Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

The case involves East Ohio Gas Company, doing business as Dominion Energy Ohio ("Dominion"), and J. William Vigrass, individually and as executor of Virginia Vigrass’s estate. Dominion had requested access to Virginia's residence to inspect the gas meter located inside. However, due to Virginia's immunocompromised state and susceptibility to COVID-19, she denied Dominion access. Despite her account being paid in full, Dominion disconnected its natural-gas service to Virginia’s residence in January 2022. The disconnection resulted in freezing temperatures inside the residence, causing the water pipes to burst and damage the property. Virginia was later found dead in her residence.In the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas, Vigrass sued Dominion on claims relating to the shutoff of its natural-gas service to Virginia’s residence. Dominion moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, arguing that the Public Utilities Commission of Ohio had exclusive jurisdiction over the claims as they related to a service issue. However, Judge Peter J. Corrigan denied Dominion’s motion, reasoning that he had jurisdiction over the complaint because Vigrass had asserted common-law claims.Dominion then filed an original action in prohibition in the Supreme Court of Ohio, asserting that Judge Corrigan patently and unambiguously lacks jurisdiction over Vigrass’s action. Dominion sought an order to prevent Judge Corrigan from exercising jurisdiction and to vacate the orders he has issued in the underlying case.The Supreme Court of Ohio granted the writ of prohibition, ordering Judge Corrigan to cease exercising jurisdiction over the underlying case and directing him to vacate the orders that he had previously issued in the case. The court concluded that both parts of the test set forth in Allstate Ins. Co. v. Cleveland Elec. Illum. Co. were met, indicating that the Public Utilities Commission of Ohio had exclusive jurisdiction over the case. The court also granted in part and denied in part Dominion's motion to strike certain parts of Vigrass's brief. View "State ex rel. E. Ohio Gas Co. v. Corrigan" on Justia Law

In 2006, Doris Sloan filed for survivor’s benefits under the Black Lung Benefits Act following the death of her husband, Gurstle Sloan, who had worked as a coal miner for Drummond Company for 16 years. Sloan's claim was denied by an administrative law judge, and this denial was reviewed twice. Sloan argued that the administrative law judge improperly excluded evidence supporting her request to modify her claim and erred by finding that the evidence did not establish that her husband’s death was due to pneumoconiosis.The Benefits Review Board affirmed the administrative law judge’s denial of survivor’s benefits. Sloan timely moved for reconsideration by the en banc Board, arguing that the administrative law judge erred by excluding and failing to consider certain evidence and by improperly relying on the opinion of the government’s expert witness. The Board denied Sloan’s motion for reconsideration en banc. Sloan filed a second motion for reconsideration, which was also denied by the Board.In the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, the court was required to decide whether it had jurisdiction over a petition for review of a denial of survivor’s benefits under the Black Lung Benefits Act filed in this Court one day late. The court found that the filing deadline is jurisdictional and it had no jurisdiction to review the denial of a motion for reconsideration by the Benefits Review Board. Therefore, the court lacked jurisdiction to review the petition and dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction. View "Sloan v. Drummond Company, Inc." on Justia Law

The case revolves around the University Hospital's decision to award a contract for the design, construction, and operation of an on-site pharmacy to a bidder other than Sumukha LLC. Sumukha challenged the decision, but the hospital's hearing officer denied the protest. Sumukha then appealed to the Appellate Division. While the appeal was pending, Sumukha filed a second protest challenging the decision to change the pharmacy's planned location. When the hospital failed to respond, Sumukha filed a second appeal in the Appellate Division.The Appellate Division dismissed the appeal from Sumukha’s first protest, concluding that University Hospital’s determination was not directly appealable to the Appellate Division. It later dismissed Sumukha’s second appeal. Both dismissals were without prejudice to Sumukha’s right to file an action in the Law Division. The Court granted certification and consolidated the appeals.The Supreme Court of New Jersey found no evidence in University Hospital’s enabling statute that the Legislature intended the Hospital to be a “state administrative agency” under Rule 2:2-3(a)(2). The court held that University Hospital’s decisions and actions may not be directly appealed to the Appellate Division. The court affirmed the dismissal of the appeals, without prejudice to Sumukha’s right to file actions in the Law Division. View "In re Protest of Contract for Retail Pharmacy Design, Construction, Start-Up and Operation, Request for Proposal No. UH-P20-006" on Justia Law

