Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

High-level officials in the California prison system transferred 122 inmates from the California Institution for Men, where there was a widespread COVID-19 outbreak, to San Quentin State Prison, where there were no known cases of the virus. The transfer sparked an outbreak of COVID-19 at San Quentin that ultimately killed one prison guard and over twenty-five inmates. The guard’s family members sued the prison officials, claiming that the officials violated the guard’s due process rights. The officials moved to dismiss, arguing that they were entitled to qualified immunity. The district court denied the motion with respect to some of the officials, who then filed an interlocutory appeal.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of Defendants’ motion to dismiss. The panel held that based on the allegations in the complaint, Defendants were not entitled to qualified immunity. Plaintiffs sufficiently alleged a violation of the guard’s substantive due process right to be free from a state-created danger, under which state actors may be liable for their roles in creating or exposing individuals to danger they otherwise would not have faced. The panel held that the unlawfulness of defendants’ alleged actions was clearly established by the combination of two precedents: L.W. v. Grubbs, 974 F.2d 119 (9th Cir. 1992), which recognized a claim under the state-created danger doctrine arising out of a prison’s disregard for the safety of a female employee who was raped after being required to work alone with an inmate known to be likely to commit a violent crime if placed alone with a woman; and Pauluk v. Savage, 836 F.3d 1117 (9th Cir. 2016). View "PATRICIA POLANCO, ET AL V. RALPH DIAZ, ET AL" on Justia Law

A Missouri physician prescribed ivermectin and hydroxychloroquine to Minnesota residents (Plaintiffs) to treat their severe COVID-19 infections. Pharmacists at Walmart and Hy-Vee stores in Albert Lea, Minnesota, refused to fill the prescriptions. the district court granted Defendants’ motions to dismiss all claims with prejudice. Plaintiffs appealed the district court’s dismissal of their claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress for failure to plausibly plead that the pharmacists’ alleged actions amounted to “extreme and outrageous” conduct.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The allegation that the Hy-Vee pharmacist said he was following “corporate policy” is neither extreme nor outrageous in these stressful circumstances. Moreover, Plaintiffs do not allege experiencing physical or specific psychological consequences after the pharmacists refused to fill their prescriptions, nor that they sought medical or mental health treatment for their distress. To the contrary, they allege both fully recovered from COVID-19 two weeks after self-treating with horse paste. View "William Salier v. Walmart, Inc." on Justia Law

Petitioner sued directors and staff of a structured sober living facility, including a real party in interest Peter Schuster, for dependent adult abuse. The trial court found Petitioner failed to comply with Code of Civil Procedure section 2031.210 because his statement of compliance in response to Schuster’s document requests failed to identify which documents would relate to which specific requests. The court imposed sanctions against Petitioner and his attorney in the amount of $910 for misusing the discovery process. Petitioner filed the instant petition for a writ of mandate directing the court to reverse the sanctions order. He argued that a statement of compliance in response to a production demand need not identify which document pertains to which request; such identification need only occur when the documents are produced.   The Second Appellate District granted Petitioner’s petition. The court explained that based on the plain language of section 2031.210, a statement of compliance need not identify the specific request to which each document will pertain. Because Petitioner substantially complied with his discovery responsibilities in this regard, the court’s imposition of sanctions was an abuse of discretion. View "Pollock v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

During their employment with Dialysis Clinic, Inc. (DCI), the Doctors maintained staff privileges and worked at Washington Hospital. In 2013, Alyssa McLaughlin was admitted to the Hospital and received treatment from, among other medical staff, the Doctors, Kathryn Simons, M.D., Anne F. Josiah, M.D., Thomas Pirosko, D.O., and Ashely Berkley, D.O. At some point during or after that treatment, McLaughlin sustained severe and permanent neurological injuries. Attributing those injuries to negligence in her treatment, McLaughlin and her husband, William McLaughlin (collectively, the McLaughlins), initiated an action against the Doctors, the Hospital, and the other physicians noted above who were responsible for her care. The issue this case presented for the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's review centered on whether, as a matter of law, the Hospital could seek contribution and/or indemnity from DCI for negligence committed by DCI’s employees (the Doctors). The trial and superior courts both concluded that, although traditional principles of contribution and indemnity did not apply cleanly these particular circumstances, equitable principles of law permitted the Hospital to seek both contribution and indemnity from DCI. As a result, the trial court denied DCI’s motion for summary relief, and the superior court affirmed. The Supreme Court was unanimous in finding that, if the Hospital and DCI were determined to be vicariously liable for the negligence of the Doctors, the law permitted the Hospital to seek contribution from DCI. The Court was evenly divided on the question of whether the Hospital could also seek indemnification from DCI. Given the decision on contribution and inability to reach a decision on indemnity, the superior court was affirmed on those questions. View "McLaughlin v. Nahata, et al." on Justia Law

