Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries
Articles Posted in Idaho Supreme Court - Civil
McCall v. Silva
This consolidated action began as four separate lawsuits arising from transactions involving a dairy operation. This appeal focused on the claims asserted by Jack McCall against Max Silva personally. Max Silva appeals from the judgment of the district court in Twin Falls County finding him personally liable for the purchase of 116 dairy cows. After a bench trial, the district court found Silva personally liable for the purchase of the cows and dismissed the other claims against him. Silva contended that the district court erred when it found him personally liable for the purchase. Silva also argued that the district court abused its discretion when it failed to award him attorney fees proportionate to the claims on which he prevailed at trial. Finding no reversible error, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed. View "McCall v. Silva" on Justia Law
Andrews v. Idaho Industrial Special Indemnity Fund
Steven Andrews filed for workers’ compensation benefits after he fell from a ladder in 2009 while working for the Corporation of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints (LDS Church). Andrews sought to establish that the Idaho Industrial Special Indemnity Fund (ISIF) was liable pursuant to Idaho Code section 72- 332. The referee concluded that Andrews failed to show that ISIF was liable because the evidence showed that any pre-existing physical impairments did not constitute a subjective hindrance and that Andrews failed to show that his pre-existing impairments combined with the industrial accident to cause his total and permanent disability. The Commission adopted the recommendation. Andrews timely appealed, arguing that the Commission’s order was not supported by substantial and competent evidence. Not persuaded by Andrews’ arguments, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed. View "Andrews v. Idaho Industrial Special Indemnity Fund" on Justia Law
Quigley v. Kemp
Idaho discovery rules require a testifying witness to disclose the basis and reasons for all opinions and all of the data and information considered by the witness in forming the opinions. The issue central to this case was whether a plaintiff had to disclose the identity of a non-testifying medical expert (the physician assistant) who consulted with a testifying expert (the physican-expert) to familiarize the testifying expert with the applicable local standard of care. This was a matter of first impression for the Idaho Court. The district court held that Rule 26(b)(4)(B) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure shielded the Quigleys from disclosing the identity of the non-testifying medical expert. Defendant Dr. Travis Kemp was granted a permissive, interlocutory appeal to resolve this issue. The Supreme Court concluded district court’s decision to preclude discovery under Rule 26(b)(4)(B) was not consistent with applicable legal standards, and constituted reversible error. View "Quigley v. Kemp" on Justia Law
Deiter v. Coons
Plainitffs appealed when their claims against a person who sold a steer for slaughter were dismissed. The steer was later found to be contaminated with E. coli bacteria. Patty Anderson agreed to sell a 4-H steer for her eighteen-year-old granddaughter. Joseph Deiter purchased one-half of the steer. Anderson contacted Donald Janak, who owned a mobile slaughtering business. He was asked to slaughter the steer for Deiter, and to deliver the carcass to Don’s Meats, which was a custom meat processing business that was owned and operated by Donald and Sharon Coons and their daughter Penny Coons. Janak slaughtered and skinned the steer, cut the carcass in half down the middle, and delivered the two halves of the carcass to Don’s Meats, where the meat was processed. After eating the meat, the members of the Deiter family became ill due to becoming infected with E. coli bacteria. The Deiters filed suit against Anderson, Janak and his corporation, and the Coonses. Anderson successfully moved for summary judgment as to the claims against her. The Coonses also successfully moved for summary judgment. The Deiters settled with Janak, and they appealed the judgment in favor of Anderson and the Coonses. The Deiters argued to the district court that Anderson and the Coonses violated the Federal Meat Inspection Act because she sold or offered for sale, in commerce, articles which were capable for use as human food and which were adulterated at the time of the sale or offer for sale as proscribed by 21 U.S.C. 610(c). Finding that the Deiters did not show any genuine issue of material fact with respect to the grant of summary judgment to Anderson or the Coonses, the Supreme Court affirmed dismissal of claims against those parties. View "Deiter v. Coons" on Justia Law
American Semiconductor v. Sage Silicon Solutions
