Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

This case concerned a partition action: the district court determined that a physical partition of the property would result in great prejudice and ordered the parties to sell the property and split the proceeds equally. Kay Kiebert appealed the district court’s order, arguing that the district court utilized the wrong standard for determining whether “great prejudice” would result from a physical partition and that it also relied on inappropriate considerations in determining that great prejudice would result. Finding no reversible error, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s order. View "Nordgaarden v. Kiebert" on Justia Law

Appellants Brett and Jenny Terrell appealed a district court’s decision to grant Respondent Paradis de Golf Holding, LLC attorney fees under Idaho Code section 12-120(3). In February 2020, the “Terrells”) sued Paradis for an alleged violation of a recreational easement. In early 2004, Prairie Golf, LLC conveyed to BRMC, LLC a “perpetual, nonexclusive ‘recreational easement’ upon, over, through and across [Prairie Golf’s] property[.]” The easement was appurtenant to and ran with BRMC’s property, which was to be subdivided into 52 single-family residential lots (“the Grayling Estates subdivision”). The easement instrument stated that “each purchaser/owner of a Lot shall be entitled to the benefit of this easement,” which included the ability to play golf for free at a nearby golf course owned at the time by Prairie Golf. In early 2006, the Terrells purchased a home in the Grayling Estates subdivision, which benefitted from the recreational easement. In April 2014, Paradis acquired the golf course subject to the recreational easement. In 2019, Paradis began developing property within the golf course boundary area, which included converting a par five hole to a par three hole and removing a driving range. Paradis then developed residential lots on the excess property where the driving range and part of the par five golf hole used to be. Believing that these developments infringed upon their easement rights, the Terrells sued Paradis. The parties proceeded to arbitration for resolution of their dispute. The arbitrator rendered a decision in Paradis’ favor, finding that none of Paradis’ alterations to the golf course infringed upon the Terrells’ easement rights. Following the arbitration proceedings, Paradis moved for attorney fees under Idaho Code section 12-120(3). The Idaho Supreme Court found the district court erred in concluding that an award of fees was appropriate under section 12-120(3): "Our caselaw is clear that transactions for personal or household purposes do not constitute a commercial transaction for purposes of section 12-120(3)." View "Terrell v. Paradis de Golf Holding, LLC" on Justia Law

This appeal concerned the existence of an easement across a lot (“Lot 20”) in the Greenbriar Estates subdivision. In 2004, John Esposito acquired two adjacent parcels of land. The northern parcel contained a mini storage unit for use by the residents of the Greenbriar Estates (the “Mini Storage Lot”), while Esposito planned to develop the southern parcel into a recreational vehicle storage lot1 (the “RV Lot”) and to additionally build several more homes. The only access to the planned RV Lot at the time of severance was through the northern parcel. However, no access easement either existed or was created at the time that the northern and southern parcels were severed from the Greenbriar subdivision. Once he completed the development of the subdivision, Esposito quitclaimed the common areas within the subdivision to the Greenbriar Estates Homeowners’ Association (the “HOA”). The HOA subsequently contested Esposito’s use of Lot 20 to access the RV Lot. After Esposito and the HOA began litigating this dispute, the parties entered into two partial settlement agreements: one in 2012 and the second in 2014. In 2013, during the ongoing litigation, Esposito defaulted on his payments for the RV Lot and mortgage-holder D.L. Evans Bank foreclosed. In 2014, Esposito, who no longer owned the RV Lot, settled all existing claims with the HOA in the 2014 total settlement agreement; however, the 2014 agreement did not refer to the RV Lot. Several years later after executing the 2014 settlement agreement, Esposito reacquired the RV Lot from the Bank and resumed his efforts to transform the parcel into RV storage and additional homesites. Once Esposito began developing the RV Lot and using Lot 20 to access it, the HOA again filed suit in district court, alleging Esposito had no right to use Lot 20. The district court granted the HOA’s request to quiet title to Lot 20 but denied the HOA’s request for attorney fees. Esposito and the HOA both appealed the district court’s decisions. Finding no reversible error in the district court's decision, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed. View "Greenbriar Estates Homeowners' Association, Inc. v. Esposito" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Idaho Supreme Court's review centered on a residence in the Boise foothills that was damaged by a landslide, which ultimately prevented the builder from obtaining a certificate of occupancy. BrunoBuilt, Inc., the general contractor of the project, sued multiple parties, including Erstad Architects, PA, the architectural firm for the project, Andrew Erstad, the principal architect, and Cheryl Pearse, the project manager from Erstad Architects, PA (collectively, Defendants), for professional negligence in connection with work completed for construction of the residence. Defendants successfully moved for summary judgment on the basis that the two-year statute of limitations in Idaho Code section 5-219(4) barred BrunoBuilt’s claim. Two years after the district court issued its memorandum decision and order granting summary judgment, BrunoBuilt moved the district court for reconsideration, citing new evidence and arguments. The district court denied the motion for reconsideration, concluding it was “untimely, lacking in diligence, and improper.” BrunoBuilt then appealed, challenging the decision of the district court on summary judgment and additionally asserting that the court erred in an earlier order deconsolidating the cases with other defendants. Prior to oral argument, Defendants moved the Supreme Court to sanction counsel for BrunoBuilt pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 11.2 for non-disclosure of material procedural facts in its opening brief. After review, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s decision granting summary judgment against BrunoBuilt, and agreed that the conduct of BrunoBuilt’s attorney on appeal ran afoul of Rule 11.2, and imposed sanctions. View "BrunoBuilt, Inc. v. Erstad Architects, PA" on Justia Law

