Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

A citizen of Mexico, who had been a lawful permanent resident in the United States since 1982, was convicted twice for aggravated assault with a deadly weapon—first in 2011 for shooting his ex-wife and again in 2018 for assaulting a roommate with a knife. These felony convictions led the Department of Homeland Security to initiate removal proceedings against him under Section 237(a)(2)(C) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, which concerns firearm offenses. An immigration judge ordered his removal after he completed his sentences, finding him ineligible for relief due to his convictions.The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed the removal order in 2020. The individual’s first petition for review to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit was dismissed as untimely. In 2022, he filed his first motion to reopen or reconsider with the BIA, arguing that a Supreme Court decision, Borden v. United States, changed the legal landscape regarding his removability. The BIA denied this motion, finding Borden inapplicable because his removal was based on a firearm offense, not an aggravated felony, and that the motion was untimely. In 2024, he filed a second motion to reopen, again citing Borden and seeking equitable tolling of both the time and numerical limits on motions to reopen. The BIA denied this second motion, holding that the statutory limit of one motion to reopen applied and that equitable tolling did not extend to the numerical bar.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the BIA’s denial. The court held that the statutory “number bar” in the INA, which generally allows only one motion to reopen, is not subject to equitable tolling. The court dismissed the petition in part and denied it in part, concluding that the BIA did not err in refusing to reopen the removal proceedings. View "Garcia Morin v. Bondi" on Justia Law

Philip Myers, a native and citizen of Liberia, was adopted by a U.S. citizen and entered the United States as a child. He later sustained several criminal convictions, including for aggravated felonies. In 2021, the Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings against him. Myers claimed derivative citizenship through his adoptive mother, who had become a naturalized U.S. citizen, and also alleged that he had been abused by her. The United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) had previously denied his derivative citizenship application, finding insufficient evidence that he was in his adoptive mother’s legal and physical custody at the relevant time. During removal proceedings, Myers, sometimes represented by counsel and sometimes pro se, was found competent to proceed without safeguards. He applied for various forms of relief, including asylum and protection under the Convention Against Torture, but these were denied.The Immigration Judge ordered Myers removed to Liberia. Myers appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), arguing that the competency determination was flawed and that he should have been found incompetent to proceed pro se. The BIA found no clear error in the Immigration Judge’s competency finding and dismissed the appeal. Myers then moved to reopen the proceedings, citing a pending motion with USCIS regarding derivative citizenship, alleged errors in the competency determination, a new asylum claim based on his sexual orientation, and a pending T-visa application as a victim of sex trafficking. The BIA denied the motion to reopen, and Myers was removed to Liberia.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the BIA’s denial of the motion to reopen for abuse of discretion and found none. The court also rejected Myers’s constitutional challenge to the statutory requirements for derivative citizenship and found no genuine issue of material fact regarding his nationality claim. The petition for review was denied. View "Myers v. Bondi" on Justia Law

The petitioner, who entered the United States without authorization in 2006, lived with his wife and three children, all of whom are U.S. citizens. He was the primary financial provider for the family, earning significantly more than his wife and providing health insurance for the household. The family faced removal proceedings after the petitioner was arrested for driving on a suspended license and leaving the scene of an accident. The petitioner argued that his removal would cause his children exceptional and extremely unusual hardship, citing their emotional distress and the family’s financial dependence on him.An immigration judge found that the petitioner met all statutory requirements for cancellation of removal except for the “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” standard. The judge determined that, while the family would experience financial and emotional difficulties, these did not rise above what is typically expected in removal cases. The petitioner appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals, which affirmed the immigration judge’s decision, assuming for the sake of argument that all three children were qualifying relatives.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case, holding that it had jurisdiction to consider legal questions related to the application of the hardship standard. The court applied a deferential standard of review, as suggested by recent Supreme Court precedent, and concluded that the immigration judge’s findings were supported by substantial evidence and were not clearly erroneous. The court held that the petitioner had not demonstrated that his removal would result in hardship substantially beyond what is ordinarily expected in such cases. Accordingly, the Seventh Circuit denied the petition for review. View "Santos Mendoza v. Bondi" on Justia Law

