Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

The attorneys represented Doe in a medical malpractice action against a hospital and other medical staff. During that litigation, the evidence established that, after Doe was admitted to the emergency room of the hospital, he attempted suicide by stabbing himself multiple times. The hospital sought a qualified protective order under the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA, 42 U.S.C. 1320d) to gain access to Doe’s protected health information and requested a subpoena pursuant to HIPAA. At trial, Doe testified in detail about his suicide attempt, his injuries therefrom, and his diagnosis., Doe was awarded $4.2 million. Subsequently, the attorneys issued a press release related to the medical malpractice trial describing Doe’s suicide attempt, the resulting injuries, and his diagnoses and commented on the medical malpractice case and Doe’s history for an article published in the Chicago Daily Law Bulletin.Doe alleged that the attorneys violated the Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities Confidentiality Act (740 ILCS 110/1). The Illinois Supreme Court reinstated the dismissal of his case. Doe waived his claims of confidentiality under the Act by voluntarily and publicly disclosing his private health information in a public trial; the qualified protective order under HIPAA did not preclude such waiver. The evidence and testimony divulged during Doe’s medical malpractice trial were not records or communications made in the course of mental health services; therefore, the Act does not apply. View "Doe v. Burke Wise Morrissey & Kaveny, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-Appellant E.W. was a participant in an employer-sponsored health insurance plan governed by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”). E.W.’s daughter, Plaintiff-Appellant I.W., was a beneficiary of E.W.’s plan. From September 2016 through December 2017, I.W. received treatment in connection with mental health challenges and an eating disorder at Uinta Academy (“Uinta”), an adolescent residential treatment center in Utah. In January 2017, Defendants-Appellees Health Net Insurance Company and Health Net of Arizona, Inc. began covering I.W.’s treatment under E.W.’s ERISA plan (the “Plan”). Effective February 23, 2017, Health Net determined I.W.’s care at Uinta was no longer medically necessary, and it denied coverage from that day forward. In assessing whether to discontinue coverage, Health Net applied the McKesson InterQual Behavioral Health 2016.3 Child and Adolescent Psychiatry Criteria. Health Net determined I.W. did not satisfy the InterQual Criteria within the relevant period and notified Plaintiffs in a letter dated March 1, 2017. Plaintiffs allegedly did not receive Health Net’s March 2017 denial letter, and I.W. remained at Uinta until December 2017, when she was formally discharged. After receiving notice in May 2018 that Health Net had denied coverage effective February 23, 2017, Plaintiffs appealed the decision. Health Net again determined I.W. did not satisfy the InterQual Criteria during the relevant period and upheld its initial denial. Plaintiffs then appealed to an external reviewer, which upheld the decision to deny coverage. Health Net moved to dismiss plaintiffs' legal claims under ERISA and the Paul Wellstone and Pete Domenici Mental Health Parity and Addiction Equity Act of 2008 (“MHPAEA”). The district court denied Plaintiffs’ motion and granted summary judgment to Health Net. After review, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision granting summary judgment to Health Net on Plaintiffs’ ERISA claim; the Court reversed the finding Plaintiffs failed to state a claim under MHPAEA; and the case was remanded for further proceedings. View "W., et al. v. Health Net Life Insurance Company, et al." on Justia Law

Alicia Sampson ("Alicia"), as administratrix of the estate of her deceased husband, Joshua Sampson ("Josh"), appealed the grant of summary judgment in favor of HeartWise Health Systems Corporation; HeartWise Clinic, LLC (collectively referred to as "HeartWise"); Isaac Health & Prevention Partners, LLC ("Isaac Health"); William Nixon, M.D.; and Jeffrey Saylor, M.D., in a wrongful-death action. At its HeartWise clinic, Isaac Health administered a battery of up to 31 physical tests that were intended "to assist in the detection of early evidence of vascular and cardiac abnormalities." In 2015, 29-year-old Josh visited the Isaac Health clinic. Months earlier, Josh's father died at age of 56 from "right ventricular dysplasia," which was a "congenital heart defect." Lowell's death led the Sampson family to seek heart evaluations to determine whether they had inherited the heart defect. Josh underwent the full battery of testing provided at the Isaac Health clinic; Josh's data from the left ventricular echocardiogram was within the "normal" range. Josh's mother, who also received the testing, stated that the nurse practitioner did not tell Josh in any way that he "needed to have any further diagnostic work-up or testing relative to his heart." On October 5, 2015, Josh collapsed at home while working on a construction project. He was taken to the Emergency Room, but died that day. The Sampson family procured a private autopsy; the report concluded that Josh died due to an arrhythmia secondary to hypertrophic cardiomyopathy, a congenital heart condition. Alicia thereafter filed suit against the clinic, HearWise and the doctors, alleging fraud and negligence. The Alabama Supreme Court reversed summary judgment entered in favor of Isaac Health and Drs. Nixon and Saylor with respect to Alicia's negligence allegations against them because those allegations were never properly presented to the circuit court for adjudication. The Court also reversed summary judgment in favor of HeartWise with respect to Alicia's fraud allegations against HeartWise because Alicia presented substantial evidence of Josh's reasonable reliance upon HeartWise's representations about its program. The Court affirmed summary judgment in favor of Isaac Health with respect to Alicia's fraud allegations against Isaac Health because Alicia failed to present substantial evidence that Josh's course of conduct would have changed if he had not seen HeartWise materials in the Isaac Health clinic's waiting room. The Court also affirmed summary judgment in favor of HeartWise with respect to Alicia's negligence allegations against HeartWise for multiple reasons. View "Sampson v. HeartWise Health Systems Corporation, et al." on Justia Law

