Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

The City of Los Angeles (City) entered into a contract with defendant and respondent PricewaterhouseCoopers, LLC (PWC) to modernize the billing system for the Los Angeles Department of Water and Power (LADWP). PWC filed a motion for sanctions under Code of Civil Procedure sections 2023.010 and 2023.030 of the Civil Discovery Act nine months after the case was dismissed with prejudice, seeking monetary sanctions for egregious misuse of the discovery process while the litigation was pending. The trial court awarded $2.5 million in sanctions. On appeal from the postjudgment order, in response to a letter from this court inviting additional briefing pursuant to Government Code section 68081, the sanctioned party contends the Discovery Act does not authorize the trial court to award monetary sanctions under section 2023.030 alone or together with section 2023.010.   The Second Appellate District reversed the postjudgment order and remanded the matter for the trial court to enter a new and different order on the issue of monetary sanctions based on discovery provisions authorizing the imposition of sanctions in this case. The court explained that although the trial court had jurisdiction to entertain PWC’s motion for sanctions and discretion to find it was timely filed, the order awarding sanctions must be reversed and remanded to allow the trial court to award PWC’s reasonable expenses incurred as a result of sanctionable conduct under provisions of the Discovery Act other than sections 2023.010 and 2023.030. View "City of L.A. v. PricewaterhouseCoopers, LLC" on Justia Law

The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC)  brought an enforcement action against BP, alleging the company capitalized on the hurricane-induced chaos in commodities markets by devising a scheme to manipulate the market for natural gas. BP sought judicial review of FERC’s order finding that BP engaged in market manipulation and imposing a $20 million civil penalty.   The Fifth Circuit explained that because FERC predicated its penalty assessment on its erroneous position that it had jurisdiction over all (and not just some) of BP’s transactions, the court must remand for a reassessment of the penalty in the light of the court’s jurisdictional holding. Thus, the court granted in part and denied in part BP’s petition for review and remanded to the agency for reassessment of the penalty.   The court explained that it has rejected FERC’s expansive assertion that it has jurisdiction over any manipulative trade affecting the price of an NGA transaction. The court, however, reaffirmed the Commission’s authority over transactions directly involving natural gas in interstate commerce under the NGA. The court further determined that there was substantial evidence to support FERC’s finding that BP manipulated the market for natural gas. The court found that FERC’s reasoning in imposing a penalty was not arbitrary and capricious, though the court concluded that FERC’s reliance on an erroneous understanding of its own jurisdiction necessitates remand for recalculation of the penalty. Finally, the court held that neither separation of functions nor statute of limitations issues justify overturning the Commission’s order. View "BP America v. FERC" on Justia Law

The Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (within the Department of Transportation (DOT)) found that Polyweave had violated federal regulations and assessed a $14,460 civil penalty. While seeking judicial review of that civil-penalty order in the court of appeals, Polyweave filed suit in district court seeking injunctive and declaratory relief to prevent DOT from rescinding a regulation (Subpart D) that included requirements for enforcement actions taken by DOT administrations, such as the Polyweave enforcement proceeding. Polyweave argued that the DOT improperly rescinded Subpart D and alleges that it, therefore, incurred procedural injuries in the underlying enforcement proceeding.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the suit. The district court lacked jurisdiction over Polyweave’s claims because the court of appeals exclusive jurisdiction (49 U.S.C. 5127) over judicial review of the underlying agency order bars Polyweave from attempting to litigate the rescission of Subpart D in the district court. When Congress places judicial review of certain types of agency action in the court of appeals rather than the district court, this jurisdictional allocation cannot be circumvented by suing in the district court to challenge agency procedures used (or omitted) in the proceedings leading to such actions, at least where court-of-appeals jurisdiction provides a fully effective forum to address such arguments. The only plausible bases for asserting Article III injury in this case, which involves enforcement procedures, can be asserted in review of the agency action in which those procedures were applied. View "Polyweave Packaging, Inc. v. Buttigieg" on Justia Law

