Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

AgStar Financial Services, ACA (AgStar) appealed the district court’s award of attorney fees to Northwest Sand & Gravel, Inc., Gordon Paving Company, Inc., and Blackrock Land Holdings, LLC (collectively, Gordon Paving), following a deficiency proceeding. Gordon Paving’s cross-appeal asserted that the district court erred in three respects: (1) by permitting AgStar to sell personal property serving as collateral for Gordon Paving’s debt to AgStar after the district court determined that AgStar was not entitled to a deficiency judgment; (2) by awarding AgStar post-judgment attorney fees; and (3) allowing AgStar’s claim of exemption to a royalty check. AgStar moved the district court for an order directing Gordon Paving to transfer the titles of various vehicles that Gordon Paving had pledged as collateral for certain bond obligations to AgStar, and for a comfort order allowing AgStar to sell the personal property collateral at auction. Gordon Paving opposed AgStar’s motion, arguing that because the district court had already determined that AgStar had received real property worth more than the debt owed under the foreclosure judgment and denied AgStar a deficiency judgment, AgStar was estopped from selling any further collateral because Gordon Paving’s debt was extinguished. Gordon Paving moved for an award of attorney fees, asserting that, as the prevailing party in the deficiency proceeding, it was entitled to attorney fees. AgStar opposed Gordon Paving’s request for attorney fees. After review, the Supreme Court found: (1) the district court abused its discretion when it awarded attorney fees without first determining the prevailing party in the entire action; (2) the district court did not err when it held a bond agreement did not bar Gordon Paving from being awarded attorney fees; (3) the district court erred when it allowed AgStar to continue to sell the personal property collateral to satisfy the foreclosure judgment. The Court did not reach the issue of the district court’s award of post-judgment attorney fees to AgStar because Gordon Paving did not support its claim with sufficient argument or authority. As such, the Court reversed the district court’s order allowing AgStar to sell the personal property collateral to satisfy the foreclosure judgment; vacated the judgment awarding attorney fees and costs to Gordon Paving; and remanded for the district court to determine attorney fee and cost issues and for further proceedings. View "Agstar Financial v. NW Sand & Gravel" on Justia Law

The Watkins Company, LLC appealed the award of attorney fees to the Estate of Michael Storms (Storms) and Brownstone Companies, Inc. (Brownstone). Watkins brought this action in 2010 seeking a temporary restraining order (TRO) and damages resulting from a breach of contract. Watkins was granted a TRO which was secured by a $10,000 bond. Storms and Brownstone counterclaimed, seeking damages resulting from the TRO. After a seven day bench trial, Watkins was awarded $699.64 and Storms and Brownstone were awarded $17,015.88; however, Storms and Brownstone’s award was limited to the bond amount of $10,000. Storms and Brownstone requested that they be awarded attorney fees of $80,126.50. Following a hearing, the district court awarded Storms and Brownstone 90% of their requested attorney fees, finding that 10% of their attorney fees were incurred pursuing their counterclaim and were unrecoverable. Watkins argued on appeal that the district court’s finding that 90% of Storms and Brownstone’s attorney fees were attributable to defending the breach of contract claim was not supported by substantial and competent evidence. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Watkins Co. v. Estate of Michael Storms" on Justia Law

In 2015, the Plaintiffs filed this action seeking to quiet title in a strip of land that was 34.56 feet wide and 314.70 feet long. They alleged that they had satisfied the requirements for acquiring title to the property by adverse possession, which were set forth in Idaho Code section 5-210. At the time that the Plaintiffs went into possession of the strip of property, the required time for occupying adversely possessed property was five years. In 2006, an amendment to Idaho Code section 5-210 increased the statutory time period for adverse possession to twenty years. When that amendment became effective, the Plaintiffs had possessed the strip of land for four years and eight months. Guild Mortgage Company held a promissory note that was secured by a deed of trust in the strip of land; Mortgage Electronic Systems, Inc., was the trustee on the deed of trust; and Terry Lankford was the owner of the strip of land (collectively, Defendants). Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the 2006 amendment to Idaho Code section 5-210 applied, so the Plaintiffs had not possessed the property for the required statutory period. The district court agreed, and entered a judgment dismissing the complaint. Plaintiffs timely appealed. Finding no reversible error in the district court's dismissal, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Schoorl v. Guild Mortgage Co" on Justia Law

