Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Workforce Safety and Insurance (“WSI”) and John Sandberg appealed a district court judgment affirming in part and reversing in part an Administrative Law Judge’s (“ALJ”) decision on remand, entered after the North Dakota Supreme Court's decision in State by & through Workforce Safety and Insurance v. Sandberg (“Sandberg II”), 956 N.W.2d 342. On appeal, the North Dakota Supreme Court determined the ALJ had made conflicting and insufficient findings to support the finding that Sandberg’s claim was compensable and it was “unable to reconcile the ALJ’s decision with the statutory requirements for medical evidence supported by objective medical findings for a compensable injury in N.D.C.C. § 65-01-02(10).” On remand, the ALJ made additional findings and again held Sandberg met his burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that he had sustained a compensable injury. WSI appealed to the district court and the court affirmed the ALJ’s order. On the second appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed the “judgment affirming the ALJ’s revised order to the extent the order found Sandberg sustained a compensable injury; however, the Court remand[ed] the case to WSI for further proceedings on whether benefits must be awarded on an aggravation basis under N.D.C.C. § 65-05-15.” On remand, WSI reversed its decision and accepted Sandberg’s claim on an aggravation basis and denied Sandberg disability benefits. Sandberg appealed to the district court, which affirmed WSI’s determination to award benefits on an aggravation basis and reversed the ALJ’s affirmance of WSI’s denial of disability benefits concluding WSI exceeded the scope of remand provided in Sandberg II. The Supreme Court concluded the district court erred in finding WSI exceeded the scope of the remand and in reversing the ALJ's order affirming WSI's denial of disability benefits. The Court affirmed the district court affirmance of the ALJ’s order awarding benefits on an aggravation basis under N.D.C.C. § 65-05-15. The Court reinstated the ALJ’s order affirming WSI’s denial of disability benefits. View "Sandberg v. WSI, et al." on Justia Law

The question presented for the Court of Appeal in this case was whether California could lawfully require anyone who seeks to vote in a presidential primary for a candidate of a particular political party to associate with that party as a condition of receiving a ballot with that candidate’s name on it. Plaintiffs contended that the answer was no, making Elections Code section 13102 unconstitutional. Defendants California Secretary of State and the State of California disputed this conclusion, asserting that the United States Supreme Court answered this question in the affirmative on multiple occasions. Defendants pointed out, that when plaintiffs discuss a “right” to cast an expressive ballot simply for the sake of doing so, rather than to affect the outcome of an election, they have ceased talking about voting. The Supreme Court has rejected the notion that elections have some “generalized expressive function.” California Court of Appeal concluded Plaintiffs’ inventive theories therefore did not supply a constitutional basis for evading binding legal precedent that foreclosed their arguments. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the trial court’s ruling sustaining the defendants’ demurrer without leave to amend. View "Boydston v. Padilla" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit under: 42 U.S.C. § 1983; the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68; and Oklahoma state law, challenging an allegedly unconstitutional scheme to collect “court debts” from impoverished Oklahoma citizens. The Second Amended Class Action Complaint (“SACAC”) named numerous “Defendants,” which fell into three broad categories: (1) individual Oklahoma sheriffs, the Oklahoma Sheriff’s Association (“OSA”), and officials of Tulsa and Rodgers Counties (collectively, “Sheriffs”); (2) state court judges (collectively, “Judges”); and (3) Aberdeen Enterprises, II, Inc. and its principal officers (collectively, “Aberdeen”). Plaintiffs alleged Aberdeen, a debt-collection company, acting in concert with other Defendants, used actual or threatened incarceration to coerce indigent Oklahomans into paying court debts, without any inquiry into ability to pay. The district court dismissed the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, broadly holding that three independent doctrines prevented Plaintiffs from proceeding on any claim against any Defendant. Plaintiffs appealed to the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, asserting that none of the doctrines identified by the district court deprived federal courts of the ability to reach the merits of the claims listed in the complaint. To this, the Tenth Circuit agrees the district court erred in dismissing the SACAC. Accordingly, the judgment of dismissal was reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "Graff, et al. v. Aberdeen Enterprizes, II, et al." on Justia Law

