Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

The case involves a dispute regarding the office of constable for the District 59 election precinct in Jefferson County, Alabama. Frederick Burkes, Sr. won the 2020 Democratic party primary for the office and was declared and certified as the winner. Prior to assuming office, he filed a bond as required by state law. However, James Franklin contended that the bond was not timely filed as it was not filed within 40 days of the declaration of Burkes's election. Consequently, Jefferson Probate Judge James Naftel declared the office of constable for District 59 vacant, leading to Governor Kay Ivey appointing Franklin to the office.Burkes initiated a quo warranto action against Franklin, challenging his appointment. The trial court ruled in favor of Franklin, a decision that was appealed by Burkes. The Supreme Court of Alabama affirmed the trial court's decision. The Court found that Burkes had indeed filed his official bond on time, as per § 11-2-6 of the Alabama Code. However, Burkes's argument before the trial court was framed around a perceived conflict between § 36-5-2 and § 36-23-4 of the Alabama Code, not § 11-2-6. As a result, the Supreme Court of Alabama affirmed the trial court's decision because Burkes had not presented an argument concerning § 11-2-6 to the trial court. View "State of Alabama ex rel. Burkes v. Franklin" on Justia Law

In this case, the Supreme Court of Mississippi affirmed the trial court's dismissal of a case brought by John E. Federinko against Forrest County and its coroner, Butch Benedict, Jr. Federinko, the father of Alison Dawkins, disagreed with the findings of the county's investigation into his daughter's death by suicide. He argued that the county had a ministerial duty to perform an autopsy and to obtain postmortem blood and vitreous fluids, which they had failed to do. His subsequent private autopsy suggested that his daughter's death may have been a homicide.The court, however, ruled that Forrest County had no duty to perform an autopsy and did not breach any duty to obtain or attempt to obtain postmortem blood and fluids. They found that even if Federinko's suspicions were correct and his daughter's death was not a suicide, that would not change the county's obligations. The court concluded that Federinko failed to allege a tortious act, rendering the issue of discretionary-function immunity moot. Therefore, the trial court's denial of Federinko's motion for partial summary judgment, as well as its grant of Forrest County's motion for summary judgment and subsequent dismissal of the case, were affirmed. View "Federinko v. Forrest County, Mississippi" on Justia Law

This case involves a dispute over a public records request made by the relator, Thomas Clark, an inmate at Lebanon Correctional Institution. Clark sent a request to the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction (ODRC) for an up-to-date paper copy of the commissary price list for each commissary window at the prison. After several failed attempts to obtain the information through internal procedures, and despite an assurance from an inspector that he would provide the requested lists, Clark had still not received the paper copies. He therefore filed a mandamus action to compel the ODRC to provide the records.The Supreme Court of Ohio denied the writ of mandamus as moot because the ODRC had already provided Clark with the records he requested. However, the court found that the ODRC had failed to comply with its obligations under Ohio's Public Records Act, R.C. 149.43, for 11 business days starting from the day Clark filed the mandamus action. Accordingly, the court awarded Clark $1,000 in statutory damages, the maximum amount allowed under the statute. The court declined to award court costs, finding no evidence of bad faith on the part of the ODRC. View "State ex rel. Clark v. Dept. of Rehab. & Corr." on Justia Law

In a dispute between the City of Winder and Barrow County, Georgia, the Supreme Court of Georgia addressed the interpretation of the Services Delivery Strategy (SDS) Act, with regard to the delivery of services to county and city residents and property owners and the funding of these services. The case initially revolved around three main issues: the maintenance of county roads and who benefits from them, the funding of services that primarily benefit the unincorporated area of the county, and whether the County could challenge the water rates charged by the City as an illegal tax.The court concluded that determining whether the maintenance of county roads primarily benefits the unincorporated area of a county cannot be resolved as a matter of law and requires analysis of the totality of the circumstances involved. The court held that services that primarily benefit the unincorporated area of the county should be funded through the mechanisms delineated in the Act, limiting the sources within a special district that can be used for funding.Finally, the court decided that a superior court adjudicating a petition under the SDS Act is not authorized to determine whether the City’s usage rates charged to water customers in unincorporated areas of the County are an illegal tax. The court reversed the rulings of the lower courts and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "CITY OF WINDER v. BARROW COUNTY" on Justia Law

