Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Health Law
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Defendant-petitioner Lisa Mestas petitioned the Alabama Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus directing the circuit court to vacate its order denying her motion for a summary judgment in this wrongful-death/medical-negligence action brought by David Lee Autrey, as the personal representative of the estate of his wife, Bridgette Ann Moore, and to enter a summary judgment in Mestas's favor on the basis of State-agent immunity. In May 2017, Autrey's wife, Moore, went to the University of South Alabama Medical Center to undergo a surgery required by the prior amputation of her right leg. The surgery was performed without incident, and Moore was transferred to a hospital room for recovery. At approximately 9:30 p.m. that night, nurses found Moore unresponsive. Attempts to revive her were unsuccessful, and Moore was pronounced deceased. It was later determined that Moore died as a result of opioid-induced respiratory depression ("OIRD"). Mestas argued that, at all times relevant to Autrey's lawsuit, she was an employee of the University of South Alabama ("USA") and served as the Chief Nursing Officer ("CNO") for USA Health System, which included USA Medical Center, various clinics, and a children's hospital. According to Mestas, as the CNO, her primary responsibilities were administrative in nature and she had not provided any direct patient care since 2010. Mestas argued that because Autrey's claims against her arose from the line and scope of her employment with a State agency,2 and because she did not treat Moore, she was entitled to, among other things, State-agent immunity. The Supreme Court concluded Mestas demonstrated she was entitled to state-agent immunity, and that she had a clear right to the relief sought. The Court therefore granted her petition and issued the writ, directing the trial court to grant her summary judgment. View "Ex parte Lisa Mestas." on Justia Law

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Head Start is a federal program that funds early childhood education for low-income children and provides other resources and education to the children’s families. Michigan Head Start grantees challenged the COVID-19 vaccine mandate for Head Start program staff, contractors, and volunteers imposed by an interim final rule of the Department of Health and Human Services. The district court denied a preliminary injunction.The Sixth Circuit denied an injunction pending appeal. The plaintiffs have not shown that they will likely prevail on the merits. HHS likely did not violate the Administrative Procedure Act when it promulgated the vaccine requirement through an interim final rule instead of notice-and-comment rulemaking, 5 U.S.C. 553(b)(B). That rule contains ample discussion of the evidence in support of a vaccine requirement and the justifications for the requirement, 86 Fed. Reg. 68,055-059. HHS likely has the statutory authority to issue a vaccine requirement for Head Start program staff, contractors, and volunteers under 42 U.S.C. 9836a(a)(1)(A), (E). The risk that unvaccinated staff members could transmit a deadly disease to Head Start children—who are ineligible for the COVID-19 vaccine due to their young age—is “a threat to the health” of the children. The court noted HHS’s history of regulating the health of Head Start children and staff. View "Livingston Educational Service Agency v. Becerra" on Justia Law

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In 2019 a woman sued her former husband’s medical provider, alleging that from 2003 to 2010 the provider negligently prescribed the husband opioid medications, leading to his addiction, damage to the couple’s business and marital estate, the couple’s divorce in 2011, and ultimately the husband's death in 2017. The superior court ruled the claims were barred by the statute of limitations and rejected the woman’s argument that the provider should have been estopped from relying on a limitations defense. Because the undisputed evidence shows that by 2010 the woman had knowledge of her alleged injuries, the provider’s alleged role in causing those injuries, and the provider’s alleged negligence, the Alaska Supreme Court concluded that the claims accrued at that time and were no longer timely when filed in 2019. And because the record did not show that the woman’s failure to timely file her claims stemmed from reasonable reliance on fraudulent conduct by the provider, the Supreme Court concluded that equitable estoppel did not apply. View "Park v. Spayd" on Justia Law

