Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Petitioner Alysia Webb filed a verified petition for mandamus relief with the superior court, alleging the City of Riverside (Riverside) violated Propositions 26 and 218 when it began transferring additional revenue from electric utility reserve fund accounts into the general fund without approval by the electorate. Webb contended the court improperly dismissed her case without leave to amend on a demurrer because the 120-day statute of limitations arising under Public Utilities Code section 10004.52 did not apply to her challenge of Riverside's change in calculation of its electric general fund transfer. She further argued the fund transfers constituted a tax increase because they altered the methodology used to calculate the amount of money Riverside transfers from the electric utility reserve to the general fund. After review, the Court of Appeal disagreed and affirmed the superior court. View "Webb v. City of Riverside" on Justia Law

The New Jersey State Health Benefits Commission (SHBC) and the School Employees’ Health Benefits Commission (SEHBC) (collectively, the Commissions) administered the New Jersey State Health Benefits Program (SHBP) and the School Employees’ Health Benefits Program (SEHBP), respectively. At issue was the method used by the Commissions to correct erroneously tiered reimbursement rates previously applied to members’ out-of-pocket expenses for out-of-network behavioral health services. In a separate matter involving a single plan member, the tiered reimbursement schedule was determined to have violated N.J.S.A. 52:14-17.46.7, which addressed the calculation of reimbursement rates for out-of-network health benefit services. Following that decision, the Commissions permitted members who paid for out-of-pocket behavioral health services and did not receive a proper reimbursement to obtain retroactive reimbursement for charges incurred between May 2009 and March 2014. The challenge before the New Jersey Supreme Court centered on the reasonableness of the Commissions’ notice to members who may have been affected by the application of the erroneous reimbursement rates. The Supreme Court reversed the Appellate Division’s holding and remanded the matter to the Commissions for further proceedings. “Significant questions exist concerning the extent of the notice actually provided, either by the Commissions or through their agents to active employees, former employees, and retirees, a hearing is necessary.” View "In the Matter of State and School Employees' Health Benefits Commissions' Implementation of I/M/O Philip Yucht" on Justia Law

Petitioners Mary Allen, Fred Ward, and other interested parties, appealed the decision of the New Hampshire Site Evaluation Committee (Committee) authorizing respondent Antrim Wind Energy, LLC (Antrim Wind), to construct and operate nine wind turbines in the town of Antrim. Antrim Wind originally filed an application (Antrim I) with the Committee in 2012, seeking authorization to construct ten wind turbines. Six of the turbines would be equipped with red flashing aviation obstruction lights. The project also included four miles of new gravel surfaced roads, a joint electrical system, an interconnection substation, and a maintenance building. Antrim Wind further proposed to construct a meteorological tower between turbines three and four to obtain wind data, dedicate 800 acres of land to conservation easements, and install a radar activated lighting system. Antrim I was initially denied; a few years later, Antrim II was filed and ultimately approved by the Committee, finding the second application reflected a “substantial change” from the first application, and as such, would not “have an unreasonable adverse effect on the health, safety, or aesthetics of the region. On appeal, petitioners argued the Committee’s ultimate decision was unreasonable, unlawful, and unjust because: (1) the subcommittee was unlawfully constituted; (2) the denial of Antrim I barred Antrim Wind’s Antrim II application under the doctrine of res judicata as well as the subsequent application doctrine as set forth in Fisher v. City of Dover, 120 N.H. 187 (1980); and (3) there was insufficient evidence in the record to support the subcommittee’s finding that the project proposed in Antrim II would not have an unreasonable adverse impact on aesthetics, public health, and safety. After review of the record, the New Hampshire Supreme Court concluded there was competent evidence to support all of the subcommittee’s factual findings. The subcommittee deliberated about each of these assessments and impacts and determined which experts it found to be more credible. The subcommittee also imposed certain mitigation measures and conditions to address remaining concerns and to ensure regulatory compliance. Accordingly, the Court concluded petitioners failed to show reversible error. View "Appeal of Allen et al." on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Court of Appeals’ review centered on the trial court’s partial denial of a special motion to strike pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16, the anti-SLAPP statute, directed at causes of action arising out of the manner in which defendants, the Office of the Inspector General (OIG) and Robert Barton, in his capacity as Inspector General, conducted interviews with five correctional officers who previously worked at High Desert State Prison. The interviews were conducted as part of an investigation into that institution’s “practices . . . with respect to (1) excessive use of force against inmates, (2) internal reviews of incidents involving the excessive use of force against inmates, and (3) protection of inmates from assault and harm by others.” As relevant here, these officers and the California Correctional Peace Officers Association (CCPOA) alleged in their first and second causes of action that defendants violated Penal Code section 6126.5 and Government Code section 3300 et seq. (the Public Safety Officers Procedural Bill of Rights or the Act) by refusing the officers’ requests to be represented during the interviews. The trial court denied the anti-SLAPP motion as to these causes of action, concluding: (1) defendants carried their threshold burden of demonstrating the gravamen of these causes of action arose from protected activity; but (2) plaintiffs established a probability of prevailing on the merits of these claims. The Court of Appeal agreed defendants carried their burden on the threshold issue, but concluded plaintiffs failed to establish a probability of prevailing on the merits of these causes of action. The Court therefore reversed the portion of the trial court’s order denying the anti-SLAPP motion with respect to the first and second causes of action and remanded the matter to the trial court with directions to enter a new order granting the motion in its entirety and dismissing the complaint. View "Blue v. Cal. Office of the Inspector General" on Justia Law