Jeremy and Jessica Litster appealed a district court dismissal on summary judgment. The case concerned the enforceability of three promissory notes, which were prepared and issued by Jeremy to Jason Lee , Scott McNab, and a non-party, Rick Lee. In February 2009, Jeremy learned of an "investment opportunity" that required a minimum buy-in of $500,000. Jeremy and Jason solicited close friends and family to "invest" by transferring money to them, which would later be transferred to Jeremy's relative, Marc Jenson. Ultimately, the "investment" failed, and Plaintiffs and other "investors" looked to Jeremy for repayment. Jeremy made payments on these promissory notes. However, in July 2011, Jeremy stopped making payments because he learned that the Idaho Department of Finance had been notified regarding his investment solicitation activity. Plaintiffs filed a complaint against the Litsters in 2014, alleging three counts of breach of contract for failure to pay the amounts due according to the promissory notes. The Litsters answered asserting, inter alia, the affirmative defense that the notes were issued under duress. Plaintiffs filed a motion for summary judgment of the issues of breach of contract and duress. The district court granted Plaintiffs' motion. On the issue of duress, the district court found in Plaintiffs' favor under two different legal theories: (1) the Litsters failed to provide sufficient evidence of their claim for duress to create a genuine issue of material fact; and (2) the district court noted that the undisputed evidence demonstrated that Jeremy ratified the promissory notes by making payments thereon. It concluded that, in addition to the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, the Litsters' "claim for duress fails because [Jeremy ] ratified the contracts by making payments on the [n]otes." The Supreme Court affirmed summary judgment, finding that the Litsters failed to contest the alternate grounds upon which the summary judgment was granted. View "Lee v. Litster" on Justia Law

Geralyn Gallagher appealed when her lawsuit against the Best Western Cottontree Inn (the Hotel) and Snake River Peterson Properties LLC (Snake River) was dismissed. The district court held that the amended complaint did not relate back to the date of the original filing and that the statute of limitations was not tolled by Snake River’s failure to file a certificate of assumed business name. Gallagher argued that the amended complaint should relate back to the date that she filed the original complaint. Gallagher argued that because complaints can be amended at any time, and because the original complaint was filed within the statute of limitations, the amended complaint related back to that time. The district court found that because Gallagher was amending her complaint to name a new defendant, Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c) applied. Snake River did not have notice of the suit within the statute of limitations, the district court held that the amended complaint could not relate back. The Supreme Court concluded the district court’s conclusion was correct. Gallagher also argued the statute of limitations should have been tolled because Snake River failed to file a certificate of assumed business name with the Secretary of State. The district court found that because Gallagher’s only search was of the Secretary of State’s database, Gallagher did not exercise reasonable diligence in ascertaining the proper party. The district court therefore declined to toll the statute of limitations. Although the Supreme Court found that the district court correctly dismissed Gallagher’s personal injury action due to the expiration of the statute of limitations, the Court remanded this case in order to give the district court the opportunity to entertain a motion to amend the complaint to assert a cause of action against Snake River under Idaho Code section 53-509(2). View "Gallagher v. Best Wester Cottontree" on Justia Law

The Lincoln County Sheriff took three children into shelter care in 2013 on the ground that the children were endangered in their surroundings and that prompt removal was necessary to prevent serious physical or mental injury to the children. On the same day, the prosecuting attorney filed a petition under the Child Protective Act (“CPA”) and the magistrate court appointed a public defender to represent the children’s mother (Mother) and another public defender to represent the children’s father (Father). Two years later, the Department of Health and Welfare filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of Mother and Father. The evidentiary hearing on that petition was held in 2016. On the morning of the first day of the hearing, Mother’s counsel stated that he would like the magistrate court to determine whether a guardian ad litem should be appointed for Mother pursuant to Idaho Code section 16-2007(5). The magistrate court denied the appointment of a guardian ad litem. Based upon the evidence presented during the hearing, the court found that the parental rights of Mother and of Father should have been terminated on the ground that they each had neglected the children and that termination of their parental rights was in the best interests of the children. The court entered its judgment on June 21, 2016, and an amended judgment on July 21, 2016. Mother appealed, but Father did not. Finding that there was no showing that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to appoint a guardian ad litem, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Re: Termination of Parental Rights" on Justia Law

