Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

A group of residents (“the Neighbors”) appealed three separate zoning decisions of the City of Ocean Springs Board of Alderman to the Jackson County Circuit Court. The circuit court, sitting as an appellate court pursuant to Mississippi Code Section 11-51-75 (Rev. 2019), consolidated the appeals and reversed the City’s zoning decisions in two of the appeals and remanded the first appeal to the City board. The City then appealed whether the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to review the decisions when W. Lee Brumfield, who was an applicant before the City, was not included as a party to the Neighbors’ appeal. Due to the Mississippi Supreme Court’s intervening decision in Longo v. City of Waveland, 353 So. 3d 437 (Miss. 2022), and the fact that the circuit court did not address the issue in its ruling, the Supreme Court found that Brumfield’s status as a petitioner could not be determined at this point. The case was remanded to the circuit court for a factual determination as to whether Brumfield is a petitioner under Section 11-51-75. View "City of Ocean Springs v. Illanne, et al." on Justia Law

After the Acting General Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board withdrew an unfair labor practice complaint that his predecessor had issued against a union, the aggrieved employer requested permission to appeal the complaint’s withdrawal to the Board. The Board denied the request, concluding that the Acting General Counsel’s decision was an unreviewable act of prosecutorial discretion. The employer then petitioned the Fifth Circuit for review of the Board’s order.   The Fifth Circuit denied the petition. The court concluded that it has jurisdiction over the petition for review, that Acting General Counsel’s designation was valid and that the Board permissibly determined that Acting General Counsel had discretion to withdraw the complaint against the Unions. The court explained that the Board’s own conclusion that the General Counsel has the discretion to withdraw unfair labor practice complaints in cases where a motion for summary judgment has been filed but no hearing has occurred, and the Board has neither issued a Notice to Show Cause nor transferred the case to itself fits squarely within the holding of UFCW. As such, it is a permissible interpretation of the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”) View "United Natural Foods v. NLRB" on Justia Law

President Obama issued a Proclamation under the Antiquities Act expanding the Cascade-Siskiyou National Monument (“Monument”) in southwestern Oregon. Proclamation 9564 (“Proclamation”). Murphy Timber Company and Murphy Timber Investments, LLC (collectively, “Murphy”) are Oregon timber businesses. Murphy owns woodlands and purchases timber harvested in western Oregon to supply its wood products manufacturing facilities. Concerned that the Proclamation imposed a new limitation on its timber supply and deleterious effects on its woodlands adjacent to the expanded Monument, Murphy sued the President, the Secretary of the Interior (“Secretary”), and the Bureau of Land Management (“BLM”) seeking declaratory and injunctive relief.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s summary judgment in favor of the United States and intervenor environmental organizations. First, the Court has recognized constitutional challenges to presidential acts as reviewable. Second, the Court has held that actions by subordinate Executive Branch officials that extend beyond delegated statutory authority— i.e., ultra vires actions—are reviewable. The panel concluded that Murphy’s particularized allegations that the O&C Act restricts the President’s designation powers under the Antiquities Act satisfied the applicable jurisdictional standard. The panel held that the Proclamation’s exercise of Antiquities Act power was consistent with the text, history, and purpose of the O&C Act. Third, the panel held that the dissent’s concerns that the Proclamation and the O&C Act are in conflict are unsubstantiated. View "MURPHY COMPANY, ET AL V. JOSEPH BIDEN, ET AL" on Justia Law

The IRS investigated the companies to determine whether they are liable for penalties for promoting abusive tax shelters. Summonses led to the production of documents in 2014, including email chains involving the Delaware Department of Insurance, relating to the issuance of certificates of authority to the companies' clients and to a meeting with the Department’s Director of Captive and Financial Insurance Products. The IRS issued an administrative summons to the Department for testimony and records relating to filings by and communications with the companies. “Request 1” seeks all e-mails between the Department and the companies related to the Captive Insurance Program. The Department raised confidentiality objections under Delaware Insurance Code section 6920. The IRS declined to abide by section 6920's confidentiality requirements. The Department refuses to produce any response to Request 1.The government filed a successful petition to enforce the summons. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting the Department’s argument that, under the McCarran-Ferguson Act (MFA), 15 U.S.C. 1011, Delaware law embodied in section 6920 overrides the IRS’s statutory authority to issue and enforce summonses. While the MFA does protect state insurance laws from intrusive federal action when certain requirements are met, before any such reverse preemption occurs, the conduct at issue (refusal to produce summonsed documents) must constitute the “business of insurance” under the MFA. That threshold requirement was not met here. View "United States v. State of Delaware Department of Insurance" on Justia Law