Bird Rides, Inc. (Bird) launched its electric motorized scooter rental business in the City of Los Angeles (the City) by deploying hundreds of Bird scooters onto the City’s streets and sidewalks. Plaintiff and her daughter were on a City sidewalk just after twilight. The sidewalk was crowded with holiday shoppers, and Plaintiff did not see the back wheel of a Bird scooter sticking out from behind a trash can. She tripped on the scooter, fell, and sustained serious physical injuries. Plaintiffs sued Bird and the City for negligence and other related claims. The trial court sustained Defendants’ demurrer without leave to amend, concluding neither Bird nor the City owed Plaintiffs a duty of care.   The Second Appellate District concluded that the trial court’s judgment is correct as to the City, but the trial court erred when it dismissed the claims against Bird. Because Plaintiffs’ claims against the City are premised on the public entity’s discretionary authority to enforce the permit, the City is immune from liability under the Government Claims Act. In contrast, regardless of the permit’s terms, Bird may be held liable for breaching its general duty under section 1714 to use “ordinary care or skill in the management of [its] property.” The court explained that having deployed its dockless scooters onto public streets, Bird’s general duty encompasses an obligation, among other things, to use ordinary care to locate and move a Bird scooter when the scooter poses an unreasonable risk of danger to others. The court concluded that Plaintiff is authorized to assert a private action for public nuisance against the company. View "Hacala v. Bird Rides, Inc." on Justia Law

This case concerned California’s efforts to relicense its hydropower facilities at Oroville Dam. Before the license expired, California’s Department of Water Resources (DWR) began the process for relicensing these facilities. It also, in connection with this effort, prepared a statement of potential environmental impacts, known as an environmental impact report or EIR, under the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA). Three local governments - Butte County, Plumas County, and Plumas County Flood Control and Water Conservation District (together, the Counties) - filed writ petitions challenging the sufficiency of DWR’s EIR. The trial court found none of the Counties' arguments persuasive and entered judgment in DWR’s favor. On appeal, the Court of Appeal considered this case for the third time. In its first decision, the Court found the Counties’ challenge largely preempted by the Federal Power Act, but the California Supreme Court vacated that decision and asked the appellate court to reconsider in light of one of its precedents. In the appeals court's second decision, it again found the Counties’ challenge largely preempted. But the Supreme Court, taking up the case a second time, reversed the appellate court's decision in part. While the Supreme Court agreed that some of the remedies the Counties sought were preempted, it found they could still challenge the sufficiency of DWR’s EIR. It thus remanded the matter to the appeals court for further consideration. Turning to the merits for the first time since this appeal was filed over a decade ago, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "County of Butte, et al. v. Dept. of Water Resources" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a claim under 42 U.S.C 405(g), believing the Social Security Administration miscalculated his benefits. He filed his claim more than one year after the SSA verbally denied his request for review, and after he did not receive the requested written documentation of the SSA's denial.The SSA filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because Sec. 405(g)’s waiver of sovereign immunity applied only with respect to judicial review of a “final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security” and that Plaintiff had not obtained a final decision, having refused to exhaust the four-step administrative process. The district court granted SSA’s motion.Finding that Sec. 405(g)’s exhaustion requirement is not jurisdictional, the Fourth Circuit nonetheless concluded that exhaustion is a mandatory requirement of the Social Security Act that may be excused only in a narrow set of circumstances, which were not present in this case. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court’s dismissal. View "L.N.P. v. Kilolo Kijakazi" on Justia Law