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Petitioner Lisa French went to respondents Centura Health Corporation and Catholic Health Initiatives Colorado d/b/a St. Anthony North Health Campus (collectively, “Centura”) for surgery. Upon reviewing French’s insurance information prior to surgery, Centura advised her that she would personally be responsible for $1,336.90 of the amounts to be billed. After the surgery, however, Centura determined that it had misread French’s insurance card and that she was, in fact, an out-of-network patient. Centura then billed French $229,112.13 and ultimately sued her to collect. The Colorado Supreme Court granted certiorari to review: (1) whether here, Centura’s database used by listing rates for specific medical services and supplies, was incorporated by reference into hospital services agreements (“HSAs”) that French had signed; and (2) if so, whether the price term in the HSAs was sufficiently unambiguous to render the HSAs enforceable. The Court concluded that because French neither had knowledge of nor assented to the chargemaster, which was not referenced in the HSA or disclosed to her, the chargemaster was not incorporated by reference into the HSA. Accordingly, the HSA left its price term open, and therefore, the jury appropriately determined that term. The Court reverse the judgment of the division below, and did not decide whether the price that French was to pay was unambiguous, even if the HSA incorporated the chargemaster. View "French v. Centura Health" on Justia Law

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Defendants Kim Reynolds, Governor of Iowa, and Ann Lebo, Director of the Iowa Department of Education, appealed the district court’s entry of a preliminary injunction completely barring enforcement of Iowa’s facial covering statute, Code Section 280.31. The Eighth Circuit vacated the district court’s entry of preliminary injunction completely barring enforcement of Iowa Code Section 280.31 as moot.   The court reasoned that the issue surrounding the preliminary injunction is moot because the current conditions differ vastly from those prevailing when the district court addressed it. The court reasoned that COVID-19 vaccines are now available to children and adolescents over the age of four, greatly decreasing Plaintiffs’ children’s risk of serious bodily injury or death from contracting COVID-19 at school. Further, when Plaintiffs sought a preliminary injunction, delta was the dominant variant, producing high transmission rates and caseloads throughout the country. Now, omicron has become dominant and subsided, leaving markedly lower transmission rates and caseloads throughout Iowa and the country. The court noted that to the extent that the case continues, the Court emphasized that the parties and district court should pay particular attention to Section 280.31’s exception for “any other provision of law.” Iowa Code Section 280.31. This exception unambiguously states that Section 280.31 does not apply where “any other provision of law” requires masks. The word "any” makes the term “provision of law” a broad category that does not distinguish between state or federal law. View "The Arc of Iowa v. Kimberly Reynolds" on Justia Law

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This putative class action against California and San Diego County officials challenged California Governor Gavin Newsom’s emergency orders and related public health directives restricting business operations during the COVID-19 pandemic. Plaintiffs, owners of affected restaurants and gyms (Owners), primarily contended the orders were procedurally invalid because they were adopted without complying with the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). Furthermore, Owners contended that the business restrictions were substantively invalid because they effected a taking without compensation, violating the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Rejecting these claims, the superior court sustained demurrers to the third amended complaint without leave to amend and dismissed the action. While the Court of Appeal sympathized with the position some Owners find themselves in and the significant financial losses they alleged, the unambiguous terms of the Emergency Services Act and controlling United States Supreme Court regulatory takings caselaw required that the judgment be affirmed. View "640 Tenth, LP v. Newsom" on Justia Law

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On November 21, 2017, Richard Bush presented to Saint Bernard Parish Hospital for depression and suicidal ideations. At the hospital, Dr. Miguel Aguilera treated and discharged him. Bush attempted re-admittance with the same complaints, but was refused re-admittance. Thereafter, Bush attempted suicide in the hospital bathroom. He was found alive and transported to University Hospital in New Orleans for treatment; however, he succumbed to his injuries from the suicide attempt and died on November 30, 2017. In November 2018, his wife, Patricia Bush, on behalf of herself, her daughters, Madalyn and Ashley Bush, and on behalf of the decedent, Richard Bush, filed a formal pro se complaint with the Patient Compensation Fund (“PCF”) to convene a medical review panel (“MRP”), naming Saint Bernard Parish Hospital and Dr. Aguilera for malpractice relating to Richard Bush's death. The Louisiana Supreme Court granted this writ application in order to determine: (1) whether contra non valentem interrupted prescription; and (2) whether the court of appeal erred in relying on documents that were not entered as evidence and were not part of the record. The Court found that, while contra non valentem may interrupt prescription in a wrongful death claim in certain instances, it did not interrupt prescription in this case due to the fact that the court of appeal incorrectly considered documents that were not in evidence. The Court reversed the court of appeal’s ruling in part, affirmed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Medical Review Panel for the Claim of Richard Bush" on Justia Law

