Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Elfido Gonzalez Castillo, a Mexican citizen, was admitted to the U.S. as a lawful permanent resident in 1989. In 2009, he applied for naturalization but failed to disclose pending criminal charges for sexually abusing his niece. He was naturalized in October 2009 and later pled guilty to third-degree sexual assault. In 2019, the government sought to revoke his naturalization, which was granted in 2022. Subsequently, the Department of Homeland Security issued a Notice to Appear (NTA) for removal proceedings, charging Castillo with removability for a child abuse conviction. The NTA was filed in the Cleveland Immigration Court, and hearings were conducted remotely.The Immigration Judge (IJ) denied Castillo’s application for cancellation of removal. Castillo appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), arguing he was not removable because he was a U.S. citizen at the time of his conviction. The BIA applied Sixth Circuit law, as the NTA was filed in Cleveland, and dismissed the appeal. Castillo filed three petitions for review in the Third Circuit, asserting that venue was proper there because the IJ completed the proceedings while he was detained in Pennsylvania.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case to determine the proper venue for Castillo’s petitions. The court concluded that the IJ completed the proceedings in Cleveland, Ohio, where the NTA was filed and administrative venue vested. Therefore, venue did not lie in the Third Circuit but in the Sixth Circuit. The Third Circuit held that it had the inherent power to transfer the case to the appropriate venue and decided to transfer Castillo’s petitions to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. View "Castillo v. Attorney General United States of America" on Justia Law

The case involves Mike Govender Hatchet, a Sierra Leone citizen who sought to adjust his immigration status to that of a lawful permanent resident in the United States. Hatchet applied for discretionary relief multiple times, but the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) denied each application, citing facts that rendered Hatchet ineligible for discretionary relief. Hatchet challenged the agency's actions in federal district court, arguing that the agency relied on facts clearly at odds with the record.The case was initially heard in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee. The district court dismissed Hatchet's case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, agreeing with the defendants' argument that the Supreme Court's recent decision in Patel demonstrated that Hatchet's claims were not subject to judicial review due to a jurisdiction-stripping statute.The case was then appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. The appellate court affirmed the district court's dismissal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The court held that the district court lacked jurisdiction to review the factual findings of USCIS, and because Hatchet's arguments were entirely fact-bound, the court agreed that the district court properly dismissed the case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The court's decision was based on the Supreme Court's recent decision in Patel, which held that federal courts are without jurisdiction to review both discretionary and non-discretionary judgments related to the granting of relief, including factual findings. View "Hatchet v. Andrade" on Justia Law

The case involves Carlos Inestroza-Tosta, a native and citizen of Honduras, who illegally entered the United States multiple times and was removed on each occasion. After his third illegal entry, he was apprehended following an arrest for aggravated assault. His prior order of removal was reinstated, but he claimed a fear of returning to Honduras and sought withholding of removal and relief under the Convention Against Torture. His requests were denied by the Immigration Judge (IJ) and the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), leading to his appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.The BIA dismissed Inestroza-Tosta's appeal, affirming the IJ's denial of his motion for administrative closure and his applications for statutory withholding of removal and relief under the Convention Against Torture. The BIA held that Inestroza-Tosta had not established that any harm he experienced or feared was connected to a protected ground, and his proposed particular social group, "gang violence recipients," was not recognized by law.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that the 30-day deadline for a would-be immigrant to seek judicial review of a "final order of removal" is nonjurisdictional. The court also held that an order of removal is not final until a decision has been made on the alien’s request for withholding of removal. Applying these conclusions to this case, the court ruled that Inestroza-Tosta timely sought review of the BIA’s denial of his requests for statutory withholding of removal and relief under the Convention Against Torture. However, his petition failed on the merits. Although he suffered persecution in the past, he could not demonstrate a clear probability of future harm based on a protected status or trait. Therefore, while his petition for review was timely, it was denied. View "Inestroza-Tosta v. Attorney General United States of America" on Justia Law