This is an appeal from the district court’s denial of the State of North Dakota’s supplemental motion to intervene in the lawsuit against the Department of the Interior brought by the Mandan, Hidatsa and Arikara Nation, recognized as the Three Affiliated Tribes of the Fort Berthold Indian Reservation (“Tribes”). The Tribes, joined by the Interior Department, filed oppositions to the State’s continuing as a party. In response, the State moved again to intervene with respect to the remaining Counts. This time the district court denied the State’s intervention motion. The district court explained that “there [was] no longer a live controversy before the Court on that issue.” The court explained: “At various points, the State argues that ‘an M-Opinion does not establish legal title’ and that, as a result, a dispute remains.   The DC Circuit reversed. The court explained that the Interior lacks “authority to adjudicate legal title to real property.” The Interior Department conceded as much. The action of the Bureau of Indian Affairs recording title in its records office, therefore, could not “establish legal title,” as the district court supposed. As the Interior stated in its brief, “there has been no final determination of title to the Missouri riverbed.” The action of the Bureau of Indian Affairs recording title in its records office, therefore, could not “establish legal title,” as the district court supposed. Accordingly, the court wrote that there is no doubt that the State satisfied the Rule’s requirement that the intervention motion must be timely. View "Mandan, Hidatsa and Arikara Nation v. DOI" on Justia Law

Claimant Hipolito Coria sought review of the Court of Appeals’ decision reversing a penalty that the Workers’ Compensation Board imposed on respondent SAIF for unreasonable claims processing. The board imposed the penalty pursuant to ORS 656.262(11)(a), which provides, in part, that, if an “insurer . . . unreasonably refuses to pay compensation,” the insurer “shall be liable for an additional amount up to 25 percent of the amounts then due,” plus penalty-related attorney fees. On review, the parties disagreed about the board’s reason for imposing the penalty. They also disagreed about many of the procedural and substantive legal requirements for imposing penalties pursuant to ORS 656.262(11)(a). The Oregon Supreme Court concluded the board’s imposition of the penalty was not supported by substantial reason because the board’s order failed to “articulate a rational connection between the facts and the legal conclusions it draws from them.” Consequently, the Court reversed and remanded the case to the board to explain its reasoning; necessarily, the Court did not reach the parties’ arguments about the legal requirements for imposing penalties pursuant to ORS 656.262(11)(a). View "SAIF v. Coria" on Justia Law

In passing the Water Infrastructure Improvements for the Nation Act (“WIIN Act”), Congress directed the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers to design a fish-passage structure for the New Savannah Bluff Lock and Dam. The Corps settled on a design that would lower the pool of water by about three feet. The State of South Carolina and several of its agencies responded by suing the Corps and various federal officials. Their complaint alleged that the Corps’ design violated the WIIN Act, the National Environmental Policy Act, the Administrative Procedure Act, state law, a previous settlement agreement, and certain easements. The district court held that the Corps’ plan didn’t “maintain the pool” since it would lower it from its height on the date of the Act’s enactment. Corps argued that this reading ignores the clause “for water supply and recreational activities” and that a lowered pool that still fulfills these functions would comply with the Act.   The Fourth Circuit vacated the district court’s judgment for Plaintiffs on their WIIN Act claim and the resulting permanent injunction against the Corps. The court left it to the district court to decide whether the Corps’ chosen design can maintain the pool’s then-extant water-supply and recreational purposes. The court explained that it agreed with the Corps that pinning the required pool height to the “arbitrary and unknowable-to-Congress date that the President signed the legislation” leads to “absurd results.” Plaintiffs suggest that the statute only obligates the Corps to maintain the pool at its “normal operating range.” But neither the statute nor the district court’s order makes clear this permissible “range.” View "State of South Carolina v. United States Army Corps of Engineers" on Justia Law

