Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Barber Group, Inc., doing business as Barber Honda (Barber)—a car dealer in Bakersfield, California—brought an establishment protest to the California New Motor Vehicle Board (Board), challenging a decision by American Honda Motor Co., Inc. (Honda) to open a new dealership about nine miles away. The Board overruled Barber’s protest, and the trial court denied Barber’s petition for administrative mandate challenging the Board’s decision. On appeal, Barber argued the Board prejudicially erred when it: (1) relied on Honda’s dealer performance standards at the protest hearing without first deciding whether those standards were reasonable; (2) permitted the proposed new dealership to exercise a peremptory challenge to an administrative law judge initially assigned to the protest hearing, contrary to notions of fairness and the Board’s own order in the matter; and (3) denied Barber’s request that it take official notice of the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic. Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "Barber Group, Inc. v. New Motor Vehicle Bd." on Justia Law

In 1992, the Crow Tribe brought a declaratory action against Wyoming Game and Fish officials to determine whether the 1868 Treaty with the Crows afforded it an unrestricted right to hunt in the Bighorn National Forest. Relying on a line of prior Supreme Court cases interpreting Indian treaties, the federal district court in Wyoming held in Crow Tribe of Indians v. Repsis (Repsis I), 866 F. Supp. 520 (D. Wyo. 1994), that Wyoming’s admission as a state extinguished the Tribe’s treaty hunting rights (the “Statehood Holding”). In Crow Tribe of Indians v. Repsis (Repsis II), 73 F.3d 982 (10th Cir. 1995), the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s Statehood Holding. Alternatively, the Tenth Circuit held that the Bighorn National Forest was “occupied,” so the Tribe’s treaty hunting rights would not have applied to the area in question (the “Occupation Rationale”), and also reasoned that Wyoming could have justified its restrictions on hunting due to its interest in conservation (the “Conservation Necessity Rationale”). In 2019, the Supreme Court decided Herrera v. Wyoming, 139 S. Ct. 1686 (2019), in response to Wyoming’s attempts to prosecute a Tribe member for hunting in Bighorn National Forest. Critically, the Court held that the Tribe’s treaty rights had not been extinguished by Wyoming’s admittance as a state and that Bighorn National Forest was not categorically “occupied.” On remand, Wyoming continued its efforts to prosecute the Tribe’s member, arguing in part that the defendant could not assert a treaty right to hunt in Bighorn National Forest because Repsis II continued to bind the Tribe and its members through the doctrine of issue preclusion. The Tribe moved for relief from Repsis II under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b). But the district court denied the Tribe’s motion, holding that it lacked the power to grant relief because the Tenth Circuit relied on alternative grounds for affirmance (the Occupation and Conservation Necessity Rationales) that the district court had not considered in Repsis I. The Tribe appealed, arguing that the district court legally erred when it held that it lacked the power to review the Tribe’s Rule 60(b) motion. The Tenth Circuit concluded the district court abused its discretion when it held that it lacked the authority to review the Tribe’s motion for post-judgment relief. The matter was remanded again for further proceedings. View "Crow Tribe of Indians, et al. v. Repsis, et al." on Justia Law

Gillette, a serial sex offender, received a 27-year sentence for sex crimes. After his release, he never registered as a sex offender. On a tip, law enforcement found that Gillette had been living with a 15-year-old boy and had engaged in sexual contact with that child and another child. Gillette was convicted on 20 counts of territorial-law offenses; federal charges were dismissed. The court sentenced Gillette to 155 years’ imprisonment. The Third Circuit affirmed.Gillette filed a habeas petition in the Virgin Islands Superior Court. At Gillette’s request, the Superior Court issued a subpoena duces tecum to the U.S. Attorney’s Office (USAO). As required by Department of Justice regulations, the USAO requested that Gillette submit “a summary of the information” sought “and its relevance to the proceeding.” Gillette instead moved for contempt and sanctions against the USAO for failing to respond to his subpoena. The USAO then removed the proceedings to federal court and successfully moved to quash the subpoena. The Third Circuit dismissed Gillette’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The government never waived its sovereign immunity concerning non-monetary actions against it, so the Superior Court lacked jurisdiction over the USAO; the district court derived its jurisdiction over Gillette’s subpoena-enforcement action from 28 U.S.C. 1442(a)(1) and also lacked jurisdiction. View "Gillette v. Golden Grove Adult Correctional Facility" on Justia Law

Respondent G.W. had, in her lifetime, received a variety of mental health diagnoses, including depression, post-traumatic stress disorder, and borderline personality disorder. In May and June 2019, G.W. was arrested on a number of criminal charges, including criminal threatening and violation of a protective order, based upon her conduct towards a man with whom she previously had a romantic relationship and that man’s current partner (the complainants). G.W.’s conduct leading to her arrest included trespassing on the complainants’ property, contacting them after a protective order was in place, placing two improvised explosive devices and one incendiary device in the complainants’ vehicles, and making a bomb threat to the workplace of one of the complainants. G.W. appealed a circuit court decision ordering her involuntary admission to the Secure Psychiatric Unit (SPU) of the New Hampshire State Prison for a period of three years with a conditional discharge when and if clinically appropriate. On appeal, G.W. challenged the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the trial court’s conclusion that she met the involuntary admission standard. She also argued the court erred when it ordered that she remain in jail, where she had been detained on pending criminal charges, until a bed became available at the SPU. Finding no abuse of discretion or other reversible error, the New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed the admission. View "In re G.W." on Justia Law

