Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

In the case at hand, the Court of Appeals of the State of Nevada reversed and remanded a district court order that had dismissed a professional negligence action for being time-barred. The case was brought by Gina Engelson, as the special administrator of the estate of Lenore Meyer, against Dignity Health (doing business as St. Rose Dominican Hospital-Siena Campus) and Grape Holdings LLC (doing business as Sage Creek Post-Acute). Lenore Meyer had developed a severe bedsore while being treated at these facilities. Meyer's family alleged that the care provided by the facilities fell below the standard of care in multiple ways, including failing to timely and adequately treat the bedsore. Meyer eventually died, and exactly one year after her death, Engelson filed a professional negligence complaint against the facilities. The district court dismissed the complaint as time-barred, finding that the complaint was filed more than a year after the estate and its special administrator knew or should have known about the relevant legal injury.Upon review, the Court of Appeals found that the district court erred in dismissing the complaint as time-barred. The Court of Appeals clarified that an affidavit of merit, which is required to support a professional negligence-based wrongful death claim, need not opine as to the element of causation. The Court of Appeals concluded that the evidence did not irrefutably demonstrate that the estate or its special administrator discovered or should have discovered the legal injury more than a year before the filing of the complaint. Therefore, the Court of Appeals reversed the district court's order and remanded for further proceedings. View "Engelson v. Dignity Health" on Justia Law

In a case before the United States Court of Appeals For the Eighth Circuit, the plaintiffs, a group of patients, sued BJC Health System (BJC) alleging that BJC had violated their medical privacy rights under Missouri state law. Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that when they accessed their electronic health records (EHRs) through BJC’s online patient portal, their protected health information was shared with third-party marketing services. BJC removed the case to federal court under the federal officer removal statute, arguing that they acted under the United States Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) when creating and operating the online patient portal. BJC's argument was rejected by the district court which ordered the case to be remanded back to Missouri state court. BJC appealed this decision.The United States Court of Appeals For the Eighth Circuit affirmed the decision of the district court to remand the case to the Missouri state court. The appellate court held that BJC, while receiving federal incentive payments from HHS for creating and operating the online patient portal, was not essentially performing a basic governmental task or duty. Therefore, BJC was not acting under a federal officer in terms of the federal officer removal statute. The court concluded that the creation and operation of an online patient portal was not a basic governmental task, and BJC was not a government contractor or functioning as a federal instrumentality. View "Doe v. BJC Health System" on Justia Law

In this case, Virginia Cora Ward, as the administratrix of the estate of Edmund Edward Ward, brought a case against AlphaCore Pharma, LLC (ACP) and Bruce Auerbach. The decedent, Edmund Ward, was a participant in a clinical trial for a drug known as ACP-501, which was developed by ACP and administered by the National Institutes of Health (NIH). The trial took place in Maryland, where Ward traveled from his home in Massachusetts to receive treatment. Ward later withdrew from the trial due to deteriorating kidney function.In 2016, Ward filed a complaint against ACP, Auerbach, and several others, alleging fraudulent inducement to participate in the clinical trial. ACP and Auerbach moved to dismiss the case for lack of personal jurisdiction, arguing that they lacked sufficient contacts with Massachusetts. The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts agreed with them and dismissed the case. Ward appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit.The First Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that neither ACP nor Auerbach had sufficient related and purposeful contacts in and with Massachusetts to establish personal jurisdiction. The court rejected Ward's claims that ACP and Auerbach had contacts with Massachusetts through their interactions with Ward's Massachusetts-based doctor, their alleged shipment of the drug to Massachusetts, their involvement in drafting the clinical trial protocol, and their alleged reimbursement of Ward's travel expenses. The court found that these claims were either unsupported by evidence or were not sufficient to establish personal jurisdiction. As a result, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the case against ACP and Auerbach for lack of personal jurisdiction. View "Ward v. Schaefer" on Justia Law

The Minnesota Supreme Court ruled that an individual can bring a private action under the Minnesota private attorney general statute to compel a healthcare provider to disclose that individual’s medical records as required by the Minnesota Health Records Act. This decision was based on the interpretation of the private attorney general statute, which the court concluded applies to laws regarding unfair, discriminatory, and other unlawful practices in business, commerce, or trade. The court found that the Minnesota Health Records Act, which mandates the timely disclosure of health records to patients, falls within this category. However, the court also held that an individual does not have a private right of action under the Minnesota Health Care Bill of Rights to compel a healthcare provider to disclose an individual’s medical records. The ruling affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded the case to the district court for further proceedings. View "Findling vs. Group Health Plan, Inc." on Justia Law

