Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals granting a motion to dismiss Appellant’s complaint for a writ of mandamus challenging the Industrial Commission’s determination that it had continuing jurisdiction to reconsider a previous order denying a claim for death benefits because of a clear mistake of fact regarding how the decedent worker died, holding that the complaint did state a claim for relief.Appellant’s complaint for a writ of mandamus alleged that the Commission abused its discretion in determining that the staff hearing officer had based the disallowance of the claim for death benefits on a clear mistake of fact. Because this question involved whether there was a factual mistake sufficient to invoke the continuing-jurisdiction provisions of Ohio Rev. Code 4123.52, the question was a proper subject matter for an action seeking a writ of mandamus. Therefore, the court of appeals erred in dismissing the action on the basis that the Commission’s decision to exercise its continuing jurisdiction was appealable to the court of common pleas. View "State ex rel. Belle Tire Distributors, Inc. v. Industrial Commission of Ohio" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Colorado Supreme Court's consideration centered on whether Colorado’s Independent Ethics Commission (“the IEC”) had jurisdiction pursuant to article XXIX of the state constitution to hear a complaint based on allegations that then-Secretary of State Scott Gessler (“the Secretary”) breached the public trust by using money from his statutorily-provided discretionary fund for partisan and personal purposes. The IEC investigated the complaint, held a hearing, and determined that the Secretary’s conduct breached the public trust. The Secretary sought judicial review of the IEC’s ruling, arguing that the IEC lacked jurisdiction over the case. Both the district court and the court of appeals affirmed the IEC’s ruling. The Colorado Supreme Court held that relevant jurisdictional language in article XXIX, section 5 of the state constitution authorized the IEC to hear complaints involving ethical standards of conduct relating to activities that could allow covered individuals, including elected officials, to improperly benefit financially from their public employment. Furthermore, the Court held that section 24-18-103, C.R.S. (2017), was one such ethical standard of conduct which established the holding of public office or employment was a public trust, and that a public official “shall carry out his duties for the benefit of the people of the state.” Because the allegations against the Secretary clearly implicated this standard, the Court concluded the complaint fell within the IEC’s jurisdiction and rejected the Secretary’s jurisdictional and vagueness challenges. Additionally, the Court rejected the Secretary’s procedural due process claim because he failed to demonstrate that he suffered any prejudice as a result of the alleged violation. View "Gessler v. Smith" on Justia Law

William Veitch was a Republican candidate for district attorney for the 10th Judicial Circuit of Alabama. His request for a declaration was denied, and he petitioned for a writ of mandamus when the trial court refused to direct that the names of candidates running for the office of district attorney for the 10th Judicial Circuit be included not only on the ballot to be used in the primary election in the Birmingham Division of Jefferson County, but also on the ballot to be used in the primary election in the portion of Jefferson County known as the Bessemer Cutoff. The trial court dismissed Veitch's action based on its conclusion that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction and, alternatively, based on the doctrine of laches. Veitch appealed. The Alabama Supreme Court found a jurisdiction-stripping statute did not deprive the trial court of jurisdiction and Veitch was not precluded by the doctrine of laches from bringing his action. At this point, the Court expressed no opinion on the merits of Veitch's arguments regarding the alleged repeal of the 1953 Act, its alleged unconstitutionality, or its alleged unconstitutional application. The trial court's judgment was therefore reversed and this case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Veitch v. Vowell" on Justia Law

Appellee, the Marcellus Shale Coalition (“MSC”), filed in the Commonwealth Court’s original jurisdiction a petition for review in the nature of a complaint seeking declaratory and injunctive relief (the “Petition”), on behalf of itself and its members. MSC challenged the validity of several regulations relating to unconventional gas well operations as governed by Pennsylvania’s Oil and Gas Act of 2012 (known as Act 13). MSC alleged that certain provisions were void and unenforceable for multiple reasons, including that they were vague, lacked statutory authorization, and conflicted with other regulations and statutes applicable to the industry. Furthermore, MSC averred that the rulemaking process did not comply with the Regulatory Review Act, and that the Pennsylvania Environmental Quality Board (the “EQB”) failed to develop criteria for the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection (“DEP”) to use in conditioning a drilling permit on relevant factors. The Commonwealth Court issued a single-judge, unpublished opinion and order, granting in part and denying in part preliminary injunctive relief. The Commonwealth Court also issued an order granting in part and denying in part MSC's Application for Expedited Special Relief. The order preliminarily enjoined DEP from implementing and enforcing certain sections of the Act. After its review of the parties' arguments on appeal of the Commonwealth Court order, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part. The Supreme Court affirmed the grant of preliminary injunctive relief as to Counts I and II. As for Count IV, the Court affirmed the grant of relief as to Section 78a.59c, but reversed the grant of relief as to Section 78a.59b(b). Finally, the Court reversed the grant of preliminary injunctive relief as to Count V. View "Marcellus Shale Coalition v. Dept. Environmental Protection" on Justia Law