The Contractors’ State License Board sought a writ of mandate and a stay to prevent the “apex deposition” of Forg, the Board’s Registrar of Contractors, a position which makes him the Board’s secretary and chief executive officer. Reversing the trial court, the court of appeal held that under well-established California law, the head of a government agency, such as Fogt, generally is not subject to deposition. “An exception to the rule exists only when the official has direct personal factual information pertaining to material issues in the action and the deposing party shows the information to be gained from the deposition is not available through any other source.” The exception does not apply in this case. View "Contractors' State License Board v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

Petitioner Octavio Pina was employed as a pipeline installer by American Piping Inspection, Inc. At the time of his injury, he worked at an oilrig site approximately 130 miles away from his home. Petitioner traveled weekly to Employer's drilling site; he would work 6 days then return home on the weekend. Employer provided a daily per diem payment for lodging and meals incurred. Employer used Petitioner's truck to haul work related equipment and materials and paid him $50 per day for the use of his truck. At the time of Petitioner's injury, it was the practice of Employer to pay for the gas necessary to refuel Petitioner's truck each morning before traveling to the rig site. Petitioner was required to stop at the Employer-designated gas station at the time set by the supervisor. Employer also agreed to purchase ice and water each day for the entire crew, but only if they stopped at the designated gas station at the time specified by Employer. Employer had been paying for Petitioner's gasoline for three months prior to his injury. On the morning of September 22, 2014, Petitioner met his supervisor at the designated gas station to get ice, water and gasoline. The supervisor agreed that "Claimant was reporting to work that morning when he made it to the gas station." On his way to the worksite, Petitioner had a collision and sustained serious injuries. Emergency medical care was given and Petitioner was transported via helicopter for medical treatment. Petitioner never arrived at the drilling site that morning. Although Petitioner did not sign the attendance sheet at the rig site that morning, Employer paid him for a full day of work. Petitioner filed a claim for benefits under the Administrative Workers' Compensation Act (AWCA). Employer denied the claim was compensable within the meaning of the AWCA on the following grounds: (1) Petitioner was not performing employment services at the time of injury; and (2) the injury did not occur in the course and scope of employment. The administrative law judge determined Petitioner's injury did not occur in the course and scope of employment within the meaning of the AWCA and denied his claim. The Oklahoma Supreme Court reversed, finding Petitioner was in the course and scope of his employment as the term was defined in 85A O.S. Supp. 2013 sec 2 (13) because his actions at the time of injury were related to and in furtherance of the business of the employer. View "Pina v. American Piping Inspection" on Justia Law