The case revolves around the Employees Retirement System of the Government of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico (ERS), which was established in 1951 as the Commonwealth's pension program for public employees. The appellants are seven individual beneficiaries of pensions paid by ERS. They had been litigating claims against UBS Financial Services Inc. (UBS) in the Commonwealth Court of First Instance related to UBS's role in issuing ERS pension funding bonds in 2008. Meanwhile, in January 2022, as part of its broad authority to promulgate orders necessary to carry out the Puerto Rico Oversight, Management, and Economic Stability Act (PROMESA), the district court confirmed the Modified Eighth Amended Title III Joint Plan of Adjustment (the Plan).The district court had previously confirmed the Plan, which implemented several changes related to ERS and its pension plan payments to retired Commonwealth employees. The Plan replaced the Committee with the Avoidance Action Trustee as the plaintiff with exclusive power to prosecute the Underwriter Action and recover damages that ERS incurred. The Plan also ordered the immediate dissolution of ERS.UBS filed a motion to enforce the Plan, requesting that the district court enjoin the ERS Beneficiaries from pursuing the Commonwealth Action. The district court granted UBS's motion and enjoined the ERS Beneficiaries from pursuing the Commonwealth Action. The district court concluded that the ERS Beneficiaries' Commonwealth Action claims were rooted in a generalized injury and were derivative of ERS's right to recover on its own behalf. The district court further rejected the ERS Beneficiaries' arguments that they were entitled to recover for non-derivative general tort claims against UBS under various Commonwealth statutes.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the district court's decision, concluding that the ERS Beneficiaries sought to raise derivative claims that belong exclusively to the Trustee or the Commonwealth. The court held that continued litigation of the FAC's derivative claims violates the terms of the Plan and PROMESA. View "UBS Financial Services Inc. v. Estate of Jose Nazario Serrano" on Justia Law

In September 2021, John Sandy Campbell filed a lawsuit against her former employer, the Los Angeles Unified School District, alleging racial discrimination and retaliation for whistleblowing. These allegations were in violation of Labor Code sections 1102.5 and 1106 and Government Code section 12940 (the Fair Employment and Housing Act). The District demurred, arguing that Campbell had not complied with the Government Code’s claim presentation requirement and that the statute of limitations barred her cause of action under the Act. The trial court sustained the District's demurrer without leave to amend, citing Le Mere v. Los Angeles Unified School District and Government Code section 12965, subdivision (c)(1)(C).The Court of Appeal of the State of California Second Appellate District Division Eight reviewed the trial court's ruling independently and applied the standard for demurrers. The court agreed with the trial court, stating that a plaintiff suing a public entity for damages must timely present a written claim to the entity before filing suit. Campbell had not demonstrated that she substantially complied with the claim presentation requirement. Furthermore, Campbell's amended complaint did not plead compliance with the claim presentation requirement.Additionally, Campbell's claim for violation of the Act was time-barred. The Department of Fair Employment and Housing had provided Campbell a Right to Sue notice dated October 9, 2018, giving her one year to file a civil action. Campbell did not sue until September 2021, making her suit untimely. The court also rejected Campbell's argument that the discovery rule saved her lawsuit. The court affirmed the judgment and order sustaining the demurrer without leave to amend and awarded costs to the respondent. View "Campbell v. L.A. Unified School Dist." on Justia Law

The case revolves around Alphonso Mobley Jr., who filed a writ of mandamus against Ohio Secretary of State Frank LaRose, seeking a certified copy of a document in response to a public-records request. Mobley also sought statutory damages and court costs under R.C. 149.43(C). The document in question was the "Certified Bond of Director of Ohio Department of Rehabilitations and Corrections for year 2021-2022." Mobley had initially received an uncertified copy of the bond, and upon his second request, he enclosed a check for $5 for a certified copy. However, he alleged that the secretary had not responded to his request for a certified copy, leading him to file this action.The secretary's office sent Mobley a certified copy of the bond six business days after he filed the action. The secretary denied liability under the Ohio Public Records Act, R.C. 149.43 et seq., and stated that he had provided the requested record. The Supreme Court of Ohio granted an alternative writ and set a schedule for the parties’ submission of evidence and merit briefs.The Supreme Court of Ohio ruled that the mandamus claim was moot as the secretary had provided Mobley with a certified copy of the record he had requested. Mobley argued that the record was incomplete, but the court found no merit in his argument. The court also denied Mobley's request for statutory damages, stating that the failure to provide a certified copy within a reasonable time is not a failure to comply with an obligation under R.C. 149.43(B). The court also denied Mobley's claim for court costs, as he had filed an affidavit of indigency and therefore had no obligation to pay costs. View "State ex rel. Mobley v. LaRose" on Justia Law

Emilio Puente, a police officer for the City of Iowa City, resigned from his position and later attempted to rescind his resignation. When the City rejected his attempt, Puente filed an action with the Civil Service Commission of Iowa City (Commission) for review of the City’s refusal to reinstate him. The Commission dismissed Puente's complaint, agreeing with the City that it was untimely. Puente then filed a petition for judicial review in the Johnson County District Court, which was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. The court concluded that Puente’s “petition for judicial review” was not a “notice of appeal” as required by Iowa Code § 400.27.The Iowa Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's decision. The court of appeals relied on the differences between a chapter 17A proceeding and an appeal under section 400.27 to conclude that the petition for judicial review could not be deemed a notice of appeal. The court of appeals noted that the two are initiated differently, have different venue provisions and service requirements, and have different standards and scopes of review.The Supreme Court of Iowa reversed the lower courts' decisions. The Supreme Court found that Puente had substantially complied with the requirements for filing a notice of appeal from the Commission’s decision to the district court. The court noted that Puente's petition sought "judicial review" of the Commission’s decision, identifying the Commission as a “respondent” rather than a “defendant.” The court concluded that Puente's reference to the wrong Code provision for venue did not mean he failed to substantially comply with the correct Code provision. The court vacated the decision of the court of appeals, reversed the district court judgment dismissing Puente’s appeal from the Commission’s decision, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Puente v. Civil Service Commission of Iowa City" on Justia Law

