Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Petitioner was the victim of an armed robbery, carjacking, and shooting that occurred in the parking lot of an Embassy Suites hotel. Petitioner filed a negligence action against Hilton Hotels and related companies (collectively, Respondents). Following one mistrial, the parties commenced a second trial. Ultimately, the jury found that Petitioner sustained a total of $1.7 million in damages, and the trial court entered judgment in accordance with the verdict. Thereafter, Petitioner filed a motion for attorneys’ fees. The trial court denied the motion. The Fifth District affirmed, concluding that Petitioner’s pretrial offers of settlement to Respondents did not satisfy the requirements of Fla. Stat. 768.79 and Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.442. The Supreme Court quashed the decision below, holding that the plain language of both section 768.79 and Rule 1.442 indicated that Petitioner was entitled to attorneys’ fees because he submitted sufficient offers to settle his claims against Respondents and obtained satisfactory judgments in his favor. View "Anderson v. Hilton Hotels Corp." on Justia Law

Plaintiff served Defendants with offers of judgment. Plaintiff ultimately prevailed on her negligence claim against Defendants and was awarded damages in excess of the amount contained in her offers of judgment, enough to trigger the payment of fees under Fla. Stat. 768.79(1). The trial court granted Plaintiff’s motion to tax attorney’s fees and costs, determining that Plaintiff’s failure to include the attorney’s fees language in the offer of judgment did not create an ambiguity because Plaintiff did not seek attorney’s fees in her complaint. The First District Court of Appeal reversed the order granting Plaintiff’s motion to tax attorney’s fees and costs, holding that an offer of settlement that fails to address attorney’s fees is invalid even where no attorney’s fees have been sought in the case. The Supreme Court quashed the decision of the First District, holding that an offer of settlement is not invalid for failing to state whether the proposal includes attorney’s fees and whether attorney’s fees are part of the legal claim if attorney’s fees are not sought in the pleadings. View "Kuhajda v. Borden Dairy Co. of Alabama" on Justia Law

After Father and Mother were assigned case plans by the Department of Children & Families (DCF) regarding their two children, the children were reunified with Mother. The trial court then terminated supervision by DCF and issued an order limiting the ability of Father to seek future visitation to the discretion of the children. Father sought review, alleging that the trial court denied him due process by terminating DCF supervision without a motion and departed from the essential requirements of the law when it limited his future contact with his children to the sole discretion of the children. The Third District granted Father’s second claim and quashed the trial court’s order to the extent that it limited Father’s contact with the children to the children’s sole discretion. At issue before the Supreme Court was whether a post-dependency order that is subject to future modification for purposes of child welfare and parental visitation is reviewable as a final order by appeal, as an interlocutory order reviewable by appeal, or as a non-final order reviewable by certiorari. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision below, holding that a post-dependency order that is subject to future modification for purposes of child welfare and parental visitation is a non-final order reviewable by certiorari. View "M.M. v. Fla. Dep’t of Children & Families" on Justia Law

Plaintiff prevailed in an action filed against GEICO General Insurance Company. Thereafter, Plaintiff moved for attorney’s fees. Plaintiff sought discovery related to her opposition’s attorneys’ time records and propounded Lodestar/Multiplier Fee Determination Interrogatories. GEICO objected to the discovery requests, but the circuit court overruled the objections. GEICO filed a petition for writ of certiorari requesting that the Fourth District quash the orders relating to the request to produce and the interrogatory. The Fourth District granted the petition, concluding that Plaintiff failed to establish that the billing records of opposing counsel were actually relevant and necessary and that their substantial equivalent could not be obtained elsewhere. The Supreme Court quashed the decision of the Fourth District, holding that hours expended by counsel for a defendant insurance company in a contested claim for attorney’s fees filed pursuant to Fla. Stat. 624.155 and 627.428 is relevant to the issue of the reasonableness of time expended by counsel for the plaintiff, and discovery of such information, where disputed, falls within the sound decision of the trial court. View "Paton v. Geico Gen. Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiff-corporation filed a lawsuit against Defendant-insurer for personal injury protection benefits. The parties settled the case, and the trial court entered an order of dismissal with prejudice. After the attorney for Plaintiff learned of the dismissal order, he moved to vacate the order of dismissal based on excusable neglect so that he could file his motion for attorney’s fees. The county court vacated the initial dismissal, but the circuit court reversed and reinstated the order of dismissal. Plaintiff filed a petition for common law certiorari. The Fourth District Court of Appeal granted the petition and quashed the decision of the circuit court. Plaintiff subsequently filed a motion for attorney’s fees. The Fourth District denied the motion on the basis of the Supreme Court’s holding in Stockman v. Downs, concluding that because Plaintiff did not request fees in the petition or reply, the motion was untimely. The Supreme Court quashed the decision below to the extent it held that, pursuant to Stockman, a request for attorney’s fees in Fla. R. App. P. 9.100 original proceedings must be made in the petition, a response, or a reply. Remanded. View "Advanced Chiropractic & Rehab. Ctr. v. United Auto. Ins. Co." on Justia Law

This case arose from a malfunctioning HVAC system installed in a new building owned by Caduceus Properties. Caduceus sued Michael Gordon, the building architect, and Gordon initiated a third-party action against KTD Consulting Engineers and William Graney, who designed the HVAC system. The third-party claims were dismissed. After the statute of limitations governing Caduceus’ original action had expired, Caduceus successfully amended its complaint to name third-party defendants, KTD and Graney, as party defendants to the action. The trial court ruled against KTD and Graney. The court of appeal reversed, holding that the amended complaint did not relate back and was barred by the statute of limitations. The Supreme Court remanded, holding (1) an amended complaint, filed after the statute of limitations has expired, that names a party who had previously been made a third-party defendant as a party defendant, relates back under Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.190(c) to the filing of the third-party complaint; and (2) for the amended pleading to be timely in this situation, the third-party complaint must have been filed prior to the expiration of the statute of limitations, and the plaintiff’s claims in the amended complaint must arise from the same conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth in the third-party complaint. View "Caduceus Props., LLC v. William G. Graney, P.E." on Justia Law