Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

The case stems from a compensation fund established by the Justice for United States Victims of State Sponsored Terrorism Act. Pursuant to that statute, known as the “Terrorism Act,” the child’s grandfather, Appellant, has received roughly $250,000 of a multimillion-dollar judgment against the Islamic Republic of Iran, a state sponsor of terrorism. Contending that the law requires more prompt and regular payment to claimants like himself, Appellant sued the federal officials administering the fund.The court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Appellant’s first claim. The court reasoned that the statute does not authorize the retroactive increase of penalties collected prior to the Clarification Act amendments. Further, the court affirmed the dismissal of the second claim because the court need reach Appellant’s second claim only “[i]n the event [that he] prevails on Count 1.”Next, Appellant sought an injunction “requiring the Attorney General ‘to appoint a [s]pecial [m]aster going forward if there is more than $100 million in the [f]und’ and ordering that the [s]pecial [m]aster ‘make a distribution in 2021.’” The court declined to resolve without briefing this late-raised issue. Appellant argues that once the fund’s balance exceeds $100 million, “the special master is required to distribute all the money in the [f]und to claimants.” However, the court explained that the statute “does not set a threshold for mandating distributions from the fund” and, it is possible for the fund to exceed $100 million and still lack “available” funds, Thus, the court affirmed the district court’s dismissal. View "Murray Braun v. USA" on Justia Law

In 2016, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service exercised its authority under the Endangered Species Act (ESA) to designate nearly 14,000 acres of riparian land in New Mexico, Colorado, and Arizona as critical habitat for the New Mexico Meadow Jumping Mouse. Two New Mexico ranching associations whose members graze cattle on the designated land challenged the Service’s critical habitat determination. The district court rejected each argument and upheld the Service’s critical habitat designation. After review, the Tenth Circuit affirmed, concluding: (1) the Service’s method for assessing the economic impacts of critical habitat designation complied with the ESA; (2) the Service adequately considered the effects of designation on the ranching association members’ water rights; and (3) the Service reasonably supported its decision not to exclude certain areas from the critical habitat designation. View "Northern New Mexico Stockman, et al. v. United States Fish & Wildlife Service, et al." on Justia Law

In this interlocutory appeal, the Supreme Court reversed and dismissed in part and dismissed in part this appeal from the judgment of the circuit court in a dispute centering on the Attorney General's spending on television commercials and legal filings in out-of-state federal litigation, holding that dismissal was warranted.In this lawsuit, Plaintiffs alleged that Attorney General Leslie Rutledge exceeded her authority and should be enjoined from continuing to act in excess of her authority and that she had spent funds in excess of her authority in an illegal exaction. The Attorney General asserted various immunity defenses, which the circuit court denied. The Supreme Court reversed and dismissed in part and dismissed in part, holding (1) as to the first claim for relief, the Attorney General had sovereign immunity and could not be enjoined; and (2) as to the second allegation, Rutledge as an individual was entitled to statutory immunity. View "Rutledge v. Remmel" on Justia Law