American Semiconductor, Inc. sued to recover damages arising out of Zilog, Inc., contracting with Sage Silicon Solutions, LLC, to perform engineering services for it, where that entity was formed by, and the services were provided by, employees of American Semiconductor, Inc. American Semiconductor, Inc., obtained a jury verdict awarding damages against the engineers and the entity they had formed, but it did not recover against Zilog, Inc. American Semiconductor, Inc., appealed, challenging the dismissal of one of its claims against Zilog, Inc., and seeking a new trial on damages against the engineers and their entity. The Supreme Court found no reversible error and affirmed the district court judgment. View "American Semiconductor v. Sage Silicon Solutions" on Justia Law
Joki v. Idaho Bd of Education
The Idaho Supreme Court concluded the district court did not err in dismissing the State Defendants under the Constitutionally Based Educational Claims Act (“CBECA”). This appeal arose from Russell Joki’s action challenging the constitutionality of: (1) fees charged to students of Meridian Joint District #21 ; and (2) the statewide system of funding Idaho’s public schools. Joki and sixteen other individuals (collectively referred to as “Joki”) initiated the suit against the State, the Idaho Legislature, the Idaho State Board of Education, and the Superintendent of Public Instruction (collectively referred to as the “State Defendants”), all 114 Idaho public school districts, and one charter school. The district court granted the State Defendants’ motion to dismiss. Joki argued the CBECA did not apply here, but the Supreme Court disagreed, finding: (1) the CBECA was constitutional, “it is not unreasonable for the legislature to also declare that allegations that the required educational services are not being furnished should first be addressed to the local school districts which have been given the responsibility and authority to provide those services;” and (2) Joki’s claims relating to the fees levied by the school districts fell squarely within the definition of a constitutionally based educational claim because the legislature’s duty was to provide free common schools. View "Joki v. Idaho Bd of Education" on Justia Law
Westover v. Cundick
Val and LaRee Westover appealed the district court’s judgment and denial of their request for writs of mandate and prohibition against Franklin County Assessor Jase Cundick. The dispute arose when the Westovers granted an easement to Rocky Mountain Power on property owned by the Westovers. Based on his office’s records, Cundick sent a letter to Rocky Mountain Power stating that the Westovers did not own the property in question. The Westovers sought a writ of mandate to require Cundick to retract the letter and a writ of prohibition to prevent him from sending such letters in the future. The district court denied the Westovers’ request for writs of mandate and prohibition after it concluded that there were other remedies available at law. On appeal, the Westovers argued the district court erred by failing to grant injunctive relief prohibiting Cundick from sending out letters concerning real estate transactions and property ownership. Although the Westovers’ complaint did not request that the district court grant injunctive relief, they argued that the district court erred because the Westovers were clearly entitled to injunctive relief under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(c). Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Westover v. Cundick" on Justia Law
Griffith v. JumpTime Meridian, LLC
In 2014, seventeen-year-old plaintiff Seth Griffith was seriously injured when he attempted a triple front flip into a pit filled with foam blocks at an indoor trampoline park owned and operated by JumpTime Meridian, LLC (“JumpTime”). Plaintiff’s girlfriend and her sister were near the large foam pit. Plaintiff jumped into the large foam pit a few times. He spent about 45 minutes “kind of horsing around on both the runway trampoline and the foam pit and the twin trampolines.” After he did a double front flip into the small foam pit, the monitor came up to him and asked if he had ever done a double before. He answered that he had. As he continued performing double front flips into the small foam pit, he decided to try a triple front flip. When he attempted it, he did not rotate far enough and landed on his head and neck, suffering a cervical dislocation and fracture, which required a fusion of his C6 and C7 vertebrae. Plaintiff filed this action alleging that JumpTime negligently caused his injury. He contended that because he was under the age of eighteen, JumpTime had a duty to supervise him. He had been intentionally landing the double front flips on his back in the pit. He testified that he did so “because you don’t want to land on your feet because you can bash your head against your knees.” JumpTime’s written policy manual instructed its employees with respect to the foam pit to “[f]ollow the rules outlined on the wall and continuously enforce it.” There were signs on the walls near the two pits that