This appeal stemmed from a medical-malpractice wrongful-death action filed by Patricia West ("Mrs. West"), the personal representative of the estate of her husband, John West, Jr. ("Mr. West"), against Springhill Hospitals, Inc., d/b/a Springhill Memorial Hospital ("SMH"). In 2014, then 59-year-old Mr. West accidentally sliced most of the tip of his left thumb off when he was using a table saw in his shop. He went to the emergency room, at which he had surgery to suture the wound from the saw cut. Mr. West was given two pain medications for postsurgical care: Dilaudid, the brand name for hydromorphone, and Percocet, the brand name for the opioid oxycodone. Mr. West was admitted to the hospital following surgery for observation. He was given the prescribed pain medications while in the hospital. The hospital admitted prescribed doses of Dilaudid were administered to Mr. West, but Percoset was not. Mr. West was found unresponsive after the doses of Dilaudid, and no drugs to counteract opioid overdoses were given. Mrs. West's lawsuit alleged negligence against the hospital for failing to assess monitor her husband while in the hospital. A jury returned a verdict against SMH and awarded $35 million in punitive damages. The trial court thereafter entered judgment on the jury's verdict finding SMH liable. After a hearing concerning a remittitur of the punitive-damages award, the trial court reduced the amount of the award to $10 million. After review, the Alabama Supreme Court affirmed both the judgment entered on the jury's verdict finding SMH liable and the trial court's order reducing the punitive-damages award. View "Springhill Hospitals, Inc. v. West" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs are individual physicians based in Arizona, joined by several Arizona medical and advocacy groups. The named Defendants are Arizona Attorney General Kristin Mayes, all Arizona County Attorneys, and various state enforcement agencies. The Attorney General declined to defend this lawsuit, and the district court allowed Warren Petersen, President of the Arizona Senate, and Ben Toma, Speaker of the Arizona House of Representatives, to intervene. This suit by Arizona physicians, medical associations, and advocacy groups claims that an Arizona law criminalizing the performance of certain abortions is unconstitutionally vague. The district court denied a preliminary injunction, finding that Plaintiffs lacked standing.   The Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded. The panel held that the physician plaintiffs had demonstrated both actual and imminent injuries sufficient for standing. Plaintiffs suffered an actual injury—economic losses— because they lost money by complying with the laws, which forbade them from providing medical services they would otherwise provide, and these economic losses were fairly traceable to the statute. A favorable decision would relieve plaintiffs of compliance with the laws and restore the revenue generated by the prohibited procedures. Plaintiffs sufficiently alleged two imminent future injuries that affected interests protected by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments: (1) a liberty interest that was imperiled because violating the statute could result in imprisonment; and (2) a property interest that was threatened because a statutory violation could result in revocation of plaintiffs’ licenses, loss of revenue, and monetary damages. Finally, plaintiffs satisfied the causation and redressability requirements with respect to their imminent future injury. View "PAUL ISAACSON, ET AL V. KRISTIN MAYES, ET AL" on Justia Law

A.I. appealed a district court’s order continuing her commitment to the North Dakota State Hospital (“NDSH”) for a period not to exceed 180 days. She argued the court erred in not ordering a less restrictive alternative treatment as testimony supported A.I.’s needs could be met with a lower level of care. In addition, A.I. asserted the entry of an order, that indicated a waiver of the continuing treatment hearing filed after a hearing was held, was clearly erroneous. The North Dakota Supreme Court concluded the court’s order to continue her hospitalization was not clearly erroneous, and the court’s order following waiver of treatment or continuing treatment hearing, as conceded by both parties, was entered in error. The Court affirmed the district court’s order for continued treatment and vacated the superfluous order entered in the record at docket entry 43. View "Interest of A.I." on Justia Law