President Biden invoked his authority under the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949 (“Procurement Act”) to direct federal agencies to include in certain contracts a clause requiring covered contractor employees to follow COVID-19 safety protocols, including vaccination requirements, in order for employees to be eligible to work on federal government projects. Plaintiffs sued to enjoin the vaccination mandate. This lawsuit revolved around four documents that comprise the Contractor Mandate: the Executive Order, the Task Force Guidance, the Office of Management and Budget Determination, and the Federal Acquisition Regulatory Council Guidance. The district court granted a permanent injunction against the Contractor Mandate, effective in any contract that either involved a party domiciled or headquartered in Arizona and/or was performed “principally” in Arizona.   The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s order granting a permanent injunction and dissolved the injunction. First, the panel held the Major Questions Doctrine—which requires that Congress speak clearly if it wishes to assign to an agency decisions of vast economic and political significance—did not apply. Second, the panel held that even if the Major Questions Doctrine applied, it would not bar the Contractor Mandate because the Mandate is not a transformative expansion of the President’s authority under the Procurement Act. Third, the panel held that the Contractor Mandate fell within the President’s authority under the Procurement Act. Fourth, the panel held that the nondelegation doctrine and state sovereignty concerns did not invalidate the Contractor Mandate. Finally, the panel held that the Contractor Mandate satisfied the Office of Federal Procurement Policy Act’s procedural requirements. View "KRISTIN MAYES, ET AL V. JOSEPH BIDEN, ET AL" on Justia Law

The Pennsylvania Secretary of the Commonwealth decertified certain voting equipment that Fulton County acquired from Dominion Voting Systems, Inc. (“Dominion”) in 2019 and used in the 2020 general election. The Secretary decertified the voting equipment after learning that, following the 2020 election, Fulton County had allowed Wake Technology Services, Inc. (“Wake TSI”), to perform a probing inspection of that equipment as well as the software and data contained therein. The Secretary maintained that Wake TSI’s inspection had compromised the integrity of the equipment. Fulton County and the other named Petitioner-Appellees petitioned in the Commonwealth Court’s original jurisdiction to challenge the Secretary’s decertification authority generally and as applied in this case. During the pleading stage, the Secretary learned that Fulton County intended to allow another entity, Envoy Sage, LLC, to inspect the allegedly compromised equipment. The Secretary sought a protective order from the Commonwealth Court barring that inspection and any other third-party inspection during the litigation. The court denied relief. The Secretary appealed that ruling to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, which entered a temporary order on January 27, 2022, to prevent the inspection and to preserve the status quo during the Court's review of the Secretary’s appeal. Months later—and with no public consideration, official proceedings, or notice to the courts or other parties to this litigation—the County allowed yet another party, Speckin Forensics, LLC to inspect the voting equipment and electronic evidence at issue in this litigation. Upon learning of this alleged violation of the temporary order, the Secretary filed an “Application for an Order Holding [the County] in Contempt and Imposing Sanctions.” The Supreme Court found Fulton County willfully violated the Supreme Court's order. The Court found Fulton County and its various attorneys engaged in a "sustained, deliberate pattern of dilatory, obdurate, and vexatious conduct and have acted in bad faith throughout these sanction proceedings." Taken as a whole, that behavior prompted the Court to sanction both the County and the County Attorney. View "County of Fulton, et al. v. Sec. of Com." on Justia Law

This appeal concerned whether Dr. Timothy Shrom and Debra Shrom were eligible under the Pennsylvania Storage Tank and Spill Prevention Act (Act) for payment from the Underground Storage Tank Indemnification Fund (Fund) for costs they incurred in remediating contamination caused by fuel releases from underground storage tanks (USTs or tanks) located on their property. The Fund concluded, and the Underground Storage Tank Indemnification Board (Board) ultimately agreed, that the Shroms were ineligible for such payment because the subject USTs were not registered with the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) as required by Section 503 of the Act and the registration fees were not paid at the time of the fuel releases that gave rise to the Shroms’ claim for remediation costs. The Commonwealth Court reversed the Board’s decision on appeal, concluding that: (1) the Shroms were eligible to receive payment from the Fund for remediation costs under the Act; (2) the Board’s holding relative to the timing of the payment of the Section 503 registration fees constituted an unlawful de facto regulation; and (3) contrary to the Board’s finding, payment of the Shroms’ claim did not appear to pose any imminent risk to the Fund’s solvency. Finding no error in the Commonwealth Court’s decision, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed. View "Shrom, et al v PA Underground Storage Tank" on Justia Law