Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Victor Meza-Carmona, born in Mexico to a U.S. citizen mother, Victoria, claimed U.S. citizenship based on his mother's status. Under 8 U.S.C. § 1409(c) (1952), Victoria could transmit citizenship to him only if she had been physically present in the U.S. for a continuous period of one year before his birth. Victoria was born in Los Angeles and baptized in El Paso, Texas, but later moved to Mexico. The case hinges on whether Victoria met the continuous physical presence requirement.The Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings against Meza-Carmona in 2012. An immigration judge ordered his removal, and the Board of Immigration Appeals dismissed his appeal. Meza-Carmona then petitioned for review. The Ninth Circuit transferred the case to the District of Arizona to resolve factual disputes about his citizenship claim. The district court found that Meza-Carmona failed to prove his mother's continuous physical presence in the U.S. for one year before his birth.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the district court's findings. The court held that 8 U.S.C. § 1409(c) requires a person claiming citizenship to show that their mother stayed in the U.S. for one year without leaving. The Ninth Circuit found that the district court did not clearly err in determining that Meza-Carmona failed to establish his mother's continuous presence. The evidence allowed for either inference—that Victoria stayed continuously in the U.S. or that she did not. Given the record, the district court's conclusion was not clear error. Consequently, the Ninth Circuit denied Meza-Carmona's petition for review. View "MEZA-CARMONA V. GARLAND" on Justia Law

Claude Stephen Bent, a lawful permanent resident from Jamaica, pleaded no contest to two felony charges in California in 2006. The judge did not inform him of the immigration consequences of his plea. After serving his sentence, Bent was detained by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in 2016 and charged with removability based on his felony conviction. Bent applied for asylum and other relief, but an immigration judge (IJ) denied his application and ordered his removal. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed the IJ's decision. Bent appealed to the Ninth Circuit, which remanded the case to the BIA. The BIA again dismissed his appeal, and Bent petitioned for review.Bent moved to vacate his 2006 conviction in California state court, which was granted in 2022 on the grounds that his plea was involuntary and violated his Fifth Amendment rights. Bent then moved to reopen his removal proceedings before the BIA, arguing that his vacated conviction invalidated the basis for his removal. The BIA denied the motion, stating it was untimely and not subject to equitable tolling, and mischaracterized the California statute as allowing vacatur solely to mitigate immigration consequences.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the BIA erred in its interpretation of California Penal Code § 1473.7(a)(1) and the state court's order, which vacated Bent's conviction due to a constitutional defect, not to alleviate immigration consequences. The Ninth Circuit also held that the BIA misapplied equitable tolling precedent by not properly assessing whether Bent diligently pursued his rights. The court granted Bent's petition for review in part and remanded the case to the BIA to adjudicate his motion to reopen under the correct legal standards. View "BENT V. GARLAND" on Justia Law

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) issued a rule allowing certain H-4 visa holders, who are dependent spouses of H-1B visa holders, to work in the United States. Save Jobs USA challenged this rule, arguing that DHS exceeded its authority under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). The INA includes provisions that grant the Secretary of Homeland Security the power to set conditions for nonimmigrants' stay in the U.S. and to establish necessary regulations. DHS relied on these provisions to justify the rule.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia granted summary judgment in favor of DHS, citing the precedent set by the D.C. Circuit in Washington Alliance of Technology Workers v. DHS (Washtech). In Washtech, the court upheld a DHS rule allowing certain foreign students to work in the U.S. based on similar INA provisions. The district court found that Save Jobs USA did not meaningfully distinguish its case from Washtech and thus ruled in favor of DHS.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that the INA provisions cited by DHS indeed grant the agency the authority to issue employment-related rules for nonimmigrants. The court noted that Save Jobs USA did not effectively challenge the applicability of the Washtech precedent. Additionally, the court rejected Save Jobs USA's argument that the major questions doctrine should apply, stating that Washtech had already interpreted the relevant statutory provisions post-West Virginia v. EPA. Therefore, the appellate court upheld the district court's summary judgment in favor of DHS. View "Save Jobs USA v. DHS" on Justia Law