The California Commission on Teacher Credentialing (Commission) and the Committee of Credentials of the Commission on Teacher Credentialing (Committee) appealed a judgment and peremptory writ of prohibition directing them to discontinue certain investigative proceedings against present and former public school administrators Kathy Little, Simone Kovats, and Debra Sather (together, the administrators). The Committee commenced an initial review of the administrators’ fitness to continue as credential holders in 2019. Nonparty John Villani was a special education teacher employed by the District between 2011 and 2014. Villani sued the District in 2016 alleging the District unlawfully retaliated against him after he reported that a teacher-aide, David Yoder, was “grooming” and paying inappropriate attention to some of the minor students in his care. Yoder was subsequently charged and convicted of several felony sex offenses against minors, including an offense against one of the aforementioned students. As relevant here, Villani’s lawsuit also alleged the administrators ignored his concerns about Yoder. The Commission learned about Villani’s lawsuit from a news article; the Commission thereafter launched its investigation. The administrators objected to the manner in which the Commission had obtained documents and information from Villani and argued the Committee had not established jurisdiction to review their credentials. The administrators demanded the Commission cease the investigation and the Committee drop the scheduled meetings. The Commission and Committee argued the trial court erred in ruling the administrators were excused from exhausting administrative remedies and misinterpreted Education Code section 44242.5, which defined the scope of the Committee’s jurisdiction. Finding no error, the Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment and writ. View "Little v. Com. on Teacher Credentialing" on Justia Law

OSHA inspector Minett-Jackson attempted to conduct an inspection of AMC, a Chicago fruit and vegetable wholesaler. AMC considered the timing suspicious because AMC was scheduled to go to trial on another OSHA matter days later. AMC denied Minett-Jackson entry. OSHA applied for an ex parte inspection warrant. Minett-Jackson’s warrant application stated that it was “based upon a complaint from one of AMC’s current employees.” who had witnessed a forklift accident. Minett-Jackson stated that, based on her training and experience, she knew that the described situation might constitute violations of the Occupational Safety and Health Act, 29 U.S.C. 651. When Minett-Jackson returned to AMC with a warrant, she was again denied entry. AMC filed an emergency motion to stay the warrant and unseal the application and requested time to file a motion to quash the warrant on the ground that it was not supported by probable cause.The Seventh Circuit dismissed an appeal from the denial of the motion to quash, noting that the district court’s order was not final under 28 U.S.C. 1291. Significant ongoing proceedings in the district court afford the contesting party a full opportunity to object to the warrant in an adversarial context. Motions for contempt and to toll the statute of limitations are pending before the district court. View "Anthony Marano Co. v. Walsh" on Justia Law

Two tribes claimed to be a child’s tribe for purposes of the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA): The Native Village of Wales claimed the child was a tribal member; the Native Village of Chignik Lagoon claims that the child is “eligible for tribal membership.” After the superior court terminated the biological parents’ parental rights, Wales moved to transfer subsequent proceedings, including potential adoption, to its tribal court. Chignik Lagoon intervened in the child in need of aid (CINA) case, arguing that the child was not a member of Wales under Wales’s constitution and that transfer of further proceedings to the Wales tribal court was not authorized under ICWA. The superior court found that the child was a member of Wales and that Wales was the child’s tribe for ICWA purposes, and therefore granted the transfer of jurisdiction. Chignik Lagoon appealed. After review, the Alaska Supreme Court affirmed the superior court’s determination that the child was a member of Wales and that Wales was appropriately designated as the child’s tribe for ICWA purposes. The Supreme Court also concluded that, given that ruling, Chignik Lagoon lacked standing to challenge the transfer of proceedings to the Wales tribal court. View "Native Village of Chignik Lagoon v. Alaska Dept. of Health & Soc. Svcs." on Justia Law

Petitioners, a school district and the school district's superintendent, filed suit o stop the Oklahoma State School Board from taking actions against the school district in the meetings of the Board. The Board continued with its meetings and petitioners filed requests for a restraining order, preliminary injunction, and declaratory judgment to prevent further State Board actions until both the school district and its superintendent obtained administrative individual proceedings. The district court denied the petitioners' requests and they appealed. The State Board continued with its meetings, placed the school district on probation and required an interim superintendent as a condition of probation. The Oklahoma Supreme Court held the Superintendent failed to show a likelihood of success on the merits of his claim that a due process violation occurred, or a likelihood of success on the merits of his claim that his administrative remedy was inadequate, and failed to show he was entitled to a preliminary injunction. The Supreme Court held the School District failed to show a likelihood of success on the merits on a claim the State Board lacked authority to place the school district on probation with a condition requiring an interim superintendent, and failed to show a likelihood of success on the merits of a claim the school district was entitled to an administrative individual proceeding prior to the school district being placed on probation, and school district failed to show it was entitled to a preliminary injunction. Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court's order. View "Western Heights Independent Sch. Dist. v. Oklahoma" on Justia Law

