Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Access Behavioral Health appeals from the district court’s judgment upholding an order of the Idaho Department of Health and Welfare that demanded recoupment of Medicaid payments made to Access. The Department sought to recoup certain payments made to Access because it failed to meet the Department’s documentation requirements. Following an audit of provider billings, the Department found Access billed Medicaid for two codes for services provided to the same patient on the same day without documentation to support its use of the codes. The Department concluded the documentation deficiencies violated IDAPA Rule 16.03.09.716 and the Handbook. The Idaho Supreme Court determined the Department had legal authority to issue recoupment demands to Access. Access failed to demonstrate an entitlement to payment of those funds sought to be recouped. The False Claims Act's materiality requirement was inapplicable to the Department’s administrative action. Finally, laches did not bar the Department’s administrative actions. Judgment was thus affirmed. View "Access Behavioral Health v. IDHW" on Justia Law

In October 1998, Andrea and Brad Hall, together with Linda and Frank Exler, purchased real property in Roberts, Idaho. The Halls owned a two-thirds interest in the property and the Exlers owned one-third. In September 2005, Linda deeded all of her interest in the property to Frank. Frank died intestate in March 2006. Travis Exler, Frank’s son and sole heir, was appointed as the personal representative of Frank’s estate (“the Estate”). The parties dispute their relationship in the years between Frank's death and the filing of the underlying lawsuit. Brad testified he received notice from the County rearding unpaid taxes on the property. Travis said he was unable to pay the Estate's portion of the overdue taxes. Brad testified the parties reached an agreement by which Travis would deed the property to the Halls if they paid the outstanding tax balance. Within weeks of their conversation, Brad contacted a law firm to prepare a quitclaim deed. In contrast, Travis stated he would transfer the Estate’s interest in the property if the Halls reimbursed his costs associated with cleaning up the property. Travis testified that in 2009 the parties also agreed the Halls would take care of cleanup costs and taxes. Travis stated that he did not transfer ownership of the property to the Halls and was never presented with a quitclaim or personal representative’s deed. It was undisputed that the Halls had sole control, use, and operation of the property since 2009. The Halls oversaw the administration of the lease and maintenance of the property. Travis did not list any profit or loss from the property on his personal taxes. In addition, the Halls paid the overdue taxes on the property, and made all tax payments on the property since 2009. The Halls and Travis did not communicate between 2009 and 2019. In June 2010, Travis voluntarily filed for Chapter 13 bankruptcy. Travis did not list the property on his bankruptcy petition. The Chapter 13 Bankruptcy Trustee moved to dismiss based on Travis’s failure to list an interest in the property, rental income, and the transfer of an apartment building and 150 cattle. The bankruptcy court dismissed Travis’s petition. After Travis refused the Halls’ request to reopen probate of the Estate, the Halls filed a complaint to quiet title to the property. The district court issued a memorandum decision and order, quieting title to the disputed property in the Halls based on the lost deed doctrine. Travis appealed, but finding no reversible error, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the district court's order. View "Hall v. Exler" on Justia Law

After receiving reminder notices by mail, the insureds failed to pay a renewal premium for a rented home by the due date. Fourteen days after payment was due, the insureds mailed a check to the insurance company for the late renewal premium. Six days later, but before the insurance company reviewed the late payment, a fire occurred at the home. Two days after the fire, the insurance company returned the late payment, denied coverage for the loss, and denied reinstatement of the policy. The insurance company subsequently brought a declaratory judgment action against the insureds. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the insurance company. Finding no reversible error in that judgment, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed. View "United Heritage v. Zech" on Justia Law