The case revolves around Stuart Harrow, a Department of Defense employee who was furloughed for six days. Harrow challenged this decision before the Merit Systems Protection Board. After a five-year delay, the Board ruled against him. Harrow had the right to appeal this decision to the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit within 60 days of the Board's final order. However, Harrow did not learn about the Board's decision until after the 60-day period had elapsed, and he filed his appeal late. Harrow requested the Federal Circuit to overlook his untimeliness and equitably toll the filing deadline. The Federal Circuit, however, denied his request, believing that the deadline was an unalterable "jurisdictional requirement."The Supreme Court of the United States reviewed the case. The main issue was whether the 60-day filing deadline under Section 7703(b)(1) was jurisdictional, meaning it marked the bounds of a court's power and could not be waived or subject to exceptions. The Supreme Court held that the 60-day filing deadline was not jurisdictional. The Court reasoned that procedural rules, even when phrased in mandatory terms, are generally subject to exceptions like waiver, forfeiture, and equitable tolling. The Court found no language in Section 7703(b)(1) that suggested it was a jurisdictional requirement. The Court also rejected the Government's argument that the term "pursuant to" in a different statute, 28 U.S.C. §1295(a)(9), made the deadline jurisdictional.The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the Federal Circuit and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. The Federal Circuit was directed to determine whether equitable tolling was available and, if so, whether Harrow was entitled to that relief given the facts of the case. View "Harrow v. Department of Defense" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute over a proposed project to significantly alter the California State Capitol complex. The plaintiff, Save the Capitol, Save the Trees (Save the Capitol), appealed against an order discharging a peremptory writ of mandate issued by the trial court. The writ was issued following a previous court decision that found an environmental impact report (EIR) for the project, prepared by the defendant Department of General Services and the Joint Committee on Rules of the California State Senate and Assembly (collectively DGS), failed to comply with the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA). The writ directed DGS to vacate in part its certification of the EIR and all associated project approvals, and to file a final return to the writ “upon certification of a revised EIR.”The trial court had previously denied two petitions for writ of mandate, one sought by Save the Capitol and the other by an organization named Save Our Capitol!. The Court of Appeal reversed in part and affirmed in part the trial court’s denial. On remand, the trial court issued a peremptory writ of mandate directing DGS to vacate in part its certification of the EIR and all associated project approvals. After DGS partially vacated its certification of the EIR and all associated project approvals, it revised, recirculated, and certified the revised final EIR. DGS then partially reapproved the project without one of the project components, the visitor center. DGS thereafter filed its final return and the trial court discharged the writ, over plaintiff’s objection, without determining whether the revised final EIR remedied the CEQA violations the Court of Appeal had identified in its opinion.In the Court of Appeal of the State of California Third Appellate District, Save the Capitol argued that the discharge of the writ was premature because the writ not only required DGS to revise and recirculate the defective portions of the EIR, but also to certify a revised EIR consistent with the previous court decision before the writ could be discharged. The court agreed with Save the Capitol, concluding that the trial court must determine that the revised EIR is consistent with the previous court decision before discharging the writ. The court reversed the judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Save the Capitol, Save the Trees v. Dept. of General Services" on Justia Law

The case revolves around Jay Anthony Dobyns, a former agent with the United States Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (ATF), who sued the United States for failing to adequately protect him and his family from threats related to his undercover work. The government counterclaimed, alleging that Dobyns violated his employment contract and several federal regulations by publishing a book based on his experience as an agent and by contracting his story to create a motion picture. The Court of Federal Claims found that the government had not breached the settlement agreement but had breached the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, awarding Dobyns emotional distress damages. The court also found that the government was not entitled to relief on its counterclaim.The government appealed the Claims Court’s judgment to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which reversed the finding that the government breached the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing. Dobyns, having prevailed on the government’s counterclaim, sought attorneys’ fees and costs. However, the Claims Court denied his application for attorneys’ fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA) as untimely. Dobyns appealed this decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit found that the Claims Court had abused its discretion and applied the incorrect legal standard. The Appeals Court held that the filing deadline for fee applications under EAJA is subject to equitable tolling. It found that Dobyns had justifiably relied on the government's representations about the procedure for Claims Court judgments, and thus his motion for attorneys’ fees under EAJA should be accepted as timely. The court reversed the Claims Court's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Dobyns v. United States" on Justia Law