Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

The Board issued an administrative investigative subpoena seeking complete, certified records of three of plaintiff's patients on the grounds that there was good cause to believe that plaintiff departed from the standard of care in connection with the treatment of those patients. Plaintiff's petitions to quash the subpoena were denied, and the Board’s petition to compel compliance was granted in part, with the limitation that the records to be provided should be limited by time period. The court concluded that the Board had pointed out specific instances of prescribing irregularities, which were sufficient for a finding of good cause; substantial evidence supports the trial court’s finding of good cause; and there is no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s determination that Dr. Pollak was qualified to render an expert opinion in this matter. The court also concluded that plaintiff failed to convince the court that, if the evidence of medical records at issue was obtained in violation of Civil Code section 56.26, the Board was not permitted to use it in the investigation. While the trial court may not have specifically stated it was engaging in a balancing test, the long discussion of good cause shows careful consideration of the patients’ right to privacy versus the state’s interest in safeguarding its citizens from negligent medical care. Finally, the court rejected plaintiff's claim that the subpoena was overbroad where the trial court did not err in failing to modify the subpoena in more ways than it already did in applying time restrictions. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Fett v Medical Bd. of CA" on Justia Law

Stephanie Mills had a thyroidectomy, performed by Dr. Ghaphery at Wheeling Hospital. Mills’s nerves surrounding her thyroid gland were severed during the thyroidectomy, resulting in bilateral vocal cord paralysis. Mills filed suit against Dr. Ghaphery, A.D. Ghaphery Professional Association, and Wheeling Hospital, Inc. (collectively, Wheeling Hospital), alleging medical negligence, lack of informed consent, and negligent credentialing. Mills sought discovery of certain documents from Wheeling Hospital. When the Hospital failed to respond to the discovery requests, Mills filed a motion to compel. The circuit court ordered the majority of the disputed documents to be disclosed. Wheeling Hospital sought a writ of prohibition to preclude enforcement of the circuit court’s order, asserting that the disputed documents were protected by the statutory peer review privilege. The Supreme Court granted as moulded the requested writ, holding (1) certain of the challenged documents, including those comprising Dr. Ghaphery’s request to renew his staff privilege, are specifically protected by the peer review privilege; and (2) the circuit court did not conduct a thorough in camera review of the remaining challenged documents, and Wheeling Hospital did not provide a sufficiently detailed privilege log to permit the circuit court to determine whether such documents are protected by the peer review privilege. View "State ex rel. Wheeling Hosp., Inc. v. Hon. Wilson" on Justia Law

Plaintiff has a neurological disorder, tardive dyskinesia. Plaintiff’s involuntary movements include tongue thrusting, pursing of the lips, choking, and side-to-side chewing of the jaw. She becomes mute, screams or makes non-verbal sounds, particularly under stress. She also suffers post-traumatic stress disorder and bipolar disorder, with severe anxiety. Shortly after plaintiff was diagnosed with TD, a personal injury suit that she had filed went to trial. She had no lawyer. Before trial, she sought accommodations of her medical problems, and was permitted to have a friend and a family member take notes, was given a podium, and was allowed to take occasional recesses. She was denied other requested help—a microphone, an interpreter, and a jury instruction explaining her disorder, lest the jurors think she was just acting up. She was hectored by the judge, who told the jury that the plaintiff has a “speech impediment.” She suffered other embarrassments in front of the jury, which returned a verdict for the defendant. Plaintiff unsuccessfully moved for a new trial on the ground that she was disabled within the meaning of the Americans with Disabilities Act yet had been denied reasonable accommodations. The Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded, finding that plaintiff was denied a full and fair opportunity to vindicate her claims. View "Reed v. State of Illinois" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a class action against HCP, alleging causes of action for violation of the unfair competition law (UCL), Bus. & Prof. Code, 7200 et seq.; common law fraudulent concealment; and violation of the false advertising law (FAL), Bus. & Prof. Code, 17500. Plaintiff argued that, although HCP does not fall within the literal definition of a “health care service plan” as defined in Health and Safety Code section 1345, subdivision (f)(1), due to the level of risk it assumed, HCP operated as a health care service plan without obtaining the license required by the Knox-Keene Health Care Service Plan Act of 1975, Health and Safety Code section 1340 et seq., and without meeting the regulatory mandates required of health care service plans. The trial court sustained without leave to amend the demurrers filed by HCP and entered a judgment of dismissal. The court concluded that the trial court acted within its discretion in invoking the abstention doctrine as to the statutory causes of action but not as to the common law cause of action for fraudulent concealment. However, the court found that plaintiff failed to plead a claim for fraudulent concealment, and that she has failed to demonstrate how she could amend the operative complaint to cure the defect. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Hambrick v. Healthcare Partners Med. Grp." on Justia Law