Miguel D. (Father) left his eight-year-old daughter, M.D., alone inside a locked apartment that had no electricity, an empty non-operable refrigerator, and no edible food. After waking up to find her father and his truck gone, M.D. climbed through a kitchen window to look for him and was found wandering the apartment complex. The San Diego County Health and Human Services Agency (Agency) filed a dependency petition alleging Father failed to adequately supervise and protect M.D., and willfully or negligently failed to provide her with adequate food and shelter. The juvenile court found the petition true, took jurisdiction, and removed M.D. from Father’s custody while he was offered reunification services. On appeal, Father argued the Court of Appeal had to reverse the juvenile court’s jurisdictional order because Welfare and Institutions Code section 300(b)(2) prohibited the juvenile court from assuming jurisdiction over a child “solely” due to a parent’s indigence or poverty. He further argued the Court should reverse the dispositional order because the Agency failed to demonstrate there were no reasonable means to protect M.D. without removing her from Father’s custody. Because the record did not support either contention, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "In re M.D." on Justia Law

Show Me State Premium Homes wants its purchase of a foreclosed property to be free and clear of all other interests, including those belonging to the United States. Getting what it wants would require a “judicial sale.” After removing the case the United States filed a motion to dismiss. Its position was that there could be no foreclosure without a judicial sale. The district court agreed, declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over what remained, and remanded to state court.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court but modified the dismissal of the ejectment and damages claims to be without prejudice. The court explained that a buyer’s interest is only “inchoate” before it gets a valid deed, not after. And here, title vested once the bond company “exercised its right to have the legal title transferred.” No “judicial sale” ever took place, and it is too late to hold one now, meaning that the interests held by the United States have never been foreclosed. View "Show Me State Premium Homes, LLC v. George McDonnell" on Justia Law

Fritz Opp appealed the dismissal of his case for want of jurisdiction. Opp attempted to appeal a Bureau of Criminal Investigation (“BCI”) decision denying his application for a concealed weapons license under N.D.C.C. ch. 62.1-04. The court held it lacked subject matter jurisdiction because Opp had not complied with the requirements for perfecting an appeal under the Administrative Agencies Practice Act, N.D.C.C. ch. 28-32 (“AAPA”). The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed dismissal of the action for want of jurisdiction, but modified the judgment to dismiss without prejudice. View "Opp v. Office of the North Dakota Attorney General - BCI CWL Unit, et al." on Justia Law

Lance Hagen filed a public records request related to a condemnation case he was a party to involving the City of Lincoln and North Dakota Insurance Reserve Fund (“NDIRF”). Hagen sought to determine how the City of Lincoln and NDIRF spent approximately $1.1 million dollars on litigation costs defending the action. NDIRF did not produce all requested records, and the parties sought relief from the district court. Hagen appealed the district court’s judgment that concluded certain documents belonging to NDIRF were exempt from release under the potential liability exception outlined in N.D.C.C. § 44-04-19.1(8). Hagen argued the court abused its discretion by finding NDIRF itself faced potential liability because its members could face potential liability, and because the court discussed the fiscal effect of a disclosure on NDIRF, which Hagen argued exceeded the scope of the North Dakota Supreme Court’s remand order in Hagen v. North Dakota Insurance Reserve Fund, 971 N.W.2d 833. Because the Supreme Court concluded the potential liability exception under N.D.C.C. § 44-04-19.1(8) did not apply to any of the documents determined by the district court to be exempt, the Court reversed. View "Hagen v. N.D. Insurance Reserve Fund" on Justia Law

Courage to Change Recovery Ranch, recently known as Soaring Hope Recovery Center, provided treatment and housing for people recovering from drug and alcohol addictions in a single-family neighborhood in El Paso County, Colorado. But Soaring Hope claimed the County’s strict occupancy limits, standards for group homes for disabled persons, and policies restricting what treatment options Soaring Hope could provide in a single-family zone led Soaring Hope to close its home in a single-family neighborhood (the Spruce Road home). The Tenth Circuit determined the County violated the Fair Housing Act Amendments (FHAA) by imposing facially discriminatory occupancy limits on group homes for disabled persons without a legally permissible justification. Though Soaring Hope showed standing to challenge the occupancy limits which directly injured it, Soaring Hope did not show standing to challenge the standards for group homes for disabled persons—no evidence shows that the County enforced the standards against Soaring Hope. The Tenth Circuit also held that the district court erred by granting summary judgment against Soaring Hope on its zoning-out claim for intentional discrimination: Soaring Hope raised a genuine issue of material fact about whether the County had prohibited certain therapeutic activities in its Spruce Road home while allowing those same activities in other structured group-living arrangements and residential homes. The case was remanded for the district court to further address the zoning-out claim. The judgment was affirmed in all other respects. View "Courage to Change, et al. v. El Paso County" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Marvin Sloan appealed an order finding he qualified as a sexually violent predator (SVP) and committing him to the State Department of State Hospitals. His sole argument on appeal was that the trial court erred in allowing the State to use a privately retained expert to testify at trial. To support this position, Sloan cited Needham v. Superior Court, 82 Cal.App.5th 114 (2022), which held that the State had no right to privately retain an expert under the Sexually Violent Predators Act (SVPA). The California Supreme Court recently granted review in Needham and will decide whether Needham’s interpretation of the SVPA was correct. In the meantime, the Court of Appeal joined Needham in concluding that the State could not retain an expert to testify at an SVP trial. The order was therefore reversed and the matter remanded to the trial court to issue an order excluding the testimony of the State's privately retained expert and to conduct a new trial. View "California v. Sloan" on Justia Law