Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

C.M., mother of four minors (mother), appealed juvenile court’s orders terminating parental rights and freeing the minors for adoption. Her sole contention on appeal was that the Placer County Department of Health and Human Services and juvenile court failed to comply with the inquiry and notice requirements of the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA). After review, the Court of Appeal agreed and remanded for the limited purpose of ensuring compliance with the ICWA. View "In re M.E." on Justia Law

The State of California gave the San Bernardino City Unified School District (District) hardship funding to build a school. The State demanded that the District return funds the District did not use for the project (the project savings). Education Code section 17070.63(c) allowed a district to retain project savings for other proper purposes when the savings included funds received from the state. The District challenged the demand for return of the funding in an appeal to the State Allocation Board (Board). The Board upheld the state’s demand, relying on a regulation requiring the return of hardship funding. The District then filed an administrative mandamus action in the trial court, challenging the Board’s decision and the pertinent regulation. The trial court found the regulation conflicted with the statutory scheme and entered judgment in favor of the District. The Board appealed, contending the trial court erred by determining that section 17070.63(c) allowed a district to retain hardship funding, even though the regulation required return of unused hardship funding to the state. The Court of Appeal agreed with the trial court that the regulation relied on by the Board improperly conflicted with the statutory scheme, and that the District was entitled to retain the hardship funding. View "San Bernardino City Unif. School Dist. v. State Allocation Bd." on Justia Law

Head Start is a federal program that funds early childhood education for low-income children and provides other resources and education to the children’s families. Michigan Head Start grantees challenged the COVID-19 vaccine mandate for Head Start program staff, contractors, and volunteers imposed by an interim final rule of the Department of Health and Human Services. The district court denied a preliminary injunction.The Sixth Circuit denied an injunction pending appeal. The plaintiffs have not shown that they will likely prevail on the merits. HHS likely did not violate the Administrative Procedure Act when it promulgated the vaccine requirement through an interim final rule instead of notice-and-comment rulemaking, 5 U.S.C. 553(b)(B). That rule contains ample discussion of the evidence in support of a vaccine requirement and the justifications for the requirement, 86 Fed. Reg. 68,055-059. HHS likely has the statutory authority to issue a vaccine requirement for Head Start program staff, contractors, and volunteers under 42 U.S.C. 9836a(a)(1)(A), (E). The risk that unvaccinated staff members could transmit a deadly disease to Head Start children—who are ineligible for the COVID-19 vaccine due to their young age—is “a threat to the health” of the children. The court noted HHS’s history of regulating the health of Head Start children and staff. View "Livingston Educational Service Agency v. Becerra" on Justia Law

Daniel Sharp suffered an injury to his lower back from an accident at work in 2015. After surgery, he was repeatedly advised to lose weight by the medical providers treating his injury. However, Sharp gained considerable weight instead. The Industrial Commission found that Sharp’s functional ability had diminished between 2016, when he reached maximal medical improvement (MMI) after surgery, and 2019, when his permanent disability hearing was held. The Commission attributed the worsening of Sharp’s condition to his weight gain, which it held to be a superseding cause of any increase in Sharp’s disability post-MMI. Accordingly, the Commission evaluated Sharp’s disability based on his condition at MMI, despite the Idaho Supreme Court's opinion in Brown v. Home Depot, 272 P.3d 577 (2012), requiring that a claimant’s disability be evaluated based on circumstances at time of the hearing. After review in this case, the Supreme Court held that the Commission erred by departing from "Brown," by applying an incorrect standard to determine that Sharp was not entitled to compensation due to the aggravation of his injury, and by reaching certain factual conclusions not supported by substantial and competent evidence. Therefore, the Commission’s decision was vacated and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "Sharp v. Thomas Bros Plumbing" on Justia Law

S Bar Ranch owned approximately 3000 acres of land in rural Elmore County, Idaho. S Bar purchased the land in 2015. There were very few structures on S Bar’s property, save for an airplane hangar that included a five-hundred square-foot apartment. S Bar’s address was listed in Sun Valley, Idaho, and its principal, Chris Stephens, used the property for recreational purposes. Cat Creek Energy, LLC, an Idaho company managed by John Faulkner, owned and managed more than 23,000 acres of land in Elmore County near Anderson Ranch reservoir. Faulkner, on behalf of his other companies, leased land to Cat Creek to develop the project at issue in this dispute. In late 2014 and early 2015, Cat Creek began the process of obtaining conditional use permits (“CUPs”) for a proposed alternative energy development (“the project”) in Elmore County. As initially proposed, the project had five components: a 50,000 acre-foot reservoir with hydroelectric turbines, up to 39 wind turbines, approximately 174,000 photovoltaic solar panels, electrical transmission lines, and an onsite power substation. Cat Creek sought to build the project on approximately 23,000 acres of land that it had leased near Anderson Ranch Reservoir. In 2019, the district court issued a Memorandum Decision and Order, affirming the Board’s decisions with respect to the CUPs. The district court found that S Bar only had standing to challenge the CUPs relating to wind turbines, electric transmission lines, and the on-site substation. The district court also reiterated its prior oral ruling that a 2017 CUP Order was a final agency action and that S Bar’s petition for judicial review of that order was untimely. With regard to the development agreement and a 2018 CUP Amendment, the district court concluded that the Board did not err in a manner specified by Idaho Code section 67-5279 and that S Bar had not shown that its substantial rights had been prejudiced. S Bar appealed, but finding no reversible error in the district court's judgment, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed judgment in favor of Cat Creek. View "S Bar Ranch v. Elmore County" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, a group of organizations devoted to animal welfare and individuals who work with those organizations and with marine mammals, sued the National Marine Fisheries Service (“NMFS”) and its parent agency, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (“NOAA”), seeking to enforce conditions in permits held by SeaWorld, a business operating several marine zoological parks. The permits authorize the capture and display of orcas and require display facilities to transmit medical and necropsy data to the NMFS following the death of an animal displayed under the terms of a permit. The district court dismissed Plaintiffs’ suit for lack of standing.   The D.C. Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal. The court reasoned that to establish standing, a plaintiff “must show (1) an injury in fact that is concrete and particularized and actual or imminent; (2) that the injury is fairly traceable to the defendant’s challenged conduct; and (3) that the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable decision.” Prevention of Cruelty to Animals v. Feld Ent., Inc., 659 F.3d 13 (D.C. Cir. 2011).   Here, the court found that Plaintiffs failed to allege a favorable decision would lead the NMFS to enforce the permit conditions and thus redress their alleged injury. Their allegation to the contrary relies upon unadorned speculation that the NMFS would choose to enforce the necropsy permit conditions and that SeaWorld would voluntarily send necropsy information to an agency that had not enforced permit conditions in twenty-three years should the court determine that the NMFS retains its discretion to enforce permits it issued prior to 1994. View "Lori Marino v. NOAA" on Justia Law