Appellants were residents of Blaine County, Idaho (the “County”) who opposed a modified conditional use permit that the County granted to Idaho Power to install above-ground power lines. After the County denied Petitioners’ motion to reconsider as untimely, Petitioners sought judicial review of the permit in district court. Intervenor, Idaho Power Company, filed a motion to dismiss the petition, which the County joined, arguing that Petitioners’ underlying motion to reconsider was untimely, thereby precluding the district court from exercising its jurisdiction over the petition. The district court granted the motion to dismiss and concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to consider the petition because the Local Land Use and Planning Act (LLUPA) required aggrieved parties to file a timely motion to reconsider prior to seeking judicial review. The district court further held that no exception to the exhaustion of administrative remedies doctrine applied. Petitioners timely appealed to the Idaho Supreme Court to resolve the question of whether the LLUPA required a timely motion to reconsider to be filed in advance of a petition for judicial review. The Supreme Court concluded the act does require the filing of a timely motion to reconsider in advance of a petition for judicial review, and, therefore, affirmed the district court's order. View "Richardson v. Blaine County" on Justia Law

BrunoBuilt, Inc., was constructing a custom home on a vacant lot in 2016 when a landslide occurred beneath the Terra Nativa subdivision in the Boise foothills. Following damage to the lot, BrunoBuilt filed a professional negligence suit against numerous engineers and engineering firms involved in the construction of the subdivision, arguing that they failed to identify preexisting landslide conditions and other geological circumstances that made residential development unsafe at this site. In the fall of 2018, BrunoBuilt discovered additional damage to the finished custom home itself. It then brought suit against additional defendants, including Briggs Engineering, Inc., and Erstad Architects. Briggs Engineering moved for summary judgment, which the district court granted. The court concluded that BrunoBuilt’s action was time barred by the two-year statute of limitations under Idaho Code section 5-219(4). BrunoBuilt appealed this decision, arguing that the malpractice claim did not begin to accrue until there was damage to the custom home, rather than just the land. To this the Idaho Supreme Court disagreed with BrunoBuilt’s analysis and affirmed the district court that BrunoBuilt’s claim was time barred. View "Brunobuilt, Inc. v. Briggs Engineering, Inc." on Justia Law

Jane Doe, a three-year-old child, was in the custody of the Idaho Department of Health and Welfare (the “Department”); she was six days shy of her first birthday when the State removed her from the custody of her mother and placed her with a foster family. Her mother’s attempts to stick to a permanency plan were inconsistent, and while for the majority of the life of this case, the magistrate court held fast to a permanency goal of reunification, it modified that goal in the summer of 2022 so that termination of parental rights and adoption became the primary goals for Jane and reunification became the concurrent goal. Mother appealed the district court’s change of the permanency goals. She also sought a permissive appeal from the magistrate court to appeal to the district court. The magistrate court granted the motion. The district court dismissed the case and remanded it back to the magistrate court sua sponte after determining it did not have jurisdiction to hear the appeal. Mother then appealed to the Idaho Supreme Court. The Supreme Court found no error in the district court’s judgment and affirmed. View "IDHW v. Jane Doe (2022-36)" on Justia Law