John Doe, a detained alien, filed a habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 in the Northern District of California, challenging his detention at the Golden State Annex (GSA) in the Eastern District of California. He named several federal officials, including the Attorney General and the Acting Director for the San Francisco ICE Field Office, as respondents. Doe sought release unless he was provided a bond hearing. The district court granted Doe’s petition, leading to his release after a bond hearing.The district court denied the respondents' motion to dismiss, which argued that the court lacked jurisdiction because Doe did not name his immediate custodian and filed the petition outside the district of confinement. The court held that the Northern District of California was an appropriate jurisdiction for petitions filed by aliens detained by the San Francisco ICE Field Office.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and reversed the district court’s decision. The Ninth Circuit held that the district court erred in exercising jurisdiction over Doe’s habeas petition. The court explained that under Rumsfeld v. Padilla, a core habeas petition challenging present physical confinement must name the immediate custodian, typically the warden, and be filed in the district of confinement. Doe’s petition was a core habeas petition because it sought release from detention. However, Doe failed to name the Facility Administrator of GSA as the respondent and filed the petition in the Northern District of California instead of the Eastern District of California, where he was confined. Consequently, the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s denial of the motion to dismiss and remanded with instructions to vacate the grant of Doe’s habeas petition. View "DOE V. GARLAND" on Justia Law

Elfido Gonzalez Castillo, a Mexican citizen, was admitted to the U.S. as a lawful permanent resident in 1989. In 2009, he applied for naturalization but failed to disclose pending criminal charges for sexually abusing his niece. He was naturalized in October 2009 and later pled guilty to third-degree sexual assault. In 2019, the government sought to revoke his naturalization, which was granted in 2022. Subsequently, the Department of Homeland Security issued a Notice to Appear (NTA) for removal proceedings, charging Castillo with removability for a child abuse conviction. The NTA was filed in the Cleveland Immigration Court, and hearings were conducted remotely.The Immigration Judge (IJ) denied Castillo’s application for cancellation of removal. Castillo appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), arguing he was not removable because he was a U.S. citizen at the time of his conviction. The BIA applied Sixth Circuit law, as the NTA was filed in Cleveland, and dismissed the appeal. Castillo filed three petitions for review in the Third Circuit, asserting that venue was proper there because the IJ completed the proceedings while he was detained in Pennsylvania.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case to determine the proper venue for Castillo’s petitions. The court concluded that the IJ completed the proceedings in Cleveland, Ohio, where the NTA was filed and administrative venue vested. Therefore, venue did not lie in the Third Circuit but in the Sixth Circuit. The Third Circuit held that it had the inherent power to transfer the case to the appropriate venue and decided to transfer Castillo’s petitions to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. View "Castillo v. Attorney General United States of America" on Justia Law

The case involves Mike Govender Hatchet, a Sierra Leone citizen who sought to adjust his immigration status to that of a lawful permanent resident in the United States. Hatchet applied for discretionary relief multiple times, but the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) denied each application, citing facts that rendered Hatchet ineligible for discretionary relief. Hatchet challenged the agency's actions in federal district court, arguing that the agency relied on facts clearly at odds with the record.The case was initially heard in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee. The district court dismissed Hatchet's case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, agreeing with the defendants' argument that the Supreme Court's recent decision in Patel demonstrated that Hatchet's claims were not subject to judicial review due to a jurisdiction-stripping statute.The case was then appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. The appellate court affirmed the district court's dismissal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The court held that the district court lacked jurisdiction to review the factual findings of USCIS, and because Hatchet's arguments were entirely fact-bound, the court agreed that the district court properly dismissed the case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The court's decision was based on the Supreme Court's recent decision in Patel, which held that federal courts are without jurisdiction to review both discretionary and non-discretionary judgments related to the granting of relief, including factual findings. View "Hatchet v. Andrade" on Justia Law

The case involves Carlos Inestroza-Tosta, a native and citizen of Honduras, who illegally entered the United States multiple times and was removed on each occasion. After his third illegal entry, he was apprehended following an arrest for aggravated assault. His prior order of removal was reinstated, but he claimed a fear of returning to Honduras and sought withholding of removal and relief under the Convention Against Torture. His requests were denied by the Immigration Judge (IJ) and the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), leading to his appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.The BIA dismissed Inestroza-Tosta's appeal, affirming the IJ's denial of his motion for administrative closure and his applications for statutory withholding of removal and relief under the Convention Against Torture. The BIA held that Inestroza-Tosta had not established that any harm he experienced or feared was connected to a protected ground, and his proposed particular social group, "gang violence recipients," was not recognized by law.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that the 30-day deadline for a would-be immigrant to seek judicial review of a "final order of removal" is nonjurisdictional. The court also held that an order of removal is not final until a decision has been made on the alien’s request for withholding of removal. Applying these conclusions to this case, the court ruled that Inestroza-Tosta timely sought review of the BIA’s denial of his requests for statutory withholding of removal and relief under the Convention Against Torture. However, his petition failed on the merits. Although he suffered persecution in the past, he could not demonstrate a clear probability of future harm based on a protected status or trait. Therefore, while his petition for review was timely, it was denied. View "Inestroza-Tosta v. Attorney General United States of America" on Justia Law

