Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Health Law
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In this case, the court dealt with the suspension and subsequent resignation of a licensed obstetrician and gynecologist, Plaintiff Dr. Vardui Asiryan, from the defendant Glendale Adventist Medical Center and its Medical Staff. The Medical Staff suspended Asiryan’s privileges at the hospital without holding a hearing or giving her prior notice. Asiryan sued both entities, alleging they failed to comply with statutory and common law procedural requirements in connection with suspending her privileges at the hospital. She further claimed that the Medical Staff lied to her regarding their obligations to report her suspension and resignation to the state licensing board.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District, Division One, held that the trial court correctly concluded that the Business and Professions Code is the sole source of procedural protections in connection with hospital peer review, and that the common law doctrine of fair procedure does not supplement those protections with additional guarantees. Therefore, the court correctly granted the nonsuit on Asiryan’s common law peer review claims and correctly rejected her proposed jury instructions regarding peer review.As for the court's order awarding attorney fees, the Court of Appeal held that given the court’s rulings denying certain portions of defendants’ summary judgment and nonsuit motions, a hypothetical reasonable attorney could have deemed Asiryan’s peer review claims against the Medical Staff tenable and reasonably decided to take them to trial. This same logic does not apply to the fees awarded to GAMC, because the court disposed of the claims against GAMC on summary judgment. The Court of Appeal therefore reversed the court’s fee order to the extent it awards fees to the Medical Staff, but affirmed the order as it applies to GAMC. View "Asiryan v. Medical Staff of Glendale Adventist Medical Center" on Justia Law

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This case was before the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit where the City of Huntington and Cabell County Commission (plaintiffs) brought a suit against AmerisourceBergen Drug Corporation, Cardinal Health, Inc., and McKesson Corporation (defendants), three distributors of opioids. The plaintiffs alleged that these companies perpetuated the opioid epidemic by repeatedly shipping excessive quantities of opioids to pharmacies, thus creating a public nuisance under West Virginia common law. The district court ruled in favor of the distributors, holding that West Virginia’s common law of public nuisance did not cover the plaintiffs’ claims.After a bench trial in 2021, the district court held that the common law of public nuisance in West Virginia did not extend to the sale, distribution, and manufacture of opioids. The court found that the application of public nuisance law to the sale, marketing, and distribution of products would invite litigation against any product with a known risk of harm, regardless of the benefits conferred on the public from proper use of the product. The court also rejected the plaintiffs’ proposed remedy, a 15-year “Abatement Plan” developed by an expert in opioid abatement intervention. The court held that this relief did not qualify as an abatement as it did not restrict the defendants' conduct or their distribution of opioids but generally proposed programs and services to address the harms caused by opioid abuse and addiction.The plaintiffs appealed the decision to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, which certified the following question to the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia: Under West Virginia’s common law, can conditions caused by the distribution of a controlled substance constitute a public nuisance and, if so, what are the elements of such a public nuisance claim? View "City of Huntington v. Amerisourcebergen Drug Corporation" on Justia Law

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The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ruled in a case involving a claimant who was denied Social Security benefits. The claimant, who had undergone surgery to treat a brain condition known as Arnold-Chiari malformation, testified to experiencing severe and frequent headaches. However, the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) rejected his testimony regarding the severity of his headaches, asserting that his headache symptoms were inconsistent with the medical evidence and his daily activities.The court of appeals found that the ALJ failed to provide clear and convincing reasons for rejecting the claimant's symptom testimony regarding his headaches. It noted that the ALJ did not specify which of the claimant's symptoms were inconsistent with the record evidence. The court also rejected the argument that a claimant must provide independent medical evidence to establish the severity of headaches.Furthermore, the court found that the claimant's daily activities were not inconsistent with his testimony about the severity and frequency of his headaches. The district court's affirmation of the ALJ's decision based on the claimant's conservative treatment was also found erroneous since the ALJ did not consider this factor. Consequently, the court reversed the judgment of the district court, remanding it back to the ALJ to reconsider the credibility of the claimant's headache symptom testimony. View "Ferguson v. O'Malley" on Justia Law