In 2017, the State of Alabama sued, among others, Epic Tech, LLC ("Epic Tech"); K.C. Economic Development, LLC, d/b/a VictoryLand ("KCED"); and Sheriff Andre Brunson, in his official capacity as sheriff of Macon County (referred to collectively as "the Macon County defendants"). At around that same time, the State sued, White Hall Enrichment Advancement Team d/b/a Southern Star Entertainment ("Southern Star") and White Hall (referred to collectively as "the Lowndes County defendants"). In each action, the State sought an order declaring the illegal gambling operations conducted by the defendants to be a public nuisance and related injunctive relief. The State's complaint in each action was also accompanied by a motion seeking the entry of an order preliminarily enjoining the defendants from engaging in illegal gambling operations. In case nos. 1200798 and 1210064, the State appealed Macon Circuit Court and Lowndes Circuit Court orders denying the State's requests for injunctive relief. In case no. 1210122, defendants/counterclaim plaintiffs White Hall Entertainment and the White Hall Town Council (referred to collectively as "White Hall"), cross-appealed the Lowndes Circuit Court's order dismissing their counterclaims against the State. The Alabama Supreme Court consolidated these appeals. In case no. 1200798, the Court reversed the Macon Circuit Court order denying the State's request for preliminary injunctive relief and remanded the matter for that court to enter, within 30 days, a preliminary injunction enjoining the defendants' gambling operations in Macon County; in case no. 1210064, the Court reversed the Lowndes Circuit Court order denying the State's request for permanent injunctive relief and remanded the matter for that court to enter, within 30 days, a permanent injunction enjoining the defendants' gambling operations in Lowndes County; and in case no. 1210122, the Court affirmed the Lowndes Circuit Court's order dismissing White Hall's counterclaims. View "White Hall Entertainment, et al. v. Alabama" on Justia Law

This case arises from a regulatory dispute involving a hydroelectric project. The project aimed to boost a municipality’s water supply. To obtain more water, the municipality proposed to raise a local dam and expand a nearby reservoir. But implementation of the proposal would require amendment of the municipality’s license with the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers granted a discharge permit to the municipality. A group of conservation organizations challenged the Corps’ decision by petitioning in federal district court. While the petition was pending, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission allowed amendment of the municipality’s license to raise the dam and expand the reservoir. The Commission’s amendment of the municipality’s license triggered a jurisdictional question: if federal courts of appeals had exclusive jurisdiction over petitions challenging decisions made by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, did this jurisdiction extend to challenges against the Corps’ issuance of a permit to allow discharges required for the modification of a hydroelectric project licensed by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission? The district court answered yes, but the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals disagreed. The conservation organizations were challenging the Corps’ issuance of a permit, not the Commission’s amendment of a license. So the statute didn’t limit jurisdiction to the court of appeals. View "Save The Colorado, et al. v. Spellmon, et al." on Justia Law

In 2014, Poway Unified School District (the District) constructed a new elementary school. The $82 million project was funded primarily by special tax bonds paid for by homeowners in local communities. Approximately four years later, following the passage of Proposition 51, the District received reimbursement funds from the State of California ($27,672,923). The District allocated a small portion to retire local bonds but used a larger amount toward new high priority outlay expenditures. Two homeowners, Albert Bates and Bridget Denihan, disagreed with the District’s fund allocation decision and filed a petition for a writ of mandate and a complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief. The trial court denied all relief and entered a judgment in the District’s favor. On appeal, the Homeowners contended California Code of Regulations, title 2, section 1859.90.5 and Education Code section 17070.631 required the District to allocate all newly acquired “State Funds” toward retiring the local bonds, unless it could prove there was a savings during construction (but there was none). The Court of Appeal concluded the Homeowners’ arguments had merit, and reversed the judgment. View "Bates v. Poway Unified School Dist." on Justia Law