In 2014, nine of Jerry and Deidre Matthews’ adopted children were placed in the emergency custody of the State. In June 2016, Jerry Matthews pleaded no contest to reduced charges of child neglect. He received a suspended life sentence in exchange for his promise to testify truthfully against his now former wife, Deidre Matthews. In October 2017, Deidre Matthews pleaded no contest in the same state court to twelve counts of child abuse, child neglect, and child endangerment. The state court sentenced Deidre Matthews to life in prison with all but four years suspended. The children claimed among other things, that eighteen Oklahoma Department of Human Services (ODHS) caseworkers violated their Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process rights in connection with the horrific events recounted in the complaint. They generally alleged that between January 2004 and March 2014, various individuals, all with good cause, reported to ODHS that the children living in the Matthews’ home were being mentally and physically abused. At least seventeen reports of abuse and neglect were made to ODHS during this time period. “To say the ODHS caseworkers left the children with the Matthews to suffer continued abuse and neglect under deplorable conditions in a dangerous home environment is perhaps an understatement.” The caseworkers appealed the district court’s denial of their motion to dismiss the constitutional claims against them on the basis of qualified immunity. At issue before the Tenth Circuit was: (1) whether the facts alleged in the complaint gave rise to constitutional claims against each of the ODHS caseworkers; and if so, (2) whether those claims were clearly established at the time of the alleged constitutional violations. Because the caseworkers asserted the defense of qualified immunity, the burden was on Plaintiffs to establish their right to proceed. The Tenth Circuit found plaintiffs did not meet that burden as to some, but not all, of the caseworkers, and affirmed in part and reversed in part. “The people of the State of Oklahoma ‘may well prefer a system of liability which would place upon the State and its officials the responsibility for failure to act in situations such as the present one.’ The people may create such a system if they have not already done so. But ‘when the allegations in a complaint, however true, could not raise a claim of entitlement to relief [under the Constitution], this basic deficiency should be exposed at the point of minimum expenditure of time and money by the parties and the court.’” View "Matthews v. Bergdorf" on Justia Law

Ed Richardson and Reginald Eggleston, individually and in their official capacities as interim superintendent of the Alabama Department of Education and chief administrative officer of the Alabama State Board of Education, respectively, and Gordon Stone, individually and in his official capacity as mayor of the Town of Pike Road (collectively referred to as "the defendants"), appealed an injunction staying the sale of Georgia Washington Middle School, located in Montgomery, and the sale of any other real property owned by, or the closure of any other schools operated by, the Montgomery County Board of Education. The Alabama Supreme Court determined plaintiffs did not have standing to bring suit, thus the trial court never acquired subject-matter jurisdiction over this case. Accordingly, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal and ordered the trial court to dismiss the case. View "Richardson v. Relf" on Justia Law

Petitioner N. Miles Cook, III, appealed a Wetlands Council (Council) ruling upholding the decision of the New Hampshire Department of Environmental Services (DES) denying his request for a permit to reconstruct and extend his dock on the Piscataqua River. Because DES did not have the benefit of the New Hampshire Supreme Court’s interpretation of the term “need” as used in Env-Wt 302.01(a) and Env-Wt 302.04(a)(1) for determining whether an applicant has met the permit requirements, and because, as the Council noted, the central issue was whether petitioner “could justify the expanded dock proposal based on his ‘need’ to access navigable water on a more frequent basis than he currently experiences with the existing dock,” the Supreme Court vacated DES’s decision and remanded to the Council with instructions to remand to DES for further consideration in light of the definition the Court adopted for the purposes of this opinion. View "Appeal of N. Miles Cook, III" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-homeowners alleged the copper piping in their homes was damaged by a chemical the defendant water districts added to tap water. Adding the chemical was authorized by regulation, however, and it was undisputed that the water districts complied with all statutory and regulatory standards. After a bifurcated bench trial on certain legal issues, the trial court entered judgment for the water districts, finding plaintiffs’ causes of action for nuisance and inverse condemnation were preempted by federal and state laws, and otherwise insufficient on the merits. The plaintiff homeowners appealed. After review, the Court of Appeal concluded plaintiffs’ causes of action failed on the merits, and thus affirmed. View "Williams v. Moulton Niguel Water Dist." on Justia Law