Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

On October 8, 2016, Rita Kay filed a complaint against "Brookwood Baptist Health LLC" and fictitiously named defendants pursuant to the Alabama Medical Liability Act, based on injuries she allegedly suffered at the hands of another patient while she was being treated in the Psychiatric and Behavioral Health Inpatient Services Unit at Brookwood Baptist Medical Center from October 8, 2014, until October 12, 2014. She asserted claims of medical negligence, false imprisonment, negligence and wantonness, breach of contract, and negligent and/or wanton hiring, training, and/or supervision. Brookwood Health Services, Inc., filed a petition for a writ of mandamus directing the Circuit Court to dismiss Kay's action against it. Assuming, without deciding, that service on Brookwood Baptist Health LLC, the original defendant, was proper, the materials before the Alabama Supreme Court established that Brookwood Baptist Health LLC did not receive the complaint until February 13, 2017 -- 128 days after the lawsuit was commenced. Therefore, the Court concluded Brookwood established it was added as a defendant after the expiration of the applicable limitations period and that relation-back principles do not apply. Therefore, it has demonstrated that it had a clear legal right to the relief sought. Accordingly, the Supreme Court granted the petition for a writ of mandamus and directed the trial court to vacate its September 7, 2017, order denying the motion to dismiss filed by Brookwood Health Services, Inc., and to dismiss Kay's complaint. View "Ex parte Brookwood Health Services, Inc." on Justia Law

In this interlocutory appeal, the Supreme Court held that sovereign immunity barred the counterclaims filed by Defendants against the State and that it lacked interlocutory jurisdiction to address the trial court’s dismissal of the Defendants’ third-party claims.The State brought this enforcement action under the Texas Medicaid Fraud Prevention Act, alleging that Defendants - several dentists and their professional associations and employees - fraudulently obtained Medicaid payments for providing dental and orthodontic treatments to children. Defendants asserted counterclaims and third-party claims alleging that the State and its contractor mismanaged the payment-approval process and misled Defendants regarding the requirements imposed by the Texas Medical Program. The trial court granted the State’s plea to the jurisdiction against the counterclaims and motion to dismiss the third-party claims. Defendants filed this interlocutory appeal. The court of appeals affirmed the trial court’s order dismissing Defendants’ counterclaims and concluded that it lacked jurisdiction over the order dismissing the third-party claims. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) sovereign immunity barred the counterclaims, and (2) this Court lacked interlocutory jurisdiction to address the order dismissing the third-party claims. View "Nazari v. State" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs were 23 federally qualified health centers (FQHC’s) and rural health clinics (RHC’s) that served medically underserved populations (the Clinics). The dispute before the Court of Appeal centered on coverage for adult dental, chiropractic, and podiatric services the FQHC’s and RHC’s provided to Medi-Cal patients for a period between 2009 and 2013. Prior to July 1, 2009, the Department processed and paid claims for these services. In 2009, in a cost-cutting measure due to budget problems, the Legislature enacted Welfare and Institutions Code section 14131.101 to exclude coverage for these services (and others) “to the extent permitted by federal law.” After the Department stopped paying claims for these services, various FQHC’s and RHC’s challenged the validity of section 14131.10, claiming it conflicted with federal Medicaid law. In California Assn. of Rural Health Clinics v. Douglas, 738 F.3d 1007 (9th Cir. 2013), the Ninth Circuit held section 14131.10 was invalid to the extent it eliminated coverage for these services when provided by FQHC’s and RHC’s because the federal Medicaid Act imposed on participating states the obligation to cover these services by these providers. In response to CARHC, the Department announced it would reimburse FQHC’s and RHC’s for these services for dates of service only on or after September 26, 2013, the date of the Ninth Circuit’s mandate. Seeking reimbursement for services provided prior to September 26, 2103, the Clinics petitioned for a writ of mandate to compel the Department to accept, process, and pay claims for these services for the period July 1, 2009, to September 26, 2013. The trial court granted the petition in part and entered judgment for the Clinics. The Department appeals. Characterizing the Clinics’ writ petition as a suit for damages, it contended: (1) sovereign immunity barred the Clinics’ claims for retroactive payment; (2) the CARHC decision was retroactive because the Medicaid Act is spending clause legislation and its terms were not sufficiently clear as to the requirement to cover adult dental, chiropractic, and podiatric services provided by FQHC’s and RHC’s; and (3) retroactive relief violated the separation of powers doctrine because it forces the Legislature to appropriate money. The Court of Appeal disagreed with the Department’s characterization of the Clinics’ lawsuit. "Rather than a suit for damages, the lawsuit seeks an order to compel performance of a mandatory duty and did not result in a money judgment. Under well-settled California law, such a mandamus proceeding is not barred by sovereign immunity. The Department’s contentions based on spending clause legislation and separation of powers are new arguments raised for the first time on appeal. We exercise our discretion to consider only the spending clause argument. We reject it because the Department has not shown its obligations under Medicaid law, as determined by CARHC, came as a surprise. The separation of powers argument raises factual issues about appropriations that should have been presented in the trial court and we decline to consider this new argument." Accordingly, the Court affirmed the judgment. View "American Indian Health etc. v. Kent" on Justia Law

