Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Jennie and Christopher Zinn appealed a circuit court's dismissal of their complaint against Ashley Till. In October 2017, the Zinns filed an adoption petition with the probate court concerning an unborn child. The child was born later that month, and the probate court subsequently entered an interlocutory adoption decree. In November 2017, the Zinns filed an amended adoption petition, listing the child's name and providing the consent of the child's mother and purported father to the child's adoption. On December 18, 2017, Till, an employee of the Alabama Department of Human Resources, submitted an acknowledgment letter to the probate court stating that there was no entry in the putative-father registry relating to the child. The next day, the probate court entered a final decree of adoption. On January 25, 2018, Till submitted a corrected acknowledgment letter to the probate court, identifying an individual who was, in fact, listed in the putative-father registry regarding the child and stating that incomplete information had previously been provided "due to oversight and neglect." The next day, the probate court vacated the final decree of adoption based on the corrected acknowledgment letter. In June 2019, the Zinns filed suit against Till alleging: (1) negligence; (2) wantonness; and (3) that the defendants had "acted willfully, maliciously, in bad faith, beyond their authority or under a mistaken interpretation of the law ...." The Zinns' complaint sought awards of compensatory and punitive damages. On appeal, the Zinns argue that the circuit court erred by dismissing their claims on immunity grounds. Till moved to dismiss count one of the Zinns' complaint based on State-agent immunity, and the circuit court cited State-agent immunity as an alternative ground for dismissing counts two and three of the complaint. Insofar as the circuit court's judgment dismissing each count of the complaint was based on the doctrine of State-agent immunity, the parties appeared to agree that the judgment should have been reversed regarding each count. The judgment was reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings. View "Zinn v. Till" on Justia Law

This case concerned the reallocation of a circuit-court judgeship from the 10th Judicial Circuit located in Jefferson County, Alabama to the 23d Judicial Circuit located in Madison County. Tiara Young Hudson, an attorney residing in Jefferson County, had been a candidate for appointment and election to the Jefferson County judgeship before its reallocation to Madison County. Hudson filed suit at the Montgomery Circuit Court ("the trial court") seeking a judgment declaring that the act providing for the reallocation of judgeships, § 12-9A-1 et seq. ("the Act"), Ala. Code 1975, violated certain provisions of the Alabama Constitution of 1901. Hudson also sought a permanent injunction removing the Madison County circuit judge that had been appointed to fill the reallocated judgeship from office and directing the governor to appoint a new person nominated by the Jefferson County Judicial Commission to fill the judgeship in Jefferson County. The trial court dismissed the action on the ground that it did not have subject-matter jurisdiction to grant the requested relief. Finding no reversible error in that dismissal, the Alabama Supreme Court affirmed. View "Hudson v. Ivey, et al." on Justia Law

On May 27, 2016, at approximately 2:00 a.m., Sgt. George Taylor, a police officer employed by the Chickasaw Police Department, discovered an automobile on the shoulder of the on-ramp to an interstate highway. Carlos Lens Fernandez ("Lens") was passed out inside the automobile, and the automobile's engine was running. After he failed to complete various field sobriety tests, Lens acknowledged that he was intoxicated. Sgt. Taylor arrested Lens for driving under the influence and, with assistance from Officer Gregory Musgrove, transported Lens to the Chickasaw City Jail. At the jail, Lens did not advise Sgt. Taylor or any other person that he had any medical issues or that he needed medical attention. According to both Sgt. Taylor and Sgt. Phillip Burson, Lens appeared to be intoxicated, and nothing about their encounter with Lens indicated to them that Lens needed medical attention. At approximated 8 a.m., jailers checked on Lens, but he was not responding to oral commands. Officer Robert Wenzinger stated that when he checked Lens, he could not find a pulse and noticed that Lens was cool to the touch on his arm and neck. Emergency medical services were dispatched; by 8:50 a.m., attempts to resuscitate Lens were unsuccessful, and Lens was pronounced dead at 9:14 a.m. Lens's autopsy report listed the cause of death as "hypertensive and atherosclerotic cardiovascular disease." Carlos Fernando Reixach Murey, as administrator of Lens' estate, appealed the grant of summary judgment entered in two separate actions in favor of the City of Chickasaw, and the varios officers and jail officials who checked on Lens when he was arrested and detained. Finding no reversible error in the grant of summary judgment in either case, the Alabama Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court. View "Murey v. City of Chickasaw, et al." on Justia Law