instructed customers to land on their feet. JumpTime moved for summary judgment alleging that there was no negligence, based upon the opinion of an expert that industry standards permitted landing a front flip into a foam pit on one’s feet, buttocks, or back, and that there was no evidence of causation. In response, Plaintiff contended that the signs on the wall stating how to land in the foam pit established the standard of care and that because of the attendant’s failure to admonish him for landing incorrectly, he was not discouraged from attempting a more difficult maneuver like a triple front flip. The district court granted JumpTime’s motion for summary judgment, holding that Plaintiff had failed to produce evidence of negligence and causation. Plaintiff then timely appealed. Finding that Plaintiff’s testimony did not support an inference that JumpTime was in any way responsible for his decision to try the triple front flip, the district court did not err in granting summary judgment to JumpTime based upon the lack of evidence regarding causation. View "Griffith v. JumpTime Meridian, LLC" on Justia Law
Wyman v. Eck
In 2011, John Wyman first visited Julie L. Scott, P.A., to address a lesion he had discovered on his left heel. P.A. Scott diagnosed the lesion as an infected wart, prescribed antibiotic ointment, and instructed John to return for a follow-up appointment, scheduled for January 5, 2012. For reasons unclear, John did not attend the follow-up appointment. John returned to see P.A. Scott on April 19, 2012, because his lesion did not improve. Still believing the lesion was an infected wart, P.A. Scott froze it off during that appointment. She again instructed John to return for a follow-up appointment, scheduled for May 10, 2012. For reasons unclear, John did not attend the follow-up appointment. He never again returned to see P.A. Scott. John’s lesion, however, failed to improve. It would later be diagnosed as a stage IIIC malignant melanoma tumor, and not a wart. Nearly two years after the date of the biopsy, on August 28, 2014, the Wymans filed a pre-litigation screening application with the Idaho State Board of Medicine. On September 5, 2014, the Wymans lodged a complaint in district court, alleging medical malpractice claims against P.A. Scott and her employer, Center for Lifetime Health, LLC, for their alleged failure to perform a biopsy that would have revealed cancer. In the following medical malpractice suit against Scott, her employer and the hospital, the district court concluded a two-year statute of limitations barred the Wymans' claims. Finding no reversible error in that judgment, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Wyman v. Eck" on Justia Law
Agstar Financial v. Gordon Paving Co, Inc.
Gordon Paving Company, Inc., Northwest Sand & Gravel, Inc., Blackrock Land Holdings, LLC (collectively, “Gordon Paving”), Brandon Hansen, an individual, Brian Hansen, an individual, Carol Hansen GPC Nevada Trust, Craig Hansen GPC Nevada Trust, Canyon Equipment and Truck Service, Inc., and Doe Entities owned by Brian, Brandon, and Craig Hansen (collectively “Guarantors”) appealed the district court’s denial of their motion to set aside default in a breach of personal guarantee action brought by AgStar Financial Services, ACA (“AgStar”). Between 2007 and 2008, Gordon Paving borrowed $10 million from AgStar. In addition to real and personal property collateral, the indebtedness was secured by separate guarantee agreements executed by Guarantors. By 2012, Gordon Paving had defaulted and AgStar sued for foreclosure. A year later, the district court entered a Judgment and Decree of Foreclosure against Gordon Paving. AgStar purchased the real property collateral at a foreclosure sale. AgStar moved for entry of a deficiency judgment for the difference between the unpaid judgment as of the time of the sale and its credit bids for the real property. The district court denied AgStar’s motion for a deficiency judgment, finding that the reasonable value of the properties that AgStar purchased by credit bids was nearly two million dollars greater than Gordon Paving’s indebtedness. In an Opinion issued in early 2017, the Idaho Supreme Court held that Gordon Paving’s indebtedness to AgStar had been fully satisfied and discharged. AgStar brought the present action against Guarantors, bringing a number of theories, including breach of personal guarantee. The district court ultimately entered a judgment against Guarantors on the cause of action based on breach of their personal guarantees. AgStar agreed to dismiss the other claims with prejudice because the judgment on the guarantees represented the total remaining amount due on Gordon Paving’s indebtedness. AgStar moved for an award of attorney fees and costs, which was granted. Guarantors timely appealed, but finding no error in defaulting the Guarantors, and in the award of fees and costs, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Agstar Financial v. Gordon Paving Co, Inc." on Justia Law