A healthcare provider contended it was underpaid for substance abuse treatment that it rendered to 29 patients. Seeking to recover the difference directly from the insurance company, the provider filed suit alleging the insurer entered into binding payment agreements during verification of benefits and authorization calls with the provider and otherwise misrepresented or concealed the amounts it would pay for treatment. The trial court entered summary judgment against the provider. After review, the Court of Appeal concluded the court did not err in determining one or more elements of the provider’s causes of action could not be established. View "Aton Center v. United Healthcare Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Candi Ottgen and her husband brought a medical malpractice action against Abdalmaijid Katranji, M.D., and others, alleging that Katranji had negligently performed two thumb surgeries on her, first on May 1, 2017, the second July 23, 2017. Plaintiffs filed their action on April 11, 2019, focusing their complaint on the first surgery, but they did not attach an affidavit of merit (AOM) to the complaint as required by MCL 600.2912d(1). On May 9, 2019, defendants moved for summary judgment pursuant to Scarsella v. Pollak, 461 Mich 547 (2000), which held that filing a medical malpractice complaint without an AOM was ineffective to commence the action and thereby toll the two-year statutory limitations period. Plaintiffs responded by filing an amended complaint with an AOM that had purportedly been executed on January 30, 2019, but was not attached to the original complaint because of a clerical error. Plaintiffs also separately requested permission to make the late filing and contended that it related back to the original complaint. The trial court held that Scarsella was inapplicable because the AOM was completed when the original complaint was filed and its omission from the filing was inadvertent. The trial court also permitted plaintiffs to file their late AOM and allowed it to relate back to the April 2019 complaint. The Court of Appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that Scarsella applied and, accordingly, that plaintiffs’ complaint was untimely with regard to the first surgery, rendering the April 2019 complaint ineffective and leaving nothing for the subsequently filed May 13, 2019 amended complaint to relate back to. The Michigan Supreme Court concluded Scarsella was erroneously decided and failed to survive a stare decisis analysis, and it was therefore overruled. "Filing an AOM under MCL 600.2912d(1) is not required to commence a medical malpractice action and toll the statutory limitations period. Instead, the normal tolling rules apply to medical malpractice actions, and tolling occurs upon the filing of a timely served complaint. A failure to comply with MCL 600.2912d(1) can still be a basis for dismissal of a case; however, the dismissal cannot be based on statute-of-limitations grounds." Because the courts below did not consider the nature of dismissals for violations of MCL 600.2912d(1), the case was remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Ottgen v. Katranji" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that because Plaintiff's state-law claims were based on allegations that his father's health maintenance organization (HMO) plan and healthcare services administrator that managed his father's benefits (collectively, Defendants) breached state-law duties that incorporated and duplicated standards established under Medicare Part C, Part C's preemption provision preempted them.Plaintiff brought this action alleging a state statutory claim under the Elder Abuse Act and common law claims of negligence and wrongful death for the alleged maltreatment of his father, a Medicare Advantage (MA) enrollee who died after being discharged from a skilled nursing facility. Plaintiff alleged that the MA HMO and healthcare services administrator breached a duty to ensure his father received skilled nursing benefits to which he was entitled under his MA plan. Defendants demurred, arguing that the claims were preempted by Part C's preemption provision. The trial court sustained the demurrers, and the court of appeal affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because Plaintiff's state-law claims were based on allegations that Defendants breached state-law duties that incorporate and duplicate standards established under Part C, the claims were expressly preempted. View "Quishenberry v. UnitedHealthcare, Inc." on Justia Law