Lidia Gomez-Gabriel, a Guatemalan native and citizen, along with her son, sought review of a final order of removal issued by the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA). Gomez-Gabriel testified that Guatemalan gang members harassed her for money on multiple occasions and threatened her with a weapon once. After this incident, she avoided the area and had no further interactions with the gang. Fearing for their safety, she and her son fled to the United States in November 2015. The Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings, and after being detained for twelve days, they were informed about the one-year deadline to file an asylum application. They filed for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT) in August 2017.The Immigration Judge (IJ) denied their application, determining that the asylum application was time-barred and that the asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT applications were without merit. The Petitioners appealed to the BIA, which affirmed the IJ's decision without opinion.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case. The court agreed with the government that the Petitioners failed to exhaust their administrative remedies regarding their asylum and CAT claims, as they did not raise these issues before the BIA. However, the court found that the Petitioners adequately challenged their withholding of removal claim.On the merits, the court held that substantial evidence supported the IJ's determination that Gomez-Gabriel's membership in a protected group was not a central reason for her persecution. The court found that the gang's motivation was financial gain rather than animus towards her group membership. Consequently, the court denied the petition for review. View "A. G.-G. v. Attorney General" on Justia Law

The case involves several states and individual plaintiffs challenging an executive order issued by President Trump, which denies citizenship to children born in the United States to parents who are temporarily or unlawfully present. The district court issued a universal preliminary injunction to prevent the implementation of the executive order. The defendants appealed, arguing that the states lack standing, the preliminary injunction was improperly issued, and its scope was too broad.The United States District Court for the Western District of Washington granted a temporary restraining order and later a preliminary injunction, concluding that the states had standing and that the executive order likely violated both the Constitution and the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). The court found that the states would suffer irreparable harm without the injunction and that the balance of equities and public interest favored the plaintiffs. The district court issued a universal injunction, determining that a geographically limited injunction would not provide complete relief to the states.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that the executive order was unconstitutional as it contradicted the Fourteenth Amendment, which grants citizenship to all persons born in the United States and subject to its jurisdiction. The court found that the states had standing due to the economic harm they would suffer from the loss of federal reimbursements and the administrative burden of complying with the executive order. The court also concluded that the universal preliminary injunction was necessary to provide complete relief to the states, as a geographically limited injunction would not address the administrative and financial burdens imposed by the executive order. View "Washington v. Trump" on Justia Law

N.S. was arrested for robbery and destruction of property and was released on his own recognizance by a Magistrate Judge. However, before he could leave the courthouse, U.S. Marshals detained him based on an ICE detainer. N.S. filed a class complaint alleging that the Marshals acted beyond their statutory authority by making a civil immigration arrest, violating the Administrative Procedure Act.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia certified the proposed class and granted N.S.'s request for a permanent injunction, prohibiting Marshal Dixon and his agents from arresting and detaining criminal defendants in the Superior Court for suspected civil immigration violations. The court held that the Marshals were not authorized to make civil immigration arrests as they had not undergone the required training. The court also found that the 2002 Order delegating authority to the Marshals lacked sufficient legal support.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the Marshals were not authorized to make civil immigration arrests due to the lack of required training. However, the court found that the class-wide injunction issued by the district court was barred by 8 U.S.C. § 1252(f)(1), which prohibits lower courts from enjoining the operation of certain immigration provisions. The court vacated the injunction and remanded the case to the district court to reconsider the appropriate remedy. View "N.S. v. Dixon" on Justia Law

Pierre Riley, a Jamaican citizen, was ordered removed from the United States by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) under expedited procedures for aliens convicted of aggravated felonies. Riley sought relief under the Convention Against Torture (CAT), claiming he would be killed by a drug kingpin if returned to Jamaica. An Immigration Judge (IJ) found Riley credible and granted deferral of removal under the CAT. However, the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) vacated the IJ’s order, allowing the removal order to be enforced.Riley filed a petition for review in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit within 30 days of the BIA’s decision but long after the DHS issued the final administrative review order (FARO). The Fourth Circuit dismissed Riley’s petition for lack of jurisdiction, holding that the 30-day filing deadline for judicial review of a final order of removal is jurisdictional and that the final order of removal was the FARO, not the BIA’s decision.The Supreme Court of the United States reviewed the case and held that BIA orders denying deferral of removal in withholding-only proceedings are not final orders of removal under 8 U.S.C. §1252(b)(1). The Court also held that the 30-day filing deadline under §1252(b)(1) is a claims-processing rule, not a jurisdictional requirement. Consequently, the Court vacated the Fourth Circuit’s judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Riley v. Bondi" on Justia Law