After the EEOC closed its investigation into Plaintiff’s charge of discrimination, the agency issued Plaintiff a right-to-sue notice. This notice, however, only reached Plaintiff’s attorney and not Plaintiff himself. The EEOC then sent a subsequent notice acknowledging that the first had not reached Plaintiff and advising him that his 90-day window in which to file suit began to run upon its—the second notice’s—receipt. Plaintiff filed his complaint 141 days after his attorney is presumed to have received the first notice and 89 days after Plaintiff and his attorney received the second. The district court dismissed Plaintiff’s suit as untimely and held that equitable tolling was unavailable.   The Fifth Circuit vacated the district court’s order dismissing Plaintiff’s complaint. The court explained that Plaintiff’s case did not present the kind of exceptional circumstances that may warrant equitable tolling; the district court failed to consider controlling precedent from this court that tolling may be available when the EEOC affirmatively misleads a claimant about the time in which he must file his federal complaint. The court wrote that this was an abuse of discretion. Further, the court found that the district court did not proceed beyond this first prong of the tolling analysis the record at this motion to dismiss stage does not disclose whether Plaintiff diligently pursued his rights. View "Bernstein v. Maximus Federal Services" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a federal inmate, sued Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) staff alleging, inter alia, discrimination and retaliation under the Rehabilitation Act. The district court dismissed the action for failure to exhaust available administrative remedies. According to the court, the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) required Plaintiff to exhaust both the BOP’s Administrative Remedy Program and an additional remedy, particular to prison discrimination claims, administered by the Department of Justice’s Director of Equal Employment Opportunity. Plaintiff appealed, arguing that he was only required to exhaust the BOP’s Administrative Remedy Program under the Prison Litigation Reform Act. Plaintiff asserted in the alternative that the Department of Justice remedies were not “available” to him.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the PLRA’s exhaustion provision is plain. It requires prisoners to utilize all “available” administrative remedies. For Rehabilitation Act claimants, these remedies include both the BOP’s ARP and a separate EEO process administered by the DOJ. Here, Plaintiff failed to exhaust these remedies despite them being “available” to him under the PLRA. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Plaintiff’s complaint without prejudice to his ability to exhaust the EEO remedies “available” to him within the meaning of the PLRA. View "Webster Williams, III v. Michael Carvajal" on Justia Law

During the summer of 2021, Appellants Edmond Public School Board Members and Edmond Public School District Superintendent, Angela Grunewald, (collectively "District") anticipated a complete return to in-person instruction for the 2021-2022 school year. Prior to the start of the school year, the Oklahoma City County Health Department ("OCCHD") expressed to District that quarantines should be recommended rather than required. In response, District prepared a standard letter that alerted parents when their child was exposed to a positive COVID-19 case, which left the responsibility "for carrying out a quarantine or not" up to the parents. School began on Thursday, August 12, 2021. By the fourth day of school, District reported 140 positive cases of COVID-19 which rose to 170 positive cases on the fifth day of the school year. The District thereafter implemented a policy consistent with the OCCHD’s recommendation and informed parents of the policy by email. As a result of the Policy, several unvaccinated students were required to quarantine due to being identified as a close contact. The Appellees, parents of children enrolled in Edmond Public Schools affected by the Policy ("Parents"), individually and on behalf of their children, filed a Petition for Declaratory Judgment and Injunctive Relief and an Application for Temporary Restraining Order ("TRO") alleging the policy violated state statutory and federal constitutional rights. District objected, and the TRO was denied. The trial court denied relief on all three counts pleaded in the Petition, but granted a Temporary Injunction based on Parents' Equal Protection Clause argument and enjoined District from implementing or enforcing the Policy. The District appealed. The trial court determined Parents were likely to succeed on the merits of their Equal Protection Clause claim against District but were unlikely to succeed on the merits of their claim that the Policy violated 70 O.S.Supp.2021, § 1210.189(A)(1). The Oklahoma Supreme Court found the trial court improperly interpreted § 1210.189(A)(1) and incorrectly concluded Parents were unlikely to succeed on the merits of their claim that the Policy violated § 1210.189(A)(1). Because the Supreme Court determined the policy violated 70 O.S.Supp.2021, § 1210.189(A)(1), it did not address the Equal Protection Clause argument. The trial court’s order was vacated and a declaratory judgment was granted in favor of the Parents. View "Shellem v. Gruneweld" on Justia Law