In 2014, decedent Aaron Martineau, age 28, arrived at the McKenzie-Willamette Hospital emergency room, complaining of sudden onset chest pain, shortness of breath, and other symptoms. He was seen by a physician assistant and by a physician, defendant Gary Josephsen, M.D.; both worked for defendant Doctor’s Emergency Room Corporation, P.C. (collectively, the ER defendants). Defendants did not adequately review the x-ray or refer decedent for further imaging or other tests to rule out or confirm the presence of serious cardiovascular or cardiopulmonary conditions. Instead, they diagnosed him with noncardiac chest pain and discharged him from the hospital. Approximately 24 hours after being discharged, decedent died from an aortic dissection in his heart. In this wrongful death action, two issues were presented for the Oregon Supreme Court's review: (1) whether the trial court erred when it instructed the jury that physicians “are not negligent merely because their efforts were unsuccessful” and that a physician “does not guarantee a good result by undertaking to perform a service;” and (2) whether plaintiff had alleged a lost chance claim under Oregon’s survival statute, ORS 30.075, that was separately cognizable from her wrongful death claim under ORS 30.020. The trial court dismissed plaintiff’s lost chance claim before trial. Later, when submitting the wrongful death claim to the jury at the close of trial, the court included the challenged instruction—which was taken from Uniform Civil Jury Instruction (UCJI) 44.03 at defendants’ request—in its instructions to the jury. After the jury returned a verdict in defendants’ favor, plaintiff appealed, and the Court of Appeals reversed, concluding the trial court had erred in dismissing plaintiff’s lost chance claim and by including UCJI 44.03 in the jury instructions. After its review, the Supreme Court concluded plaintiff did not allege a lost chance claim that was cognizable under Oregon law, and, further, the trial court did not err when it included UCJI 44.03 in the jury instructions. The Court therefore reversed the Court of Appeals and affirmed the trial court. View "Martineau v. McKenzie-Willamette Medical Center" on Justia Law

Third-Party Plaintiff Dynasty Healthcare, LLC, a medical billing firm, claimed that a Medicare Administrative Contractor (“MAC”) negligently processed and misclassified the enrollment and payment application of one of Dynasty’s clients, a medical services supplier, and that. As a result, the client was underpaid for providing Medicare services. When the client sued Dynasty for the error, Dynasty sued the MAC, blaming it for the error. The district court dismissed Dynasty’s claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because Dynasty failed to pursue administrative channels through the United  States Department of Health and Human Services before seeking judicial review. At issue on appeal is whether Dynasty’s claims “arise under” the Medicare Act, such that the administrative channeling requirement set forth in 42 U.S.C. 14 Section 405(h) applies; and second, if so, whether the district court nonetheless had jurisdiction based on a narrow exception to the  Medicare Act’s jurisdiction stripping provision recognized in Shalala v. Illinois Council on Long Term Care, Inc.   The Second Circuit affirmed. The court concluded that the claims arise under the Medicare Act and that the Illinois Council exception does not apply to these claims. The court explained that Dynasty is not entitled to the exception because Retina’s financial interests in the claims alleged in this case were aligned with Dynasty’s interests at all relevant times, and Retina had both the incentive and the ability to seek administrative review. That Retina pursued a different course is irrelevant to the court's analysis under Illinois Council’s “objective inquiry.” View "Dynasty Healthcare, LLC v. Nat'l Gov't Services, Inc." on Justia Law

In the winter of 2020, the Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS) determined that the threat posed by the novel SARS-CoV-2 virus constituted a public health emergency. The CDC published the rule at issue—the Requirement for Persons to Wear Masks While on Conveyances and at Transportation Hubs, 86 Fed. Reg. 8025-01 (Feb. 3, 2021) (“Mandate”). Plaintiffs initiated this litigation, arguing that the Mandate was unlawful under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 USC Section 706(2) (APA), and unconstitutional under non-delegation and separation-of-powers tenets.   The Eleventh Circuit vacated the district court’s judgment and instructed the district court to dismiss the case as moot. The court explained that it found Plaintiffs’ contention that there is a reasonable expectation that the CDC will issue another nationwide mask mandate for all conveyances and transportation hubs to be speculative. Conjectures of future harms like these do not establish a reasonable expectation that a mask mandate from the CDC will reissue. Further, the court reasoned that there is no “reasonable expectation or a demonstrated probability that the same controversy will recur involving the same complaining party.” View "Health Freedom Defense Fund, et al v. President of the United States, et al" on Justia Law