Jana Mortensen sought treatment from Dr. Jeffrey Baker at The Healing Sanctuary, LLC, after a hysterectomy failed to resolve symptoms for ongoing pelvic pain. Mortensen alleged Dr. Baker prescribed Mortensen a 14-day course of “ozone treatment” to be self-administered intravaginally at home. Mortensen allegedly breathed in ozone gas while administering the treatment, which she alleged caused her permanent pulmonary and cardiac injuries. Mortensen filed a complaint against Dr. Baker and The Healing Sanctuary (collectively “Dr. Baker”), claiming medical malpractice. Dr. Baker moved for summary judgment, arguing that Mortensen could not prove causation. The district court conditionally granted Dr. Baker’s motion for summary judgment after finding Mortensen had not raised a genuine issue of material fact; however, the court gave Mortensen a specified time to secure expert testimony on causation. Mortensen did not comply with the deadline. The district court entered summary judgment, denying Mortensen’s second request for additional time. The district court also denied her motion to reconsider. Mortensen appealed. The Idaho Supreme Court reversed, finding the district court erred in excluding certain statements. As a result, Dr. Baker was not entitled to summary judgment because the excluded testimony created a genuine issue of material fact. View "Mortensen v. Baker" on Justia Law

The Idaho Board of Pharmacy (“Board”) filed an administrative complaint against pharmacist Cindy Chambers, alleging that she dispensed a controlled substance without a valid prescription. Chambers prevailed before the Board and it determined that she was entitled to recover her reasonable attorney fees and costs; however, she failed to comply with the 14-day deadline for requesting her award. When she filed a request almost seven months after the deadline had passed, the Board denied her request upon finding that she failed to show good cause for the late filing. Chambers then sought judicial review from the district court, which dismissed her petition. Chambers then appealed to the Idaho Supreme Court, maintaining that both the Board and the district court erred by applying the wrong legal standard. Finding no reversible error, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed. View "Chambers v. Idaho Board of Pharmacy" on Justia Law

Gerald Neeser, in his capacity as trustee of the Gerald E. Neeser Revocable Living Trust (Neeser), owned two adjacent parcels of land, Lots 3 and 4, on the south shore of Spirit Lake in Kootenai County, Idaho. Inland Empire Paper Company (IEP) owned several hundred acres of land adjacent to Neeser’s, which it used to grow and harvest timber. Neeser filed a complaint alleging that he had a prescriptive easement over IEP’s land, specifically a road known as the “M1 Road,” for ingress and egress to his property. Both parties moved for summary judgment. The district court granted Neeser’s motion for summary judgment after concluding that Neeser had established a prescriptive easement over IEP’s land benefiting Lots 3 and 4 and that there were no genuine issues of material fact regarding that issue. Several months later, IEP moved the district court to reconsider its order on summary judgment, which the district court denied. IEP timely appealed. Finding that the district court abused its discretion in declining to strike portions of Neeser’s declaration that was outside of his personal knowledge, and that Neeser did not offer admissible evidence eliminating issues of material fact regarding the elements of a prescriptive easement, the Idaho Supreme Court reversed the grant of summary judgment. View "Neeser v. Inland Empire Paper Company" on Justia Law

Canyon County employed William Hartman as a heavy equipment operator at the Pickles Butte landfill in Nampa, Idaho, from 2012 until 2017. In February 2017, Hartman reported to Canyon County’s Human Resources Office that a female co-worker was being sexually harassed. The next month, Hartman, who was an army veteran, told both the director of the landfill, David Loper, and his immediate supervisor that he was taking narcotics prescribed to him for chronic pain. Canyon County requested Hartman provide, by a set deadline, medical documentation confirming his prescription and verifying that his use of narcotics would not adversely impact his ability to safely operate equipment. Hartman stated he was attempting to obtain the documentation, but he failed to provide it within the requested timeframe. On April 28, 2017, Loper sent Hartman a “Notice of Intent to Terminate,” informing him that his employment with Canyon County would be terminated effective May 2, 2017. The notice stated that pursuant to Rule 11.04 of the Canyon County Personnel Manual and “I.C. § 72-1701 et. seq. [sic],” Hartman could request a good faith hearing concerning the termination within two days of receiving the letter. Prior to Hartman’s receipt of the notice, Canyon County paid Hartman the balance of his accrued leave. Hartman did not request a good faith hearing. Hartman filed a notice of tort claim with Canyon County on July 27, 2017, alleging he had been unlawfully terminated. He filed a charge of discrimination with the Idaho Human Rights Commission on August 3, 2017. On November 28, 2018, Hartman filed a complaint against Canyon County, alleging: (1) disability-based discrimination in violation of the Idaho Human Rights Act (“IHRA”) and Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”); (2) unlawful retaliation in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act (“Title VII”); and (3) unlawful termination in violation of the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act (“USERRA”). Hartman later voluntarily dismissed his USERRA claim. After considering the parties’ supplemental briefing the district court issued a written decision, granting Canyon County’s motion for summary judgment. Finding that the district court erred in its grant of summary judgment, the Idaho Supreme Court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Hartman v. Canyon County" on Justia Law

