Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals certified two questions of Colorado law to the Colorado Supreme Court. The questions stemmed from an action brought by teacher Linda Johnson against Denver School District No. 1 (“the District”) and the District’s Board of Education, in which Johnson argued that by placing her on unpaid leave, the District breached her contract and violated her due process rights. The federal district court concluded that because Johnson was placed on unpaid leave, rather than terminated, she was not deprived of a property interest. Johnson appealed that decision to the Tenth Circuit. After analyzing the statutory history and the current statutory language, the Colorado Supreme Court held that the provisions of section 22-63-202(2)(c.5) (CRS 2015) applied to all displaced nonprobationary teachers, not just nonprobationary teachers who were displaced because of a reduction in enrollment or an administrative decision to eliminate certain programs (the reasons stated in subparagraph (VII)). Furthermore, the Court held that nonprobationary teachers who placed on unpaid leave had no vested property interest in salary and benefits, meaning a nonprobationary teacher who is placed on unpaid leave under subparagraph (IV) is not deprived of a state property interest. View "Johnson v. Sch. Dist. No. 1" on Justia Law

The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals certified two questions of Colorado law to the Colorado Supreme Court. The questions stemmed from an action brought by teacher Linda Johnson against Denver School District No. 1 (“the District”) and the District’s Board of Education, in which Johnson argued that by placing her on unpaid leave, the District breached her contract and violated her due process rights. The federal district court concluded that because Johnson was placed on unpaid leave, rather than terminated, she was not deprived of a property interest. Johnson appealed that decision to the Tenth Circuit. After analyzing the statutory history and the current statutory language, the Colorado Supreme Court held that the provisions of section 22-63-202(2)(c.5) (CRS 2015) applied to all displaced nonprobationary teachers, not just nonprobationary teachers who were displaced because of a reduction in enrollment or an administrative decision to eliminate certain programs (the reasons stated in subparagraph (VII)). Furthermore, the Court held that nonprobationary teachers who placed on unpaid leave had no vested property interest in salary and benefits, meaning a nonprobationary teacher who is placed on unpaid leave under subparagraph (IV) is not deprived of a state property interest. View "Johnson v. Sch. Dist. No. 1" on Justia Law

The Town of Hayneville ("the Town") and Carol Scrushy petitioned the Alabama Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to direct the Lowndes Circuit Court to vacate its July 7, 2017, order denying the Town and Scrushy's motion to dismiss what they characterized as an election contest filed by Darshini Bandy, Connie Johnson, and Justin Pouncey (referred to collectively as "the electors") and to enter an order dismissing the electors' action. After review, the Supreme Court found the circuit court had the power to enforce its prior orders and to void the May 23, 2017, special election, which, the court found, had not been ordered in strict compliance with the State's election laws. The July 7, 2017, judgment of the circuit court enforcing its prior orders concerning the August 2016 election and the special election to fill the vacant council seat in District A was a valid judgment. Accordingly, Scrushy and the Town were not entitled to the relief they sought. View "Ex parte Carol Scrushy & the Town of Hayneville." on Justia Law

Florence County challenged the validity of the West Florence Fire District, arguing that it violated the South Carolina Supreme Court's decision in Wagener v. Smith, 71 S.E.2d 1 (1952) and conflicted with the state's constitutional provisions concerning special legislation and home rule. The circuit court held in favor of Florence County on all three grounds, and the West Florence Fire District appealed. The South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed on constitutional grounds. View "County of Florence v. West Florence Fire District" on Justia Law

This direct cross-appeal to the South Carolina Supreme Court involved the scope of the authority the Department of Revenue (DOR) to enforce various provisions of state law relating to the imposition of a transportation penny tax by Richland County (County) and the County's expenditure of the funds generated by the tax. After DOR conducted an audit and informed the County that DOR intended to cease future remittances to the County based on purported misuse of funds, the County filed a declaratory judgment action in circuit court, arguing DOR lacked the authority to stop payments and seeking a writ of mandamus compelling DOR to continue remitting revenues. DOR counterclaimed seeking a declaration that the County's expenditures were unlawful, an injunction to prohibit future unlawful expenditures, and alternatively, the appointment of a receiver to administer the County's tax revenues. Following a hearing, the circuit court issued a writ of mandamus compelling DOR to remit the tax revenues, denied injunctive relief, and refused to appoint a receiver. Both the County and DOR appealed. After review, the Supreme Court affirmed in all respects except it reversed the circuit court's denial of DOR's request for injunctive relief. DOR was entitled to an injunction requiring the County to expend the funds generated by the tax solely on transportation-related projects in accordance with the law. View "Richland County v. So. Carolina Dept. of Revenue" on Justia Law