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In a medical malpractice case before the Supreme Court of the State of Nevada, the plaintiff, Kimberly D. Taylor, sued Dr. Keith Brill and Women’s Health Associates of Southern Nevada-Martin PLLC for professional negligence. Taylor alleged that Dr. Brill breached the standard of care by perforating her uterus and bowel during a surgical procedure and failed to inform her of these complications. The jury ruled in favor of Dr. Brill and denied all of Taylor’s claims.The Supreme Court of Nevada held that in a professional negligence action, evidence of informed consent and assumption of the risk are irrelevant and inadmissible when the plaintiff does not challenge consent. The court stated that even if a plaintiff gave informed consent, it would not vitiate the medical provider’s duty to provide treatment according to the ordinary standard of care. Furthermore, evidence of a procedure’s risks must still fall within Nevada's professional negligence statute, and a case-by-case analysis is required to determine whether the evidence should be excluded due to its potential to confuse the jury.The court also held that expert or physician testimony is not required to demonstrate the reasonableness of the billing amount of special damages. The court found that the district court had abused its discretion by prohibiting non-expert evidence demonstrating the reasonableness of the charges for medical treatment received by Taylor.Finally, the court ruled that evidence of insurance write-downs is not admissible under NRS 42.021(1), as it only contemplates evidence of actual benefits paid to the plaintiff by collateral sources.Based on these errors, the Supreme Court of Nevada reversed the judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings, including a new trial. View "Taylor v. Brill" on Justia Law

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The plaintiff, Yarnell, filed a wrongful death action against Clinton No. 1, Inc., a healthcare and rehabilitation center, alleging that Clinton's negligence led to her mother's death from COVID-19. The Missouri Supreme Court addressed whether Clinton's proposed theories of immunity barred Yarnell's claims, which were based on the Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness (PREP) Act and two Missouri acts.Yarnell's mother had contracted with Clinton for a private room, but Clinton placed her with a roommate, which Yarnell claimed exposed her mother to COVID-19, violated their agreement, and ultimately led to her mother's death. Clinton argued that Yarnell's claims were barred by the PREP Act, which provides immunity for healthcare providers administering or using covered countermeasures during a public health emergency, and Missouri laws granting immunity to healthcare providers during an emergency declared by the governor and in COVID-19 exposure actions.The court found that Yarnell's petition did not implicate a covered countermeasure under the PREP Act, as it made no reference to the administration or use of a diagnostic test or any other covered countermeasure. The court also found that Clinton failed to demonstrate it agreed to be deployed during the emergency or that the governor or any state agency acted on such agreement and deployed Clinton, which would have entitled it to immunity under Missouri law. Lastly, the court noted that Yarnell had adequately alleged her harm was caused by Clinton's recklessness, and the two COVID-19 statutes would not foreclose relief if Yarnell were able to prove such recklessness. Therefore, the court quashed its preliminary writ of mandamus, allowing Yarnell's case to proceed. View "State ex rel. Clinton No. 1 vs. Baker" on Justia Law

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The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, in a case involving physicians who challenged California's Assembly Bill 2098 (AB 2098), which declared it unprofessional conduct for a doctor to provide COVID-19-related disinformation or misinformation to patients, ruled that the case is moot following the repeal of AB 2098. The court found no reasonable expectation that California would reenact AB 2098 or similar legislation. Additionally, evidence from the Executive Director of the Medical Board of California indicated that the board's employees and agents had been instructed not to enforce AB 2098, and that the board would have no legal authority to enforce the law once it was no longer in effect. Therefore, the court vacated the lower court's judgement and instructed it to dismiss the case due to mootness. View "MCDONALD V. LAWSON" on Justia Law