This case involves an appeal from plaintiffs Sara Halsey and Susan Kiralis-Vernon against Fedcap Rehabilitation Services, Inc. The plaintiffs were participants in a state program, Additional Support for People in Retraining and Employment - Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (ASPIRE-TANF), for which Fedcap was a contract agency. The plaintiffs allege that Fedcap failed to correctly administer the program and fulfill its obligations, including informing them of available services and support, processing their requests for benefits, and engaging in an interactive process to evaluate their requests for reasonable accommodations. Kiralis-Vernon also alleges that a Fedcap employee verbally assaulted her due, in part, to her race.The U.S. District Court for the District of Maine dismissed the case, reasoning that the plaintiffs were required to first pursue an administrative remedy before the Department of Health and Human Services as required by Maine law. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the claims related to Fedcap’s administration of the ASPIRE-TANF program, agreeing that under Maine law, the plaintiffs had to first seek administrative review before bringing these claims to court.However, the appellate court vacated the dismissal of Kiralis-Vernon's claim of racial discrimination, ruling that this claim did not fall within the same jurisdiction and expertise of the Department, and thus, was not subject to the same requirement for administrative review. The case was remanded for further proceedings on this claim. View "Halsey v. Fedcap Rehabilitation Services, Inc." on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute over rights-of-way on federal land in Utah. Kane County and the State of Utah (collectively, "Kane County") have filed multiple lawsuits seeking to establish title to hundreds of these roads under an old statute known as Revised Statute (R.S.) 2477. The Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance and several other environmental groups (collectively, "SUWA") have sought to intervene in these lawsuits to oppose Kane County's claims and to argue for a narrow interpretation of any rights-of-way that are recognized.In this appeal, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals determined that the district court incorrectly denied SUWA's motion to intervene on the issue of "scope," which concerns the use and width of any recognized rights-of-way. The court held that SUWA's interests in this issue were not adequately represented by the United States, which also opposed Kane County's claims but had broader responsibilities and interests to balance. However, the court affirmed the district court's denial of SUWA's motion to intervene on the issue of "title" (i.e., whether Kane County has a valid claim to the roads under R.S. 2477), because SUWA's interests on this issue were adequately represented by the United States. The case was sent back to the lower court for further proceedings consistent with the appeals court's decision. View "Kane County v. United States" on Justia Law

This case concerns a petition for a writ of mandamus filed by various users of the PredictIt platform against the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas. The petitioners challenged the district court's decision to transfer their lawsuit against the Commodities Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) to the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia (D.D.C.).PredictIt is an online platform that allows users to trade on the predicted outcomes of political events. In 2022, the CFTC Division of Market Oversight rescinded a “no-action” letter it issued to PredictIt's operator, Victoria University, in 2014. The petitioners, claiming injury from the CFTC's decision, filed a lawsuit against the CFTC alleging that the agency acted arbitrarily and capriciously in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act and withdrew a license without following necessary procedural steps.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit found that the district court abused its discretion by transferring the case to D.D.C. based primarily on court congestion. The appellate court noted that none of the factors used to evaluate whether a case should be transferred under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) favored the CFTC's chosen venue of D.D.C. The court also pointed out that the district court's decision had implications beyond the immediate case due to the supervisory nature of writs of mandamus. Consequently, the petition for a writ of mandamus was granted, and the district court was directed to request the return of the case from D.D.C. View "In Re: Kevin Clarke" on Justia Law

In the case before the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, the Borough of Longport and the Township of Irvington, two New Jersey municipalities, sued Netflix, Inc. and Hulu, LLC, two popular video streaming companies. The municipalities sought to enforce a provision of the New Jersey Cable Television Act (CTA), which requires cable television entities to pay franchise fees to municipalities. The CTA, however, does not provide an express right of action for municipalities to enforce its provisions. The court had to determine whether the CTA implies such a right. The court concluded that it does not and affirmed the judgment of the District Court. The court found that the CTA expressly vests all enforcement authority in the Board of Public Utilities (BPU) and that it would be inconsistent with the purposes of the CTA to infer the existence of a private right of action for municipalities. The court rejected the municipalities' argument that the New Jersey Constitution recognizes that municipalities have powers of "necessary or fair implication", stating that this cannot change the plain meaning of statutes or provide municipalities with statutory enforcement authority that would directly conflict with the statute. View "Borough of Longport v. Netflix Inc" on Justia Law

In Wyoming, Jerry Peterson brought a case against the Laramie City Council, alleging that the council violated the Wyoming Public Meetings Act by holding its meetings remotely during and after the COVID-19 pandemic. Peterson argued that this remote format presented a barrier to attendance at the council meetings, violating a section of the Act that states a member of the public should not be required to fulfill any condition precedent to their attendance. The District Court dismissed the case on the grounds of laches, asserting that Peterson had delayed unreasonably in filing the suit. However, the Supreme Court of Wyoming reversed this decision and remanded the case back to the lower court. The Supreme Court found that the District Court had incorrectly determined Peterson's claims all accrued at the same time and that it had improperly taken judicial notice of the City Council's evidence. The Supreme Court also concluded that the District Court had made an erroneous conclusory determination that the City Council would be prejudiced by Peterson’s delay in bringing his action. View "Peterson v. Laramie City Council" on Justia Law

In a dispute between John Drumm, Chief of Police, et al. and the Freedom of Information Commission in Connecticut, the court was tasked with interpreting a provision of the Freedom of Information Act. The provision in question exempts from disclosure records of law enforcement agencies compiled in connection with the detection or investigation of a crime, if the disclosure of such records would result in the disclosure of information to be used in a prospective law enforcement action if prejudicial to such action. The case arose from a request for documents related to a 2010 unsolved murder case by a filmmaker who was working on a documentary about the case. The request was denied by the police department, and the filmmaker filed a complaint with the Freedom of Information Commission. The commission ruled in favor of the filmmaker and ordered the documents be provided. The police department appealed the decision, arguing that the commission failed to apply the correct legal standard.The court held that a "prospective law enforcement action" refers to a future law enforcement action that has at least a reasonable possibility of occurring, meaning that the occurrence is more than theoretically possible but not necessarily likely or probable. The court also clarified that under the first prong of the exception, a respondent before the commission must establish only that it is at least reasonably possible that the information contained in a requested document will be used in support of an arrest or prosecution. Because the commission had not applied this standard and had made clearly erroneous factual findings, the court reversed the judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings before the commission. View "Drumm v. Freedom of Information Commission" on Justia Law