In March 2007, Plaintiff Dara Hem brought suit in a Texas federal court after he was seriously injured in an accident. Hem was traveling through northern New Mexico when his Toyota truck separated from the U-Haul trailer it was towing, causing the truck to roll over several times. After treating Hem for his injuries, the University of New Mexico Hospital (UNMH) recorded a hospital lien for Hem's outstanding medical bills. The lien would attach to any future judgment or settlement he might procure from a lawsuit, pursuant to the Hospital Lien Act. Although Hem did not dispute the amount owed, UNMH agreed to compromise on the lien amount and accept a lesser amount as payment in full. In exchange, one of Hem's attorneys, Miller, agreed to give up his statutory priority over settlement funds already obtained from U-Haul and some anticipated settlement funds from Toyota, so UNMH would be paid first. The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review was whether the agreement UNMH made to reduce the amount of a lien for medical services rendered violated Article IV, Section 32 of the New Mexico Constitution. UNMH argued it had priority over settlement funds pursuant to the agreement between itself and Hem's initial attorney, Clay Miller. Hem's second attorney, Turner & Associates, P.A. (claimant in interpleader) argued that this agreement was unconstitutional. Therefore, Turner argued that it has a priority right to collect fees and costs out of the interpleaded settlement funds prior to the satisfaction of the hospital lien, pursuant to the Act. The New Mexico Supreme Court held that: (1) the first clause of Section 32 was correctly interpreted in State Investment and is strictly a limitation on the Legislature; and (2) Article IV, Section 32 of the New Mexico Constitution does not prohibit UNMH from agreeing to compromise the amount owed by a patient-debtor. View "Hem v. Toyota Motor Corp." on Justia Law

In 2010, the Colorado Governor, under guidance from the state's medical and nursing boards, decided that Colorado would opt-out of a federal regulation requiring certified registered nurse anesthetists (CRNAs) administer anesthesia under a physician's supervision. Under the regulation, hospitals, ambulatory surgical centers and critical access hospitals received Medicare reimbursement if CRNAs worked under a physician's supervision. Petitioners the Colorado Medical Society and the Colorado Society of Anesthesiologists, filed suit against the Governor, claiming that Colorado law did not permit CRNAs to administer anesthesia without supervision. In ruling on the Governor's motion to dismiss, the trial court found that petitioners failed to state a valid claim and granted relief. The appellate court agreed with the trial court's conclusion. The Supreme Court agreed with the result, but held that the Governor's decision to opt-out of the federal regulation was revieweable by a court only for a gross abuse of discretion. Because petitioners did not allege that such a gross abuse occurred here, the court of appeals' decision to affirm dismissal of the case was affirmed. View "Colorado Medical Society v. Hickenlooper" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, individually on and behalf of the Estate of Sharon Hanna (the decedent), brought an action against HCR ManorCare, LLC and other entities and individuals engaged in the operation of nursing homes and assisted living facilities (collectively, ManorCare) alleging that the decedent died as a result of substandard care she received at Heartland of Charleston, a ManorCare nursing home. This appeal concerned Plaintiff’s request for production seeking “Center Visit Summaries,” which concerned the treatment of patients at Heartland during the decedent’s residency, and “Briefing Packets,” which consisted of reports and meeting minutes received by the board of directors of each ManorCare corporate entity relating to the decedent’s residency at Heartland. The circuit court directed ManorCare to produce the documents requested. Defendants asked the Supreme Court for relief in prohibition to prevent the enforcement of the circuit court’s orders. The Supreme Court granted the requested relief as moulded, holding (1) ManorCare’s requested relief concerning the Center Visit Summaries was without merit; but (2) the circuit court exceeded its jurisdiction in ordering the production of the board of director Briefing Packets, as the court should have conducted an in camera proceeding to make an independent determination as to whether the Briefing Packets were excluded from discovery pursuant to the attorney-client privilege. View "State ex rel. HCR Manorcare, LLC v. Hon. Stucky" on Justia Law