In this case alleging health care liability claims, the trial court erred by allowing Plaintiff to amend her complaint after the expiration of the statute of limitations to substitute as a defendant a health care provider to which Plaintiff had not sent pre-suit notice.The Supreme Court reversed the decisions of the trial court and court of appeals, holding that Plaintiff did not comply with the mandatory pre-suit notice provision of the Tennessee Health Care Liability Act, Tenn. Code Ann. 29-26-121(a)(1), because she did not give written pre-suit notice of the potential claim to the health care provider she later sought to substitute as a defendant after the expiration of the statute of limitations. View "Runions v. Jackson-Madison County General Hospital District" on Justia Law

Abramge is a Brazilian nonprofit professional association of private health insurance providers, many of whom were impacted by a bribery and kickback scandal in the medical device market that broke in the Brazilian media in 2015. Abramge alleged that Stryker, a Michigan corporation, masterminded an “illicit scheme, which was planned and run from Michigan, designed to increase its market share by making improper payments and paying bribes and kickbacks to Brazilian doctors to induce the use of Stryker products” and “made improper payments and paid kickbacks to Brazilian doctors with the intent of influencing those doctors to use Stryker devices and products in patients even if those devices ... did not best meet the patients’ medical needs.” The scheme allegedly increased the cost of devices and the number of devices implanted and surgeries performed; health insurance providers paid for those increases. Abramge claims that Stryker’s actions injured not only its insurer members but also the entire Brazilian public health system and patients throughout the country. Abramge filed suit in the Western District of Michigan, claiming fraud, civil conspiracy, tortious interference with contractual relationships, and unjust enrichment. The district court dismissed, citing forum non conveniens. The Sixth Circuit reversed and remanded. Stryker did not carry its burden of proving that Brazil is an available and adequate alternative forum in which the case may be heard. View "Associacao Brasileira de Medicina v. Stryker Corp." on Justia Law

In consolidated petitions, defendant Mobile Infirmary Medical Center ("MIMC") sought a writ of mandamus to direct the Mobile Circuit Court to vacate portions of its May 5, 2017, discovery orders. More specifically, in case no. 1160731, MIMC sought mandamus review of the portion of the trial court's order compelling MIMC to produce certain documents previously submitted to the trial court for in camera review on the ground that the documents are protected from discovery under section 6-5-551 and/or section 22-21-8, Ala. Code 1975. In case no. 1160815, MIMC sought mandamus review of another May 5, 2017, order denying MIMC's motions seeking reconsideration of, or in the alternative, a protective order regarding the trial court's November 10, 2016 order compelling MIMC's response to various discover requests. The underlying case centered on a negligence action brought by the administrator of the estate of Rhonda Lynn Snow who sought surgery at an MIMC facility in 2013. At around 5:50 a.m. on December 11, 2013, a nurse allegedly administered a dose of Dilaudid to Rhonda; thereafter, at 6:40 a.m. Rhonda was found "non-responsive" in her room and the staff at the medical center were unable to resuscitate her. Rhonda remained on life support until her death on January 3, 2014. The Alabama Supreme Court determined MIMC demonstrated the trial court exceeded its discretion in requiring MIMC to respond to the discovery requests at issue, and accordingly, issued writs in both cases. View "Ex parte Mobile Infirmary Association d/b/a Mobile Infirmary Medical Center." on Justia Law

