mother’s non-citizen national status extends back to her birth and, as a result, that Petitioner qualifies for non-citizen national status too. View "ILAI KOONWAIYOU V. ANTONY BLINKEN, ET AL" on Justia Law