This was an appeal of a judgment denying a claim for contribution on equitable principles in an action by one co-guarantor against another co-guarantor. One of two independent grounds for the district court’s decision was not challenged on appeal, and we therefore affirm the judgment of the district court without addressing either ground. In his opening brief, plaintiff-appellant R. Gordon Schmidt did not state the basis for the trial court’s rulings, did not state the standard of review and, therefore, did not present any argument and authority showing how the court abused its discretion. Therefore, he waived those issues on appeal. More significantly, the district court based its ruling on two alternative grounds. Although Schmidt argued the Supreme Court should reweigh the equities as to the first ground addressed by the district court, he did not mention the second ground. "Where a lower court makes a ruling based on two alternative grounds and only one of those grounds is challenged on appeal, the appellate court must affirm on the uncontested basis." Therefore, the Supreme Court did not address the merits of either ground on appeal. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "Schmidt v. Huston" on Justia Law

This was an appeal of a judgment against a bail bondsman who revoked a bail bond for an illegal alien at the request of an agent of United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement. The district court awarded damages in the amount of the bail bond premiums, and the appellants contended on appeal that they were entitled to additional damages. The Supreme Court found no reversible error in the district court's judgment and affirmed. View "Garcia v. Absolute Bail Bonds" on Justia Law

Appellants appealed the district court's denial of their motion for summary judgment and the grant of summary judgment in favor of the Board of the Local Improvement District No. 1101 and the Ada County Board of Commissioners (the Boards) in a case regarding assessments levied on properties within the Sage Acres Local Improvement District. Appellants also appealed the district court’s award of attorney fees to the Boards. Ada County Ordinance No. 780 established the Ada County Local Improvement District No. 1101, known as Sage Acres Local Improvement District (LID). The ordinance was adopted in 2011. The purpose of the LID was to construct a water delivery system for residential and irrigation use by properties within the Sage Acres Subdivision (Sage Acres) in Boise. water system was completed in 2014. Appellants challenged the creation of the LID and Ada County Ordinance No. 809, which confirmed the assessments levied on properties affected by the LID. In 2013, Appellants filed a Notice of Appeal from Assessments; the district court set the matter for trial in 2014, and ordered the parties to mediate no later than 90 days prior to trial. Prior to mediation, the Boards moved for summary judgment, arguing that Appellants’ claims were not legally or factually supported. Finding no reversible error in the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the Boards, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Hoffman v. Bd of Local Improvement Dist No. 1101" on Justia Law

In 2008, plaintiff Sharon Hammer began working as the City Administrator for the City of Sun Valley (City) pursuant to a written employment agreement. In 2011, DeWayne Briscoe defeated the incumbent mayor, Wayne Willich, in the mayoral election. The City’s council conducted a special executive session to discuss allegations of improper use of public funds and equipment by plaintiff. The following day, her husband, an attorney, sent a letter to Mayor Willich threatening litigation. The City placed the Plaintiff on paid administrative leave, and three days later her husband filed a lawsuit on her behalf against the City and members of city government. Following an investigation, Plaintiff resumed her duties, and no disciplinary action was taken. In early 2012, Briscoe was sworn in as the mayor. The next day, he placed Plaintiff on paid administrative leave and notified her of another investigation. Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed her pending lawsuit against the City and members of city government. A few days after dismissing her case, Plaintiff was terminated from employment based upon the unanimous vote of the Mayor and city council. Plaintiff brought another lawsuit seeking to recover under the Idaho Protection of Public Employees Act. The district court ruled that the Plaintiff had waived her claim against the City of Sun Valley pursuant to a release she had signed, and that the Act did not provide a cause of action against City officials. Finding no reversible error in that judgment, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Hammer v. City of Sun Valley" on Justia Law