Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs, Hispanic employees of Koch, a poultry processor, filed suit alleging harassment and abuse on the job. Koch claims that plaintiffs made up the allegations in order to benefit from the U-visa program. The U-visa program has offered temporary nonimmigrant status to victims of “substantial physical or mental abuse” resulting from certain offenses, including sexual assault, abusive sexual contact, extortion, and felonious assault. This appeal concerns Koch’s attempt to obtain concrete evidence of this malfeasance – namely, any and all records relating to plaintiffs' speculated U visa applications – through discovery. Confirming that it has jurisdiction, the court rejected Koch's waiver claim regarding plaintiffs' section 1367 claims. The court found the D.C. Circuit’s decision in In re England to be persuasive, where the D.C. Circuit construed a provision barring disclosure of certain military promotion records to any person not a member of the promotion board to forbid civil discovery of the records. In regard to section 1367's application to the EEOC, the court concluded that section 1367’s similar text and analogous purpose counsel the same result here as in England. However, section 1367 does not bar discovery of the records from the individual claimants. Their protection, if any, lies in the basic constraints of the discovery process. The court could not conclude that the district court abused its discretion in finding U visa discovery relevant and potentially probative of fraud. However, the court concluded that the discovery the district court approved would impose an undue burden and must be redefined. Accordingly, the court remanded for the district court to devise an approach to U visa discovery that adequately protects the diverse and competing interests at stake. View "Cazorla v. Koch Foods of Mississippi, LLC" on Justia Law

As a result of criminal convictions Immigration and Customs Enforcement sought removal of lawful U.S. permanent residents. Pending removal proceedings, each was detained under 8 U.S.C. 1226(c), which provides that if ICE has “reason to believe” that an alien is “deportable” or “inadmissible” by virtue of having committed a specified crime, that alien “shall” be taken into custody when released from detention for that crime, "without regard to whether the alien is released on parole, supervised release, or probation, and without regard to whether the alien may be arrested or imprisoned again for the same offense.” In a purported class action, the district court dismissed in part, holding that section 1226(c) did not violate substantive due process with respect to aliens who assert a substantial challenge to their removability. The court later held that the form giving aliens notice of their right to seek a hearing does not provide constitutionally adequate notice, that the government was required to revise the form, and that procedures for that hearing violate due process by not placing the initial burden on the government. The court then denied a motion to certify the class, stating that certification was “unnecessary” because “all aliens who are subjected to mandatory detention would benefit from the injunctive relief and remedies.” Stating that the district court “put the cart before the horse a,” the Third Circuit vacated. Once petitioners were released from detention, their individual claims became moot so the court retained jurisdiction only to rule on the motion for class certification—not to decide the merits issues. View "Gayle v. Warden Monmouth Cnty. Corr. Inst." on Justia Law

Hugo Gutierrez-Brizuela applied for adjustment of status in reliance on the Tenth Circuit's decision in "Padilla-Caldera I" in the period it was valid law. Gutierrez-Brizuela applied for relief during the period after the BIA’s announcement of its contrary interpretation in "Briones" yet before "Padilla-Caldera II" declared "Briones" controlling and "Padilla-Caldera I" effectively overruled. The BIA suggested this factual distinction made all the legal difference. "But we fail to see how. Indeed, the government’s position in this appeal seems to us clearly inconsistent with both the rule and reasoning of De Niz Robles." In 2009 the law expressly gave Gutierrez-Brizuela two options: he could seek an adjustment of status pursuant to "Padilla-Caldera I" or accept a ten-year waiting period outside the country. "Relying on binding circuit precedent, he chose the former path. Yet the BIA now seeks to apply a new law to block that path at a time when it’s too late for Mr. Gutierrez-Brizuela to alter his conduct. Meaning that, if we allowed the BIA to apply Briones here, Mr. Gutierrez-Brizuela would lose the seven years he could’ve spent complying with the BIA’s ten year waiting period and instead have to start that waiting period now. The due process concerns are obvious: when Mr. Gutierrez-Brizuela made his choice, he had no notice of the law the BIA now seeks to apply. And the equal protection problems are obvious too: if the agency were free to change the law retroactively based on shifting political winds, it could use that power to punish politically disfavored groups or individuals for conduct they can no longer alter." This case was remanded back to the BIA for reconsideration of Gutierrez-Brizuela's application based on the law in effect at the time of his application. View "Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Ordonez, a citizen of Guatemala, entered the U.S. without inspection in 2014 and was detained. She claims that she expressed fear of returning to Guatemala because of abuse she had suffered there. The Department of Homeland Security removed her, but less than two months later, Ordonez reentered with the youngest of her three sons, Gonzalez, then six years old. Border Patrol detained them. DHS initiated proceedings to restore the prior order of removal and served Gonzalez with notice under 8 U.S.C 1182(a)(6)(A)(i). While proceedings were pending, Ordonez sought asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture, based on her alleged fear of abusive conduct by her former boyfriend. Gonzalez applied for derivative relief. An IJ and the BIA denied relief. While a petition was pending in the Third Circuit, the BIA granted a joint motion to reopen and reissued its decisions and orders without change. Ordonez did not file a petition for review in of the reissued decisions and orders. The Third Circuit held that, because the reissued decisions and orders did not alter the challenged decisions and orders it had jurisdiction over the petition, but denied that petition on the merits. View "Ordonez-Tevalan v. Att'y Gen. of the United States" on Justia Law