The Mine Safety and Health Administration (“MSHA”) is an agency within the Department of Labor whose mission is to administer the provisions of the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act (“Mine Act”). The Mine Act authorizes the Secretary of Labor (“Secretary”), acting through MSHA, to promulgate mandatory safety and health standards, inspect mines, issue citations and orders for violations of the Act or mandatory standards, and propose penalties for those violations. An inspector for MSHA discovered a crane at Westfall operating on-site with no working service brakes. Eight years after the sentence was deemed a final order, and only after MSHA had begun enforcement proceedings against the operator for failing to pay its delinquent penalties, Westfall filed a motion to reopen the matter. A two-member majority of the Commission granted the motion. The DC Circuit granted the Secretary’s petition for review, reversed the Commission’s decision dismissing Westfall’s motion to reopen as moot, and remanded the case for a prompt disposition. The court explained that the Commission’s decision relies on a ground not raised or addressed by the parties, lacks substantial evidence to support its principal findings, and ignores the potential applicability of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) covering motions to reopen. View "Secretary of Labor v. Westfall Aggregate & Materials, Inc." on Justia Law

Former City of Clarksdale Commissioner Charles Moton alleged that his December 2013 and May 2015 arrests at Clarksdale city commissioners meetings were in violation of "a litany" of his state constitutional rights. The trial court dismissed Moton’s claims because he failed to file suit within the statute of limitations. Finding no reversible error, the Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's judgment. View "Moton v. City of Clarksdale" on Justia Law

In 2019, after Roosevelt Jones paid his annual rent more than thirty days late, the North Bolivar Consolidated School District, pursuant to a late penalty provision contained in the lease between the parties, assessed Jones a late fee for $11,028.60. Jones filed suit arguing, amongst other things, that the district should be estopped from enforcing the late payment penalty provision because it had a custom of accepting late rent payments without penalty. Jones argued he relied on the custom to his detriment when making his rent payment late. In August 2021, the school district moved for summary judgment, arguing that it could not be estopped by the unauthorized acts of its officials. The chancellor found that the district had failed to show the acts of its officials in accepting the late payments were not authorized. The school district sought interlocutory appeal of the denial of summary judgment, and was granted. The Mississippi Supreme Court concluded the school district was a trustee of sixteenth section school lands and, consequently, bore a statutory duty to collect all funds due from the sixteenth section properties that it leased. Any past failure by it to collect such funds was unauthorized as a matter of law and could not form the basis for estoppel. Therefore, the Supreme Court reversed the chancery court’s judgment and rendered judgment in favor of the school district. View "North Bolivar Consolidated School District v. Jones" on Justia Law

The Commission on Teacher Credentialing (Commission) and its Committee of Credentials (Committee) (collectively, defendants) appealed the grant of mandamus relief to petitioner Russell Earnest, setting aside the Committee’s disciplinary recommendation against him and enjoining the Commission from acting on that recommendation. Defendants argued the trial court erred in finding: (1) Earnest was excused from exhausting his administrative remedies; and (2) the Committee lacked jurisdiction to conduct a formal review pursuant to Education Code1 section 44242.5 (d). They further asserted the trial court should have denied the petition under the doctrine of judicial restraint. In the unpublished portion of the opinion, the Court of Appeal concluded all three factors outlined in Coachella Valley Mosquito & Vector Control Dist. v. California Public Employment Relations Bd., 35 Cal.4th 1072 (2005) weighed in favor of excusing Earnest from exhausting his administrative remedies. In the published portion of the opinion, the Court found that although section 44242.5 (b)(3) generally provided a jurisdictional basis for the Committee to commence initial reviews, as discussed post, the provision was also incorporated in section 44242.5 (d)(3) to provide a jurisdictional basis for the Committee to commence formal reviews. It was this jurisdictional provision the Committee relied upon in commencing a formal review of Earnest’s fitness to hold a credential. The Court thus concluded the plain language of section 44242.5(b)(3) imposed the onus on the employer to determine whether to provide a notifying statement to the Committee, and thus only the employer may determine whether an enumerated action was the “result of an allegation of misconduct,” triggering the Committee’s jurisdiction. Applying that interpretation to the facts of this case, the Court concluded the Committee did not have jurisdiction to commence a formal review of Earnest’s fitness to hold a credential. The grant of mandamus relief was thus affirmed. View "Earnest v. Com. on Teacher Credentialing" on Justia Law