The question this appeal presented for the Court of Appeal centered on whether Labor Code section 4656(c)(2)1 precluded respondent, Workers' Compensation Appeals Board (the Board), from awarding respondent, Kyle Pike, temporary disability payments for periods of disability occurring more than five years after the date of the underlying injury that Pike suffered while working for San Diego County. The Court concluded the plain language of the statute indicated the answer to this question was, "Yes." Section 4656(c)(2) provided, "Aggregate disability payments for a single injury occurring on or after January 1, 2008,[2] causing temporary disability shall not extend for more than 104 compensable weeks within a period of five years from the date of injury." (Italics added.) Accordingly, the Court annulled a Board order affirming a workers' compensation administrative law judge's order that awarded temporary disability benefits for periods of disability occurring more than five years after Pike's injury. View "County of San Diego v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd." on Justia Law

The question this appeal presented for the Court of Appeal centered on whether Labor Code section 4656(c)(2)1 precluded respondent, Workers' Compensation Appeals Board (the Board), from awarding respondent, Kyle Pike, temporary disability payments for periods of disability occurring more than five years after the date of the underlying injury that Pike suffered while working for San Diego County. The Court concluded the plain language of the statute indicated the answer to this question was, "Yes." Section 4656(c)(2) provided, "Aggregate disability payments for a single injury occurring on or after January 1, 2008,[2] causing temporary disability shall not extend for more than 104 compensable weeks within a period of five years from the date of injury." (Italics added.) Accordingly, the Court annulled a Board order affirming a workers' compensation administrative law judge's order that awarded temporary disability benefits for periods of disability occurring more than five years after Pike's injury. View "County of San Diego v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd." on Justia Law

The case stemmed from a 2010 fire in the City of Paterson (City) that consumed a multi-unit home owned by Florence Brown, taking the lives of four residents and injuring several others as they made their escape. During the lengthy proceedings below, a question arose of whether the City and its electrical inspector, Robert Bierals—alleged by the plaintiffs to be at least partially at fault for the fire, were entitled to qualified or absolute immunity under the New Jersey Tort Claims Act (TCA). During discovery, Bierals and the City moved for summary judgment on immunity grounds. The trial court ruled that Bierals and the City were entitled only to qualified immunity and denied their motions. After the close of discovery, Bierals and the City again moved for summary judgment. A different judge granted the motion, ruling that they were entitled to absolute immunity. Because the critical causative conduct in this case was a failure to enforce the law, the New Jersey Supreme Court concluded Bierals was entitled to absolute immunity. The Court therefore reversed the Appellate Division and entered judgment in favor of Bierals and the City. View "Lee v. Brown" on Justia Law

New Energy Economy, Inc. (NEE) appealed a final order issued by the New Mexico Public Regulation Commission (PRC). NEE contended the PRC violated New Mexico law by approving a contested stipulation granting the Public Service Company of New Mexico (PNM) certificates of public convenience and necessity (CCNs) to acquire new generation resources and by filing a notice proposing to dismiss the protests to PNM’s 2014 integrated resource plan (IRP). The New Mexico Supreme Court determined NEE’s arguments were predicated on a mistaken understanding of the law, and NEE asked the Court to accept factual assertions that were rejected in earlier proceedings. The Court affirmed the PRC’s final order. View "New Energy Econ. v. N.M. Pub. Regulation Comm'n" on Justia Law

Early in the proceedings in New Mexico ex rel. King v. Valley Meat Co., LLC, No. D-101- 3 CV-2013-3197 (Valley Meat case), A. Blair Dunn, counsel for Valley Meat Co., e-mailed an Inspection of Public Records Act (IPRA) request to First Judicial District Court Executive Officer Stephen Pacheco for production of, among other things, communications and records relating to the Valley Meat case, including “all communications between . . . Judge Matthew Wilson and his staff . . . and Court Clerk’s staff” and “[a]ny communications received by Judge Matthew Wilson and his staff, Judge Raymond Ortiz and his staff, and any member of the Court Clerk’s staff to/from any outside person or organization.” In this superintending control proceeding, the New Mexico Supreme Court clarified the constitutional and statutory procedures for IPRA enforcement actions to compel production of court records, and held that IPRA actions directed at a district court’s records had to be filed against the lawfully designated IPRA custodian and must be filed in the judicial district that maintains the records. Furthermore, the Court held that the contents of an officeholder’s personal election campaign, social media website, and the internal decision-making communications that are at the core of the constitutional duties of the judicial branch, such as preliminary drafts of judicial decisions, are not public records that are subject to mandatory disclosure and inspection under IPRA. View "Pacheco v. Hudson" on Justia Law