Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Paul Knopf, the former Director of the Planning and Development Department (“City Planner”) in Evanston, Wyoming (“City”), sued Mayor Kent Williams under 42 U.S.C. 1983. Knopf claimed Mayor Williams did not reappoint him to his position as City Planner because he had sent an email to the City Attorney raising concerns about impropriety relating to a City project. Thus, Knopf alleged that Mayor Williams retaliated against him for exercising his First Amendment rights. Mayor Williams moved for summary judgment based on qualified immunity, which the court denied. In this interlocutory appeal, the Mayor asked the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals to reverse that denial, arguing that a reasonable person in his position would not have understood Knopf to have spoken outside of his official duties, and that a “reasonable official: would have believed the email at issue here exceeded the scope of Knopf’s official duties. A split panel concluded Knopf failed to show a violation of clearly established federal law on an essential element of his claim, thus the Court reversed the district court’s denial of sovereign immunity to Mayor Williams. View "Knopf v. Williams" on Justia Law

In 2016, personnel from real party in interest, San Bernardino County Children and Family Services (CFS), received a referral alleging emotional abuse and general neglect of Minors by Mother and physical abuse by R.N. (Father 1). The allegations alleged substance abuse by Mother and domestic violence in the presence of Minors. CFS personnel received a second referral alleging Mother was transient, on drugs, and had left Minors with a friend. Minors disclosed witnessing the parents engage in domestic violence. They also described substance use by both the parents and drug paraphernalia in the home. They described being hit by both parents. Minors said they did not feel safe with the parents. Mother had a previous history with CFS, including three previous neglect investigations, three prior abuse investigations; Father 1 had an extensive history with CFS. Reunification services as to six of Father 1’s other children had previously been terminated; Father 1’s parental rights had been terminated as to one of his other children. Father 1 also had an extensive criminal history. The juvenile court terminated petitioner, W.P.’s (Mother), reunification services as to G.N. (born in September 2016), R.Y. (born in January 2009), M.M.M.1 (born in March 2005), and M.M.M.2 (born in May 2003) (collectively Minors), and set the Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 hearing. In her petition, Mother contended the juvenile court erred as a matter of law in declining to grant her another six months of reunification services as to the elder three Minors. Mother contended the court erred as a matter of law in declining to provide her a minimum of 12 months of reunification services because the court improperly interpreted section 361.5 (a)(1)(c), to apply to any sibling group removed from parents, regardless of whether those siblings were placed together. CFS conceded the juvenile court erred in its interpretation of the statute and in terminating Mother’s reunification services after only six months based upon that erroneous interpretation. the Court of Appeal agreed and granted Mother's petition. View "W.P. v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

In 2016, personnel from real party in interest, San Bernardino County Children and Family Services (CFS), received a referral alleging emotional abuse and general neglect of Minors by Mother and physical abuse by R.N. (Father 1). The allegations alleged substance abuse by Mother and domestic violence in the presence of Minors. CFS personnel received a second referral alleging Mother was transient, on drugs, and had left Minors with a friend. Minors disclosed witnessing the parents engage in domestic violence. They also described substance use by both the parents and drug paraphernalia in the home. They described being hit by both parents. Minors said they did not feel safe with the parents. Mother had a previous history with CFS, including three previous neglect investigations, three prior abuse investigations; Father 1 had an extensive history with CFS. Reunification services as to six of Father 1’s other children had previously been terminated; Father 1’s parental rights had been terminated as to one of his other children. Father 1 also had an extensive criminal history. The juvenile court terminated petitioner, W.P.’s (Mother), reunification services as to G.N. (born in September 2016), R.Y. (born in January 2009), M.M.M.1 (born in March 2005), and M.M.M.2 (born in May 2003) (collectively Minors), and set the Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 hearing. In her petition, Mother contended the juvenile court erred as a matter of law in declining to grant her another six months of reunification services as to the elder three Minors. Mother contended the court erred as a matter of law in declining to provide her a minimum of 12 months of reunification services because the court improperly interpreted section 361.5 (a)(1)(c), to apply to any sibling group removed from parents, regardless of whether those siblings were placed together. CFS conceded the juvenile court erred in its interpretation of the statute and in terminating Mother’s reunification services after only six months based upon that erroneous interpretation. the Court of Appeal agreed and granted Mother's petition. View "W.P. v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

Jane Doe is a transgender man residing in Marion County, Indiana. Doe is originally from Mexico. The U.S. granted him asylum because of the persecution he might face in Mexico for being transgender. Doe alleges that he faces harassment and discrimination in the U.S. when he gives his legal name or shows his identification to others. Doe sought to legally change his name from Jane to John so that his name conforms to his gender identity and physical appearance, which are male. Doe asserts that the statute governing name changes is unconstitutional because it requires petitioners to provide proof of U.S. citizenship, Ind. Code 34‐28‐2‐2.5(a)(5). As an asylee, Doe cannot provide such proof. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Doe’s case for lack of standing. The Eleventh Amendment generally immunizes state officials from suit in federal court unless the official has “some connection with the enforcement” of an allegedly unconstitutional state statute. The Governor, the Attorney General, and the Executive Director of the Indiana Supreme Court Administration, do not enforce the challenged law. The County Clerk of Court is not a state official, but Doe cannot establish “redressability” because the Clerk has no power to grant or deny a name-change petition but may only accept and process petitions. View "Doe v. Holcomb" on Justia Law