“Red Sun Farms” is the trade name under which various entities do business as “U.S. producers of fresh tomatoes grown in the United States, U.S. importers and resellers of fresh tomatoes from Mexico, and foreign producers and exporters of fresh tomatoes from Mexico.”Red Sun filed suit against the government based on an antidumping duty investigation to determine whether fresh Mexican tomatoes were being imported into the United States and sold at less than fair value. In its motion to dismiss, the government observed, with respect to the five identified entities doing business as “Red Sun Farms,” that “[i]t is unclear whether all of these parties possess standing or can be considered real parties in interest” and reserved its right to raise additional arguments on the subject. In a discovery filing, the government noted the varying singular/plural usage by Red Sun Farms and stated that “‘Plaintiff’ Red Sun Farms actually consists of several companies.”The Federal Circuit reversed the dismissal of the suit. Red Sun challenged the Department of Commerce’s Final Determination resulting from a continued investigation under 19 U.S.C. 1516a(a)(2)(B)(iv); although no final antidumping order had been issued, its claims are not premature. Jurisdiction exists based on 28 U.S.C. 1516a(g)(3)(A)(i) and 1516a(a)(2)(B)(i). View "Red Sun Farms v. United States" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs were involved in a motor vehicle accident involving a vehicle operated by a USPS employee; through counsel, Plaintiffs submitted a “claim for damage, injury, or death." Subsequently, Plaintiffs retained a new law firm (Pawlowski), and provided notice to the USPS. On September 27, 2018, Plaintiffs filed a Federal Tort Claims Act action against the government and the USPS employee. On October 16, 2018, a copy of the complaint and summons in the first FTCA action was delivered to the government. Another law firm (“Youngblood”), filed the first FTCA action complaint.On October 22, 2018, the USPS mailed a certified letter denying Plaintiffs’ administrative claims to Pawlowski, indicating Plaintiffs had until April 22, 2019 to file suit against the government. Neither Pawlowski nor Youngblood provided the USPS notice of any change in representation. On August 30, 2019, Plaintiffs filed their second FTCA complaint. On March 4, 2020, the government moved for summary judgment, arguing Plaintiffs’ claims were time-barred.Plaintiffs contend that the government failed to comply with the plain language of 39 C.F.R. Sec. 912.9(a) when the USPS sent the denial letter to Pawlowski. Further that the district court erred in finding they were not entitled to equitable tolling.The court ruled that the USPS mailed the denial letter to the legal representative who Plaintiffs most recently identified, thus complying with the regulation. Further, the court held that Plaintiffs failed to demonstrate entitlement to equitable tolling. The court affirmed the district court’s order granting summary judgment for the government. View "Robert Wayne Dotson, et al. v. USA" on Justia Law

Appellant Nicholas Kroll appealed the Court of Chancery’s dismissal of his complaint. Kroll was terminated from his position as a police officer for the City of Wilmington (the “City”) on the ground that he failed to comply with a departmental requirement that he reside in the City. A second ground was that he violated a departmental regulation regarding dishonesty by giving a false or inaccurate address on annual, required residency affidavits. After his dismissal, he filed suit seeking a declaratory judgment that the City, its police department, and its mayor, in his official capacity, breached the police Collective Bargaining Agreement (the “CBA”) and his right to due process by modifying the definition of the term “residence” in October 2017, and applying the modified definition to him without giving the Fraternal Order of Police an opportunity to bargain the new definition on behalf of its members. The modification, Kroll argued, was material to the decision to terminate his employment. He also sought an injunction reinstating him as a City police officer with back pay. Appellees moved to dismiss, arguing the Court of Chancery lacked jurisdiction over the complaint’s subject matter. The Appellees argued, in part, that Kroll had an adequate remedy at law in the form of a petition for a writ of certiorari, which was within the jurisdiction of the Superior Court. Appellees had not argued that Kroll’s complaint fell within the CBA grievance procedure (that issue was raised sua sponte by the Court of Chancery in its ruling). The parties agreed the disciplinary action taken against Kroll was not subject to the grievance procedure set forth in the CBA. Appellees agreed the Court of Chancery committed legal error by basing its decision on the CBA’s grievance procedure. They urged the Delaware Supreme Court, however, to affirm on the alternative grounds for dismissal that were asserted in the Court of Chancery. Finding the Court of Chancery did not address Appellees' arguments, the Supreme Court reversed judgment and remanded for further proceedings. View "Kroll v. City of Wilmington" on Justia Law