When the Indiana Department of Child Services identifies a situation that involves the apparent neglect or abuse of a child, it files a “CHINS” (Children in Need of Services) petition that may request the child’s placement with foster parents. The litigation ends only when the court determines that the child’s parents can resume unsupervised custody, the child is adopted, or the child turns 18. Minors who are or were subject to CHINS proceedings sought an injunction covering how the Department investigates child welfare before CHINS proceedings, when it may or must initiate CHINS proceedings, and what relief the Department may or must pursue. The district court denied a request to abstain and declined to dismiss the suit.The Seventh Circuit reversed. Only two plaintiffs still have live claims; all of their claims may be resolved in CHINS proceedings, so “Younger” abstention applies. Short of ordering the state to produce more money, "it is hard to see what options are open to a federal court but closed to a CHINS court." It is improper for a federal court to issue an injunction requiring a state official to comply with existing state law. Questions that lie outside the scope of CHINS proceedings, such as how the Department handles investigations before filing a CHINS petition, do not affect the status of the remaining plaintiffs. Any contentions that rest on state law also are outside the province of the federal court. View "Ashley W. v. Holcomb" on Justia Law

Defendants Kim Reynolds, Governor of Iowa, and Ann Lebo, Director of the Iowa Department of Education, appealed the district court’s entry of a preliminary injunction completely barring enforcement of Iowa’s facial covering statute, Code Section 280.31. The Eighth Circuit vacated the district court’s entry of preliminary injunction completely barring enforcement of Iowa Code Section 280.31 as moot.   The court reasoned that the issue surrounding the preliminary injunction is moot because the current conditions differ vastly from those prevailing when the district court addressed it. The court reasoned that COVID-19 vaccines are now available to children and adolescents over the age of four, greatly decreasing Plaintiffs’ children’s risk of serious bodily injury or death from contracting COVID-19 at school. Further, when Plaintiffs sought a preliminary injunction, delta was the dominant variant, producing high transmission rates and caseloads throughout the country. Now, omicron has become dominant and subsided, leaving markedly lower transmission rates and caseloads throughout Iowa and the country. The court noted that to the extent that the case continues, the Court emphasized that the parties and district court should pay particular attention to Section 280.31’s exception for “any other provision of law.” Iowa Code Section 280.31. This exception unambiguously states that Section 280.31 does not apply where “any other provision of law” requires masks. The word "any” makes the term “provision of law” a broad category that does not distinguish between state or federal law. View "The Arc of Iowa v. Kimberly Reynolds" on Justia Law

This putative class action against California and San Diego County officials challenged California Governor Gavin Newsom’s emergency orders and related public health directives restricting business operations during the COVID-19 pandemic. Plaintiffs, owners of affected restaurants and gyms (Owners), primarily contended the orders were procedurally invalid because they were adopted without complying with the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). Furthermore, Owners contended that the business restrictions were substantively invalid because they effected a taking without compensation, violating the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Rejecting these claims, the superior court sustained demurrers to the third amended complaint without leave to amend and dismissed the action. While the Court of Appeal sympathized with the position some Owners find themselves in and the significant financial losses they alleged, the unambiguous terms of the Emergency Services Act and controlling United States Supreme Court regulatory takings caselaw required that the judgment be affirmed. View "640 Tenth, LP v. Newsom" on Justia Law

In this consolidated workers compensation appeal arising from disputes between EagleMed, LLC, a critical care transportation service, and Travelers Insurance, a workers compensation insurance carrier, the Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals' judgment directing the Workers Compensation Appeals Board to dismiss this proceeding, holding that remand was required.49 U.S.C. 41713(b)(1) prohibits states from enacting or enforcing any law related to a service of an air carrier providing air transportation. Kan. Stat. Ann. 44-510i(c)(2) requires the Director of the Division of Workers Compensation to oversee health care provider services to ensure charges are "fair, reasonable, and necessary." At issue was the phrase "usual and customary charges." The Board decided it lacked jurisdiction to determine the reasonableness of air ambulance charges that would reduce the amount owed, made no factual determination whether the disputed billings were "usual and customary charges," and ordered Travelers to pay in full. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court vacated the panel's decision and the Board's order that Travelers pay EagleMed in full and remanded the case for the Board to decide whether the charges were "usual and customary," holding that the Board will need to interpret this term in a manner reflecting both federal law and the state's legislative purposes. View "EagleMed v. Travelers Insurance" on Justia Law