At issue before the Colorado Supreme Court in this matter was a trial court’s order denying immunity to Defendant New Century Hospice, Inc. and its subsidiaries, Defendants Legacy Hospice, LLC, d/b/a New Century Hospice of Denver, LLC, and Legacy Hospice of Colorado Springs, LLC (collectively, “New Century”). New Century argued it was entitled to immunity under four different statutes. Tana Edwards filed suit against New Century (her former employer) and Kathleen Johnson, the Director of Operations for New Century Castle Rock (collectively, “Defendants”). As part of her employment with New Century, Edwards provided in-home care to an elderly patient. In December 2019, Johnson began to suspect that Edwards was diverting pain medications from the patient. Defendants reported the suspected drug diversion to the Castle Rock Police Department and the Colorado Department of Public Health and Environment (“CDPHE”). Defendants also lodged a complaint against Edwards’s nursing license with the Colorado Board of Nursing (“the Board”). After investigations, no criminal charges were filed and no formal disciplinary actions were taken against Edwards. Edwards subsequently brought this action against Defendants, alleging claims for negligent supervision and negligent hiring against New Century, as well as claims for defamation and intentional infliction of emotional distress against New Century and Johnson. Defendants moved for summary judgment. The trial court granted the motion as to Edwards’s claims for negligent hiring, defamation, and intentional infliction of emotional distress, finding that the claims were either time-barred or could not be proven. Three of the statutes New Century cited for its immunity claim, 12-20-402(1), C.R.S. (2022) (“the Professions Act”), 12-255-123(2), C.R.S. (2022) (“the Nurse Practice Act”), and 18-6.5-108(3), C.R.S. (2022) (“the Mandatory Reporter statute”), only authorized immunity for a “person.” Relying on the plain meaning of “person,” the Supreme Court held that New Century was not entitled to immunity under these three statutes because it was a corporation, not a person. The fourth statute, 18-8-115, C.R.S. (2022) (“the Duty to Report statute”), explicitly entitled corporations to immunity, but only if certain conditions were met. Applying the plain language of the statute, the Supreme Court held that New Century was not entitled to summary judgment on the issue of immunity under this statute because it did not carry its burden of demonstrating that all such conditions were met. View "In re Edwards v. New Century Hospice" on Justia Law

The Idaho Department of Health and Welfare’s (“the Department”) cited Grace at Fairview Lakes, LLC (“Grace”), a residential assisted living and memory care facility, for failing to provide a safe living environment for residents and for inadequate training in relation to COVID-19 infection control measures. Grace requested administrative review of the enforcement action, which was affirmed by a Department administrator. Grace then filed an administrative appeal challenging the action, which was affirmed by a hearing officer. Grace then filed a petition for judicial review to the district court. The district court denied all the relief sought by Grace. On appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, Grace argued the district court erred because the hearing officer’s decision was not supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole. The Supreme Court found no error in the district court’s decision because there was substantial evidence in the record to support the hearing officer’s order. View "Grace at Fairview Lakes, LLC v. IDHW" on Justia Law

A group of Doctors sued the FDA and the Department of Health and Human Services (together, the “Agencies”), claiming an FDA ad intended to deter people from off-label use of ivermectin to treat COVID-19. Each Doctor says that FDA’s messaging interfered with their own individual medical practice.The Doctors argue that FDA’s ad and similar public statements violated FDA’s enabling act (“Act”) and the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”). The district court held that sovereign immunity protects the Agencies and the Officials, and it dismissed the suit. The Fifth Circuit reversed.The Fifth Circuit held that the Doctors can use the APA to bypass sovereign immunity and assert their ultra vires claims against the Agencies and the Officials. The ad was plausibly agency action, because it publicly announced the general principle that consumers should not use ivermectin to treat the coronavirus, and the Doctors fall within the Act’s zone of interests.The Doctors’ pure APA claim cannot go forward because the ad does not determine legal rights and thus lacks the finality. However, the Fifth Circuit held that the Doctors’ first theory was enough to allow this suit to proceed. View "Apter v. Dept of Health & Human Svc" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was placed on unpaid administrative leave and then terminated from her employment with defendant Sequoia Union Elementary School District (the School District) after refusing to either provide verification of her COVID-19 vaccination status or undergo weekly testing as required by a then-operative order of the State Public Health Officer.Plaintiff brought suit under the Confidentiality of Medical Information Act against defendants the School District; Sequoia Union Elementary School (the School); and the School principal and superintendent, alleging (1) discrimination due to her refusal to authorize release of her medical information and (2) unauthorized use of her medical information.The trial court sustained defendants’ demurrer without leave to amend, finding each claim failed as a matter of law due to certain statutory exceptions.Without any factual allegations that defendants received any “medical information,” such as medical records, a medical certification, or other information in “electronic or physical form... derived from a provider of health care” (section 56.05, subd.(i)), the Fifth Appellate District found that the complaint fails to state a cause of action for unauthorized use of such information under section 56.20(c). View "Rossi v. Sequoia Union Elementary School" on Justia Law