The attorneys represented Doe in a medical malpractice action against a hospital and other medical staff. During that litigation, the evidence established that, after Doe was admitted to the emergency room of the hospital, he attempted suicide by stabbing himself multiple times. The hospital sought a qualified protective order under the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA, 42 U.S.C. 1320d) to gain access to Doe’s protected health information and requested a subpoena pursuant to HIPAA. At trial, Doe testified in detail about his suicide attempt, his injuries therefrom, and his diagnosis., Doe was awarded $4.2 million. Subsequently, the attorneys issued a press release related to the medical malpractice trial describing Doe’s suicide attempt, the resulting injuries, and his diagnoses and commented on the medical malpractice case and Doe’s history for an article published in the Chicago Daily Law Bulletin.Doe alleged that the attorneys violated the Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities Confidentiality Act (740 ILCS 110/1). The Illinois Supreme Court reinstated the dismissal of his case. Doe waived his claims of confidentiality under the Act by voluntarily and publicly disclosing his private health information in a public trial; the qualified protective order under HIPAA did not preclude such waiver. The evidence and testimony divulged during Doe’s medical malpractice trial were not records or communications made in the course of mental health services; therefore, the Act does not apply. View "Doe v. Burke Wise Morrissey & Kaveny, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-Appellant E.W. was a participant in an employer-sponsored health insurance plan governed by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”). E.W.’s daughter, Plaintiff-Appellant I.W., was a beneficiary of E.W.’s plan. From September 2016 through December 2017, I.W. received treatment in connection with mental health challenges and an eating disorder at Uinta Academy (“Uinta”), an adolescent residential treatment center in Utah. In January 2017, Defendants-Appellees Health Net Insurance Company and Health Net of Arizona, Inc. began covering I.W.’s treatment under E.W.’s ERISA plan (the “Plan”). Effective February 23, 2017, Health Net determined I.W.’s care at Uinta was no longer medically necessary, and it denied coverage from that day forward. In assessing whether to discontinue coverage, Health Net applied the McKesson InterQual Behavioral Health 2016.3 Child and Adolescent Psychiatry Criteria. Health Net determined I.W. did not satisfy the InterQual Criteria within the relevant period and notified Plaintiffs in a letter dated March 1, 2017. Plaintiffs allegedly did not receive Health Net’s March 2017 denial letter, and I.W. remained at Uinta until December 2017, when she was formally discharged. After receiving notice in May 2018 that Health Net had denied coverage effective February 23, 2017, Plaintiffs appealed the decision. Health Net again determined I.W. did not satisfy the InterQual Criteria during the relevant period and upheld its initial denial. Plaintiffs then appealed to an external reviewer, which upheld the decision to deny coverage. Health Net moved to dismiss plaintiffs' legal claims under ERISA and the Paul Wellstone and Pete Domenici Mental Health Parity and Addiction Equity Act of 2008 (“MHPAEA”). The district court denied Plaintiffs’ motion and granted summary judgment to Health Net. After review, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision granting summary judgment to Health Net on Plaintiffs’ ERISA claim; the Court reversed the finding Plaintiffs failed to state a claim under MHPAEA; and the case was remanded for further proceedings. View "W., et al. v. Health Net Life Insurance Company, et al." on Justia Law

Alicia Sampson ("Alicia"), as administratrix of the estate of her deceased husband, Joshua Sampson ("Josh"), appealed the grant of summary judgment in favor of HeartWise Health Systems Corporation; HeartWise Clinic, LLC (collectively referred to as "HeartWise"); Isaac Health & Prevention Partners, LLC ("Isaac Health"); William Nixon, M.D.; and Jeffrey Saylor, M.D., in a wrongful-death action. At its HeartWise clinic, Isaac Health administered a battery of up to 31 physical tests that were intended "to assist in the detection of early evidence of vascular and cardiac abnormalities." In 2015, 29-year-old Josh visited the Isaac Health clinic. Months earlier, Josh's father died at age of 56 from "right ventricular dysplasia," which was a "congenital heart defect." Lowell's death led the Sampson family to seek heart evaluations to determine whether they had inherited the heart defect. Josh underwent the full battery of testing provided at the Isaac Health clinic; Josh's data from the left ventricular echocardiogram was within the "normal" range. Josh's mother, who also received the testing, stated that the nurse practitioner did not tell Josh in any way that he "needed to have any further diagnostic work-up or testing relative to his heart." On October 5, 2015, Josh collapsed at home while working on a construction project. He was taken to the Emergency Room, but died that day. The Sampson family procured a private autopsy; the report concluded that Josh died due to an arrhythmia secondary to hypertrophic cardiomyopathy, a congenital heart condition. Alicia thereafter filed suit against the clinic, HearWise and the doctors, alleging fraud and negligence. The Alabama Supreme Court reversed summary judgment entered in favor of Isaac Health and Drs. Nixon and Saylor with respect to Alicia's negligence allegations against them because those allegations were never properly presented to the circuit court for adjudication. The Court also reversed summary judgment in favor of HeartWise with respect to Alicia's fraud allegations against HeartWise because Alicia presented substantial evidence of Josh's reasonable reliance upon HeartWise's representations about its program. The Court affirmed summary judgment in favor of Isaac Health with respect to Alicia's fraud allegations against Isaac Health because Alicia failed to present substantial evidence that Josh's course of conduct would have changed if he had not seen HeartWise materials in the Isaac Health clinic's waiting room. The Court also affirmed summary judgment in favor of HeartWise with respect to Alicia's negligence allegations against HeartWise for multiple reasons. View "Sampson v. HeartWise Health Systems Corporation, et al." on Justia Law