Relator Gilbert Ellinger brought a qui tam suit on behalf of the People of the State of California against Zurich American Insurance Company (Zurich), ESIS, Inc. (ESIS), and Stephanie Ann Magill, under Insurance Code section 1871.7, a provision of the Insurance Frauds Prevention Act (IFPA). In January 2016, Ellinger injured his back while working, and he immediately informed his supervisor. The following month, Ellinger reported to his employer’s human resources manager that he had sustained a work-related injury and had told his supervisor about it. The human resources manager created a “time line memorandum” summarizing the conversations she had with Ellinger about the injury. She placed the memorandum in Ellinger’s personnel file. Ellinger filed a workers’ compensation claim. Magill worked as a senior claims examiner for ESIS and was the adjuster assigned to investigate Ellinger’s claim. ESIS denied Ellinger’s claim on an unspecified date. Magill later testified that she denied the claim because of a written statement from Ellinger’s supervisor in which the supervisor claimed that Ellinger had not reported the injury to him. When the human resources manager was deposed in November 2016, she produced the time line memorandum, which Ellinger’s counsel in the workers’ compensation action did not know about until then. Nearly eight months after that disclosure, in July 2017, ESIS reversed its denial of the claim and stipulated that Ellinger was injured while working, as he had alleged. Contrary to Magill’s testimony, her email messages showed that the human resources manager had emailed Magill the time line memorandum in March and April 2016, and Magill thanked the manager for sending it. Ellinger alleged that Magill’s concealment of or failure to disclose the time line memorandum violated Penal Code section 550 (b)(1) to (3). On the basis of those alleged violations, Ellinger alleged that defendants were liable under section 1871.7. Against each defendant, Ellington sought a civil penalty and an assessment of no greater than three times the amount of his workers’ compensation claim. The trial court sustained defendants’ demurrers without leave to amend, concluding defendants could not be held liable under section 1871.7 for any failures of Magill in the claims handling or review process. Finding no reversible error in sustaining the demurrers, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "California ex rel. Ellinger v. Magill" on Justia Law

The Department of Human Services for Arapahoe County (“the Department”) sued Monica Velarde and Michael Moore to enforce a final order it had issued against them to recover Medicaid overpayments. But the Department did so only after undertaking extensive efforts on its own to recoup the fraudulently obtained benefits. The district court dismissed the Department’s suit, finding that section 24-4-106(4), C.R.S. (2021), which was part of the State Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), required an agency seeking judicial enforcement of one of its final orders to do so within thirty-five days of the order’s effective date. The Colorado Supreme Court determined district court and the court of appeals incorrectly relied on an inapplicable statutory deadline in ruling that the complaint was untimely filed. Each court was called upon to determine whether a thirty-five-day deadline governing proceedings initiated by an adversely affected or aggrieved person seeking judicial review of an agency’s action also applied to proceedings initiated by an agency seeking judicial enforcement of one of its final orders. Both courts answered yes. The Supreme Court, however, answered no. Judgment was reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings. View "Arapahoe County v. Velarde & Moore" on Justia Law

A construction company filed an administrative appeal of a final agency decision that a renovation project on a State-leased office building fell under a wage statute for public construction projects. During enforcement proceedings an administrative law judge (ALJ) found that the project parties had entered into a sham contract in an attempt to evade the statute’s coverage. The State agency charged with enforcing the wage statute adopted the ALJ’s findings verbatim as its final agency decision. The construction company appealed; acting as an intermediate court of appeals, the superior court affirmed the final agency decision. The construction company then appealed to the Alaska Supreme Court. Finding no reversible error in the superior court's judgment affirming the agency decision, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Alborn Construction, Inc. v. Alaska Dept. of Labor & Workforce Development" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs filed suit in South Carolina state court against fourteen defendants (ten individuals and four agencies), alleging five causes of action. The circuit court reviewed five preserved issues: (1) the applicable statutes of limitations for plaintiffs' claims under the Rehabilitation Act ("RA") and the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"); (2) whether the district court abused its discretion in excluding the witnesses' testimonies; (3) the plaintiffs' assertion that the district court improperly instructed the jury as to the duty owed under the South Carolina Tort Claims Act; (4) whether the district court improperly dismissed plaintiff’s RA claims; and (5) whether the court erred in dismissing plaintiff’s 1983 claims.The circuit court affirmed the district court’s decision to limit the plaintiffs' witness's testimony and further found that the court did not abuse its discretion by limiting the hybrid witness's testimony or by determining whether the defendant’s deposition had any potential to lead to admissible evidence.Further, the court found no error in the district court’s instruction or its' finding that the ADA and RA claims were subject to the South Carolina Human Affairs Law’s one-year statute of limitations. The plaintiffs failed to show reversible error as they neither pleaded nor proved any action or inaction by any individually named defendants that caused them harm. View "Johnny Timpson v. Anderson County Disabilities" on Justia Law