In a discretionary appeal, the issue reviewed by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court centered on whether the Commonwealth Court erred in reversing the decision of the Lycoming County Court of Common Pleas, which, in turn, had reversed the decision of the Fairfield Township Board of Supervisors (the “Board”) to allow for the drilling, construction, development and operation of unconventional natural gas wells as a conditional use in a district zoned Residential-Agricultural (“R-A”). The Supreme Court determined after review of the evidentiary record, the Board's decision was not supported by the evidence, and because the proposed use was not similar to any permitted use in the R-A district as required under the Fairfield Township Zoning Ordinance (the “Ordinance”), the Court reversed the decision of the Commonwealth Court. View "Gorsline v Bd. of Sup. of Fairfield Twp." on Justia Law

This discretionary appeal addressed the role of a court following a school district’s decision to conduct a private sale of an unused or unnecessary school building pursuant to section 7-707(3) of the Pennsylvania Public School Code of 1949. Ridgefield Elementary School (“Ridgefield”) sat on 7.9 acres of land (the “Property”), which contained the school, a playground, a parking lot and open greenspace. Ridgefield was located in Millcreek Township (the “Township”) and was in an R-1 single- family residential zoning district. In 2013, the Millcreek Township School District (the “School District”) closed Ridgefield, partitioned the Property into three lots, and tried to sell the Property through a sealed bid process, but it received no bids. In July 2014, the School District listed the Property for sale. Two offers were made on the property; in 2015, the School District petitioned the trial court for approval of the private sale of Lot 1 of the Property. After review, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court concluded a trial court’s involvement in such cases is limited to either approving or disapproving the sale. The statute required a determination of whether the petition for private sale contains the requisite information and was adequately supported by the opinions of two disinterested individuals who are familiar with the real estate in the geographic area, have viewed the property for sale, and concluded that the proposed sale price “is a fair and reasonable one and in their opinion a better price than could be obtained at public sale.” The statute does not require, and thus courts may not consider, whether the sale serves the public interest. Here, the Commonwealth Court based its decision on an erroneous interpretation of section 7-707(3) and the prior decisions of the Supreme Court. Therefore, the Court reversed the decision of the Commonwealth Court and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "In Re: Private Sale of Prop. by Millcreek Twp. SD" on Justia Law

An attorney for a public body must have authorization from the client in a public meeting prior to filing a notice of appeal.Fred Voltz filed an ethics complaint, termed a request for opinion (RFO), against two assemblymen with the State of Nevada Commission on Ethics. The assemblymen sought dismissal, but the Commission denied the motion to dismiss. The assemblymen then filed a petition for judicial review. The district court granted the petition and directed the Commission to dismiss the RFOs. On the advice of the Commission’s legal counsel and without consulting the Commission, the chair and executive chair authorized the filing of a notice of appeal. Thereafter, the notice of appeal was filed. The assemblymen filed suit against the Commission alleging that the Commission violated the open meeting law by filing a notice of appeal without first making its decision or taking action to appeal the district court’s order in a public meeting. Thereafter, the Commission held an open meeting and voted in favor of appealing the district court’s order directing the Commission to dismiss the RFOs. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction because the notice of appeal was filed without Commission authorization. View "State Commission on Ethics v. Hansen" on Justia Law

The failure to name a party of record in the caption of a petition for judicial review is not jurisdictionally fatal under Nev. Rev. Stat. 233B.130(2)(a) where the party is named in the body of the petition and is properly served with the petition.Appellant, a former corrections officer employed by the State of Nevada, Department of Corrections (NDOC), filed a workers’ compensation claim. Cannon Cochran Management Services, Inc. (CCMSI), as NDOC’s third-party administrator, denied Appellant’s claim. An appeals officer affirmed. Appellant then filed a petition for judicial review. The caption of the petition listed as respondents NDOC and the Department of Administration but did not individually identify CCMSI. The district court dismissed Appellant’s petition for judicial review for lack of jurisdiction. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Appellant’s failure to name CCMSI in the caption of the petition did not render the petition jurisdictionally defective because the body of the petition named CCMSI through incorporation by reference of the attached administrative decision and CCMSI was timely served with the petition. View "Prevost v. State, Department of Administration" on Justia Law

After Randy Horton won this action seeking the production of documents under the South Carolina Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), the circuit court awarded him attorneys' fees at a rate of $100 per hour. On appeal, the South Carolina Supreme Court addressed solely the question of whether the court abused its discretion in selecting that hourly rate. "When a trial court's decision is made on a sound evidentiary basis and is adequately explained with specific findings—as the law requires—we defer to the trial court's discretion. Here, however, there is no evidence in the record that supports the circuit court's reduction of the hourly rate." Rather than remand, the Court reversed the trial court and awarded Horton $35,611.50 in attorneys' fees and $1,096.56 in costs. View "Horton v. Jasper County School District" on Justia Law

The circuit court ruled Appellant Kim Murphy was not qualified to be a candidate for election to a Richland County seat on the District 5 Richland-Lexington School Board of Trustees (School Board). The circuit court based this ruling on its conclusion that Murphy resided in Lexington County. Upon review, the South Carolina Supreme Court first found the circuit court had subject matter jurisdiction over Respondents' declaratory judgment action challenging Murphy's qualifications. Second, the Court held there was probative evidence in the record supporting the circuit court's conclusion that Murphy resided in Lexington County. Therefore, the Court affirmed the circuit court's ruling that Murphy is not qualified to be a candidate for election to a Richland County seat on the School Board. View "Gantt v. Selph" on Justia Law