Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Alexander filed a suit, claiming that nine individuals—all of whom had some connection to child support proceedings related to Alexander’s son—conspired against him and violated his civil rights by imposing child support obligations that he did not owe; providing false information about those obligations to the IRS; and extorting money from him through “bribery” and “terror tactics.” Among other relief requested, Alexander asked that his child support payments “be abated.” The district court dismissed claims against the federal and the state court judges on grounds of absolute judicial immunity and remaining federal claims after finding that they fell within the domestic relations exception to federal jurisdiction. The Sixth Circuit affirmed on grounds of failure to state a claim for which relief can be granted, noting that the Supreme Court has indicated that the domestic relations exception is narrow and finding that this case did not fall within the exception. View "Alexander v. Rosen" on Justia Law

In 2001, Father filed a petition to terminate Mother’s parental rights. Mother did not file an answer to the petition. The trial court subsequently entered a default judgment terminating Mother’s parental rights. In 2010, Mother filed a petition seeking to set aside the judgment terminating her parental rights as void for lack of personal jurisdiction. Father argued that Mother’s petition was barred by the one-year statute of repose applicable to judgments terminating parental rights and thus should be dismissed. The trial court granted Mother’s petition and set aside the default judgment terminating her parental rights. The Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the default judgment was void for lack of personal jurisdiction; (2) the reasonable time filing requirement of Tenn. R. Civ. P. 60.02 does not apply to petitions seeking relief from void judgments under Rule 60.02(3); and (3) however, relief from a void judgment should be denied if certain exceptional circumstances exist. Remanded for a hearing to determine whether exceptional circumstances justify denying relief in this case. View "Turner v. Turner" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant S.H. (mother) was the biological mother of C.G. (born in 2013), the child at issue here, and B.H. (born in 2011), who was C.G.’s half sibling. Both children were removed from mother’s custody, and her parental rights were eventually terminated. On appeal, mother argued that the order terminating her parental rights as to C.G. should have been reversed for failure to comply with the notice requirements of the Indian and Child Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA). After review of the specific facts entered into the trial court record, the Court of Appeal agreed, reversed and remanded. View "In re B.H." on Justia Law

Larry Gronland and Linda Gronland (now Coleman), married in 1971 and divorced in 1994. The district court originally awarded Linda Gronland spousal support in the amount of $1,000 per month until her death, remarriage, or when Larry began drawing Social Security, whichever occurred first. In March 2014, Linda made a motion to modify the amended judgment under N.D.C.C. 14-05-24.1. Larry moved to dismiss the motion, contending the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to modify the support award because a court's jurisdiction to modify a support award was limited to ongoing support awards. Larry argued no support award was ongoing at the time of the motion because the support award terminated as of January 1, 2014, the date on which he started drawing Social Security. The court dismissed the motion for want of subject matter jurisdiction. The issue presented on appeal was whether the district court had subject matter jurisdiction to modify a spousal support award that terminated prior to Linda filing her motion to modify the award. Linda argued the district court erred in holding it lacked subject matter jurisdiction, and that she never received actual notice that Larry began drawing Social Security. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "Gronland v. Gronland" on Justia Law

During the course of their marriage, Caroline, a citizen of Canada, made more than $75,000 in loans to Kimberly, of Ohio, which were never repaid. A federal district court dismissed Caroline’s contract and tort lawsuit. While appeal was pending, Kimberly died and Caroline substituted the Estate as the real party in interest. The Sixth Circuit reversed the dismissal, finding that neither the domestic relations exception nor the probate exception to federal diversity under 28 U.S.C. 1332(a) applied. Because a court in Canada had dismissed divorce proceedings upon notice of Caroline’s death, there was no risk of a decision incompatible with a divorce decree, and, at the time Caroline filed the federal complaint, the property that she sought was not “in the custody of a state probate court.” View "Chevalier v. Barnhart" on Justia Law

Michael B., a presumed father of infant Emma B., appealed a juvenile court order denying his motion for paternity testing. He argued the trial court had an obligation to order such a test because biological paternity was a relevant fact and in denying his motion, the court prevented him from rebutting his presumed father status under Family Code section 7611, subdivision (a). After review of the trial court record, the Court of Appeal disagreed that a biological paternity determination was an essential or relevant issue in the underlying proceedings and affirmed the order. View "In re Emma B." on Justia Law

The parties were married in 1985, and defendant filed for divorce in late September 2007. As relevant here, the parties filed joint personal income tax returns for the tax years 2004, 2005, and 2006, and filed separately for the tax year 2007. During their divorce mediation, the parties recognized that tax liabilities might result from returns they jointly filed while married. The parties therefore entered into a separate "side agreement" on October 6, 2008, to allocate any yet-to-be-assessed tax liabilities for their joint tax returns in the event of an audit. The agreement was signed by the parties and their attorneys. The parties did not notify the family division about the side agreement, even though it was formed contemporaneously with the divorce proceedings, and the court thus did not consider the agreement in dividing the marital estate. Following the parties' divorce, plaintiff was audited and found to have a delinquent federal tax obligation in excess of $900,000. As a result, he was prosecuted criminally and pleaded guilty to multiple counts of federal tax evasion. After serving his criminal sentence, plaintiff filed a breach of contract action in superior court seeking to enforce the parties' side agreement and recover the defendant's share of the parties' joint tax liability. In the alternative, plaintiff sought recovery under an unjust enrichment theory. Defendant moved for summary judgment, arguing that the plain language of the agreement made plaintiff responsible for the entire tax debt. Plaintiff objected, asserting that the agreement made defendant liable for her equal share of the debt. After a hearing, the superior court granted defendant's motion for summary judgment. This appeal followed. On appeal, plaintiff argued that: (1) the trial court erred in granting summary judgment because the language of the agreement supports his interpretation and, moreover, the audit of the joint returns was not "the result" of filing his 2007 and 2008 personal tax returns; (2) the court's assumptions about the parties' intent regarding the agreement were contradicted by the parties' own affidavits; and (3) the trial court erred in rejecting his interpretation on the basis of superfluity and the pre-existing duty rule. The Supreme Court concluded because the side agreement was not presented to the Superior Court during the divorce proceedings, the Superior Court lacked jurisdiction over enforcing the side agreement. The case was remanded to that court for the entry of an order of dismissal. View "Maldini v. Maldini" on Justia Law