The case involves a challenge to a Texas Department of Family and Protective Services (DFPS) rule that authorized state licenses for two residential facilities where the federal government detained mothers and children after their illegal entry into the United States. The plaintiffs, including detained mothers and Grassroots Leadership, Inc., sought to prohibit the detention of children at these facilities, arguing that the rule was invalid under state law. However, by the time the case reached the court of appeals, all the mothers and children had been released from the facilities.The trial court denied the pleas to the jurisdiction filed by the department and the facility operators, eventually ruling in favor of the plaintiffs by declaring the rule invalid and enjoining the department from granting licenses under it. The Third Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the plaintiffs lacked standing and that their claims were moot since they were no longer detained. However, the court of appeals proceeded to address the merits of the case by invoking the "public-interest exception" to mootness and held the rule invalid under the Administrative Procedure Act.The Supreme Court of Texas reviewed the case and held that Texas courts are not constitutionally authorized to adjudicate moot cases, even if they raise questions of considerable public importance. The court emphasized that mootness is a constitutional limitation on judicial power, and there is no "public-interest exception" to mootness in Texas. Consequently, the court reversed the court of appeals' judgment regarding its jurisdiction, vacated the judgment on the merits, and dismissed the case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. View "TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF FAMILY AND PROTECTIVE SERVICES v. GRASSROOTS LEADERSHIP, INC" on Justia Law

The President invoked the Alien Enemies Act (AEA) to remove Venezuelan nationals identified as members of the Tren de Aragua (TdA), a designated foreign terrorist organization. Two detainees, along with a putative class of similarly situated detainees in the Northern District of Texas, sought injunctive relief against their summary removal under the AEA. The detainees were being held in U.S. detention facilities and were notified of their imminent removal.The District Court denied the detainees' motion for a temporary restraining order (TRO) against their removal. The detainees then moved for an emergency TRO, which was not promptly addressed by the District Court. Consequently, they appealed to the Fifth Circuit, which dismissed their appeal for lack of jurisdiction and denied their motion for an injunction pending appeal, citing insufficient time given to the district court to act. The detainees also applied to the Supreme Court for a temporary injunction.The Supreme Court of the United States reviewed the case and found that the Fifth Circuit erred in dismissing the detainees' appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The Court held that the District Court's inaction had the practical effect of refusing an injunction, given the extreme urgency and high risk of irreparable harm faced by the detainees. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the Fifth Circuit and remanded the case for further proceedings. The Court emphasized that due process requires adequate notice and time for detainees to seek habeas relief before removal. The Government was enjoined from removing the detainees under the AEA pending further proceedings and disposition of the petition for a writ of certiorari. View "A.A.R.P. v. Trump" on Justia Law

Mohsen Mahdawi, a Lawful Permanent Resident and undergraduate student at Columbia University, was arrested during his naturalization interview in Vermont. He was detained and served with a Notice to Appear, indicating that the U.S. Secretary of State had determined he was removable under the Immigration and Nationality Act. Mahdawi filed a habeas petition, claiming his arrest and detention were in retaliation for his advocacy on the war in Gaza, violating his First and Fifth Amendment rights. The district court issued a temporary restraining order (TRO) preventing his removal from Vermont and later granted his release on bail, finding he was neither a flight risk nor a danger to the community.The United States District Court for the District of Vermont initially granted Mahdawi’s emergency motion for a TRO and later extended it. The court also granted his motion for release on bail pending the resolution of his habeas petition. The government sought an emergency stay of these orders, arguing that the district court lacked jurisdiction over Mahdawi’s habeas petition and the authority to order his release.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case and denied the government’s motion for a stay. The court found that the government was unlikely to succeed on its arguments that the district court lacked jurisdiction over Mahdawi’s habeas petition and the authority to order his release. The court also concluded that the government had not demonstrated irreparable injury and that the balance of equities tipped in favor of denying the stay. Consequently, the government’s motion for a stay and request for a writ of mandamus were both denied. View "Mahdawi v. Trump" on Justia Law