Petitioner Yang You Lee was a native and citizen of Thailand. He became a permanent resident of the United States in 1987 when he was five years old. In 2014, an immigration judge (IJ) sitting in Dallas found him removable for committing a crime of violence (a misdemeanor domestic assault) and denied his application for cancellation of removal. In the Board of Immigration Appeal's order dismissing Lee's appeal, the BIA noted Oklahoma City next to Lee's file number, apparently indicating Lee's final hearing was located there. Lee filed his petition for review in the Fifth Circuit, which transferred the petition to the Tenth Circuit sua sponte and without explanation. The Tenth Circuit concluded after review that venue was proper with the Fifth Circuit, and transferred this case back to that court for further proceedings. View "Lee v. Lynch" on Justia Law

After Mata, an unlawful alien, was convicted of assault in a Texas court, an Immigration Judge ordered him removed to Mexico. Mata’s attorney filed notice of appeal with the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), but never filed a brief; the appeal was dismissed. Acting through different counsel, Mata moved to reopen his removal proceedings, 8 U.S.C. 229a(c)(7)(A). Acknowledging that he had missed the 90-day deadline for such motions, Mata argued that his previous counsel’s ineffective assistance was an exceptional circumstance entitling him to equitable tolling. The BIA dismissed the motion as untimely and declined to reopen Mata’s removal proceedings sua sponte based on its separate regulatory authority. The Fifth Circuit construed Mata’s equitable tolling claim as a request that the BIA exercise its regulatory authority to reopen the proceedings sua sponte, and, because its precedent forbids review of BIA decisions not to exercise that authority, dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. The Supreme Court reversed. A court of appeals has jurisdiction to review the BIA’s rejection of an alien’s motion to reopen. Nothing about that jurisdiction changes where the BIA rejects a motion as untimely, or when it rejects a motion requesting equitable tolling of the time limit, or when the denial also contains a separate decision not to exercise its sua sponte authority. If Mata is not entitled to relief on the merits, the correct disposition is to take jurisdiction and affirm the BIA’s denial of his motion. A federal court has a “virtually unflagging obligation” to assert jurisdiction where it has that authority; recharacterizing pleadings cannot be used to sidestep the judicial obligation to assert jurisdiction. View "Mata v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Ernest McKenzie’s Canadian birth certificate listed the wrong birth date. Because he used that birth certificate to become a naturalized United States citizen, his United States Certificate of Naturalization also listed the wrong birth date. After he was naturalized, he got his birth certificate corrected; he tried to amend his naturalization certificate so that his paperwork listed the correct date. Relying on 8 C.F.R. 334.16(b) (2011) to establish the district court’s jurisdiction, he filed suit requesting that the district court order United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) to issue a naturalization certificate with his correct date of birth. "The request seems fair and simple enough," but the Tenth Circuit could not help: "With limited exceptions not applicable here, Congress has withdrawn jurisdiction over naturalizations from the district courts. In addition, the district court lacked jurisdiction because Dr. McKenzie’s invocation of 334.16(b) is not a colorable claim." The Court affirmed the district court's dismissal of this action under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). View "McKenzie v. US Citizenship & Immigration" on Justia Law