The case involves Sandra Muñoz, an American citizen, and her husband Luis Asencio-Cordero, a citizen of El Salvador. The couple sought to obtain an immigrant visa for Asencio-Cordero to live in the United States. After several interviews, a consular officer denied Asencio-Cordero's application, citing a provision that renders inadmissible a noncitizen whom the officer believes seeks to engage in unlawful activity. Asencio-Cordero and Muñoz sued the Department of State, claiming that it had abridged Muñoz’s constitutional liberty interest in her husband’s visa application by failing to give a sufficient reason why Asencio-Cordero is inadmissible under the “unlawful activity” bar.The District Court granted summary judgment to the State Department, but the Ninth Circuit vacated the judgment, holding that Muñoz had a constitutionally protected liberty interest in her husband’s visa application and that the State Department was required to give Muñoz a reason for denying her husband’s visa. The court further held that by declining to give Muñoz more information earlier in the process, the State Department had forfeited its entitlement to insulate its decision from judicial review under the doctrine of consular nonreviewability.The Supreme Court of the United States reversed the Ninth Circuit's decision, holding that a citizen does not have a fundamental liberty interest in her noncitizen spouse being admitted to the country. The Court noted that while Congress has extended special treatment to marriage in immigration matters, it has never made spousal immigration a matter of right. The Court also noted that the assertion of a procedural due process right in someone else's legal proceeding would have unsettling collateral consequences. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the Court's opinion. View "Department of State v. Munoz" on Justia Law

The case involves Martha Isabel Rosales-Mendez, a Honduran native who illegally entered the United States. After being apprehended by border patrol agents, she was served with a notice to appear for a removal hearing. The agents recorded an address provided by her boyfriend over the phone, which turned out to be incorrect. Consequently, Rosales-Mendez did not receive the second notice setting the date and time of her removal hearing, leading to her being ordered removed in absentia when she failed to appear.Rosales-Mendez's case was initially reviewed by an immigration judge who ordered her removal in absentia after she failed to attend the hearing. She later discovered the removal order and moved to reopen the removal proceeding, arguing lack of notice. However, the immigration judge denied the motion. The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed the decision, stating that since Rosales-Mendez failed to provide a correct address, the officials were excused from providing her notice of her removal hearing.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit denied Rosales-Mendez's petition for review. The court held that immigration officials were not required to give notice of a removal hearing to an alien who provided them an inaccurate home address. The court reasoned that Rosales-Mendez, through her boyfriend, provided an incorrect address and failed to correct it, thereby forfeiting her right to actual notice of her removal hearing. The court concluded that Rosales-Mendez was properly ordered removed in absentia. View "Rosales-Mendez v. U.S. Attorney General" on Justia Law

The case involves three aliens, Moris Esmelis Campos-Chaves, Varinder Singh, and Raul Daniel Mendez-Colín, who were ordered removed in absentia after failing to appear at their respective removal hearings. The Government had initiated removal proceedings against each of them, serving them with Notices to Appear (NTAs) that did not specify the time and date of the hearings. However, each alien was later provided with a notice specifying the time and place of the removal hearing. After being ordered removed in absentia, each alien sought to rescind the order, arguing that they did not receive a proper NTA.In the lower courts, the Fifth Circuit denied Campos-Chaves's petition for review, while the Ninth Circuit granted the petitions for Singh and Mendez-Colín. The Fifth Circuit based its decision on the fact that Campos-Chaves did not dispute receiving the subsequent notice specifying the time and place of the hearing. The Ninth Circuit, on the other hand, held that the lack of a single-document NTA alone rendered the in absentia removal orders rescindable.The Supreme Court of the United States held that to rescind an in absentia removal order on the ground that the alien did not receive notice in accordance with paragraph (1) or (2), the alien must show that he did not receive notice under either paragraph for the hearing at which the alien was absent and ordered removed. Because each of the aliens in these cases received a proper paragraph (2) notice for the hearings they missed and at which they were ordered removed, they cannot seek rescission of their in absentia removal orders on the basis of defective notice. The Court affirmed the judgment of the Fifth Circuit, reversed the Ninth Circuit’s judgment in Garland v. Mendez-Colín, and vacated and remanded the Ninth Circuit’s judgment in Garland v. Singh for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "Campos-Chaves v. Garland" on Justia Law