This appeal stemmed from a medical-malpractice wrongful-death action filed by Patricia West ("Mrs. West"), the personal representative of the estate of her husband, John West, Jr. ("Mr. West"), against Springhill Hospitals, Inc., d/b/a Springhill Memorial Hospital ("SMH"). In 2014, then 59-year-old Mr. West accidentally sliced most of the tip of his left thumb off when he was using a table saw in his shop. He went to the emergency room, at which he had surgery to suture the wound from the saw cut. Mr. West was given two pain medications for postsurgical care: Dilaudid, the brand name for hydromorphone, and Percocet, the brand name for the opioid oxycodone. Mr. West was admitted to the hospital following surgery for observation. He was given the prescribed pain medications while in the hospital. The hospital admitted prescribed doses of Dilaudid were administered to Mr. West, but Percoset was not. Mr. West was found unresponsive after the doses of Dilaudid, and no drugs to counteract opioid overdoses were given. Mrs. West's lawsuit alleged negligence against the hospital for failing to assess monitor her husband while in the hospital. A jury returned a verdict against SMH and awarded $35 million in punitive damages. The trial court thereafter entered judgment on the jury's verdict finding SMH liable. After a hearing concerning a remittitur of the punitive-damages award, the trial court reduced the amount of the award to $10 million. After review, the Alabama Supreme Court affirmed both the judgment entered on the jury's verdict finding SMH liable and the trial court's order reducing the punitive-damages award. View "Springhill Hospitals, Inc. v. West" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs are individual physicians based in Arizona, joined by several Arizona medical and advocacy groups. The named Defendants are Arizona Attorney General Kristin Mayes, all Arizona County Attorneys, and various state enforcement agencies. The Attorney General declined to defend this lawsuit, and the district court allowed Warren Petersen, President of the Arizona Senate, and Ben Toma, Speaker of the Arizona House of Representatives, to intervene. This suit by Arizona physicians, medical associations, and advocacy groups claims that an Arizona law criminalizing the performance of certain abortions is unconstitutionally vague. The district court denied a preliminary injunction, finding that Plaintiffs lacked standing.   The Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded. The panel held that the physician plaintiffs had demonstrated both actual and imminent injuries sufficient for standing. Plaintiffs suffered an actual injury—economic losses— because they lost money by complying with the laws, which forbade them from providing medical services they would otherwise provide, and these economic losses were fairly traceable to the statute. A favorable decision would relieve plaintiffs of compliance with the laws and restore the revenue generated by the prohibited procedures. Plaintiffs sufficiently alleged two imminent future injuries that affected interests protected by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments: (1) a liberty interest that was imperiled because violating the statute could result in imprisonment; and (2) a property interest that was threatened because a statutory violation could result in revocation of plaintiffs’ licenses, loss of revenue, and monetary damages. Finally, plaintiffs satisfied the causation and redressability requirements with respect to their imminent future injury. View "PAUL ISAACSON, ET AL V. KRISTIN MAYES, ET AL" on Justia Law

A.I. appealed a district court’s order continuing her commitment to the North Dakota State Hospital (“NDSH”) for a period not to exceed 180 days. She argued the court erred in not ordering a less restrictive alternative treatment as testimony supported A.I.’s needs could be met with a lower level of care. In addition, A.I. asserted the entry of an order, that indicated a waiver of the continuing treatment hearing filed after a hearing was held, was clearly erroneous. The North Dakota Supreme Court concluded the court’s order to continue her hospitalization was not clearly erroneous, and the court’s order following waiver of treatment or continuing treatment hearing, as conceded by both parties, was entered in error. The Court affirmed the district court’s order for continued treatment and vacated the superfluous order entered in the record at docket entry 43. View "Interest of A.I." on Justia Law