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Illinois Insurance Guaranty Fund is a state-created insolvency insurer; when a member insurer becomes insolvent, the Fund pays covered claims. In cases involving insolvent health insurance, many claims are for patients who are eligible for both Medicare benefits and private health insurance. The Fund sought a determination that it is not subject to reporting requirements under section 111 of the 2007 Medicare, Medicaid, and SCHIP Extension Act, 42 U.S.C. 1395y(b)(7) & (b)(8), which is intended to cut Medicare spending by placing financial responsibility for medical costs with available primary plans first. Because time may be of the essence in medical treatment, the government may make conditionally cover medical expenses for Medicare beneficiaries insured by a primary plan, subject to later reimbursement from a primary plan. Section 111 imposes reporting requirements so that the government can identify the primary plan responsible for payment. The Fund believes that it is not an “applicable plan.”The district court dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, reasoning the government had not made a final decision through its administrative processes. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The Fund can obtain judicial review of its claim in a federal court only by channeling its appeal through the administrative process provided under 42 U.S.C. 405(g). The usually-waivable defense of failure to exhaust administrative remedies is a jurisdictional bar here. View "Illinois Insurance Guaranty Fund v. Becerra" on Justia Law

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Respondent K.C. appealed a circuit court decision ordering her to involuntary admission to the New Hampshire Hospital (NHH) for a two-year period, to be discharged when clinically appropriate. On appeal, respondent contended NHH presented insufficient evidence at the hearing to support the circuit court’s order. Respondent was diagnosed with bipolar I disorder with manic, psychotic features. She had contacted police in the previous year 300-400 times, believing someone was hacking her phone and “rerouting her to people in black ops.” She had two active protective orders preventing her from contacting her ex-husband and another man, and there was outstanding criminal complaints from her violating those orders. Respondent was admitted to NHH, whereupon she was evaluated by psychiatrists, and the decision was ultimately made to have her committed. Finding no reversible error in the circuit court’s order, the New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed, finding the evidence presented at respondent’s hearing was sufficient on which to have her involuntarily committed. View "In re K.C." on Justia Law

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Dr. Paulus was prosecuted for healthcare fraud. Government consultants reviewed 496 of Paulus’s procedures and concluded that 146 (about 30%) were unnecessary. King’s Daughters Medical Center (KDMC) consultants also reviewed a random selection of Paulus’ procedures. Three experts at trial concluded that Paulus overstated his patients’ arterial blockage and inserted medically unnecessary stents. A jury convicted Paulus. After remand, before sentencing, the government disclosed to Paulus for the first time the “Shields Letter,” stating that when KDMC faced previous legal trouble, it hired independent experts to review 1,049 of Paulus’s cases; they flagged about 7% of his procedures as unnecessary. The defense viewed this evidence as exculpatory and consistent with diagnostic differences of opinion. Before trial, the district court had held that the information was inadmissible and that the parties “[we]re not to disclose” any information about the KDMC Review to Paulus.The Sixth Circuit vacated Paulus’s convictions and remanded, finding that the Shields Letter was material to Paulus’s defense and that failure to disclose it violated Paulus’s “Brady” rights. On remand, the government subpoenaed KDMC for additional information regarding the study referenced in the Shields Letter. KDMC objected, citing the attorney-client, work-product, and settlement privileges. The government filed a motion to compel, which was granted. KDMC sought a writ of mandamus. The Sixth Circuit denied KDMC’s petition. KDMC’s disclosure of some information regarding its experts’ study waived its privilege over the related, undisclosed information now being sought. View "In re: King's Daughters Health System, Inc." on Justia Law