A group of pro se aggrieved property owners dubbed “Riverton Citizens Group,” timely filed a petition for judicial review challenging the Bingham County Commissioners’ (“the County”) decision to grant a zone change request. The caption of the petition named “Riverton Citizens Group” as the pro se petitioner, but the body of the petition then named the aggrieved property owners individually as the parties petitioning the County’s decision, while also providing that they were proceeding pro se under the title of “Riverton Citizens Group.” The petition was not signed by any of the aggrieved property owners. Instead, it was signed by a non-petitioner who purported to be the “agent” for “Riverton Citizens Group.” The purported “agent” was not licensed to practice law in Idaho. After the district court entered a notice of intent to dismiss the petition because Riverton Citizens Group was not represented by counsel, the aggrieved property owners attempted to correct the petition through five subsequent filings, each signed by only one of the aggrieved property owners. The district court subsequently issued a written decision, concluding the petition was “improperly filed” and therefore was not a “petition” that invoked the district court’s subject matter jurisdiction under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 84(n). Because the time for filing a new “petition” under I.R.C.P. 84(n) had passed, the district court dismissed the case with prejudice—reasoning it no longer had jurisdiction. A licensed attorney did not appear on behalf of the aggrieved property owners until after the district court’s decision to dismiss. The Idaho Supreme Court vacated the district court’s order: “the errors in the caption and the omitted signatures were not fatal or so defective as to render the petition a nullity or ‘improperly filed’ such that the district court had no subject matter jurisdiction. Instead, these errors may be corrected through a filing or amended petition on remand that relates back to the date of the timely petition.” View "Riverton Citizens Group v. Bingham County Commissioners" on Justia Law

In 2002, plaintiffs M.D. Doe, A.J. Doe, and S. Doe (together, plaintiffs) sued defendant Marysville Joint Unified School District (the District) and at least one District employee, alleging their school counselor sexually abused them. The trial court entered judgment in favor of the District after finding that plaintiffs failed to timely file a government claim before filing their complaint. The Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment on appeal, and the California Supreme Court denied review. In 2019, the California Legislature passed Assembly Bill No. 218 (2019-2020 Reg. Sess.), which amended Code of Civil Procedure section 340.1 to extend the statute of limitations for victims bringing childhood claims of sexual assault. Thereafter, plaintiffs filed this action against the District and certain individuals predicated on the same set of facts as their 2002 suit. The trial court sustained the District’s demurrer without leave to amend as to plaintiffs, finding that the prior dismissal was res judicata, and that allowing section 340.1 to reopen a final judgment would run afoul of constitutional separation of powers principles. Plaintiffs appealed, arguing the trial court erred because their prior claims were not “litigated to finality” within the meaning of section 340.1 and could therefore be revived, and because dismissing plaintiffs’ claims violated equal protection. Finding no reversible error in the trial court's judgment, the Court of Appeal affirmed dismissal. View "Doe v. Marysville Joint Unified School Dist." on Justia Law

This matter arose out of disputes between Antero Resources Corporation (“Antero”) and Airport Land Partners, Ltd (“Airport Land”) and other royalty owners (collectively, “Royalty Owners”) over whether Antero could deduct certain post-production costs from royalty payments under the applicable leases’ royalty clauses. Royalty Owners alleged that Antero has underpaid royalties in violation of their respective lease contracts. Royalty Owners filed individual breach-of-contract suits against Antero for dates between December 2016 and April 2017. Antero moved to dismiss the suits, arguing that the claims should have been brought before the Colorado Oil and Gas Conservation Commission (“COGCC” or “the Commission”) in the first instance. Statutorily, COGCC lacked jurisdiction under section 34-60-118.5(5), C.R.S. (2022), to engage in contract interpretation to resolve a bona fide dispute between parties under an oil and gas lease. But in 2017, without any intervening change to explain the shift, two district courts changed course, asserting that COGCC had responsibility for resolving contract disputes on the theory either that the contract terms were unambiguous or that settled law compelled a certain interpretation. The Colorado Supreme Court returned to the longstanding statutory mandate that COGCC lacked jurisdiction to resolve bona fide disputes of contract interpretation and held that such a dispute exists where the parties disagree in good faith about the meaning or application of a relevant contract term. View "Antero Resources v. Airport Land Partners" on Justia Law

Congress enacted Sec. 254 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, which established the Universal Service Fund (USF) and entrusted its administration to the Federal Communications Commission (FCC). The FCC relies on a private entity, the Universal Service Administrative Company (“USAC”), to aid it in its administration of the USF. USAC proposals are approved by the FCC either expressly or after fourteen days of agency inaction.USAC submitted its 2022 first quarter projections to the FCC on November 2, 2021. The FCC published these projections for notice andcomment in accordance with the Administrative Procedure Act. On November 19, 2021, Petitioners submitted comments challenging the constitutionality of the USF and the FCC’s reliance on USAC. The FCC approved USAC’s proposal on December 27, 2021. In response, Petitioners filed this petition on January 5, 2022.On appeal, Petitioners assert that: (1) the Hobbs Act is not a jurisdictional bar to their constitutional claims; (2) Section 254 violates the nondelegation doctrine because Congress failed to supply the FCC with an intelligible principle; and (3) the FCC’s relationship with USAC violates the private nondelegation doctrine because the FCC does not adequately subordinate USAC in its administration of the USF.Finding that the Hobbs Act did not bar Petitioners' claims, the Fifth Circuit reached and rejected the claims on their merits. The Fifth Circuit held that Sec. 254 does not violate the non-delegation doctrine or the private non-delegation doctrine. View "Consumers' Research v. FCC" on Justia Law