Andrew Ashmore, agent for appellant Breckenridge Property Fund 2016, LLC, (“Breckenridge”) arrived at a foreclosure sale with endorsed checks to support Breckenridge’s bid. Jesse Thomas, agent for Cornerstone Properties, LLC, (“Cornerstone”) was also present. Before the auction, the auctioneer provided Ashmore and Thomas a packet of paperwork. The last page contained a requirement that endorsed checks would not be accepted as payment for a bid. Because Ashmore only had endorsed checks, the auctioneer gave Ashmore one hour to cure the payment defect, but the auction eventually proceeded with Ashmore unable to secure a different form of payment. The property ultimately sold to Cornerstone. Breckenridge filed a complaint against the two respondents and a third defendant, alleging: (1) violations of Idaho Code section 45-1506; (2) estoppel; and (3) negligence/negligence per se, seeking mainly to void the sale to Cornerstone. Breckenridge also recorded a lis pendens against the property. The district court ultimately entered summary judgment for all defendants and quashed the lis pendens. The Idaho Supreme Court found the district court abused its discretion in awarding attorney fees to Cornerstone and the auctioneer under Idaho Code section 12-120(3). The judgment was affirmed in all other respects. View "Breckenridge Property Fund 2016, LLC v. Wally Enterprises, Inc., et al." on Justia Law

Olive Fountain Land Company, LLC (“Olive Fountain”), and Greenfield Family Trust (“Greenfield Trust”), owned neighboring properties along Lake Coeur d’Alene in Kootenai County, Idaho. Olive Fountain had permission to construct an easement road across Greenfield Trust’s land to access its undeveloped property. However, portions of the construction did not occur along the agreed and specified boundaries of the easement. Additionally, logs from the construction were sold by Olive Fountain’s agent in violation of an earlier easement agreement requiring any trees removed from the right of way to remain on Greenfield Trust’s property. Following a bench trial, the district court determined that by partially constructing a road across Greenfield Trust’s property outside the easement boundaries, Olive Fountain had committed a willful and intentional trespass under Idaho Code section 6-202. The court also determined there was a timber trespass, which entitled Greenfield Trust to recover treble damages from Olive Fountain. However, when addressing civil trespass damages, the court found the testimonial evidence on property damages from Greenfield Trust’s witnesses to be neither credible nor reasonable, and only awarded $50 in nominal damages. Greenfield Trust appealed, arguing that the court erred and abused its discretion in refusing to award damages for the diminution in property value. Finding no such abuse of discretion nor error, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed. View "Greenfield Family Trust v. Olive Fountain Land Company, LLC" on Justia Law

The Jefferson County, Idaho Board of Commissioners (“the County”) granted Appellant Tina Gilgen a conditional use permit that allowed her to place a mobile home on real property she owned with her husband, Kelly Gilgen. The Gilgen property fell within the City of Ririe’s area of impact (“AOI”). The City of Ririe (“the City”) petitioned for judicial review, claiming the County erroneously approved Gilgen’s application by applying Jefferson County zoning ordinances within the AOI instead of City ordinances, which would have resulted in a denial of Gilgen’s application. The City relied on an area of impact agreement between Jefferson County and the City of Ririe, in which the County specifically agreed to apply the City’s ordinances to property located within the AOI (“AOI Agreement”). After the County filed a notice of non-objection, the district court entered an order granting the City’s petition, reversing the County’s original decision, and remanding the matter to the County. On remand, the County issued an amended decision that denied Gilgen’s application for a conditional use permit. Several months later, Gilgen filed three motions for reconsideration of the district court’s order remanding the case, alleging the district court did not have jurisdiction to consider the City’s petition. Each of the motions was denied. The Idaho Supreme Court determined the City did not have standing to petition the district court for review of the County’s decision. The trial court’s judgment was vacated. View "City of Ririe v. Gilgen" on Justia Law