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A group of individuals filed a lawsuit against Genzyme Corporation, a drug manufacturer, for injuries allegedly caused by the company's mishandling of a prescription drug shortage between 2009 and 2012. The lawsuit was filed several years after the events in question occurred and would typically have been considered too late under the applicable statutory limitations periods. However, the plaintiffs argued that previous class actions, a savings statute, and a tolling agreement between the parties allowed the lawsuit to proceed. The district court partially agreed and rejected Genzyme's argument that the delay in filing required dismissal of the lawsuit. However, it dismissed the claims of all but four plaintiffs for lack of standing, and dismissed the remaining claims on the merits.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit found that all plaintiffs have standing and the court has jurisdiction to proceed with the case, at least with respect to the plaintiffs' individual claims. However, it concluded that four plaintiffs waited too long before filing this lawsuit, and their claims are time-barred. For the remaining plaintiffs, the court vacated the judgment dismissing their claims and remanded the case to the district court for further proceedings. View "Wilkins v. Genzyme Corporation" on Justia Law

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In this case, the parents of W.J., a young man with a chromosomal abnormality and autism, brought a case under the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986 against the Secretary of Health and Human Services, claiming that the Measles, Mumps, and Rubella vaccine administered to their son had caused or significantly aggravated his health issues. They filed their petition more than 15 years after the vaccine was administered, well beyond the Act's three-year statute of limitations. The parents argued that the statute of limitations should be equitably tolled due to their son's mental incapacitation, his minority status, and the government's alleged fraudulent concealment of a connection between the vaccine and autism.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the decision of the United States Court of Federal Claims, which had denied the parents' petition for review and confirmed a special master’s decision to dismiss the case as untimely. The court concluded that the mental incapacitation of the son did not qualify as an "extraordinary circumstance" warranting equitable tolling because the parents, as his legal guardians, had failed to demonstrate that they were unable to file a claim on his behalf. The court also rejected the arguments for minority tolling and fraudulent concealment, finding no basis for these in the Vaccine Act or its legislative history. The court further held that the special master had not erred in raising the issue of the statute of limitations, nor in dismissing the claim for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. View "W. J. v. Health and Human Services" on Justia Law

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The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit ruled in a case involving Regenative Labs ("Regenative"), a manufacturer of medical products containing human cells, tissues, or cellular or tissue-based products ("HCT/Ps"), and the Secretary of Health and Human Services. Following the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services ("CMS") issuing two technical direction letters instructing Medicare contractors to deny reimbursement for claims for products manufactured by Regenative, the company filed suit challenging these letters without first exhausting administrative remedies. The District Court dismissed the case due to lack of subject matter jurisdiction as Regenative had failed to exhaust its administrative remedies. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court’s dismissal, in part for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and in part on grounds of mootness. The Court concluded that the claims raised by Regenative arose under the Medicare Act and had to be pursued through the statutorily-prescribed administrative process. The Court also found that the company’s request for the court to vacate the contested policy was moot because the policy had already been rescinded by CMS. Finally, the court rejected Regenative's argument for mandamus jurisdiction, finding that it did not satisfy the jurisdictional requirements for this relief. View "Row 1 Inc. v. Becerra" on Justia Law

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The case in question was heard by the Supreme Court of Texas and revolved around the interpretation of the term "psychiatrist" as it applies to the involuntary civil commitment of individuals exhibiting signs of mental illness. The case involved a 34-year-old man, A.R.C., who had exhibited psychotic symptoms and delusional behavior. Two second-year psychiatry residents completed the required "certificates of medical examination for mental illness," as outlined in Tex. Health & Safety Code § 574.009(a). However, a question arose as to whether these residents could be considered psychiatrists under the statute.The Supreme Court of Texas ruled that these residents were indeed psychiatrists, reversing the lower court's judgment. The court determined that the residents, who were licensed under a physician-in-training program and were engaged in specialized psychiatric training, fell within the definition of a physician specializing in psychiatry. The court rejected the argument that only board-certified psychiatrists qualify under the statute, stating that physicians who specialize in psychiatry qualify as psychiatrists under § 574.009(a).The court emphasized that it is the judge, not the physician, who ultimately decides whether involuntary commitment is necessary or lawful. The court also noted that the legislature has the power to amend the qualifications for psychiatrists and other physicians as it sees fit, provided it adheres to the constitutional requirement of competent medical or psychiatric testimony.The Supreme Court of Texas remanded the case to the court of appeals for consideration of A.R.C.'s remaining challenges. View "IN RE A.R.C." on Justia Law