In consolidated appeals, an executor of an estate sued the clinic and physician's assistant who treated the decedent for wrongful death. The trial court dismissed the case because plaintiff failed to file a certificate of merit, as was required by statute. The refiled case was dismissed as untimely. The executor appealed to the Vermont Supreme Court, which reviewed the trial court's dismissals and found that dismissal was proper in both cases. View "Quinlan v. Five-Town Health Alliance, Inc., dba Mountain Health Center" on Justia Law

Baptist Health System, Inc., d/b/a Walker Baptist Medical Center ("WBMC"), appealed a circuit court's denial of its postjudgment motion seeking relief from the judgment entered on a jury verdict in favor of Armando Cantu ("Armando"), as father and next friend of Daniel Jose Cantu ("Daniel"), a minor, on Armando's medical-malpractice claim. In 2009, Armando and his wife, Eulalia, took then three-month-old Daniel to WBMC's emergency room for treatment following symptoms including decreased appetite, coughing, and a fever that had lingered for several days. At that time, Daniel was diagnosed by the attending emergency-room physician as suffering from a viral illness (specifically, an upper-respiratory infection) and was discharged with instructions to continue fluids and to seek further treatment if the symptoms continued. Thereafter, Daniel's condition allegedly further deteriorated into vomiting, suspected dehydration, decreased activity, and "irritab[ility] whenever his neck was touched." Daniel received a second-opinion from his pediatrician, who performed a "spinal tap," revealing Daniel had bacterial meningitis. Daniel was taken to Children's Hospital in Birmingham, where he was treated with antibiotics, and released with a "discharge diagnosis" of: "meningococcal meningitis, hydrocephalus status post ventriculoperitoneal shunt placement, seizure disorder, blindness, and deafness as a result of bacterial meningitis." In October 2011, Armando sued both WBMC and Dr. James Wilbanks (the attending physician at Daniel's first trip to the Emergency Room), alleging a single count pursuant to Alabama's Medical Liability Act. Ultimately, the jury returned a verdict finding that Dr. Wilbanks's actions did not meet the applicable standard of care, found WBMC liable for the conduct of Dr. Wilbanks, and awarded Armando $10,000,000 in damages. WBMC filed a postjudgment motion seeking a judgment as a matter of law or a new trial. Among the other claims included in that motion, WBMC specifically asserted that it was entitled to a new trial based on the trial court's admission, over WBMC's objections, of evidence of prior medical-malpractice lawsuits filed against WBMC. The Alabama Supreme Court concluded the facts related to the jury regarding prior acts and omissions by WBMC were entirely irrelevant for the purpose of curative admissibility, were highly prejudicial to WBMC, and warranted reversal of the judgment against WBMC. The judgment of the trial court was, therefore, reversed, and the case remanded for a new trial. View "Baptist Health System, Inc. v. Cantu" on Justia Law

The Appellate Division erred in summarily dismissing F.C.’s appeal from a terminated commitment and treatment order as moot in reliance on Matter of N.L., 476 Mass. 632, 633 (2017).Following F.C.’s involuntary hospitalization, McLean Hospital filed a petition for F.C.'s commitment. F.C. was involuntarily committed and treated after a hearing. F.C. appealed, and his appeal was staying pending the decision in Matter of N.L. As the appeal was pending, F.C. was discharged from the facility. Citing Matter of N.L., the Appellate Division summarily dismissed the appeal as moot. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the Appellate Division’s order and remanded for determination of the appeal on its merits, holding that appeals from expired or terminated commitment and treatment orders under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 123, 7, 8, and 8B should not be dismissed as moot where the parties have a continuing interest in the case. View "In re F.C." on Justia Law

At issue was a trial court order requiring Defendant-hospital to produce information regarding its reimbursement rates from private insurers and public payers for the services it provided to Plaintiff.Plaintiff sought a declaratory judgment that Defendant’s charges were unreasonable and its hospital lien for the amount of its services was invalid to the extent it exceeded a reasonable and regular rate for services rendered. During discovery, the trial court ordered Defendant to produce information regarding the reimbursement rates at issue. Defendant filed a petition for writ of mandamus arguing that the trial court abused its discretion in ordering production of the information because the reimbursement rates were irrelevant to whether its charges to Plaintiff, who was uninsured, were reasonable. The Supreme Court denied the writ, holding that the amounts Defendant accepted as payment for services from other patients, including those covered by private insurance and government benefits, were relevant to whether the charges to Plaintiff were reasonable and were thus discoverable. View "In re North Cypress Medical Center Operating Co." on Justia Law