The Alabama Supreme Court granted review of this case filed by E.L. seeking review of a Court of Civil Appeals decision to affirm a family court order insofar as that judgment recognized and gave effect to an adoption decree entered by the Superior Court of Fulton County, Georgia approving the adoption by V.L., E.L.'s former same-sex partner, of E.L.'s biological children, S.L., N.L., and H.L. E.L. and V.L. were involved in a relationship from approximately 1995 through 2011. During the course of that relationship, they maintained a residence in Hoover. In December 2002 E.L. gave birth to S.L., and in November 2004 E.L. gave birth to twins, N.L. and H.L. All births were achieved through the use of assisted-reproductive technology. The parties eventually made the joint decision to take legal action to formalize and to protect the parental role V.L. had undertaken. In 2007, V.L. filed a petition with the Georgia court to adopt the children. The Georgia granted the petition, and subsequently new birth certificates were issued. In approximately November 2011, E.L. and V.L. ended their relationship, and, in January 2012, V.L. moved out of the house E.L. and V.L. had previously shared. 2013, V.L. filed a petition in the Jefferson Circuit Court alleging that E.L. had denied her access to the children and had interfered with her ability to exercise her traditional and constitutional parental rights. She asked the Alabama court to register the Georgia judgment, to declare her legal rights pursuant to the Georgia judgment, and to award her some measure of custody of or visitation with the children. The matter was transferred to the Jefferson Family Court, and E.L. moved that court to dismiss V.L.'s petition on multiple grounds. The Jefferson Family Court ultimately denied E.L.'s motion to dismiss, without a hearing, and simultaneously awarded V.L. scheduled visitation with the children. E.L. filed her notice of appeal to the Court of Civil Appeals. After reviewing the record and analyzing the relevant law of both Alabama and Georgia, the Supreme Court concluded that the Court of Civil Appeals and the Jefferson Family Court erred in giving full faith and credit to the Georgia judgment because the Georgia court was without subject-matter jurisdiction to issue the Georgia judgment. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals was reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings. View "Ex parte E.L." on Justia Law

"Adam" was born in early 2015 addicted to narcotics. Adam was eventually released to his parents, David Hunt and Carey Land. A few months later, Adam was found unconscious and unresponsive. He was transported to the hospital. The parents offered no explanation as to why Adam had been found unresponsive or unconscious. Though they were home when emergency personnel arrived, neither parent accompanied the child to the hospital. Due to the seriousness of the child's condition, he was transported to a trauma center. Medical personnel determined the child had sustained multiple trauma caused by "unexplained abusive trauma." In addition to multiple fractures, Adam's other diagnoses included chronic bilateral subdural hematomas, destruction of brain tissue, seizures, respiratory failure, malnourishment and splitting of the layers of the retina in his left eye. Emergency custody would ultimately be awarded to the Department of Family Services. This expedited proceeding was the parents' appeal of a Family Court decision granting the attorney guardian ad litem's motion to instruct Adam's medical providers to de-escalate intervention and place a do-not re-intubate order and a do-not-resuscitate order and a "comfort measures" order on Adam's medical chart. The appeal presented four issues for the Delaware Supreme Court's review: (1) whether the Family Court had jurisdiction to de-escalate medical care, a no re-intubate order and do not resuscitate order on the minor's chart; (2) whether the Family Court had authority to allow such orders when the parental rights have not been terminated; (3) whether the Family Court violated the parents' procedural due process rights by not providing the parents adequate notice and process prior to issuing the orders; and (4) were the parents' due process rights violated without receiving evidence from an independent medical expert. The Supreme Court found no reversible error in the Family Court's decision, and affirmed. View "Hunt v. DFS & Office of the Child Advocate" on Justia Law

Gary Wooten purchased property before marrying Iracy Wooten. Gary subsequently executed a deed of trust to secure a loan. Thereafter, Gary conveyed the property to himself and Iracy as tenants by the entirety. Approximately two weeks later, the lender recorded the deed of trust executed solely by Gary. Five years later, the lender filed suit against Gary and Iracy seeking a judicial reformation of the deed of trust to include Iracy as grantor or to declare her interest in the property to be encumbered by the deed of trust. Iracy responded that she knew nothing of the deed of trust or the loan and first learned of them during divorce proceedings with Gary. Meanwhile, a final divorce decree was entered ordering that the property be sold and any remaining proceeds be divided equally between the parties. In the lender’s proceeding, the lender argued that Iracy was judicially estopped from denying that her interest was subject to Gary’s deed of trust and that the divorce decree justified this conclusion. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of the lender. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court erred in applying the doctrine of judicial estoppel based solely upon the divorce decree. Remanded. View "Wooten v. Bank of Am., N.A." on Justia Law