After Chan’s mother died from internal hemorrhaging related to Coumadin use following heart surgery, Chan successfully sued Curran for medical malpractice. Chan challenged the trial court’s post-verdict reduction of the $1 million noneconomic damages award to $250,000, as required by the Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act of 1975 (MICRA), Civ. Code 3333.2. Chan challenged the MICRA cap as violating equal protection, due process and the right to jury trial, based on her assertion she is entitled to seek noneconomic damages sufficient to cover attorney fees. The court of appeal rejected Chan’s claims, stating that the legitimate debate over the wisdom of MICRA’s noneconomic damages cap remains a matter for the Legislature and state electorate. View "Chan v. Curran" on Justia Law

The underlying lawsuit in this case, "Retailers’ Credit Association of Grass Valley, Inc. v. Leonard," was filed by real party in interest Retailers’ Credit Association of Grass Valley, Inc., and alleged petitioner Kathleen Leonard breached a contract by failing to pay $2,340.41 for medical services provided by additional real party in interest, Dignity Health, which was doing business as Sierra Nevada Memorial Hospital. Retailers’ Credit Association was the local collection agency providing collection services for Sierra Nevada Memorial Hospital. Leonard filed a pro. per. cross-complaint against Retailers’ Credit Association, alleging a violation of the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 by negligent disclosure of private medical information (i.e. “date of medical visits, medical record number, [and] account numbers”). On the front page of her cross-complaint, Leonard checked the box on the form that stated, “ACTION IS A LIMITED CIVIL CASE ($25,000 or less).” In the complaint itself, Leonard checked the box requesting “compensatory damages” for “limited civil cases.” She also requested injunctive relief in the form of a court order requiring Retailers’ Credit Association to remove the allegedly private information from its complaint. Leonard later filed a pro. per. motion to amend her cross-complaint. In the caption of the motion, she stated the amendment was to “NAME SIERRA NEVADA MEMORIAL HOSPITAL AS A CROSS-DEFENDANT and TO REMOVE THIS CASE TO A COURT OF GENERAL JURISDICTION.” The memorandum of points and authorities alleged that the documents attached to the complaint contained her medical record number and were not necessary for the prosecution of the collection claim and at the very least could have been redacted to protect her privacy. When she reviewed the complaint, she “noticed the attachment to the complaint contained [her] medical records and medical record number” and that the complaint with the attachment had been filed publically at the courthouse. The trial court denied Leonard’s motion to amend the cross-complaint and “[t]ransfer to [u]nlimited [j]urisdiction” without prejudice. Leonard “failed to attach the proposed [a]mended [c]ross-[c]omplaint to the motion” and as a result, the court was “unable to determine what the proposed changes include.” The court was “unable to determine if an additional [c]ross-[d]efendant [wa]s sought to be named or if damages sought exceed $25,000. Thus, th[e] Court [w]as unable to determine if [Leonard] [wa]s entitled to the relief sought.” This case involves how a limited civil case (here a cross-complaint) gets reclassified as an unlimited civil case. After review, the Court of Appeal held that where Leonard filed, through counsel, an amended cross-complaint that added a cross-defendant and added causes of action that increased the amount in controversy to over $25,000 and tried twice to pay the court clerk the reclassification fee, the trial court was required to reclassify the case. Here, the trial court refused to reclassify the case and went on to deny Leonard’s later-filed motion for reclassification, a motion that was unnecessary because the trial court should have already reclassified the case (and in any event, the motion was the inappropriate vehicle by which to change the classification here). The Court therefore granted Leonard’s petition and issued a peremptory writ of mandate directing the trial court to reclassify the case upon Leonard paying the reclassification fee. View "Leonard v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Sharp Memorial Hospital (dba Sharp Rehabilitation Center) appealed the trial court's order granting plaintiff-respondent's Berthe Kabran's motion for new trial following a special verdict on a cause of action for medical malpractice in which the jury found Sharp was negligent in the care and treatment of plaintiff's predecessor, Dr. Eke Wokocha, but that the negligence was not a substantial factor in causing harm. Sharp argued on appeal that the trial court acted in excess of its jurisdiction by granting a new trial because the motion was untimely, rendering the order void. It further argued the court abused its discretion because the evidence proffered by plaintiff in support of the new trial motion was cumulative and consistent with defense expert trial testimony, and thus would not change the outcome of the trial. After review, the Court of Appeal concluded that no jurisdictional defect appeared in the court's new trial order and, as a result, Sharp could not raise its appellate contentions as to the motion's timeliness for the first time on appeal. Furthermore, the Court concluded the trial court did not abuse its discretion in assessing the new evidence and ruling on the record that plaintiff should have been granted a new trial. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the order. View "Kabran v. Sharp Memorial" on Justia Law