John Doe sought custody of his daughter, Jane Doe, who was removed from the care of her mother in Idaho when a child protection action was initiated by the Idaho Department of Health and Welfare (“IDHW” or “the Department”). Jane Doe and her maternal half-brother were removed from the custody of their mother in December 2020 due to allegations of abusive conduct. Jane Doe had previously been removed from her mother’s custody in 2018 due to substance abuse issues. John Doe lived in Texas with his wife, who was Jane Doe’s stepmother, and their child, Jane Doe’s paternal half-sibling. At the time of the removal, John Doe was considered a “non-offending parent.” However, the initial “Adjudicatory/Disposition Report of Investigation” filed with the magistrate court noted that John Doe was listed on the Texas Public Sex Offender Website. The magistrate court exercised jurisdiction over Jane Doe in early 2021 and placed her in the Department’s legal custody. As part of the case plan for John Doe, the magistrate court ordered John Doe “to comply with and complete the approval with the [Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children (“ICPC”)] process with the state of Texas[,]” to assess the suitability of John Doe as a placement option for Jane Doe. The ICPC process ordered by the court included a home study and a placement determination. Texas denied IDHW’s multiple requests to conduct a home study on John Doe due to John Doe’s history, which included two prior sex offenses and a past child protection order, along with allegations of physical abuse, sexual abuse, negligent supervision, physical neglect, and medical neglect. Texas also noted that John Doe was a registered sex offender who had previously failed to register. As a result, John Doe never completed a home study. John Doe thereafter requested the Idaho magistrate court revise its case plan to strike the requirement he complete the ICPC process. This request was denied, and the issue before the Idaho Supreme Court in this matter centered on whether the ICPC even applied to John Doe as an out-of-state, non-custodial parent. The Supreme Court affirmed the magistrate court’s order modifying the case plan and held that by its plain language, the ICPC did not apply to an out-of-state, non-custodial parent. View "IDHW v. John Doe (2022-32)" on Justia Law

This case arose from a medical malpractice action involving a partial foot amputation and sentinel lymph node biopsy (“SLNB”). John Beebe was diagnosed with aggressive melanoma on his foot. After his diagnosis, oncology specialists recommended a forefoot amputation and a SLNB. The SLNB involved the removal of a lymph node near John’s stomach to assist the oncologist with staging the cancer. Both procedures were performed at North Idaho Day Surgery, LLC, d/b/a Northwest Specialty Hospital (“NWSH”), after which the removed forefoot was placed into a pathology specimen bag and the lymph node was placed in a specimen cup. Purportedly, both specimens were subsequently placed in a second sealed bag, which was then placed in a locked drop box at NWSH for pickup by Incyte Pathology, Inc. Two days after the surgeries, NWSH received notice from Incyte that the lymph node was missing. NWSH subsequently searched the operating rooms, refrigerators, and the dumpster, but did not find the missing specimen. The Beebes filed a complaint against NWSH for medical malpractice and negligence and against Incyte for simple negligence. They later amended their complaint to add Cheryl’s claim for loss of consortium. The Beebes appealed the jury verdict in favor of NWSH, arguing the district court erred when it granted summary judgment for NWSH and dismissed Cheryl’s loss of consortium claim prior to trial. The Idaho Supree Court vacated the jury verdict because the district court gave a “but for” jury instruction on the issue of proximate cause instead of a “substantial factor” instruction. Further, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded the district court’s grant of summary judgment and dismissal of Cheryl’s loss of consortium claim. View "Beebe v. North Idaho Day Surgery, LLC" on Justia Law

Christine and Thomas O'Holleran married in 2005. They had no children. In 2015, Christine filed for divorce and in her complaint alleged “[t]hat [Thomas] is guilty of physical and mental abuse toward [Christine], and such is sufficient that this marriage should be terminated at the fault of [Thomas].” In his response and counterclaim, Thomas requested a divorce on the grounds of habitual intemperance, extreme cruelty, and irreconcilable differences. Christine subsequently moved to amend her divorce complaint to add a tort claim for emotional and physical abuse and requested damages in excess of $10,000. In his answer to Christine’s amended complaint, Thomas asserted an affirmative defense arguing that the magistrate court lacked jurisdiction to hear Christine’s tort claim. The magistrate court granted Christine’s motion to amend her complaint. The magistrate court held a bench trial on the claims asserted in the Amended Complaint, granting the divorce on grounds of irreconcilable differences, divided the parties’ real and personal property, and awarded Christine spousal maintenance. The decision did not address Christine’s tort claim. Thomas and Christine both filed motions to reconsider, but neither mentioned the magistrate court’s lack of findings and conclusions regarding Christine’s tort claim. Similarly, the magistrate court did not address Christine’s tort claim in its order denying reconsideration. The issue on appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court was whether the magistrate court had authority to decide a tort claim by one spouse against another as an ancillary matter to a divorce proceeding. The Supreme Court determined Idaho Code sections 1-2208 and 1-2210 and I.C.A.R. 5 limited the case types that could be assigned to magistrate courts to those specified in the Seventh Judicial District’s order on local rules. That order did not give the magistrate court authority to decide civil cases seeking damages in excess of $10,000. Nor was the tort claim an ancillary matter to the divorce proceeding. Accordingly, the district court erred when it determined the magistrate court had authority to decide Christine’s tort claim. View "O'Holleran v. O'Holleran" on Justia Law