The case involves a 52-year-old native of the Dominican Republic, G.P., who unlawfully entered the United States twice and was convicted for drug trafficking both times. After serving his sentence for the second conviction, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) intended to remove him again. However, G.P. expressed fear of retaliation in the Dominican Republic due to his cooperation with the government in prosecuting the leader of the drug trafficking organization. An asylum officer found his fear credible and placed him into withholding-only proceedings. G.P. applied for deferral of removal under the Convention Against Torture (CAT), but his application was denied by an immigration judge (IJ) and the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA). G.P. appealed the decision, and the case was remanded for further consideration of his CAT claim.While his CAT claim was pending, G.P. was held in immigration detention. He brought an application for a writ of habeas corpus, arguing that there was "no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future," and that he should therefore be released subject to supervision. The district court disagreed, and G.P. appealed.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court found that G.P.'s situation was distinguishable from the case of Zadvydas v. Davis, which G.P. cited as precedent. The court noted that G.P.'s detention was not indefinite or potentially permanent, as his CAT proceedings were still pending and there was no indication of bad faith or undue delay by the agency. Furthermore, G.P. did not dispute that if he was ultimately denied relief, the government would be able to remove him to the Dominican Republic. Therefore, the court concluded that G.P. had failed to show that there was "no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future." View "G.P. v. Garland" on Justia Law

The case involves Marlon Alonzo Smith, a native and citizen of Guyana, who was found removable as an alien convicted of an aggravated felony. Smith challenged the authenticity and reliability of three documents the agency relied upon for its removability ruling: a Form I-213, Record of Deportable Alien; an FBI rap sheet; and a criminal judgment. He argued that these documents were not authenticated by any method and that an amendment to 8 C.F.R. § 287.6(a) made mandatory a requirement that domestic official records be authenticated.The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) concluded that Smith had not preserved his challenge to the authenticity of three of the Government’s exhibits, and they sufficed to establish his removability. The BIA also rejected Smith’s due process arguments and concluded that substantial evidence supported the denial of relief under the Convention Against Torture (CAT).The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit denied Smith's petition for review. The court found that Smith did not preserve his challenge to the authenticity of the documents, and they were sufficient to establish his removability. The court also rejected Smith's due process arguments and concluded that substantial evidence supported the denial of CAT protection. The court did not resolve the issue of whether the amendment to 8 C.F.R. § 287.6(a) made mandatory a requirement that domestic official records be authenticated, leaving that analysis for another day. View "SMITH V. GARLAND" on Justia Law

The case involves an Indonesian family, Edwin Kurniawan Tulung, Elizabeth Angelia Karauwan, and their son Enrico Geraldwin Tulung, who fled to the United States in 2004 due to fear of persecution for their Christian faith. They entered the US on tourist visas and applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). Their application was denied by an Immigration Judge in 2009, a decision affirmed by the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) in 2011 on the grounds that past harm did not rise to the level of persecution and future persecution was not sufficiently likely. The family's petition for review was denied in 2012.The family filed their first motion to reopen based on changed country conditions in 2014, which was denied by the BIA. They did not appeal. In 2020, they filed their second motion to reopen, which was also denied by the BIA. Again, they did not seek judicial review. Instead, they filed three motions in 2022: a third motion to reopen, a motion to reconsider the denial of the second motion to reopen, and a motion to amend the second motion to reopen. The BIA denied all three motions.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the BIA's denial of the motions to reconsider and amend. However, it found that the BIA committed an error of law in reviewing the motion to reopen. The court held that the BIA incorrectly disregarded evidence by comparing it to conditions at the time of the previous motion to reopen, rather than at the time of the original merits hearing. The court vacated the BIA's denial of the motion to reopen and remanded for further proceedings. View "Tulung v. Garland" on Justia Law

The case involves Ninoska Suate-Orellana, who was ordered to be removed to Honduras in 2011 after her asylum application was denied. She reentered the U.S. illegally in 2014, and the Department of Homeland Security reinstated her prior removal order. Suate-Orellana filed a motion for reconsideration and termination of the underlying removal order, arguing that the Notice to Appear (NTA) in the original immigration proceedings was deficient under 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a)(1) because it did not state the time or date of her hearing. The immigration judge denied the motion, and the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) dismissed her appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit granted Suate-Orellana’s petition for review of the BIA’s dismissal. The court found that Suate-Orellana had exhausted her claim that her NTA was statutorily deficient. The court also held that 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(5), which bars reopening or review of an order of removal that has been reinstated, is not jurisdictional. The court concluded that the government had forfeited its claim that § 1231(a)(5) barred reopening in this case. The case was remanded to the BIA for reconsideration of the merits of Suate-Orellana’s claim in light of intervening authorities. View "SUATE-ORELLANA V. GARLAND" on Justia Law