Jane Doe is a transgender man residing in Marion County, Indiana. Doe is originally from Mexico. The U.S. granted him asylum because of the persecution he might face in Mexico for being transgender. Doe alleges that he faces harassment and discrimination in the U.S. when he gives his legal name or shows his identification to others. Doe sought to legally change his name from Jane to John so that his name conforms to his gender identity and physical appearance, which are male. Doe asserts that the statute governing name changes is unconstitutional because it requires petitioners to provide proof of U.S. citizenship, Ind. Code 34‐28‐2‐2.5(a)(5). As an asylee, Doe cannot provide such proof. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Doe’s case for lack of standing. The Eleventh Amendment generally immunizes state officials from suit in federal court unless the official has “some connection with the enforcement” of an allegedly unconstitutional state statute. The Governor, the Attorney General, and the Executive Director of the Indiana Supreme Court Administration, do not enforce the challenged law. The County Clerk of Court is not a state official, but Doe cannot establish “redressability” because the Clerk has no power to grant or deny a name-change petition but may only accept and process petitions. View "Doe v. Holcomb" on Justia Law

On September 28, 2016, the Medical Board filed an accusation against Alfred Adams, M.D., alleging that he prescribed himself controlled substances, failed to cooperate with the board, and failed to provide an accurate address. The accusation was served by certified mail on his Emeryville address of record. The unopened mail was returned, stamped “Return to Sender, Unable to Forward.” On November 1, the board sent notice of default by certified mail, which was also returned. After a Lexis search, the board served the accusation by certified mail to another Emeryville address. On January 20, 2017, the board issued a default decision, revoking Adams’s medical license, which was served by certified mail and first class mail to both addresses. On April 7, 2017, Adams sought mandamus relief, claiming that no evidence established service. The court directed the board to set aside its default decision. The court of appeal ruled in favor of the board. Section 11505(c) authorizes service of a document adversely affecting one’s rights by registered mail and “does not require proof of service in the form of a return receipt signed by the party or other acknowledgement of receipt by the party.” Section 8311 authorizes “any other means of physical delivery that provides a receipt” but does not impose this requirement if service is made by certified mail. View "Medical Board of California v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

Ralph Smith sued the Attorney General of Mississippi, Jim Hood, raising various causes of action, each of which was premised on Smith’s purely legal argument that the Office of the Attorney General was in the judicial branch of the state government. The circuit court disagreed with Smith and found that, as a matter of law, the Office of Attorney General was in the executive branch, and so, the circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of Hood. Smith appealed. The Mississippi Supreme Court found that the Office of Attorney General was a member of the executive branch of government, as delineated in the Mississippi Constitution, Article 6. View "Smith v. Hood" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated the order of the district court denying Appellants’ petitions for judicial review challenging a 2007 decision by the Nevada Tax Commission regarding a tax refund request, holding that the district court lacked jurisdiction to consider Appellants’ petitions for judicial review because they were untimely.In 2008, Appellants filed a second de novo action (Case 2) challenging the administrative denials of their refund requests. The district court dismissed the action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because Appellants failed to file a petition for judicial review. Appellants subsequently filed a petition for judicial review (Case 3). The ALJ affirmed the Commission’s 2007 decision. In 2014, the Commission affirmed the ALJ’s decision. Appellants then filed a second petition for judicial review (Case 4) challenging the Commission’s 2014 decision. The district court consolidated the Case 3 and Case 4 petitions for judicial review and affirmed the Commission’s 2007 and 2014 decisions. The Supreme Court held that the district court lacked jurisdiction to consider Appellants’ Case 3 petition for judicial review and thus lacked the authority to consider the merits of Appellants’ Case 4 petition. View "K-Kel, Inc. v. State, Department of Taxation" on Justia Law

The court of appeals affirmed a jury verdict for Jacklyn Donevant in her wrongful termination action against the Town of Surfside Beach, finding her cause of action fit within the public policy exception to the at-will employment doctrine. Donevant was fired because she carried out her mandatory responsibility under the law to enforce the provisions of the South Carolina building code. Donevant discovered unpermitted construction work she determined to be in violation of the building code, and she issued a stop work order. She was fired a few days later. The Town appealed, contending the court of appeals misinterpreted the "public policy exception." The South Carolina Supreme Court determined the Town misinterpreted the public policy exception: "Donevant was enforcing the building code and therefore enforcing a clear mandate of public policy when she issued the stop-work order. ... Under the circumstances of this case, firing Donevant for carrying out her mandatory responsibility to enforce the building code violates public policy." View "Donevant v. Town of Surfside Beach" on Justia Law

The court of appeals affirmed a jury verdict for Jacklyn Donevant in her wrongful termination action against the Town of Surfside Beach, finding her cause of action fit within the public policy exception to the at-will employment doctrine. Donevant was fired because she carried out her mandatory responsibility under the law to enforce the provisions of the South Carolina building code. Donevant discovered unpermitted construction work she determined to be in violation of the building code, and she issued a stop work order. She was fired a few days later. The Town appealed, contending the court of appeals misinterpreted the "public policy exception." The South Carolina Supreme Court determined the Town misinterpreted the public policy exception: "Donevant was enforcing the building code and therefore enforcing a clear mandate of public policy when she issued the stop-work order. ... Under the circumstances of this case, firing Donevant for carrying out her mandatory responsibility to enforce the building code violates public policy." View "Donevant v. Town of Surfside Beach" on Justia Law