The case involves Sandra Muñoz, an American citizen, and her husband Luis Asencio-Cordero, a citizen of El Salvador. The couple sought to obtain an immigrant visa for Asencio-Cordero to live in the United States. After several interviews, a consular officer denied Asencio-Cordero's application, citing a provision that renders inadmissible a noncitizen whom the officer believes seeks to engage in unlawful activity. Asencio-Cordero and Muñoz sued the Department of State, claiming that it had abridged Muñoz’s constitutional liberty interest in her husband’s visa application by failing to give a sufficient reason why Asencio-Cordero is inadmissible under the “unlawful activity” bar.The District Court granted summary judgment to the State Department, but the Ninth Circuit vacated the judgment, holding that Muñoz had a constitutionally protected liberty interest in her husband’s visa application and that the State Department was required to give Muñoz a reason for denying her husband’s visa. The court further held that by declining to give Muñoz more information earlier in the process, the State Department had forfeited its entitlement to insulate its decision from judicial review under the doctrine of consular nonreviewability.The Supreme Court of the United States reversed the Ninth Circuit's decision, holding that a citizen does not have a fundamental liberty interest in her noncitizen spouse being admitted to the country. The Court noted that while Congress has extended special treatment to marriage in immigration matters, it has never made spousal immigration a matter of right. The Court also noted that the assertion of a procedural due process right in someone else's legal proceeding would have unsettling collateral consequences. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the Court's opinion. View "Department of State v. Munoz" on Justia Law

The case involves Martha Isabel Rosales-Mendez, a Honduran native who illegally entered the United States. After being apprehended by border patrol agents, she was served with a notice to appear for a removal hearing. The agents recorded an address provided by her boyfriend over the phone, which turned out to be incorrect. Consequently, Rosales-Mendez did not receive the second notice setting the date and time of her removal hearing, leading to her being ordered removed in absentia when she failed to appear.Rosales-Mendez's case was initially reviewed by an immigration judge who ordered her removal in absentia after she failed to attend the hearing. She later discovered the removal order and moved to reopen the removal proceeding, arguing lack of notice. However, the immigration judge denied the motion. The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed the decision, stating that since Rosales-Mendez failed to provide a correct address, the officials were excused from providing her notice of her removal hearing.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit denied Rosales-Mendez's petition for review. The court held that immigration officials were not required to give notice of a removal hearing to an alien who provided them an inaccurate home address. The court reasoned that Rosales-Mendez, through her boyfriend, provided an incorrect address and failed to correct it, thereby forfeiting her right to actual notice of her removal hearing. The court concluded that Rosales-Mendez was properly ordered removed in absentia. View "Rosales-Mendez v. U.S. Attorney General" on Justia Law

The case involves three aliens, Moris Esmelis Campos-Chaves, Varinder Singh, and Raul Daniel Mendez-Colín, who were ordered removed in absentia after failing to appear at their respective removal hearings. The Government had initiated removal proceedings against each of them, serving them with Notices to Appear (NTAs) that did not specify the time and date of the hearings. However, each alien was later provided with a notice specifying the time and place of the removal hearing. After being ordered removed in absentia, each alien sought to rescind the order, arguing that they did not receive a proper NTA.In the lower courts, the Fifth Circuit denied Campos-Chaves's petition for review, while the Ninth Circuit granted the petitions for Singh and Mendez-Colín. The Fifth Circuit based its decision on the fact that Campos-Chaves did not dispute receiving the subsequent notice specifying the time and place of the hearing. The Ninth Circuit, on the other hand, held that the lack of a single-document NTA alone rendered the in absentia removal orders rescindable.The Supreme Court of the United States held that to rescind an in absentia removal order on the ground that the alien did not receive notice in accordance with paragraph (1) or (2), the alien must show that he did not receive notice under either paragraph for the hearing at which the alien was absent and ordered removed. Because each of the aliens in these cases received a proper paragraph (2) notice for the hearings they missed and at which they were ordered removed, they cannot seek rescission of their in absentia removal orders on the basis of defective notice. The Court affirmed the judgment of the Fifth Circuit, reversed the Ninth Circuit’s judgment in Garland v. Mendez-Colín, and vacated and remanded the Ninth Circuit’s judgment in Garland v. Singh for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "Campos-Chaves v. Garland" on Justia Law